Coping with Financial Crises: Latin American Answers to European Questions

Publication Name
International Development Policy - Revue internationale de politique de développement
Volume, number, page
4.2, pp,7-28
Year of Publication
2013
Author(s)
CAVALLO Eduardo A.
FERNANDEZ-ARIAS Eduardo
Organization Name
l’Institut de hautes études internationales et du ‎développement - Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Publisher
l’Institut de hautes études internationales et du ‎développement - Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
City
Geneva
Country of Publication
Switzerland
Full Date
2013
ISBN or ISSN
1663-9391
Category
Academic articles
Theme
Subregion - European Union
Business
Keyword(s)
Economy
Banks
European Union
IMF
Financial crises
International Monetary
European Central Bank
Euro
Eurozone
European Monetary System
Euroregions
European capital markets
fiscal policy
Abstract
Europe faces challenges reminiscent of Latin American financial crises, namely unsustainable sovereign spreads, banking system distress, sudden stops in capital flows and growth rate collapse. The failure of recent liquidity support to normalize the situation suggests the need to refocus the policy debate on fundamentals: structural reform for growth and, where needed, restructuring to resolve banking crises and the debt overhang. Latin America’s experience yields relevant policy lessons for Europe on all these fronts, tempered only by the slight exception that sharp real devaluation, which was key to spearheading recovery in Latin America, is unfeasible in the eurozone. Struggling eurozone countries are caught between a rock and a hard place, as the currency union imposes strict policy constraints while the reintroduction of national currencies under conditions of crisis would be catastrophic. Nevertheless, contemporary Europe stands a better chance of recovery because, in contrast with the Latin America experience, the European Union possesses greater avenues for international cooperation. With respect to financial support, a resourceful European Central Bank able to avoid chaotic adjustment by brute force is a decisive advantage of Europe relative to Latin America, which only had access to the weaker and less reliable IMF. Arguably, the limited nature of external support strongly contributed to the depth of Latin America’s great collapses. European cooperation can explore and exhaust alternatives to a euro exit to the benefit of all union members and, if dissolution becomes unavoidable, ensure amicable support to ease the transition. The path to success remains uncharted, however, and implementation of the necessary regional mechanisms will require innovation and political will. If the available means of cooperation are not used effectively, crisis countries in Europe may fare worse than those in Latin America.