




EU-LAC Foundation

Why should the European Union have any relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean?

Coordinated by Andrés Serbin and Andrei Serbin Pont (CRIES)



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INTRODUCTION

Andrés Serbin and Andrei Serbin Pont

Based on a historical relationship of shared values, continuous political links and reciprocal migratory flows, the European Union (EU) is now emerging as a strategic partner for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) on the international global stage. Although both regions display marked differences and do not present themselves as homogeneous players, in respect of the array of protectionist, revisionist, illiberal, isolationist and unilateral tendencies, and the tectonic changes in the geo-economic and geo-political processes of the current global scenario promoted by the relevant players in the international system, the convergences between both regions on various matters related to the global agenda and to their own dynamics present a range of opportunities to develop a bi-regional focus and deepen inter-regionalism between the EU and LAC. The European Union together with Latin America and the Caribbean contain a total of 61 countries which, acting in a coordinated manner in the United Nations and other forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G-20, among others, could contribute to the reform, consolidation or deepening of the multilateral system currently being challenged by various players. This requires renewing, updating and deepening existing relationships – which up to now have mainly been perceived as concentrated in trade exchanges and North-South cooperation – bringing to light and developing other areas of cooperation that open up strategic alliances of various kinds and boosting a new agenda of mutual opportunities, visibility and impact, bearing in mind, however, the heterogeneity within both blocks.

With this in mind, this study presents, from various different angles, the challenges of transforming the bi-regional agenda into an agenda of global inter-regionalism which can meet the great challenges and priority objectives of the international agenda, from a multilateral point of view and taking account of the various levels of interaction and interconnection. From the perspective of shared values, problems and solutions, this study offers an innovative examination of these relationships, identifying challenges that may contribute to the construction of a common agenda of mutual benefit, in line with the global multilateral agenda, based on studies and in-depth analysis by researchers in both regions.

This study – involving joint collaboration between research centres of the EU and of LAC - has been developed by a consortium of three institutions: the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Germany, the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) in Spain, and the Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research (CRIES) in Latin America and the Caribbean, based in Panama and Buenos

Aires, coordinated by this latter institution, and with the participation of researchers from other institutions in both regions. This particular study has focussed its efforts on answering the question “Why should the European Union have any relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean?” by starting from existing relationships and their future potential. This question requires a bi-regional effort in tackling the problems and potential common responses to contemporary transformations caused by globalisation, global governance and the international order with the emphasis on five specific areas: economy and finance; security and defence; sustainable development and climate change; science and technology; and human rights, refugees and migration, – in response to a call from the EU-LAC Foundation. The collaboration between the aforementioned institutions is a concrete demonstration of the potential for constructing convergences and ways of cooperating between both regions which will open up opportunities to develop joint initiatives in a complex international environment that is itself in transition.

The study has also benefited from the results of the 2018 Forum for Reflection “Why should the EU have any relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean? And why should LAC have any relevance for the EU”, organised by the EU-LAC Foundation and held at the College of Europe in Bruges on 20 and 21 May 2018. It also had the benefit of the debates at the seminar “The EU-CELAC agenda in times of global inter-regionalism. A view from Academia”, which was held in Barcelona on 23 May 2018, organised by CIDOB in collaboration with the University of Havana and co-financed by the EU-LAC Foundation, with over thirty experts from both regions participating.

We are therefore grateful to the EU-LAC Foundation for their support in the production of this study; to all members of the team who have prepared their respective sections and contributed to the general revision of the study, the production of prospective scenarios and conclusions and to interviews carried out with various specialists; to the interviewees for giving so generously of their time and for their contributions, and to the support team from CRIES made up of Celeste Ronzano, Carolina Zaccato and Constanza Boettger who contributed to the revision and logistics which enabled this study to be produced.

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1. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FACE OF GLOBALISATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Produced by Anna Ayuso, Susanne Gratius and Andrés Serbin

The view of inter-regionalism that has prevailed in bi-regional relations since the first LAC–EU Summit of 1999 in Rio de Janeiro, when a strategic alliance was drawn up between the European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), was aimed at consolidating a space for political agreement and inter-regional cooperation that would complement the establishment of a free-trade zone (FTZ). This blueprint, based on three pillars – political dialogue, the promotion of development, and boosting trade between both regions – is facing transformations in the international context that are calling into question the current established international order (Serbin et al., 2018). In every area the relationship between both regions is facing the need to seek more balanced forms and patterns of relating to each other. But the long previous trajectory of these relations offers a legal, institutional and social framework that constitutes a legacy that must be accorded value at the same time as the bases on which it is constructed are being updated, with the purpose of adapting it to the current structural changes in the world order, and justifies the guiding question of this study on the relevance of the European Union to Latin America and the Caribbean.

1.1 Changes in the international environment and challenges to global governance

The international liberal order developed since the Second World War, and reinforced after the end of the Cold War, is facing a complex transition, starting with the decline in global relevance of the Atlantic Community (United States and the EU). The determining factors that have influenced this process stem from factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to its dynamic.

Among the exogenous factors the following should be mentioned:

- The shift in the global economic dynamic from the Atlantic to the Asian Pacific – with the accelerated economic growth of China as the principal force in this zone and the emergence of Greater Eurasia as a factor of economic force and geopolitical weight, unlike the general expectation of an eventual shift of these factors from North to South;
- The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States (US) and the implementation of an American foreign policy that calls into question the global leadership of that nation (Patrick, 2017) and demonstrates a series of revisionist traits that question multilateralism, global governance and the established rules, while protectionist tendencies are increasing;
- The growing assertiveness of emerging (or re-emerging) players such as China, Russia, Japan, Turkey and Iran, among others, which together tend to reinforce the tendency towards a multipolar configuration of an international system and, in some cases, threaten the international liberal order established after 1945 which has contributed – under the hegemony of the United States and within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance – to maintaining world peace and stability throughout seven decades and which has prevailed in particular from the end of the Cold War.
- The crisis in globalisation under the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent shift in the lines of economic and political power and the incipient development of a post-globalisation phase or of an alternative globalisation according to the new decision-making hubs in the world economic dynamic (Serbin, 2018b).

Added to this scenario is the impact of various expressions of protectionism on the globalisation process and the potential for their traction to be taken up by other players who do not belong to the Atlantic Community, such as China. Finally, the tensions between various emerging regional blocs, with their respective narratives – Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific, Eurasia and the Chinese initiative of One Belt, One Road (OBOR) (Serbin, 2018a) – make up a context of increasing regional complexity that eventually generates tensions in the Atlantic Community itself (as in the cases involving joining the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, AIIB, and OBOR), or as demonstrated at the recent meeting of the G-7 in June 2018, which revealed different positions between the EU and the US.

In addition, Brexit makes it obvious that, in endogenous terms, the EU is suffering its own very complex transformations that may not only affect its survival as a bloc, but may also provide a foothold for the rise in nationalism, authoritarianism, xenophobia and challenging of the institutional structure itself of the EU. This situation has generated an in-depth internal debate on the future of the Union, including the five scenarios outlined by the European Commission – (European Commission, 2017b): doing less but better; continuing with the Charter; more integration – and the proposals formulated by its President Jean-Claude Juncker (2017) and the French President

Emmanuel Macron¹, also in 2017, which include creating a European Union of Defence and a European Agency for Migration and Asylum.

Taken all together, the rise of the aforementioned processes leads to:

- A growing rupture at the heart of the Atlantic Community as the main pillar of an international liberal order, as basic common values are called into question – including democracy, international law, multilateralism and human rights;
- Difficulty in re-stating the transatlantic Alliance, not only its basis of common values and principles, but also the operation and development of security mechanisms such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or major free trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – now at a standstill – or the creation and implementation of international norms such as the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change;
- A clear fragmentation between its various members, as seen in the attack on Damascus by the US, Great Britain and France without the endorsement of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) and without the EU explicitly either supporting or condemning the action, and in the ambiguous positions taken by some members of the EU (such as Italy and Greece) in relation to sanctions against Russia.

These processes have an impact, not only on the continuance of the international liberal order, but also on relations with the South, and, in particular, with Latin America and the Caribbean (“the extreme West” according to Rouquié, 1989), inasmuch as these relations – in terms of trade and finance as well as of ideology, culture and security – are strongly identified with liberal values (democracy, human rights, multilateralism, respect for international law), with open markets and trade agreements that contribute to their growth and development, and eventually lead to a peace zone that ensures the absence of conventional conflicts.

The tensions at the heart of the North Atlantic Community and the processes affecting the survival of the international liberal order as perceived by the West have a clear impact on Latin America and the Caribbean. Bearing in mind that LAC has been considered as the southern pillar of this Atlantic Community, now in crisis, these changes may also open up the opportunity for a closer global alliance between the EU and LAC as guarantors or even leaders of a liberal order called into question or marginalised by the current administration of President Donald Trump and by other players.

At the same time, new themes are being given priority on the regional agenda, as evidenced by the 8th Summit of the Americas held in Lima on 13 and 14 April 2018, where for the first time the President of the United States was absent and an observer from the People’s Republic of China was present. At the same time intra-regional links are being re-stated as shown in the convergence between the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Pacific Alliance (PA). However, despite all the failings

1 <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/>

and limitations of the region – especially in the areas of development, violence and equality – with a few notable exceptions it is reaffirming its commitment to traditional liberal values: open markets, democracy, human rights, multilateralism and respect for international law, in line with liberal western values.

In addition, LAC, especially in the context of so-called post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism, has acquired greater autonomy and diversification in its external links and relations (Russell/Tokatlián, 2013); it has distanced itself from adopting an economic agenda imposed externally by the US – putting an end to the project for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) at the beginning of this century – and from uncritical identification with that country's foreign policy. At the same time it has developed closer links with China, Russia, India and Japan, among other important players in the international system. However, there should be more in-depth research into the regional impact of the xenophobic attitudes of Trump towards the Latino community in the US (more obvious where Mexico and the Central American countries are concerned). It is clear that the countries in the region tend to develop pragmatic relations with this country, maintaining its exclusion from certain major forums for the formulation of regional policy agreement (CELAC and the Lima Group). They are likewise redefining their links with other players in the international system, without losing their affinity with liberal values, whether their governments identify with conservative, liberal or left-wing positions, as frequently shown by the votes cast and positions taken at the United Nations (UN).

This has not prevented the exponential growth of China's economic links to the region, especially the countries of the Southern Cone and the Pacific, eventually replacing the US's importance in trade and financial relations. However, this shift has not been accompanied by identification with the "Chinese model" (except, to a certain degree, in the case of Cuba) nor by assimilation of its values, in terms of cultural differences as well as, in most cases, an absence of identification with an authoritarian state model. Despite the China-centred bias of many initiatives and studies in LAC, identification with western liberal values prevails, both at government level and among citizens, expressed in the various forms of government and in the various concepts within the reach of an active citizenship.

On the other hand, the growth of links with Russia is more in response to an increasingly proactive policy in the region by Putin than to expectations from this region, as a result of negotiations related to the sale of arms and the exploitation and commercialization of hydrocarbons. The ideological aspect of relations with Russia that stemmed from the Cold War has now disappeared to be replaced by a pragmatic approach. Similar focusses and approaches may be seen in relations with other emerging players such as India, Turkey, the Arab countries, Japan or South Korea, within the framework of increasing the diversification of the region's external relations. In this context of changes and multiple alliances of variable geometry (Grabendorf, 2013), we must ask ourselves what makes the EU attractive to LAC compared to these other players. The response

cannot be unambiguous as there are pros and cons as well as risks and opportunities, depending on the various environments in which relationships are developed.

1.2 The balance of the inter-regional relationship

Within this global framework, we must ask how relations have developed between LAC and the EU, taking account of several factors we will mention below and which, in some cases, we will examine in greater detail in the following sections. First, we analyse the level of persistence of identification with western liberal values and how they are reflected in the dynamics of the various political systems and their societies. Secondly, it would be appropriate to evaluate the convergences and divergences between the two regions in multilateral contexts, beginning with the UN. Thirdly, we must bear in mind the reference value of the European integration process for regional processes in LAC, which, although declining in attractiveness, especially after the crisis in the euro and the internal problems of the EU (including Brexit), is still, with all its pros and cons, an important reference. Fourthly, we have the continuing close trade and financial links and the existence of a major map of partnership agreements. However, in this respect, the most important factor for development is still missing – the agreement with Mercosur which has been in the process of negotiation for two decades, (Ayuso, Gratius, 2018), despite renewal of the agreement between Mexico and the EU being finalised in 2018, and modernisation of the agreement between Chile and the EU reaching an advanced stage. Fifthly, rhetorical declarations have predominated in the political dialogue with the EU through CELAC, as a collective space representing the region, and it has not proved possible to develop a convincing institutional framework. Sixthly, the model of North – South cooperation has become obsolete now that Latin America and the Caribbean, with few exceptions, is a middle-income region and Brazil has become the eighth economy in the world. We need, as we shall see later, a more holistic vision based on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In short, in order to preserve and deepen global governance in the context of better balance in patterns of relation-creating and better understanding of common alliances in terms of the promotion of the global public good, a series of questions arises:

- What positions do LAC and the EU take faced with the global tendency of a decline in liberalism and to what extent are they compromising on their values?
- In which areas and matters do they share similar positions, making it possible to negotiate the adoption of common positions with regard to the global agenda?
- Which instruments and mechanisms of inter-regionalism can LAC and the EU use to act jointly to promote and deepen global governance (UN, G-20, WTO, etc.)?

These questions, briefly introduced here, will be examined specifically and in detail in their various chapters.

The common framework of values

There is no doubt that a series of common challenges arise in the area of shared identification with western liberal values. Broadly speaking, preserving the western liberal order within the framework of marked asymmetries of power and impact in the international system, heavily influenced by respective national interests, makes it necessary to analyse which shared principles, values and traditions are important enough to create a global alliance and what changes are necessary in world and transnational governance and its institutions in order to jointly tackle international challenges.

If LAC and the EU share common values and principles, why have they not reached a greater level of international cooperation and joint agreement? Must we reformulate these values and principles? The hypothesis we suggest to account for these challenges would be that, in an international context where the international order is threatened “from within” and from outside, LAC needs an EU which can rise above “asymmetrical perceptions” (van Klaveren, 2004:55) and see them as partners who share problems and solutions in the five areas we propose (while not excluding other possible areas). We will explain later the great potential for cooperation that exists and would need to be developed to reach a closer relationship with tangible and beneficial results for LAC, and in which the EU would be an important partner. From the perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean, this requires a dialogue of equals on regional and international values, norms and principles.

Convergences and divergences

The convergences and divergences between the two regions in the multilateral context concerning major global challenges should be carefully detailed and explained, starting with the UN and the formulation and passing of international norms inspired by liberal values (for example, the concept of Responsibility to Protect adopted in 2005 during the United Nations Summit), as well as criteria enabling multilateral and/or regional sanctions to be applied².

Different interpretations of sovereignty (national or responsible), the level of “interference in internal affairs”, the most appropriate instruments to defend democracy and human rights and the resolution of major international conflicts – including Syria, the Middle East crisis and the situation in Ukraine – therefore require greater interchange of points of view which do not always converge.

This also implies identifying a common agenda concerning policies to be developed related to global goods and real possibilities for convergence (such as the SDGs, technological progress, cyber-crime, migration or climate change, among others). It is very possible that some common challenges may generate differences in how they

² See section 3 for more detail – the Security and Defence axis and alignments of European and Latin American and Caribbean votes in various situations.

are dealt with. Such differences must be tackled in an explicit way, seeking coherence between common values and interests and between legitimate national interests and the general interest, even beyond the bi-regional relationship.

Regionalism and its reference value for inter-regionalism

Regionalism and inter-regionalism have made up a pattern of relationship creation between LAC and the EU which has continued to evolve as a consequence of the increase in regionalism, yet which is also limited by the heterogeneity of the players involved, making a symmetrical relationship very difficult. Regional processes in LAC and the EU have historically provided synergies and feedback, but they have also increased divergences. On the one hand there is a growing questioning of the legislative power of the EU as a civil power, since it is incapable of projecting its values into effective responses to its internal crises and challenges (e.g. the euro crisis, the issue of social cohesion or centrifugal forces such as Brexit, emerging populism and nationalism, and radicalization and xenophobia), as well as those outside (e.g. the conflict in Syria, the management of refugees, the failure of the “Arab Spring” or control of international terrorism).

On the other hand, the economic and political crisis in Venezuela caused regional division between the opposing views of the governments which were members of the Lima Group and those in the Group of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), also reflected in the positions taken in the Organization of American States (OAS). Internal fragmentation has damaged CELAC and its ability to respond as it is divided into the same two groups. And at sub-regional level it has led to paralysis in UNASUR, created at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a new platform for political agreement and the resolution of regional conflicts between the twelve countries of South America. The differences between the two groups led to the temporary withdrawal of six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru) in April 2018.

The internal problems of CELAC led to the postponement of the Eighth EU-CELAC Summit, initially scheduled for October 2017 and which finally took place, at ministerial level only, on 16 and 17 July 2018 in Brussels, with the title “Building bridges and strengthening our partnership to face global challenges”³. This meeting highlighted the need to work on improving the structured EU-CELAC dialogue in its various thematic formats. There are quite a few asymmetries between them and it would be necessary to carry out a mapping and evaluation exercise to draw up a structure aimed at producing results and to incorporate mechanisms for assessing progress. These dialogues are a characteristic of the bi-regional strategic partnership but they should serve to gain greater influence in global governance. To date, there have indeed been positive results with global coordination in areas such as the environment, but in other areas, such as migration or cooperation over drugs, progress is much more limited. Differences

3 http://www.cooperacionespanola.es/sites/default/files/declaration_ue-celac_-_esp.pdf

within the blocs present an added difficulty in generating consensus. However, the delay in signing the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement may also be partly attributed to the respective crises in regionalism and internal fragmentation in LAC and in the EU. Intra-regional divisions have impacted the inter-regional foundation of a relationship that aspires to be a true partnership based on shared values and interests, but which has drifted into an on-demand inter-relationship (Grevi, 2016), with partners changing according to the issues, adapting to the tendency towards fragmentation and the various changing alliances that have been seen in both blocs.

Progress and problems in the map of partnership agreements

Despite greater competition from other partners, the close trade and financial links between the two blocs persist: according to the European Commission (EC, 2017), the EU is the principal investor in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the main trading partner of Cuba and Mercosur, the principal regional trading bloc, which, although a partnership agreement has not been drawn up, retains its prime position in trade between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. As for trade overall with the region, the EU has gone down from second to third place after China, as in 2016 it represented 14% of Latin American exports and imports (EC, 2017). The relative slowdown in trade is partly explained by the economic crisis in both regions, but also by the EU's farming subsidies which continue to present an obstacle to more fluid exchange, while Latin America and Mercosur in particular maintain high tariff barriers for certain products such as cars and computers.

For two decades, the map of economic agreements has been expanding, but it has also diversified in line with the various models of international insertion adopted by the countries and regional bodies of LAC. Recent progress in negotiations with Mercosur and in the renewal of agreements with Mexico and Chile show good improvement in inter-regional economic relations, despite the fact that different processes obscure the convergence of regulatory bases in the common bi-regional agenda and threaten to cause trade distortions between the various groups and countries. We must therefore examine the significance in the global arena of the potential new EU-Mercosur agreement and of renewal of the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile agreements in light of the stagnation of the Doha Round, the weakening of the WTO, the paralysis of the TTIP and the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) without the United States.

The limits of the political dialogue

The frequency and varied nature of the political forums between the EU and LAC are a distinctive characteristic of their relations as compared with those of other players such as the US and China, whose political consultations with the region are less regular and less specialised. The strategic partnership between Brazil and the EU alone, created in

2007, has generated 33 forums for dialogue which, although not all active, demonstrate the political will to continue building an agenda of shared cooperation.

In this context, the map of the political dialogue shows that a multi-level institutional structure has been created that reflects the large number of state and non-state players who contribute to building a horizontal agenda for mutual benefit. Compared to other trans-regional relationships, it is a unique structure and the political capital invested should be reflected in: a) greater visibility of the EU in LAC and b) more tangible and better disseminated results in the many existing forums for dialogue. However, the number and specific nature of the dialogues (at inter-regional, sub-regional, bilateral and local levels) contrasts with their limited visibility, especially in LAC, and their minimal impact at global level where both regions do not always coordinate their positions.

In this study we believe that investment should above all be made in the themed dialogues which bring together the greatest possible number of partners and are less fragmented by sub-regional partners or groups (e.g. the EU-CAN [Andean Community], EU-MERCOSUR [Southern Cone Common Market] and EU-SICA [Central American Integration System] dialogues) to forge a common agenda that will translate into cooperative projects and/or global positions where the 61 countries making up LAC and the EU make a difference as they represent one third of the United Nations. We should highlight the need to increase visibility and tangible results in those areas where the EU offers LAC comparative advantages compared to the US or China, for example: social cohesion (and the Welfare State), drugs or climate change. In these three areas the agendas and interests of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean coincide and divergences are less significant than in other areas.

Figure 1: Map of the Political Dialogue of the EU with LAC

| Regional | Sub-regional | Bilateral | Sectoral |
|---|-------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| EU-CELAC summits (before 2013 between LAC-EU) | Caricom/Cariforum | Political Dialogue / Human Rights with Cuba | Drugs |
| EUROLAT (Parliamentary Assembly) | MERCOSUR | Summits with Brazil (+33 sectoral dialogues) | Migration |
| Civil Societies (Activities around the Summits and other occasional meetings) | SICA | Summits with Mexico (+ sectoral dialogues) | Social Cohesion |
| | Andean Community | Political Dialogue with Colombia | Climate Change |
| | | Political Dialogue with Peru | Science, Technology and Innovation |
| | | Political Dialogue with Chile | |

Source: (Gratius, 2014, updated)

It is therefore necessary to critically evaluate the various action plans formulated following the inter-regional, sub-regional and bilateral Summits, most of which have not fully achieved their aims since they attempted to tackle issues that were too difficult to monitor and translate into joint actions. For this reason we are presenting in this study an exercise focussing on the bi-regional political agenda around matters where both partners acting in a coordinated way can make a difference at international level and gain in prominence and visibility.

In addition, besides continuing to build the inter-governmental agenda we must renew and modify the dialogue dynamic (irregular and one-off) of the stakeholders in organised civil society. One example is the inter-regional Parliamentary Assembly, EuroLat, which meets at least once a year to debate topical issues of the shared agenda and international matters. Less fluid are the institutionalised relations between development and human rights NGOs in both regions and other players in organised civil society. However, there is a network of links which deserves to be given greater prominence – such as the Civil Society Joint Working Party with an advanced dialogue with Brussels, as well as bi-regional academic meetings or EU-LAC business meetings, which merit greater prominence when programmes of cooperation are drawn up to meet their real needs.

The exhaustion of the North-South model of cooperation

The 2030 Agenda, adopted in 2015, appears as the new global framework for international cooperation which will overcome some of the limits of the Millennium Goals (MDGs). The SDGs assume a common framework in which we must determine shared responsibilities in managing global resources and risks, although differentiated according to capacity. To make progress with the joint implementation of the Development agenda it will be necessary to set more transparent objectives and indicators and to establish priorities precisely in line with agenda 2030, avoiding rhetorical exercises which do not translate into practice. Cooperation towards sustainable development, in addition to helping to attain national objectives, should make an essential contribution to the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Goals, as envisaged in SDG 17 of Agenda 2030 including commitments to the Paris Agreement, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda from the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015 and the New Urban Agenda from Habitat III in 2016.

It is against this background that we should re-examine the question guiding this study, “Why should the EU have any relevance for Latin America?” to focus on providing answers to the debates and dilemmas generated by five strategic sectors (trade, finance and technology, climate change, migration, democracy and human rights), with the aim of identifying new shared international challenges for LAC and the EU and areas of global convergence and divergence.

2. AN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL FOCUS ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Produced by Jordi Bacaria and Stephan Sberro

In economic terms, the bi-regional relationship between LAC and the EU is not enjoying its best period. The effects of the international financial crisis and the stagnation of the international trading system of the WTO, as well as political problems and identity issues in both regions, are hampering progress in the relationship. The presidency of Donald Trump in the US and China's booming emergence onto the economic and trade scene of LAC are two additional challenges. This set of challenges therefore requires the partnership to be revitalised to prevent it from completely disintegrating.

Despite this, the EU is the third trading partner of LAC, its principal investor and its prime development partner. Since the second half of the 1990s, the EU has been the principal source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in LAC. The amount of FDI in LAC from the EU was 825,700 million euros in 2016, which represents more than the FDI from the EU in China, India and Russia together. The FDI from LAC into the EU also increased from 128,500 million euros in 2009 to 250,300 million euros in 2016, with Brazil being the largest investor.

According to ECLAC, investment by the EU in LAC during the period 2010-2017 represented 18% of total European investment in other regions of the world. The countries of the European Union continue to be the principal source of FDI for Latin America and the Caribbean together, although their weight is greater in South America and less in Mexico and Central America, where investment from the United States predominates. 41% of the accumulated assets from FDI in the region are from European companies of greater importance in South America. In 2017 European FDI represented 37.3% of the total, while that from the United States contributed 28.1%. However, a changing trend can be seen with the Chinese presence in LAC as in 2017 the volume of acquisitions and mergers from China was the largest in the region with 18,000 million dollars, representing 42% of the total volume.

In the last decade, the total participation of the EU in the trade of LAC remained stable (14.4%), although the total manufacturing trade in the EU and LAC doubled, reaching 221,600 million euros in 2017. This is indicative of the new pairing of trade and direct

investment where the processes of fragmentation in production and value chains between the EU and LAC are supported, with the advantages of an increase in added value in production, greater product diversification because of the diversification of FDI, and a transference of technology and innovation, which leads to sustainable development.

We should stress that we are not starting from scratch as the current panorama is the result of various agreements and economic instruments that have been implemented from the creation of the bi-regional Strategic Partnership at the first EU-LAC Summit of Heads of State and Government at Rio de Janeiro, to the current formula of EU-CELAC Summits. Based on this and on the effective development (and modernisation in some cases such as Mexico in 2017) of free trade agreements, the EU has signed free trade agreements with 26 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean out of a total of 33 (including EU-CARIFORUM in 2009, EU-Central America in 2012, EU-Colombia-Peru-Ecuador 2013-2017). To these we can add the strategic partnerships with Brazil and Mexico. And in cooperation and aid (bilateral and regional cooperation) the EU has developed and promoted programmes on security, higher education, climate change, the promotion of SMEs, governance and equity, among others.

Overall these relations are the best expression of the relevance of the EU to LAC, to face the new challenges of inclusive integration, based on trade and investment in value chains between the EU and LAC and in economic relations and integration within LAC itself, to ensure the sustainable development of LAC, greater equity, and effectiveness in fighting climate change.

The specific nature of the bi-regional relationship (with its two comparative advantages – the convergence of perceptions on the form the international system should take, along with the need for global governance and for this to be institutionalised), could enable a strategic partnership to be strengthened to defend the common interests of both regions faced with current challenges.

In light of this, the EU is more relevant than ever to Latin America and the Caribbean, to forge a favourable environment for encouraging legal and institutional international regimes that are more stable, equitable, multilateral and transparent and to avert nationalist tensions. These objectives may be pursued in two ways: one global, jointly defending the common vision in international forums, and one of a more bilateral nature, using bi-regional economic and trade agreements as a launching pad and benchmark for stabilising and improving the international system.

2.1 Responding jointly to international upheaval

The great global challenges in the area of economics and finance are related to those posed by globalisation and the lack of effective multilateral bodies. It is necessary to

renew the world economic order by creating mechanisms for supranational governance in three closely related areas: trade, finance flows, and action against climate change.

These challenges affect every economy in the world. Globalisation, while generating economic growth, circumvents the state frameworks of sovereignty and control and increases inequality both domestically and internationally. The first is difficult to tackle because of the lack of national instruments to resolve it, the second because of the lack of a framework of supranational governance. The fourth industrial revolution, robotics and artificial intelligence, and big data, very rapidly generate increased productivity on a scale never achieved before, although at the same time and with the same speed they produce unemployment, with job opportunities being created in emerging economies with much lower salaries.

International trade today, based on the fragmentation of manufacturing production and global value chains, dependent on inter-linked transport and logistics, which dramatically reduce the costs of transport and distribution, provides new opportunities for the emerging economies, by adding technology transference and an increase in added product value to some of the production. However, it excludes those economies which cannot become part of such value chains because of a lack of capital to invest in infrastructure and human capital.

Up to now, Latin America and the Caribbean have not occupied the best position in global value chains, being overtaken by the Asian economies at the same time as some African countries have been coming into the new scenario of fragmented production with a certain degree of strength.

The paradigm shift in international trade and finance is producing two major opposing movements in search of governance solutions. One, protectionism, has a certain strength in the national context, being based on opportunist strategies (tariffs, currency wars) that threaten to break the value chains on which international trade is currently based. The other, based on bilateral and multilateral agreements, linked to cooperative “win-win” strategies, finds itself weakened by operational difficulties at national level and by shortcomings in supranational governance.

In this context, Latin America and the Caribbean, although lacking a homogeneous production component, have in recent decades known major and sustained periods of economic growth. Some countries have based growth on manufacturing production and the integration of value chains as in Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile and Brazil, or on more recent growth as in Colombia with growth closely linked to the peace process supported by the EU. These manufacturing countries whose aggregate foreign export value is made up of low-tech and medium low-tech (except Mexico and Costa Rica with high-tech and medium high-tech) (Blyde, 2014) are also characterised by the emergence of large companies (multi-Latin or global Latin) (Casanovas, 2009) which have competed with multinational companies in Europe and the United States and which are now, as a result of the 2008 crisis, facing competition in their own natural markets from the

expansion of companies in China, especially in the energy, telecommunications and finance sectors (Casanovas, 2017).

Other countries have supported their growth in the export of raw materials and food, mainly due to demand from China in particular, as has happened in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay and in the production and export of hydrocarbons and energy, as in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela. The countries whose manufacturing is most highly developed and which export to Europe, the United States and Canada, may find it extremely difficult to continue as middle-income economies and to keep growing, if protectionism increases (and triumphs), breaking the system of value chains and generating a domino effect in rupturing sea and inter-modal transport systems. This effect could be much greater, for example, than the effects of the Great Recession of 2008. For example, Honduras has the highest foreign aggregate value in LAC (45%), which indicates that this value share of its exports comes from other nations. As more than a third of the total exports from the country are from the textile sector, especially t-shirts, 80% of the aggregate value in these exports are yarns, fibres and other inputs originating in other countries, including the United States, Mexico, China and South Korea (Blyde, 2014). A tariff increase in the United States and increased transport costs because of ruptured production chains would leave this country in an uncompetitive position.

Countries most focussed on the export of raw materials and energy, whether prices are rising or not on the international markets, could also suffer consequences derived from economic protectionism and a fall in demand, affecting their growth. Some countries in Central America and the Caribbean present a different story, with considerable delay in incorporating value chains or inter-modal transport systems because of their lack of infrastructure and limited economic resources, and are seeing their growth possibilities jeopardised once more.

In the area of economics and finance the European Union is relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean if it is able to introduce elements of financial stability (closely linked to the international role of the euro) and equilibrium in the multilateral system in the face of the great economic powers – the United States with its protectionist drift and China with a very controlled and vast domestic economy, along with a certain capacity for influencing the economy of the global market.

Two documents by the European Commission define the position of the EU in the area of trade and world integration, clearly indicating its strategy – cooperative and shared – which may be relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean:

- Reflection paper on harnessing globalisation (2017)
- Trade for all – Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy (2015)

2.2 Setting a real example with a strong, renewed economic and trade relationship

Consolidation of the bi-regional relationship and the relevance of each region to the other is seen above all by the way in which the European Union has been setting up a series of free trade agreements with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, at an ever-increasing pace despite international upheavals, offering stability to both regions and an example to the rest of the world. In recent years the EU has signed agreements with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Central America. But as was the case with the leading countries – Mexico and Chile – these agreements, although containing some important components in terms of political agreement and cooperation, were reactive in economic and trade terms, as they responded to similar agreements obtained by the United States. The new scenario in the international economy and the trade policy of the United States offer an opportunity for the EU to play a more relevant role for Latin America and the Caribbean. This is particularly so at a time when the two first agreements – with Mexico and Chile – are in the process of being modernised, and while efforts are once more being made to reach an agreement with the countries of Mercosur.

The new trade policy of the United States was in reality the catalyst to restart negotiations with both Mexico and Mercosur. Up to then, there had been much talk of reopening negotiations but no actual steps had been taken. This situation was followed by the election of Donald Trump as President of the US and the debate on the need to maintain and consolidate economic multilateralism. So, in economic terms, relevance in economic policy is added to relevance in terms of trade. This relevance must be reflected as much in the achievement of agreements as in the form they take. In other words, it is not only the fact of reaching an agreement that will give new meaning to the relationship but the content itself of this agreement, different from the visions taken from an Anglo-Saxon viewpoint, that could offer new significance to the bi-regional relationship.

Similarly, the EU agreement with Canada (CETA), following the strategic approach of “Trade for All”, has introduced new concepts of environmental and worker protection and establishes a new Investment Court System (ICT) for investors to resolve differences with governments concerning investments in a swift and impartial way. CETA opens the way to a new generation of agreements as in its day did the EU- Mexico Global Agreement.

The European Commission document “Trade for All” states (p. 21): *“The bilateral agreements of the EU will begin to transform the former resolution of differences between an investor and a State into a public system of investment courts, made up of a Court of First Instance and an Appeal Court, which will function like traditional legal bodies”.*

In the same vein, the “Reflection paper on harnessing globalisation” of May 2017 poses the need for a better redistribution of benefits between European regions and citizens. However, despite this internal view, it also points to the need for European values to be imposed on globalisation and it advocates international norms. In this respect the EU

could, for example, encourage new regulations to guarantee fair competition and put an end to unfair and harmful practices such as tax evasion, public subsidies or social dumping. The document likewise restates the theme of guaranteeing investment and an international arbitration system to resolve litigation between investors and States, pointing out that *"The EU will also continue the efforts it has been making to establish fair regulations that will guarantee the protection of international investments, without preventing governments from pursuing their legitimate political objectives. Differences must be resolved by judges in accordance with the system known as the "Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)". The Commission has therefore proposed that a multilateral investment court should be created that would constitute a fair and transparent forum; we are currently discussing this proposal with our partners"* (p. 16).

This new vision to replace the former system for investor-State dispute resolution can be achieved through bilateral agreements, which would finally make it possible to achieve a broader agreement. For the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean this becomes a key piece of the new strategy to disseminate an innovative way of resolving controversies in which free competition is not the supreme value and where a new system of governance would be established aimed more at the general interest, and not only at that of a particular multinational, and where States and their public policies would keep their capacity to regulate and control economic globalisation.

The fact that it has already been possible to finalise the agreement with Canada shows that it is technically and politically possible for the existing arbitration system to co-exist with that which the EU wishes to promote, as for now Canada continues to be subject to the mechanisms for resolving disputes in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On the other hand, the EU is continuing negotiations of this type with Japan and Vietnam, but such an agreement with the countries of Latin America (Mexico, Chile and Mercosur) would give the bi-regional relationship a new impetus and significance.

In more general terms, Rodrik (2010) states that, given the great complexity of the new treaty, there is a broad space in which private interests may end up diverting the search for the general interest. This is a pessimistic view in light of the classic cooperative and win-win solutions. But when private interests predominate, or in order specifically to avoid their predominance, that is when the agreed bilateral or multilateral institutional framework, guaranteeing the general interest (environment, employment law, intellectual property rights) is the solution. Hence the relevance of the European Union's proposal, "Trade for All", to Latin America and the Caribbean, in particular the role played by global value chains and the need for regulatory agreements in trade as well as in transport and its emissions. In relation to value chains, the fragmentation of production and the relocation of sections of the value chain distributed between various countries create new opportunities for diversifying trade, a topic of particular importance to LAC, since despite the inherent risks it offers the advantage of fast training and the transference of technology and knowledge (Blyde, 2014).

De Lecea is more optimistic (2018), pointing out that growth and globalisation may become a positive sum game by way of much negotiation between East and West, and although this game appears to have been settled with China, he points out that the EU is well positioned to interact with emerging countries and with other advanced countries to tackle sources of discontent and push forward this great negotiation. Consequently, despite the G20 being the natural forum according to De Lecea, if consensus is not reached, *the EU and like-minded countries can complement the multilateral negotiations with decisive actions at regional and bilateral level.*

And this is precisely where the relationship between the EU and LAC is mutually relevant. The EU may take the lead in advancing this multilateral strategy, but it needs its partners in Latin America and the Caribbean and the bi-regional relationship to successfully fulfil this action for the benefit of all, to achieve sustainable growth and fair, inclusive globalisation.

Paradoxically, for that matter, the relevance of the bi-regional economic relationship has never been greater, at a time of fragility and the redefinition of global governance, for both Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union, as they share common visions as well as instruments of institutionalised economic governance.

It is specifically in the economic area and at this particular moment in the relationship that shared values may reinforce real common interests, generating a dual relevance.

3. THE THEME OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE: A COMMON AGENDA UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Produced by Nicolás Comini and Susanne Gratius

Latin America and the Caribbean and the EU have traditionally been perceived as regions with more soft power than hard, committed to international standards, principles and values that make up the basis for their respective peace zones and integration processes. In a different geopolitical context, this perspective needs looking at afresh, taking account of the challenges and threats facing LAC and the EU, which justify considering building a new agenda of cooperation in terms of security and defence, which is acquiring greater relevance to both regions as the US “withdraws”.

Aware of transnational threats such as terrorism, the EU is strengthening its security and defence aspect. The prospect of a European Defence Union is in the mind of French President, Emmanuel Macron, who in September 2017 presented his vision of a “Democratic, United and Sovereign European Union” at the University of the Sorbonne (Macron, 2017) with more hard power and more instruments to defend itself from real threats and, in part, from those posed by xenophobic political parties and movements. Furthermore, the reduction in the US’s commitment to NATO means greater financial contributions are required from the European countries, whose military budget generally represents percentages lower than 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in accordance with the organisation itself (NATO, 2017)⁴.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, organised crime is undermining the institutional structures of many countries. Those particularly affected, for different reasons, include Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Venezuela in Latin America and Haiti and Jamaica in the Caribbean. Organised crime is also one of the causes – and also the effect – of the phenomenon of violence, with higher rates of regional homicides than on the continent of Africa. This and other related challenges have led to a gradual “militarization” of conflicts in cities such as Rio de Janeiro and large areas of Mexico and other countries in the region, as Armed Forces personnel have been sent in to control the situation. There has likewise been an increase in military expenditure in several countries, to deal with the transnational threats of organised crime (Alda, 2016), although we must bear in mind the lack of a reliable register taking account of the diverse nature of expenses at regional level. As will be

⁴ According to NATO (2017), only 5 of its 29 members (United States, Greece, Estonia, Romania, Poland and the United Kingdom) reached the objective of 2% of GDP in 2017.

seen later, countries have different concepts and ways of assigning roles in matters of security and defence. This directly impacts what is understood at domestic level as “defence expenditure” or “security expenditure”.

The main objective of this section is to emphasise the need to strengthen cooperation in security and defence in both regions and to construct a new shared inter-regional agenda in this under-explored area of inter-regional cooperation. This includes formulating a series of proposals framed within the various levels of the relationship: bilateral, inter-regional and sub-regional. In particular, this section concentrates on analysing the relevance of the European Union to Latin America and the Caribbean, in the area of defence and security. It is assumed that both regions are trying to reinforce their identity and to readapt their strategies in areas from defence and keeping the peace to trans-regional problems, providing concrete examples of areas where a common agenda can be constructed. To this end, six examples of potential cooperation are identified for analysis; a) the theoretical-conceptual, which deals with defining the notions of Defence and Security; b) that of public security; c) that of cyber-defence and cyber-security; d) that of the issue of illegal drugs; e) that of peace-keeping missions; and f) that linked to large global conflicts.

3.1 Theoretical concepts: Defence and Security

One of the principal challenges in strengthening bi-regional cooperation lies in the issue of the conceptual differentiation between the terms ‘national defence’ and ‘internal security’, stemming from an analysis of the principal regulatory models of the Defence and Security systems in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the EU. Within this framework, it is assumed that there is a lack of consensus on the distinction between both notions, both within and between the regions.

In Latin America and the Caribbean definitions may be categorised according to narrow – or external – and comprehensive – or ‘intermestic’ – concepts of Defence, which have a direct bearing on the way States interpret their security. The two concepts can be distinguished according to three fundamental categories: the subjects (those we are attempting to defend), the extent (of the risks and threats we have to defend the subjects from) and the instruments (to be used to ensure effective defence).

Some efforts are being made to sketch out definitions common to the region. The countries of UNASUR, for example, long ago defined a series of “reference concepts”. To this end, the Centre for Strategic Studies, under the authority of the South American Defense Council, established that public security “is related to social peace, the institutional stability of the State, control of public order and guaranteeing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, which vary according to the political focus and development objectives of each State, and in relation to which they formulate their objectives and perceptions of risks and threats”. For its part, defence is seen as an essential function of the State associated with “protecting and maintaining its sovereignty and the integrity

of its people, territory and institutions; consequently, it deals with matters of security related to the external context, as a strategic area of the foreign policy of States". From this point of view, defence "is configured as the specific and exclusive arena for the organisation and use of the military force of the State, according to risks or threats relating to its very integrity and independent and sovereign existence" (CEED, 2011).

To complement this, an additional concept is incorporated: that of regional security. This is linked to defence by assuming that "the maintenance of territorial integrity and of the sovereignty of each country requires a scenario of stability and equilibrium in inter-state relations, reflected as international or regional security, requiring States to be prepared to cooperate within their strategic environment" (CEED, 2011).

The fact is that whereas one can identify broad-based models in almost every country of the region, only a few exceptions such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay keep their Armed Forces away from issues associated with transnational crimes and matters of public security. By way of illustration, the Armed Forces are central to the fight against drug trafficking in Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, among others. The increased presence of the Armed Forces in police matters in Brazil goes hand in hand with the broadening of the Army's function in Peru to combat non-conventional threats (Oliveira, 2018; Cook, 2018).

It is clear that different political definitions co-exist in defence and security, as well as multiple and various levels, and different institutional structures for their application. If we add to this picture the difficulties of the European Union – complicated by Brexit – in drawing up a policy of common defence and security, it is clear that both regions have obvious challenges facing them (Abellán, 2017). The fragmentation of the European defence sector and the maintenance of national priorities, cross-cut by commitments to NATO, require the structuring of joint decision-making processes. This involves a need to intensify the areas and levels of routine cooperation.

The challenge of public security in the bi-regional agenda

The security of the citizen is the principal condition for democracy and human rights, as violence or the threat of it reduce the freedom of movement of people who live in a permanent state of fear. Public security is therefore a shared objective of Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union. In accordance with its Global Strategy, the EU is aware that "internal and external security is increasingly interlinked; our internal security depends on there being peace outside our borders" (European Commission, 2016:5). This is why the EU, through the European Security Strategy which views "development as a pre-condition for security" (ESS, 2003: 2) is implementing a policy based on the security-development link, which is also reflected in the Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2014-2020, where the European Commission has defined it as one of the four priority areas in its cooperation with Latin America (European Commission, EEAS, 2014).

In the case of the Caribbean countries, whose cooperation in development with the EU is regulated by the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020), a similar policy is implemented. In the second revision of the Agreement, in 2010, there is greater emphasis on the relationship between development and security, linked to the fragility of the State. Although the challenges are different (high rates of homicide in Latin America and crime in the Caribbean), the responses, based on the (positive) European experience are the same: to strengthen the State as a guarantor of security, development and justice.

The European example, with low levels of violence, demonstrates that this requires the rule of law with effective and transparent public institutions. In this area, Europe could act as a model and more vigorously translate its positive experience in matters of public security to Latin America and the Caribbean. With a homicide rate of 24 per hundred thousand inhabitants (Jaitman, 2017: 1) the level of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean is four times higher than the world average of 6.9 and scarcely lower than that of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2015, El Salvador (103), Venezuela (90), Honduras (57) and Jamaica (45) topped the homicide statistics per 100,000 inhabitants in the region (Insight Crime, 2016). According to a study by Sutton/Ruprah (2017), in 2015, 13% of the citizens of five Caribbean countries - Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Surinam and Trinidad & Tobago - were victims of robberies, muggings and physical assaults.

By way of comparison, in 2015 Spain had a homicide rate of 0.7 per hundred thousand inhabitants (300 deaths). Nevertheless, because of the ever-present threat of terrorism, the perception of citizen insecurity has also increased in Europe, as previously the citizens had faith in a State that now has increasing difficulty responding to transnational threats.

From a bi-regional point of view, it is relevant to explore the new transnational security challenges posed in both regions and the most effective public security responses to strengthen the state's monopoly on the use of force and to protect democracy and human rights that are threatened by organised crime networks in Latin America and the Caribbean and the constant threat of terrorism in the European Union.

Faced with these two transnational global challenges, citizen security has become a priority in both regions, which are exploring national and regional responses. To be effective, it would be necessary to increase international cooperation, especially between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. We suggest that, in addition to the traditional North-South cooperation projects (above all the security programme which the EU finances in Central America and the 11th EDF Caribbean programme which includes crime and security among the three priorities for the period 2016-2020), other common instruments should be created to increase cooperation between the member States of the EU and the Latin American countries, including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela where criminal drug trafficking networks operate. These could include greater cooperation between intelligence agencies; an Observatory on Violence, taking up a previous proposal by the European Parliament (EP); greater

political cooperation and common prevention policies, including the strengthening of the Early Warning System.

In Latin America, resources destined for the EU's security-development link have been concentrated on the long post-conflict phase in Central America (which maintains a special programme funded with 120 million euros compared to 70 million out of the total of 805 million euros for the rest of the countries) and, more recently, on Colombia after the peace agreements were signed in 2016. Projects for the security-development link in Latin America have been directed towards two areas: the strengthening of the rule of law, and justice in particular, and the fight against drugs and drug trafficking. On the other hand, the EU is emerging as a key donor to Central America (El Salvador and Honduras) and the Caribbean (Jamaica) where it focusses more resources on the causes and the search for solutions to the problem of citizen insecurity. The growing spiral of violence in Central America entails high costs on security (estimated at 16% of GDP in El Salvador) and reduces the margin for social programmes, at the same time impacting negatively on economic development and encouraging emigration by legal and illegal routes. The figures confirm the negative interaction between insecurity and underdevelopment: Honduras and Guatemala lead regional poverty statistics with 60% and 54% (ECLAC 2016), and also lead the homicide rates. This is why the EU, by adopting the security-development link in its programmes with Latin America, is attempting to reinforce its presence and visibility in this key area of cooperation where a strong rule of law and greater regional and inter-regional cooperation could take a stand against transnational threats such as organised crime and terrorism. In this sense, the EU is a more appropriate and less interventionist partner than the US, whose approach is principally "hard-line".

The EU continues to be the most secure region in the world as it has one of the lowest rates of homicide and its member States are among the least violent. According to the Global Peace Index 2017, Portugal, Austria and Denmark are among the most peaceful countries in the world. However, threats to citizen security have also increased in the EU and with them the perception of insecurity. The debate on the future of the Union is therefore focussed on strengthening security and defence, for, among other reasons, making a joint response to the challenge of terrorism and protecting community borders from the wave of migration. The response of the Union has been, on the one hand, to welcome refugees and, in many cases to recognise their right to political asylum, and, on the other hand, to close borders (in the cases of Austria and Hungary). Another response has been the signing of an agreement with Turkey which since 2016 has been accepting the majority of Syrian refugees and those from other conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East (almost three million refugees currently live in that country).

This challenge and the widespread threat of terrorism have heightened the feeling of citizen insecurity throughout Europe. This has led, in member States of the EU, to nationalist and xenophobic responses in elections, seen in the rise of parties of the populist right which promote a security focus on migration and link it to the terrorist threat. This rhetoric has strengthened cooperation between intelligence services, border

security (Frontex) and the security aspect of the European integration process which at the same time maintains its traditional policy of prevent, pursue, protect and respond (Council of the EU 2005).

Regarding public policies, both regions fluctuate between two approaches: the “securitization” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998) of transnational threats using a military response, often the last resort in dealing with this challenge, or a human security response (Kaldor, 2007) that combines legal measures, cooperation for development and defence of human rights. At inter-regional level, the challenge of public security is reflected in the link between security and development in the Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme for Latin America (2014-2020), focussed particularly on Central America and excluding countries like Brazil or Venezuela which, despite showing serious challenges in matters of public security, receive hardly any cooperation for development because they are middle-income countries or emerging economic powers. Another more recent instrument is the programme to support Citizen Security and the Rule of Law in Latin America, EL PACCTO, presented in Buenos Aires in April 2018, which brings together 18 countries in Latin America, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal and members of specialist European agencies such as EUROJUST.

As it has very low homicide rates, the EU would appear to be an ideal partner for Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of reforms to the police, prison and judicial systems. Using this line of cooperation involves new proposals such as an ‘observatory’ on violence or police reforms that could be used to share experiences and solutions in the shared problem area of citizen insecurity. After decades of failed “hard-line” policies, largely carried out with the support of the US, the wealth of positive experience in the EU concerning citizen security based on the rule of law makes it an ideal partner for Latin America and the Caribbean, able to offer successful alternative solutions.

3.2.1 Cyber security and cyber defence as new areas for attention

The countries of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean share the common challenge of having to struggle with the concept of “hybrid wars”, which would see conventional armed forces having to fight multidimensional adversaries and threats, whose identity is difficult to define. There are multiple aspects to this issue which deserve consideration when practical collaborative approaches are being identified. The “cyber” variables of security and defence come within this set of approaches. These areas involve possibilities for dialogue and cooperation covering everything from matters of doctrine, planning and training to infrastructure, technology and equipment. It is also essential to discuss the definition of regulations, policies, procedures and standards when counteracting threats from cyberspace.

A recent article maintains that hybrid wars may be understood as a creative combination of civil and military ways and means deployed concurrently. According to this view, the political objective of state or non-state players carrying out a hybrid war is to preserve

or create non-democratic regimes and increase the strategic options for strengthening their power in international relations (Hartmann, 2017). Nevertheless, we must point out that just as there is no homogeneity in the concept of defence and security, neither is there any formal agreement on the term “hybrid war”. Although the evolution of this concept has a long history (Murray & Mansoor, 2012) and was expanded in the middle of the decade after 2000 to describe the strategy of Hezbollah in the war in Lebanon, intense discussions are taking place on the viability and appropriateness of adopting such conceptualization. These centre on, among other matters, the size, means, strategies, conventional or non-conventional nature, or the regular or irregular nature of the threats (NATO, 2015).

So we may now assume that, where they exist, so-called hybrid wars involve military, political, economic and, of course, technological dimensions (Cullen & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017). And, beyond deciding how to respond to them, there is no doubt that the technological dimension produces two essential aspects which the countries of both regions should discuss and for which they should identify cooperative projects and plans: cyber security and cyber defence.

Cyber security relates to all technology, processes, programmes and controls designed to protect cyberspace (its systems, networks and information) from potential cyber attacks. It concerns both organisations and individuals (Ericsson, 2010; Byres & Lowe, 2004), within a context of deep inter-connection. Cyber attacks may refer to a multiplicity of threats, dangers and actions whose aim may be economic, financial, political, social, technological or even personal. Attacks involve various matters such as ransomware, malware, social network frauds, social engineering, phishing, information piracy, bots, misuse of employee privileges, mini cybernet security tests or password cracking, among other things (McConnachie, 2018).

Cyber defence, for its part, is built on a complex environment of threats, where both state and non-state players may provoke cyber attacks with military objectives. Because of this, cyber defence entails the need to produce plans for collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security to guarantee the protection of communication platforms, infrastructure and information operated by the defence systems.

3.3 A joint approach to the drugs problem

The problem of drug trafficking is the sixth priority of the Action Plan (2013-2015) drawn up by the EU and CELAC at their first Summit in 2013 in Santiago de Chile. They highlighted the objectives of reducing drug supply and demand and expanding the Mechanism for Cooperation and Coordination on Drugs based on shared responsibility. These two objectives have still not been achieved. The EU continues to be the principal market for cocaine and Latin America and the Caribbean is the largest producer of this illegal drug, its production not having reduced substantially (see latest UNODC report).

This section focusses on the issue of illegal drugs, as defined by the United Nations, and the phenomenon of drug trafficking affecting Latin America and the Caribbean in particular. Both regions, however, are facing a complex dilemma: whether to undertake a military crusade or follow a comprehensive damage-limitation policy. On the one hand, there is much questioning of the effectiveness of the war against drugs (as seen in documents like the *Global Commission on Drug Policy* or the *LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy*). Some countries are even engaged in strategies with initiatives to distance the Armed Forces from these dynamics (as demonstrated by the creation of a gendarmerie corps in Mexico). And alternatives have begun to emerge in different parts of the world that are intended to counterbalance prohibitionist dynamics (Colorado-Washington-Uruguay).

However, there are many cases where an increasingly marked tendency can be seen of following the path of a war against drugs, a path already taken by Colombia and Mexico. This tendency is widespread throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the examples already mentioned, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador and Venezuela, although with marked individual differences, have adopted profiles focussed on interdiction strategies. In others countries, such as Argentina, there are various official projects to involve the Armed Forces in the fight against drug trafficking, a function that is currently banned.

Europe represents the opposite model: damage limitation, decriminalisation and even the legalisation of certain substances such as marijuana. In this sense, it represents a new paradigm currently being debated in Latin America and the Caribbean (at the OAS and regional forums in Latin America and the Caribbean). Europe was the first region to give priority to a health focus in its own policy on drugs and alternative development as the principal vision in its cooperation with third countries, including Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, the main countries involved in cocaine production, whose principal market since 2016 has been Europe. The European stamp of decriminalising possession of soft drugs and their limited legalisation also inspired debate in Latin America and the Caribbean which, starting with the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (2009), questioned the traditional paradigm of the war against drugs and suggested replacing it by decriminalisation and a focus on health, in accordance with the European vision. Similarly, Europe was the first region to recognise its “co-responsibility”, opting for alternative development or the substitution of coca plants instead of the forced eradication that is the focus of US policy in this area.

More recently, at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean lobbied, with little success (Tokatlian and Comini, 2016) for drawing up a new paradigm. In this international campaign, Europe could be the principal ally of Latin America and the Caribbean, as both regions share similar visions for tackling the problem of drugs and together they could propose a new global policy at the United Nations.

3.4 Exchange of experience and joint participation in Peace Missions

Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union are regions free from intra-state conflicts, committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and crisis management within and outside of their respective regions. Peace missions are a key instrument in this area, both at regional and international level. The incipient cooperation of Latin American countries in the EU's peace missions justifies a prospective analysis of the possibilities, limits and results of this type of innovative cooperation, which creates an important precedent for intensifying relations in areas of mutual interest and "hard power" such as security and defence, that up to now has played a subordinate role between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. As crisis management is "one of the least explored areas" of the relationship between both regions (Sanahuja; Verdes-Montenegro, 2015), this section will compare European and Latin American experiences in order to explore new niches of cooperation.

In the past and currently, several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay) have participated and are participating in numerous missions of the OAS and the United Nations, both in Latin America (El Salvador, Colombia and Guatemala and currently in Haiti) and in Africa, Europe and Asia. For the Armed Forces of South America, participating in regional and international crisis management has become one of its main activities. Central America (ONUSAL in El Salvador and MINUGUA in Guatemala) has benefited in the past from the Peace Missions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Caribbean (Haiti) is benefiting currently.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which lasted from 2004 to 2017 – and was replaced by the smaller MINUJUSTH – constituted an example of European-Caribbean-Latin American cooperation: in its last phase the Head of Mission was Trinidad & Tobago, military command was provided by Brazil and France took charge of the policing part of the Mission⁵.

Compared with the numbers of troops sent from France (827) or Spain (645) to United Nations peace missions in 2018, the participation of the Latin American countries, headed by Argentina (286), Brazil (271) and Peru (234) is smaller, although comparable with the contribution from the Netherlands, Austria or Portugal.⁶

Since the 1990s, the EU has been developing its own civil and military peace missions within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy. These operate in various parts of the world, especially in Africa, but also in Ukraine and Kosovo. The EU currently maintains six military peace missions and ten civil missions and has finalised 18 further peace missions. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the Dominican Republic have

5 <http://www.un.org/es/peacekeeping/missions/minustah>, consulted in June 2018.

6 <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, consulted in May 2018.

taken part in these missions (Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo), while Chile and Colombia signed framework partnership agreements (FPA) with the European Union in 2014. According to Sanahuja and Verdes-Montenegro (2015: 6), in 2014 Latin America represented 14% of the external partners who took part in EU Peace Missions.

This cooperation and the agreements concerning international crisis management help increase the visibility of Latin America and of the EU as global players committed to peace and dialogue (Luengo, Missiroli 2014). The emerging joint participation and the exchange of European and Latin American experiences, with peace and conflict resolution processes, also raise their profile as international mediators and open up new possibilities of greater harmonisation of positions within the United Nations.

In the future, both partners could constitute a Security and Defence Partnership, based on their regional and international experiences in building and consolidating peace. Similarly, the EU experience with peace missions in which several European countries take part could be used as a benchmark for Latin America and the Caribbean to initiate their own regional peace missions, such as in UNASUR. In this sense, Europe offers an important model of regional and international mediation and crisis management with its own criteria and apart from the United Nations.

Having said this, it is necessary to continue exploring routes for the exchange of institutional experience and for mutual participation in EU and/or United Nations peace missions. Chile and Colombia are the first Latin American countries that may cooperate in EU peace missions, creating an important precedent for other countries that could be incorporated in the future. The Binational Peace Force “Cruz del Sur” similarly presents a historic precedent in the region, with considerable potential for cooperating with the European Union within the UN.

3.5 Positions in the face of major world conflicts

Faced with the increasing absence and unpredictability of the position of the United States towards international conflicts and other transnational security challenges, Latin America and the Caribbean (which are grouped together in the UN as GRULAC) and the EU will have to take greater responsibility in the United Nations and other international forums that open a window of opportunity to coordinate responses to challenges of international security. In theory, LAC and the EU would be ideal partners to adopt common positions in international conflicts as they are areas of peace, part of the international non-proliferation regime (the NPT and the IAEA) and share a preference for the peaceful resolution of conflict.

To globalise and multilateralise a relationship previously limited to the North-South transfer of experiences now involves sharing perceptions and positions, especially at bilateral and mini-lateral level, in the face of major international security conflicts.

These include the war in Syria, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, North Korea's nuclear programme and tensions with Iran.

In this context, it becomes essential to discuss the possibilities and limits of coordinating positions on international conflicts between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite its critics, the United Nations Security Council continues to be the highest international decision-making body on these issues, so the prospective analysis will be centred on this body. It should be remembered that there is already an important precedent for cooperation at the United Nations Security Council, as Germany, Brazil, Japan and India made up the G-4 to support each other's bids for a permanent seat with veto power at the highest security body of the United Nations.

We should first identify those countries in both regions which, apart from the two permanent members, France and the United Kingdom, have been non-permanent elected members of the Security Council from 2015-2018⁷. This group of countries plus France and the United Kingdom as permanent members adopted positions that were partly convergent and partly divergent on four international conflicts in 2017-2018: Syria, North Korea, Russia and Iran:

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⁷ Between 2017 and 2018 the following took part as non-permanent members of the Security Council: Italy (2016-2017), Netherlands (2017-2018), Poland (2018-2019) and Sweden (2017-2018); Bolivia (2017-2018), Peru (2018-2019) and Uruguay (2016-2017).

» Iran

The withdrawal of the US from the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 5 +1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, signed in 2015 and called historic by some analysts) sets a new international challenge. It opens up the opportunity for other countries including Latin American countries (such as Brazil and Mexico and the member countries of the Security Council) to become partners to the agreement to compensate, at least partially, for the economic cost – reactivating the previous programme of sanctions – of the US leaving. It is worth remembering that Brazil, during the Government of Lula da Silva (2003-2011) attempted, along with Turkey, to mediate in the conflict over the development of nuclear weapons with Iran (Grevi, Gratius, 2013). Any failure of the nuclear agreement would be a risk to world peace, as it could trigger a new arms race between rivals Iran and Israel – reinforced by the US providing support and moving its Embassy to Jerusalem – and alter the power balance between the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.

» Syria

The war in Syria continues, despite several attempts (three in 2018) to adopt Security Council Resolutions to condemn the use of chemical weapons prohibited by international laws and conventions. Latin American positions on this conflict are divided between clear condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by the government of Basar al Assad, abstention, or a dissenting vote. The last three Resolutions presented in April 2018 revealed contradictory positions: the first, presented by the US to condemn Assad's Government was rejected by, among others, Bolivia (together with Russia) and supported by France, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Peru (Security Council, 2018). The second Resolution, presented by Russia to reactivate the Investigation Mechanism, was supported by Bolivia and rejected by France, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Peru, while the third, once again drawn up by Russia, was supported by Bolivia and rejected by France and Poland, with Peru, Netherlands and Sweden abstaining. This example, although limited in scope, demonstrates the intra- and inter-regional fracture lines.

» Russia.

No Latin American country has endorsed the sanctions against Russia which the EU⁸, US and other Western countries have imposed for the annexation of Crimea and for its role in the Ukraine conflict. Traditionally, Latin America and the Caribbean have been on the receiving end of sanctions – we might recall the US embargo against Cuba – and consider them an unacceptable “interference in internal affairs”. In this case, the rejection of coercive measures, together with closer ties to Russia (as a member country of BRICS and an ally of Venezuela) makes the prospect of a European-Latin

⁸ See the interactive map of EU sanctions: <https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main>

American consensus on sanctions against Russia more remote. However, it should be remembered that every year both the EU and LAC have condemned at the United Nations the unilateral embargo of the US against Cuba. In this sense, the EU could be included in the intra-Latin American consensus to reject unilateral sanctions with too general a focus rather than a selective aim (smart sanctions).

» North Korea

After the Government of Kim Jong-un launched an intercontinental ballistic missile on 22 December 2017, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted – with votes in favour from France, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden on the European side and from Bolivia and Uruguay on the Latin American side – Resolution 2397 which imposed new selective sanctions on the North Korean regime and confirmed those already in force to condemn the “threat to world peace” of the sixth nuclear test carried out by North Korea a few months earlier. The case of North Korea therefore shows, unlike that of Russia, greater acceptance of sanctions on the part of Latin America if they are approved by the United Nations. If the coercive measures are under the umbrella of Public International Law, Latin America and the EU share the same vision, enabling common positions to be created.

This brief summary of four international conflicts shows that the EU shares with Latin America and the Caribbean a belief in defending the foundations of an international global order, yet major intra- and inter-regional divisions are evident concerning the imposition of sanctions with no United Nations legitimacy. On the other hand, the interpretation of national sovereignty (responsible or absolute) also does not allow, *a priori*, for consensus building without previous dialogue and exchange of positions. Another influence is the increasing closeness of Latin America and the Caribbean to China and Russia – two countries which defend non-interference in internal affairs. Brazil as a member country of BRICS and Cuba and Venezuela as part of ALBA maintain close, asymmetrical links with both countries and especially with China. In addition, countries such as Chile and Peru depend on exports to the Asian market. This Latin American movement towards the Asia-Pacific region has implications for its commitment to the Atlantic world that has lost its prominence in the foreign policy of the Latin American countries (Bacaria and Tarragona, 2016).

3.6 Conclusions

Generally speaking, the security-defence axis offers many possibilities to construct a common agenda between Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU, from greater police and judicial cooperation against organised crime, a different paradigm to deal with the drugs problem and international conflict resolution to new challenges such as cyber security which posits a new look at the concept of security and defence in the digital era. All these matters could be used, with the support and encouragement of

regional and inter-regional institutions, to make the most of the great potential offered by the EU to Latin America in this area, including a horizontal approach by members to jointly explore less invasive policies in the areas of drugs, judicial and police reforms to tackle organised crime, greater cooperation between the intelligence services and the agreement of common positions to resolve international conflicts. Bearing in mind that the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean represent 61 countries altogether, for them to act as a bloc and/or to take a lead would strengthen their capacity to influence, as well as increase the visibility of both regions and their international role.

4. THE ISSUE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Produced by Paulo Esteves and Anna Ayuso

Cooperation for Development is one of the three pillars of the Strategic Partnership between LAC and the EU, together with political dialogue and economic cooperation. The EU continues to be the principal development partner of LAC, contributing approximately 60% of the Official Development Assistance (AOD) received by the region. The last EU-CELAC joint Action Plan⁹ to emerge from the Brussels Summit in 2015 proposed linking the social and economic dimension to the political and institutional dimension of the bi-regional relationship to give greater prominence to the needs of citizens. To this end a structure of ten major priority themes¹⁰ was created and for each of these themes it was envisaged that a dialogue would be maintained; activities to be carried out were set up and the expected results were proposed. These priorities were partially recognised in the regional indicative Multiannual Plan for Latin America 2014-2020¹¹ drawn up by the European Commission, which puts special emphasis on social and environmental aspects.

We should point out that cooperation with the countries of the Caribbean is not included in this plan but occurs separately from Latin America, because of its historic inclusion in the Asian Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group and the various agreements these countries signed with the EU, the latest being the Cotonou Agreement¹², signed in 2000 for a period of twenty years, therefore due to expire in 2020. This agreement provides for Cooperation for economic development (in the industrial, agricultural and tourism sectors), social and human development (in the health, education and nutrition sectors) and regional integration and cooperation to encourage and develop trade. The distinctive feature of this cooperation is that it has a specific financial fund, the European Development Fund (EDF), to which the other countries of Latin America do

9 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23755/eu-celac-action-plan_es_corr.pdf

10 Science, research, innovation and technology; sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity and energy; regional integration and inter-connectivity to support social cohesion and migration; education and employment to promote integration and social cohesion; and the global problem of illegal drug-trafficking; gender issues and investment in entrepreneurship for sustainable development and Higher Education and citizen Security

11 The priorities of this are: the Security and Development Link; Good governance, Accountability and social equity; Inclusive and sustainable development for human development; Environmental sustainability and climate change; and Higher Education.

12 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=celex:02000A1215\(01\)-20170101](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=celex:02000A1215(01)-20170101)

not have access¹³. The Regional programme for the Caribbean 2014-2020¹⁴ has three focal areas: Regional economic cooperation and integration; Climate change, environment, management of natural disasters and sustainable energy; and Security and the fight against organised crime. Through the EDF this regional programme combines a series of regional, sub-regional and multi-country programmes which includes support for bodies such as the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and above all the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). To these can be added CARIFORUM with which the Partnership Agreement was signed in 2008¹⁵, and which brings the Dominican Republic and Cuba into the regional dialogue, although the latter country does not form part of the Partnership Agreement and has its own bilateral Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement¹⁶ with the EU, signed in 2016. These sub-regional programmes are related both to those of Latin America through the EU-CELAC Summits and to the Action Plans arising from them which have already been mentioned. However, the integration of the various levels is not optimal in this case either.

In the Plan for Latin America 2014-2020 it is restated that “a major theme running through all the proposed priorities is support for promoting social cohesion”, as it had been in previous decades ever since it became part of the inter-regional dialogue. Emphasis in this area is put on “support for long-term strategic planning, defining public policy for reducing social inequality and quality social spending on public administration” and possible instruments suggested are “peer learning, comparative assessments and the exchange of good practice at regional level, as well as statistical support”.

With the aim of encouraging inclusive, sustainable growth for human development it was proposed to increase opportunities for decent work, especially in sectors related to the environment, improve the quality of education, and boost social cohesion. Cooperation in environmental sustainability and climate change is intended to reduce the poverty of the most vulnerable populations, by promoting sustainable environmental development and improving capacity to deal with climate change and the disasters associated with it.

The EU-CARIFORUM Regional Indicative Plan 2014-2019¹⁷ puts even greater emphasis on cooperation in the area of the environment, climate change, disaster prevention and sustainable energy, as it is dealing with a region which, together with Central America, is particularly vulnerable and energy dependent. The Regional Programme for Central America 2014-2020, complementing the Regional Programme of Latin America, makes climate change and disaster management one of the three pillars of the regional programme, placing special emphasis on improving environmental governance and full incorporation of environmental issues in short-, medium- and long-term planning.

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13 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/where-does-money-come/european-development-fund_en

14 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/caribbean-regional-indicative-programme_en.pdf

15 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ.L:2008:289:0003:1955:EN:PDF>

16 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12504-2016-INIT/es/pdf>

17 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/caribbean-regional-indicative-programme_en.pdf

These priorities, instruments and the focus on regional and sub-regional relationships, as well as the themed programmes, must be in line with Agenda 2030 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015; there is a commitment in SDG17 to a Global Partnership. An alliance between both regions is essential to the strong social links maintained by LAC and Europe, just as the networks created are an advantage in relations with other regions such as Asia or Africa. The closeness of values and cultures is accordingly an important asset in advancing the agenda of sustainable development. At the EU-CELAC ministerial Summit held in Brussels in July 2018 the final Declaration reiterated the commitment to all those present, assuring them that Agenda 2030 would be effectively put into practice as would the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which is an essential element in securing the necessary resources. But in addition to resources, the effective application of the Agenda requires an effort in planning and monitoring which concerns everyone and it is in this area where the EU can be a strategic partner if resources are directed towards reinforcing institutional capacity and training human capital.

Below we highlight six areas where EU-LAC cooperation could generate significant results on both sides of the Atlantic. Two of these concern international commitments already mentioned above: Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The other four areas of cooperation, although closely linked to the SDGs, deal with specific challenges where LAC could benefit from cooperation with the EU, namely: the reduction of poverty and vulnerability; the fight against multi-dimensional inequality; the strengthening of national systems to protect the environment; and sustainable cities.

4.1 Agenda 2030 and the Global Partnership

The SDGs are a global commitment of a multidimensional nature (economic, social and environmental) which proposes radical changes to the structures determining the persistence of problems of development besetting the planet. Agenda 2030 offers an opportunity to coordinate the various dimensions in alignment with the SDGs. Both the EU and the countries of LAC have made a commitment to implement them, but they are in the process of determining which resources will be used. What is certain is that the traditional ODA is no longer sufficient, and that all kinds of resources, both public and private, will need to be mobilised. We therefore find ourselves faced with new areas for action and new players which require new strategies and instruments (Alonso, 2018).

Furthermore, several LAC countries are already upper-middle income countries and are therefore no longer considered eligible to receive bilateral community cooperation¹⁸. That forces them to seek innovative cooperation schemes within the parameters

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18 The countries so graded are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela which from 2014 will only be able to take part in regional programmes and horizontal routes open to all countries.

defined in SDG17. Accordingly, the European Union Global Strategy urges the creation of “more innovative ways of cooperation” (European Union Global Strategy, 2016) and in Latin America countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Mexico have already taken an active role in development policies beyond their borders which, although with limited resources, seek to exchange experience and knowledge between peers (Ayllon, Ojeda and Surasky 2014).

So, whereas the more traditional instruments of cooperation in cooperation programmes between the EU and LAC will focus on the least advanced countries in the region, in May 2018 there was a commitment to establish a new Regional Mechanism for Development in transition for Latin America and the Caribbean¹⁹ with the support of the Centre for Development at the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the United Nations specially aimed at implementing the SDGs. This instrument directly links bi-regional cooperation with the multilateral agenda and reinforces the alliance between the EU and LAC.

The current regional schemes which are being reinforced appear to be the vehicle for overcoming bilateralism and extending the inter-regional dimension. In addition it should facilitate moving from a traditional vertical, North-South cooperation to another more cross-cutting model, in which South-South and triangular interchange programmes will become more common. This type of cooperation is the one defined by middle-income countries like those that predominate in LAC and for over a decade it has been promoted by several governments in the region. The EU, the origin of over 50% of the ODA in the world and the principal donor in the region, is a much more susceptible partner than others to the multilateral schemes of this type of cooperation and to aligning inter-regional cooperation at various levels with global goals, adapting the current instruments.

The High Level Forum of the Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, formed in 2017, reaffirmed in its final *communiqué*²⁰ the commitment of the whole region to the SDGs, to monitoring them through national reports and to supporting the regional report²¹ drawn up by ECLAC. In the latter it states that Agenda 2030 and multilateralism are the instruments to correct the course of globalisation. For its part, the EU in the 2017 document “New Consensus on Development. Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future”²² also made a commitment to the Partnership to implement Agenda 2030. This indicates that the EU and member States will cooperate in an increasingly diversified way, adapted to reflect the growing variety

19 <https://www.cepal.org/es/comunicados/union-europea-ocde-cepal-suscriben-acuerdo-la-facilitacion-desarrollo-paises-transicion>

20 https://foroalc2030.cepal.org/2017/sites/default/files/1fororegional-conclusiones-recomendaciones_orig_3mayo.pdf

21 Annual report on the progress and the regional challenges of Agenda 2030 on sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017 https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/41173/S1700475_es.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y

22 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf

of developing countries and that cooperation for development – in addition to financial assistance – must include a series of strategies, policies and instruments that reflect this variety. So both regions opt for regionalism and multilateralism as essential instruments to reach objectives and establish partnerships with other regional stakeholders. This is a differential fact compared with other players such as the United States, China and even Russia which show greater preference for bilateral instruments.

Agenda 2030 specifies that this type of innovative initiative should be in line with changes in the sustainable and socially inclusive development model. In this context, we can identify a group of opportunities for EU-LAC cooperation, involving the joint construction of implementation measures from guidelines in SDG17²³. This objective attempts to express *the shared responsibility* of achieving a better world for all and a commitment to global cooperation in an ever more interconnected world (Ryder-Jones 2018). Both LAC and the EU, through joint plans, must better define their respective responsibilities in respect of global challenges. A first step is to identify how these inter-regional development priorities brought together in the action plans and strategies contribute to the various SDGs. The existing structured dialogues, better defined, may be an instrument to establish consensus that will then be translated into specific programmes of cooperation.

Another of the aspects highlighted in SDG17 is the *Coherence of Policies* for Development (Goal 17:14). This has been identified for more than two decades as an essential component for achieving effective results in sustainable development, at the same time as being seen as a tool to enable the economic, social and environmental dimensions of any government to interact at all levels when legislation is being created and policy designed, at both domestic and international level, and to contribute to global governance and to achieving development strategies (OECD 2016).

The principle of coherence, which was introduced in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005²⁴, has been the subject of reports on the fulfilment of commitments at the conferences in Accra (Ghana) in 2008 and Busan (Korea) in 2011 and in peer reviews carried out by the OECD on Cooperation Policies. Incorporating it in Agenda 2030 is a way of transcending the area of Cooperation for Development and extending it to all types of policy, and makes it necessary to create spaces for the interaction and interconnection of various stakeholders, working together, sharing ideas and encouraging innovation at all levels of society (Ryder-Jones 2018). European institutions and member countries have been incorporating the principle of coherence for years, with variable results. These experiences, which have been analysed by the OECD, may be shared and compared with the current situation in Latin America and they may together contribute to strengthening the global partnership. They may incorporate

23 The goals of this Objective include: strengthening and mobilising internal and international resources; cooperation in technological matters; capacity creation for planning; promoting a system of fair and non-discriminatory trade; coherence between norms and institutions; multiple public and private partnerships; and securing quality data, supervision mechanisms and accountability. <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/es/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-17-partnerships-for-the-goals.html#targets>

24 <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34580968.pdf>

other regional partners such as ECLAC and the OECD, which are already working on these matters, but also bodies from outside the region. Incorporating the coherence analysis into inter-regional relations would be a major contribution to implementation at global level.

Agenda 2030 must be inclusive and therefore *fully involve civil society* in cooperation mechanisms for implementing the SDGs. The effectiveness of this participation is still difficult to evaluate in EU-LAC relations. There are various forums and side events, but they are not fully integrated into the procedures for drawing up agendas. However, there is no doubt that the existence of deep social and cultural links between the societies on both sides is a positive factor favouring social exchange from an intercultural and multidimensional perspective. Building multi-sectorial partnerships in the area of EU-LAC cooperation (involving governments, organisations of civil society and the private sector), in the spirit of SDG 17, must therefore be a cross-cutting instrument for the formulation, implementation and evaluation of inter-regional cooperation related to implementing the SDGs. The EU-LAC Foundation is called upon to play a leading role in introducing more flexible formulae for incorporating civil society, as well as giving greater visibility to the social agenda and how it affects the citizens.

Another essential aspect of implementing Agenda 2030 as expressed in SDG 17 is that of *accountability*. The United Nations, through the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators (IAEG-SDGs)²⁵ is drawing up indicators to make it possible to evaluate the starting position of each State and territory for the purpose of establishing specific priorities to enable the 17 objectives, 169 goals and over 200 indicators to be achieved. Producing and publicising this data will be an instrument to establish policy priorities. But implementing them will require strong, reliable institutions that are subject to public scrutiny. A partnership between LAC and the EU to adopt good practice for the implementation of Agenda 2030, both in their bilateral relations and in the global arena, would provide an essential boost for the effectiveness of the agenda. The experience that has been developed in the Ibero-American arena by the SEGIB concerning South-South Cooperation may be an appropriate starting point for the construction of mechanisms to monitor inter-regional contributions to the implementation of the SDGs.

Finally, both the European countries and those of Latin America and the Caribbean have accumulated much experience over the last decade in the field of *triangular cooperation*. This cooperation model has the potential to produce, not only a better division of work and sharing of costs, but, above all, dialogues and innovative solutions for implementing the SDGs. In 2016 ADELANTE (Regional Fund for Cooperation and International Partnership) was created with funding of EUR 10M) for Triangular Cooperation with Latin America²⁶. Evaluation of its operation and results is key to strengthening instruments of this type and sharing them with similar experiences in

25 <http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/>

26 <http://www.adelante-i.eu/cooperacion-triangular>

other regions with which LAC is still developing links of cooperation, such as Africa or the Asian Pacific, and where the EU and its member States have previous experience.

4.2 Reducing poverty and vulnerability

Over the last two decades, the countries of LAC have taken huge strides towards reducing poverty. Between 2002 and 2013, 72 million people ceased being in a situation of poverty, of whom 59 million had been in a situation of extreme poverty (UNDP 2016). The same movement saw the middle classes of the region gain 94 million people, taking them from 108 million in 2002, or 21% of the population, to 202 million in 2013, or 35% of the population (Idem). However, despite this considerable improvement, the OECD notes that 40% of the middle class currently find themselves in a vulnerable situation (OECD 2018). Furthermore, progress made in the last two decades is now threatened by the slowing economic growth of the region and by the very pattern of economic development adopted, which is too dependent on the production of primary products and has a tendency towards deindustrialization (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2011).

In the EU the *austerity measures* dictated by the financial institutions dominated by creditors during the euro crisis plunged part of Europe into recession and extended recovery time (Krugman, 2015). The brunt of the austerity policies was borne by the most vulnerable sectors of the population in the countries of southern Europe, with increased unemployment, evictions and cuts in public services. The flagship European welfare state was called into question both by sections of the liberal right, which accused it of unsustainability, and by sections of the left who denounced its dismantling to favour big business. Several pieces of research indicate that a “paradigm shift” is necessary in the fight against poverty, to overcome the traditional rationale of redistribution and propose a rationale of multidimensional development (Camagni and Capello 2015).

The dialogue on social cohesion between the EU and LAC originated at the beginning of the century and was boosted by the creation of the EUROsocial programme after the Guadalajara Summit in 2004. Agenda 2030 is now a new opportunity to revitalise policies to fight poverty with a multidimensional focus. SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (zero hunger), 3 (health), 4 (education), 6 (clean water and sanitation) and 8 (decent work) are directly aimed at ensuring that the most basic needs are met. In these areas, the EU and LAC have been promoting the exchange of experiences for some fifteen years through regional cooperation programmes such as the current EUROsocial+ which is based on learning from each other. This extensive experience has no parallel in other partners in the region and should be used to implement the SDGs, as they are a global agenda that must be adapted to local conditions. In this sense implementing Agenda 2030 should lead dialogue back to social cohesion policies, incorporating social participation with a joint focus that enables knowledge and experience to be transferred through public and private interaction.

Unlike two decades ago when the debate on social cohesion first appeared on bi-regional agendas, and when the dominant feeling was that it was a European concept foreign to the reality of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is now an established concept with empirical studies in the region promoted by the Social Development Area of ECLAC, supported by the EU. Faced with the current scenario of deteriorating living conditions in the region, this institution has launched a new initiative “Towards a regional agenda for inclusive social development. Bases and initial proposal” (CEPAL, 2018b)²⁷ which was to be discussed at the Second Meeting of the General Committee of the Regional Conference on Social Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Panama on 12 September 2018. This is an attempt to contribute to “a shared long-term vision with explicit commitments, which is key to the building of social pacts for equality” (CEPAL, 2018b; 47) in line with international commitments and agendas. Among these, Agenda 2030, the New Urban Agenda, the ILO Global Jobs Pact (2009) and other United Nations commitments are obviously included, but also the regional Agendas, for which 41 intergovernmental forums at regional and sub-regional level were identified, linked to 24 organisations (CEPAL, 2018b; 52).

The new regional agenda for inclusive development proposes giving coherence to all these initiatives and aligning them with Agenda 2030. The EU, because of its previous experience of several decades of joint cooperation, as well as because of the need to face up to the increased vulnerability within its own borders, is the principal strategic partner of LAC in the implementation of this regional strategy and of the social policies that are helping reverse the negative consequences of the austerity policies in both regions. In so doing it is putting cohesion policies once more at the heart of development policy and making them an essential part of Agenda 2030. But in addition, EU-LAC cooperation is not only about social policies, it also has the potential to experiment with innovative policies that may make a significant contribution to the reduction of poverty and vulnerability by establishing multi-sectorial partnerships to help integrate regional businesses into global value chains; helping increase productivity; and promoting innovation through other agendas also linked to the SDG and which emphasise investment and the transfer of knowledge and technology, as is examined in greater depth in other sections of this essay.

4.3 Fighting multidimensional inequality

Despite the progress made in the fight against inequality of income, inequalities in LAC have a multidimensional character that transcends access to income and presents a major obstacle to the human and sustainable development of the region. Indeed, indigenous peoples, people of African descent and women are not only subject to inequality of income but also to specific discrimination and inequalities that contribute to their exclusion. Throughout recent decades, many actions have been taken by countries in the region, with varying levels of success. However, hierarchies of gender

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²⁷ https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/44019/4/S1800662_es.pdf

and race produce an intersection of inequalities and require policies to be adopted that can combat these multiple dimensions.

While the current crisis impacts negatively on the poor, large fortunes continue to grow larger in the region and according to ECLAC, in 2014 10% of the population in LAC held over 70% of the wealth. In the European Union the crisis has also increased inequality (Perrons, 2017), endangering the welfare state (Hermann, 2014), and has opened up a North-South divide, leading to increased Euroscepticism. With the austerity measures and increased unemployment, the middle classes are seeing their well-being eroded and they look for answers in nationalist populism, with outbreaks of xenophobia.

Agenda 2030 puts inequality at the centre of the SDGs: Goal 10 is to reduce inequality within and between countries and 5 is to reduce gender inequality. These two mandates must give rise to a set of specific measures. To this end it is important to define goals and results indicators, but it is also necessary to consider the dynamics that generate or perpetuate inequality. Instruments facilitating participation and public scrutiny are needed in both national and local spheres, and both must have international monitoring and guarantee universal access to quality data on the implementation of public policy. Inequality is an impediment to economic recovery and sustainable growth (Birdsall, Lustig and McLeod 2011; Piketty, 2014), but attempts at structural reform to combat it are hindered by elites who are quite comfortable with the *status quo*. Responses to inequality require more progressive tax reforms, fighting fraud and eliminating tax havens. This requires both national and international measures. A central aspect of this type of reform is that it leads to increased transparency in the management of tax collection and fiscal expenditure, revealing the inequalities in current taxation structures and helping fight the political clientelism of social spending, corruption and collusion between political elites and financiers. These all prevent the drawing up of the regulations necessary to avoid abuses, such as those that led to the latest crises and indebtedness of countries. LAC and the EU could be key members in leading a two-fold pact to fight corruption and take control of tax havens to slow the outflow of tax and capital that erodes the tax revenue needed to support public policies: firstly, by promoting international persecution and establishing measures against tax havens and secondly, to improve policies favouring transparency and the control of taxation within countries through technical cooperation and exchange, as has already been begun in some EUROsociAL programmes.

EU-LAC cooperation also faces a major challenge in fighting gender and race inequalities and how they intersect. In the statement made at the EU-CELAC inter-ministerial meeting in July 2018, representatives repeated the need to promote equal rights for women and girls and gender issues, which are also one of the strands of the Action Plan although specific programmes are not mentioned. A recent comparative study pointed out that although gender issues have become part of the regional agendas in both regions, there are great asymmetries according to the topic and country and “there is no joint approach or agenda in favour of achieving equality between both regional blocs beyond what is set out in the Santiago Action Plan.” (Carballo and Echart, 2015).

Including gender equality in the SDGs in a specific manner should lead more dialogue and the structuring of specific action plans.

Firstly, the LAC-EU cooperation agenda should involve the fight against multidimensional inequality as a condition to be applied to all sectors and include it as one of the elements to analyse the coherence of policies in bi-regional relations. As well as sharing experiences, lessons learned and good practice, we must reinforce procedures that boost the fight against gender and race inequality in a cross-cutting way.

Secondly, EU-LAC should support organisations in civil society that work directly to fight gender and race inequality and xenophobia, establishing an inter-regional support network that can help raise visibility and awareness of the issue based on empirical evidence. Thirdly and finally, EU-LAC cooperation must seek to incorporate actions and procedures to fight gender and race inequality as part of a common framework for investment and to engage the economic and social players in the private sector.

4.4 Climate Change and energy cooperation

Climate change is part of the positive agenda in the relationship between the EU and LAC, where greater consensus can be seen in the face of global challenges. The international regime of cooperation and climate change has altered priorities on the inter-regional agenda between LAC and the EU. Both regions have made a commitment and pushed for the Climate Change Agreement signed in Paris, in December 2015, and to the SDGs drawn up by the United Nations in a multilateral exercise shared by governments and NGOs.

Despite these common objectives, the challenges are not comparable. At global level, because it is a historic polluter, Europe will have to pay a higher price to slow down climate change, whereas LAC is among the countries of the South with the lowest greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and they therefore need to be treated differently according to their responsibilities.

Because of its commitments to the Paris Declaration and Agreement on Climate Change, Europe should move towards a clean energy model and reduce emissions. Europe is responsible for 9% of global emissions of GHG and is the third global emitter of pollutants after China (28%) and the United States (16%), with Germany, the United Kingdom and France being the main countries responsible. The EU has defined Agenda 2030 on Energy²⁸ to renew the energy matrix and fulfil the three initial objectives in environmental protection: raising renewable clean energy to 20%, reducing GHG by 20% and saving 20% of energy. In 2014, the EU achieved a 24% reduction in emissions compared with the 1990 level. In its “Roadmap towards a competitive low-carbon

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28 <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/2030-energy-strategy>

economy by 2050²⁹ the EU commits to reduce its GHG by 80% compared to 1990 levels and this will be done in three stages: 40% by 2030, 60% by 2040 and then 80% by 2050. In LAC the economic growth cycle of the last decade helped reduce poverty, but increased the environmental cost, raising GHG to seven tonnes per capita, representing 9% of the global total (with 6% corresponding to Brazil). This negative tendency, reinforced by the rapid progress of urban development, prompted “The unsustainability of the current style of development” (CEPAL, 2015: 10). With today’s consumer trends, by 2050 climate change will cost the region between 1.5% and 5% of GDP (CEPAL, 2015a: 9), and Central America and the Caribbean will be the regions most affected by its negative consequences, including natural disasters, the destruction of crops and raised sea levels.

The accordance of the objectives in the agendas contrasts with the energy profiles of both regions which are very different and only partly compatible. Halting climate change and promoting a new model of sustainable development that can replace current highly polluting patterns of consumption is a shared interest of LAC and the EU and therefore an area with great potential for cooperation. However, more progress is needed for agreement on the best measures and instruments to achieve it.

The use of renewable energy in transport, domestic heating and the industrial sector and the transformation of the automotive sector will be key to achieving these goals. The European programme, LIFE 2014-2020, is a positive experience but it is not enough to deal with the enormous efforts required from States and it will be necessary to involve not only the public sector but also the private.

The environment and energy occupy a prominent position in the strategic cooperation priorities of the EU with LAC. EuroCLIMA was the first regional programme designed in 2008 to reduce climate change and seek common projects focussed on preserving the environment. In June 2015, the European Commission approved a new programme of sustainable development for Latin America, EuroCLIMA⁺³⁰, which provides technical and financial support for development, as well as for various areas³¹ of adaptation and mitigation for climate change and will also support implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The energy transition is under way and will speed up over the next decade, evolving into a more complex energy matrix. Renewable energy will become cheaper and increasingly competitive in emerging markets with growing demand. In OECD countries, technological innovations will make it possible to ensure the stability of access to renewables. Hydrocarbons will probably continue to supply a large part of the demand, but their decreasing importance may have geopolitical consequences.

29 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0112&from=EN>

30 <http://www.euroclima.org/es/>

31 Climate governance; Forests, biodiversity and ecosystems; Renewable energy and energy efficiency; Water management in the context of urban resilience; Management and reduction of disaster risk; Droughts and floods; Urban mobility; and Resilient food production.

Policies currently in force to provide subsidies for hydrocarbons in LAC are counter-productive to boosting energy changes.

SDGs 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities), 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), 13 (Climate Action), 14 (Life Below Sea), and 15 (Life on Land) provide the international framework for cooperation between the EU and LAC and for ensuring their compatibility with the Paris Agreement. Both the EU and LAC must maintain the intensity of the efforts they are making in international negotiations. Efforts that will be directed to the detailed construction of measures to implement the Paris Agreement and to then creating the necessary institutional architecture (Carlino, 2017)³². In the Declaration by the EU-LAC Ministers of Foreign Affairs in July 2016, both regions made a commitment to promote the Talanoa Dialogue³³ created by the United Nations at COP23 in Bonn in 2017 to verify and promote the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This same declaration expresses the need for the commitment to also be translated into resources and technology transference, where the EU is one of the principal players and an essential partner for LAC, both through bi-regional programmes, such as financing the multilateral Funds created in the United Nations, and the Green Climate Fund.

In March 2018, 24 representatives from LAC adopted a regional agreement to protect rights of access to information, public participation and access to justice for environmental matters (Principle 10 of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development) in Costa Rica. This is intended to promote and protect defenders of the Environment and will be signed during the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018. In this case too, the EU can and must help implement it by supporting citizen movements exercising their environmental rights. In addition, the cultural capital of consumers will exert a great influence over energy transition, therefore it is essential to include in the cooperation mechanisms, programmes to raise awareness and educate people on the need for change in the energy matrix and the negative consequences of not making such changes. This must be done both with the general population and with the younger generations from the earliest ages. LAC and the EU can help by designing environmental education programmes, for schools and for the general population, to encourage the use of alternative energy and responsible consumption.

4.5 Reinforcing national systems for socio-environmental protection

There is a consensus between the principal agents in the field of development on the need to mobilise resources, in order to implement both Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement. At the same time, analysts identify a context marked by significant liquidity (pension funds and sovereign wealth funds) between developed countries

32 http://www.pnuma.org/cambio_climatico/publicaciones/Acuerdo_de_Par%C3%ADs_-_Implicaciones_en_ALC_-_Estudio_1.pdf

33 <https://unfccc.int/es/news/la-onu-lanza-un-portal-para-el-dialogo-de-talanoa-con-el-objetivo-de-aumentar-la-ambicion-climatica-portal-para-el-dialogo-de-talanoa-con-el-objetivo-de-aumentar-la-ambicion-climatica>

on the one hand and, on the other, the availability of private resources that could be mobilised for investment in developing countries. This context, marked by the apparent correspondence between supply and demand, paradoxically ends up putting pressure on national systems of environmental protection.

Indeed, some governments in the region, seeking to attract investment, have encouraged flexibility in the regulatory instruments that protect indigenous people and those of African descent, minimise the environmental impact and guarantee rights (including labour rights) are observed. This has negative effects on the well-being, health and working conditions of the population. The minimum standards requirement is often seen as a protectionist weapon of the more advanced countries against the developing countries. The EU, as the largest investor in the region, must commit to a regulatory framework for investment that respects the environment and protects biodiversity in accordance with the agreements in force.

EU-LAC cooperation may help reinforce national systems to protect the environment by promoting political dialogue and the exchange of experience and good practice. Taking as a starting point the Equator Principles³⁴, and the United Nations “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”³⁵ such cooperation may, above all, form a common regulatory framework to establish safeguards and minimum ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) standards for investment in the region. SDGs 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) must help create a Partnership which, through dialogue and cooperation, can help raise standards, replacing the unilateral conditionality and protectionism that have been dominant in the past.

The Nairobi Programme on the effects of climate change, vulnerability and adaptation, has contributed to the drawing up, disseminating and bringing into use of adaptation policies, instruments and practices, and is also being adapted in line with Agenda 2030. The Summary Report by the Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change³⁶ points to the need to identify and facilitate innovative measures to achieve the SDGs and highlights the Lima Initiative for understanding Adaptation to Climate Change that emerged at COP 20 in 2014 and in which numerous centres regional networks participated. Inter-regional cooperation between the EU and LAC should be promoted to reinforce national systems for the implementation of protection and adaptation systems and evaluate the extent to which national systems contribute to the effectiveness of the Lima Initiative.

Finally, the Convention on Biological Diversity, which came into force in 1993, is one of the most ratified treaties in the world. We must now add to its provisions the goals of

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34 These are a reference framework agreed in 2003 so that financial institutions can determine, evaluate and manage the social and environmental risks of their projects. It is a minimum, voluntary standard for decision-taking in all sectors of industry. <http://equator-principles.com/>

35 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_SP.pdf

36 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/02s_1.pdf

SDGs 15 and 16 which establish guidelines for the conservation of life in the sea and on land respectively. For its part, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights at the United Nations in 2017 mandated that a Report should be drawn up on Human Rights and Biodiversity³⁷ on the impact the loss of biodiversity may have on people. LAC is a major reserve of biological biodiversity that constitutes a global public asset which the EU must commit to protect. The EU has committed to an aid package on this issue for the Caribbean region, through the global partnership InsuResilience³⁸ at the donors Conference on 21 December 2017. However, it would be advisable to reflect the various existing initiatives in an agreed regional Action plan to protect biological diversity that becomes part of the regional agenda and aligns with the SDGs.

4.6 Sustainable cities

Increasing urbanisation is a global trend that is clearly seen in both LAC and the EU. More people now live in cities than in rural areas. In Latin America and the Caribbean the level of urbanisation is around 80% and in Europe it is over 70%³⁹. The challenge of providing this growing urban population with services, infrastructure, water and food in a sustainable manner requires rethinking the relationship between the urban and the rural. The SDGs have incorporated a specific objective, number 11, which calls for sustainable cities and communities to be encouraged, both in the social dimension and also the economic, political and environmental. But in reality all the SDGs need to be implemented locally (UCLG 2015) and it will be necessary to incorporate the urban perspective transversally in each one of the SDGs.

To this must be added the need to plan in accordance with the New Urban Agenda⁴⁰ approved at the Habitat III Conference and carry out the monitoring and evaluation of cities committed to their citizens and to global justice. This also includes localising the 17 SDGs (UCLG 2017), as in order to achieve the ODGs, it is essential to be able to count on the total commitment of local government to the effective implementation of the policies. For both agendas to secure ownership, the policies must be designed so as to include the various levels of government and the participation of civil society.

Both the EU and Latin America have incorporated the urban dimension into their regional agendas. In the case of the EU, the European Urban Agenda⁴¹ was drawn up, providing experience in the process of localising a global agenda in the local area. The construction of European multi-level governance tackles urban matters not only as a local problem, but also as a national, regional and global challenge that permeates a diverse group of sectorial policies. In this transformation of the global urban agenda into a local agenda and then a scheme for multi-level governance, the EU offers unique experience that can be translated into the inter-regional agenda.

37 <http://www.ohchr.org/SP/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/Biodiversity.aspx>

38 <https://www.insuresilience.org/>

39 <https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

40 <http://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NUA-Spanish.pdf>

41 <https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/urban-agenda>

For its part, the Regional Action Plan (RAP) for the Implementation of the New Urban Agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean (2016-2036)⁴² aims to be the roadmap for the region. It was drawn up jointly by the Assembly of Ministers and High-Level Authorities of the Housing and Urban Development Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean (MINURVI), ECLAC and UN-Habitat to implement the New Urban Agenda in the region, adapting it to local conditions while at the same time taking account of the SDG agenda. This strategy has been based on four principles: Inclusive cities; Sustainable and inclusive urban economies; Urban environmental sustainability; Effective and democratic governance. These must direct national urban policies, urban legal frameworks and territorial planning in the broadest sense.

A key condition for good planning is the availability of high-quality, up-to-date data and local information so that problems can be identified and political priorities established, and the implementation of the urban agendas can be monitored and evaluated. The RAP recognises that there is a great lack of urban data in LAC, particularly in respect of informal settlements and slums. In addition to this lack of information there is a lack of horizontal and vertical coordination between the various bodies and levels of the administration. It therefore recommends that monitoring mechanisms should be incorporated that would be specific yet also integrated into the SDG indicators, and proposes “promoting cooperation at regional, national and sub-regional levels” through technical cooperation, the development of skills and generation of knowledge, research and development of knowledge, implementation of policies and partnerships to reinforce strategic commitments. To this end, the EU and its European urban agenda provide a favoured partner for the exchange of experience.

Furthermore, cooperation between cities has for many years been included in the EU / LAC Agenda. Decentralised cooperation programmes such as URBAL in its three phases (1994-2013) helped establish international networks of cities and bilateral agreements made with the objective of giving local stakeholders a voice and coping with problems of a transnational character. The construction of a new inter-regional urban agenda must be aligned with the respective regional agendas and expressed as a contribution to the global urban and sustainable development agenda.

European experience of themed Partnerships in the urban agenda⁴³ and the mechanisms for policy coordination they have been developing can be used to show how the institutions can be opened up to other stakeholders, not only local people, but also civil society and the private sector, which are at present under-represented, by encouraging citizens to participate more and make a greater commitment to social, inclusive and environmental sustainability. Once again it is necessary to create mechanisms to link the agenda of local stakeholders with that of the private sector and civil society.

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42 https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/42144/2/S1800033_es.pdf

43 https://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM/LANG_CASTELLANO/DIRECCIONES_GENERALES/ARO_VIVIENDA/SUELO_Y_POLITICAS/ACTIVIDAD/UE/PACTO_AMSTERDAM/Partenariados.htm

City diplomacy is considered an instrument that can consolidate collaborative relations, reinforce the foreign policy of States, and make the cities concerned promoters of global peace and justice through partnerships between local, regional, national and international administrations in a multi-level government scheme with shared responsibilities to generate greater coordination between cities. The EU and LAC are both notable for calling for local bodies to have a greater role, beyond national borders, projecting themselves into regional and international organisations and demonstrating the essential role they play in the governance of the development agenda.

To incentivise the international role of cities, the EU launched the International Urban Cooperation Programme (IUC) over three years (2016-2019)⁴⁴ with the objective of encouraging cities in different parts of the world to join together and share solutions to common problems of sustainable urban development. The Project has three components: 1) city to city cooperation through the exchange of experience based on a common methodology in line with that developed in the URBACT programme in the EU⁴⁵; 2) sub-national action under the initiative of the Global Covenant of Mayors in general and the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy in Latin America and the Caribbean in particular⁴⁶; 3) inter-regional cooperation in innovation through local and regional development⁴⁷. This last area attempts to strengthen cooperation between regions of the European Union (EU) and Latin America (LA) in innovation through local and regional development. This initiative follows the framework of decentralised cooperation already practised in previous projects. The difference is that it has a more global framework. However, this does not replace the need to develop a more inclusive inter-regional agenda that can reinforce the urban dimension of the development agenda and incorporate the strategic Partnership in the structured dialogue for the purpose of launching common initiatives.

4.7 Conclusions

Cooperation is a central pillar in the bi-regional agenda to promote a more balanced relationship, primarily between LAC and the EU but also in the global context. As highlighted in the Final Declaration of the Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU and CELAC held on 16 and 17 July 2018, “Building bridges and strengthening our partnership to face up to Global Challenges”⁴⁸, it is important to respect the Principle of Shared but Differentiated Responsibilities, accommodating the needs, capacities and resources of each country. To do this it will be necessary to redesign the current cooperation instruments in terms of Agenda 2030, linking the monitoring of regional and bilateral programmes with global agendas, not only in declarations but with specific mechanisms and tangible commitments that have been mutually agreed. This requires the effective involvement of a greater number of

44 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/international/urban/

45 <http://www.iuc.eu/lac/httpiuceulac-ptcity-pairing/>

46 <http://pactodealcaldea-la.eu/>

47 <http://www.iuc.eu/lac/cooperacion-entre-regiones/>

48 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36188/declaration-es.pdf>

public and private stakeholders. The EU-LAC Foundation could play an essential role in encouraging discussion of common challenges and could be a channel to take the different views of all public development policies to different levels, bearing in mind the increasing role of local stakeholders.

5. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE AREA OF TECHNOLOGY

Produced by Nicolás Comini and Andrei Serbin Pont

The fourth technological revolution requires a fresh examination of approaches and issues to adapt them to a new context affecting national, regional and international institutions. It is therefore important to evaluate strengths and weaknesses, identify good practice and structure new patterns of cooperation between the countries of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean.

The development of new technologies challenges the traditional frameworks of governance, defence, production, transport, employment and education. Indeed, the constructive and disruptive capacity of these technologies causes issues for decision-takers, businesses and society in general. In its turn, the technological revolution generates a “metamorphosis in the way countries relate to each other” and consequently in processes of integration. Inter-connectivity presents a paradigm shift, where local, global, public and private processes intermingle and blend, requiring new institutional and action frameworks (INTAL 2016).

This is offset by the fact that it motivates a massive surge of application development based on technological convergence in a wide range of areas, from health to the military, energy, food and the environment. According to a recent study by ECLAC, businesses in the European Union “led investment in research and development in Latin America and the Caribbean: 71% of investment in R+D projects announced over the last five years is from businesses in the European Union” (ECLAC, 2018), therefore we must start from the premise that there is a bi-regional link in research and development on which we should build, using existing links to increase capacities and adapting research areas to tackle key themes in the technological sector. This is why bi-regional cooperation becomes a priority, both to progress towards models of political, social and economic organisation, and to make convergent legal frameworks compatible on both sides of the Atlantic. In this context, it is considered necessary to adopt a sufficiently flexible approach to generate hubs of inter-regional links, to add the action of stakeholders in civil society to inter-governmental action, and include inter-state, business and financial networks.

We identify below a set of technologies that are potentially constructive and disruptive (bearing in mind the speed of their progress, the scope of their impact, and their prevalence in both regions), and also analyse opportunities to develop “scientific-technological partnerships” between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, within a context where institutions like the EU-LAC Foundation could play a more active role. The group of technologies studied is made of seven components: a) artificial intelligence and robotics/automatization; b) 3D printing and digital manufacture; c) advanced materials and nanotechnology; d) Big Data; e) the internet of things and the cloud; y f) blockchain and cryptocurrencies; y, g) unmanned aircraft.

“We all carry artificial intelligence in our pockets”, explains expert Nuria Oliver (Vozpopuli, 2018). Multiple studies reveal that the development of artificial intelligence, robotics and automation poses at least two major questions: (a) will they be a source of job creation, displacement or destruction? and (b) how will this phenomenon affect the processes of regional integration? (BID 2017). Advances in these processes have great potential for technological, industrial and service production sectors, for business and for consumers, implying greater flexibility, accelerated production times, improvements in patient care and outcomes, reductions in the costs of human resources and in general expenses. Automation brings with it potential benefits to the public sector and to society: increased national productivity; better quality goods; and a better quality of life for the people (Russell & Norvig, 2016; Cohen & Feigenbaum, 2014). However, there are more pessimistic views sounding the alarm over its negative effects. Stephen Hawking, for example, maintained that artificial intelligence could lead to the end of humanity itself (Cellan-Jones, 2014). Both views present major challenges in terms of employment, education, food (for example, cultured meat) and skills training, as well as the need for large capital investment, which would involve reconfiguring industrial processes, distribution services and supply chains. Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean therefore need to rethink their long-term development strategy, diversifying exports with processes that add value to basic products.

Automation is part of this process. There is much discussion on this subject (Arntz, Gregory, & Zierahn, 2016; McKinsey Global Institute, 2017; Frey et al., 2016). Whereas certain sectors of literature argue that in countries such as the United States automation is a risk to only 9% of jobs, other sources claim that it is a potential threat to 47% of jobs (Aboal and Gonzalo Zunino, 2017). In addition to these projections, the fact is that there will be a different impact on each of the two continents (and within them), a situation that implies a need for intensive discussions on job relocation and on its political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and educational dimensions, among many others (Lee, 2016; Brockman, 2015).

On another note, 3D and 4D printing also have the potential to alter patterns of consumption, as well as our access to goods, tools and services. Dialogue on this subject is essential at bi-regional level. Designers, entrepreneurs and businesses will be able to attain a critical mass and even reach a global audience. 3D printing is also creating areas that can reinforce the capacity of educational institutions while 3D printers are

already facilitating teaching at universities where they help translate the theoretical teaching by lecturers into examples and practical work that can be done more cheaply and within the same teaching space (Azcaray, Torán, Leslabay and Sendra, 2018). However, this can also generate a gradual decline in employment as it replaces existing productive hubs that require more manpower. There have been warnings about its disruptive capacity on various occasions (Lund, Manyika & Bughin, 2016). There are likewise implications in the field of security, as the proliferation of advanced systems and low-cost 3D printing facilitate access to the means necessary for the home-made printing of weapons. This has repercussions on current firearms legislation given that this is based on the existence of regulated production centres for such items. The obsolescence of legislation on both continents is seen in the fact that production may take place in the homes of private individuals without leaving any trace.

At the same time, new materials and the development of nanotechnology have the potential to create opportunities in the private sector, from health service industries to energy and automotive service companies (Bhushan, 2017). It will be at the intersection of nanotechnology and biotechnology (sectors where investment will be concentrated), where a large number of inventions could be generated, potentially revolutionising both production systems and the goods produced. This could bring considerable related benefits for consumers and, if used appropriately, these could lead us to a more sustainable future. However, the public sector must consider the costs and benefits to citizens of using nanotechnologies, and the economic impact of these materials. Developing this type of technology requires investment and continuous support, a relationship widely discussed from various viewpoints (Mulvaney, 2016; Dickherber, 2015). At the same time, we must consider the environmental and health risks, as many of these materials have high levels of toxicity, so knowledge of these effects must be widely circulated. In terms of the integration, development and use of new materials, the way is opened up to the implementation of policies for technology transference and training, not only between European, Latin American and Caribbean States but also between companies (Fressoli & Smith, 2016). This in turn implies restructuring productive sectors and commercial agendas on both sides of the Atlantic, as new regional value chains are created.

In addition, as various authors have explained, Big Data is a phenomenon with global reach, whose impact both in Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean may be “actually or potentially economic, benefiting both the public and the private sector, in terms of increased productivity, sectorial competitiveness and the quality of life of citizens” (Malvicino and Yoguel, 2015). Concerning its impact in terms of regionalisation and globalisation, the use of Big Data can help us perceive an application particularly related to the following factors: logistics and connectivity, knowledge of the consumer, administration and customs controls, scale, circulation of knowledge, and risk management. As argued in a recent study “Big Data does not only deal with large volumes of data, but also includes other significant aspects of data processing, such as variety, velocity and veracity”. In the same vein, however, the study also states that “implementing Big Data has a high cost in terms of experts,

longer time for technological adaptation, the difficulty of implementing new analyses and limited perception” (Hernández-Leal, Duque-Méndez & Moreno-Cadauid, 2017). In the bi-regional context, experiences at national level, lessons learned and shared experience provide windows of opportunity to increase cooperation and generate more reliable and transparent systems.

As for the abstract concept of “the Internet of Things” (IoT) (Ashton, 2009) this also presents challenges. It concerns business and the public sector, as well as many other stakeholders (Diéguez, Sánchez & Schejtman, 2015) and refers to the “technological evolution that allows the Internet to reach the real world of physical objects, turning common objects into *intelligent things* connected to the Internet” (Evans, 2011). Many companies in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean have not developed the technology to process the amount of data relating to the production, distribution, sale and use of products. But the fact is that progress in innovation “presents its own progress in how it influences ways of working in every aspect of daily life, which impacts socio-economic, commercial, political, governmental, medical and educational matters and many other areas too” (Gutiérrez Hernández, 2016). The adoption of the Internet of Things by governments could create opportunities for bi-regional cooperation in areas such as infrastructure and the provision of public services, as these technologies tend to reduce costs and improve the quality of such services (Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic & Palaniswami, 2013). Investment in managing this phenomenon has the potential of generating improvements in productivity, efficiency and control. The Cloud also has the possibility of generating a positive spillover for the community by creating jobs. However, this requires appropriate support in public policy and in the training of employees (Rifkin, 2014). It also entails the need to discuss regulatory frameworks, a dynamic that could be powered by the EU-LAC Foundation. Indeed, as stated in a recent report by the Argentinian government “the deployment of systems based on the IoT, and their potential impact on users and businesses, has regulatory implications, some more related to the functions of telecommunications regulators and others related to the protection of data, security and privacy” (Ministry of Communications, undated).

In this context, Blockchain is an additional concept that presents a huge revolution across a wide range of areas, as it enables intermediaries to be eliminated in all sorts of transactions, leaving the control of processes in the hands of users and not in centralised management structures (Pastor, 2018). It is based on the existence of a secure, distributed database (a Blockchain) that requires there to be various users (hubs) that undertake to verify transactions so as to validate them. The block corresponding to this transaction therefore remains registered (Pastor, 2018). In addition to financial transactions, Blockchain offers both regions significant advantages in the administration of all types of information, such as property registry, car-sharing, decentralised storage in the Cloud, identity validation, governmental management and transparency, health and social security (Mubaslat, 2018), and management of copyright, among other things.

The use of blockchain can streamline many exchange processes between Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe, as has been shown by the incorporation of Wave by part of the BBVA Bank: international commercial transactions require a “letter of credit” (a banking document that certifies the operation and the payment between the parties) which usually takes ten days, so a pilot programme is being trialled to migrate the letter of credit process to blockchain with the result that the transaction can be verified and authorised in just two hours and twenty minutes (Morales, 2017). Furthermore, in February 2018 the European Commission launched the EU blockchain observatory and forum with the objective of identifying and highlighting the principal innovations in blockchain technology, promoting European agents and strengthening the European commitment to the many interested parties involved in blockchain activities (European Commission, 2018). These type of spaces have huge potential in streamlining the communication of lessons learned and in the design and use of new policies in the field, through which the materials derived may not only be enjoyed by State and non-State stakeholders outside the European Union, but may be used as a basis for inter-regional initiatives of a similar format.

In the financial area, blockchain is the cornerstone of cryptocurrencies as these use the blockchain system of a decentralised computer network with copies of all the transactions carried out. The cryptocurrency system allows the exchange of values outside the centralised banking systems and in total anonymity, which accounts for some of the attraction of this system, as it offers a high level of confidentiality and respect for users’ privacy, yet it also carries a high risk of being used for illegal activities such as buying and selling illegal goods or tax avoidance (Clements, 2018). This is a huge challenge to both regions, not only in terms of increased demand for electricity, the growth of “mining” in countries with lower electricity costs (and in many cases the use of less polluting ways of producing energy), but also in terms of its support in the future as the cost of generating Bitcoins increases significantly.

Finally, we must stress the importance of unmanned aircraft (drones), which are becoming increasingly common in our societies and having a profound impact. This is expressed from various points of view and across various fields. They may be used for recreation (allowing various forms of training), commercial use (facilitating tasks and reducing costs such as in audio-visual production), or in the agricultural sector, or for security purposes (reducing the load on human resources and increasing reaction times), or they may be adopted by State bodies for purposes such as checking and collecting tax liabilities, or there is their increasing importance in the military sphere where they are rapidly changing the nature of modern warfare (McDonald, 2018). All these areas are and will be affected by drones and this opens many windows of opportunity for bi-regional cooperation. They are even expected to revolutionise the door-to-door delivery of products ordered on line (Lavars, 2018).

The use of drones brings with it a series of challenges both in Europe and in Latin America and the Caribbean, including how they are regulated in law, measures to avoid congestion of airspace (Lohn, 2017), airport security, quality control so that passers-by

are safeguarded from system failures, and the regulation of their use to prevent them being used for activities that are illegal or which violate the privacy of individuals. There is currently a broad range of ways of regulating these aircraft, starting from very different premises, from total prohibition to an intermediate restrictive regulatory framework to countries with very little regulation (Jones; 2017).

In the bi-regional arena, cooperation in the design and implementation of standardised regulations may facilitate their creation by incorporating various lessons learned. It may indeed also help design world-wide regulations that not only make the use of these devices safer but also ensure that their production is not the monopoly of the central countries.

As shown in a recent study by ECLAC, “businesses in the European Union were also at the forefront of investment in research and development in Latin America and the Caribbean: 71% of investment announced for R+D projects over the last five years is from companies in the European Union. The location of centres of applied research, such as the Fraunhofer centres in Chile and Brazil, shows how research capacity is available to progress towards advanced manufacturing in the region”. The same report points out that “investment flows into the region should be reinforced by the growth and economic recovery on the horizon, and the ever greater need to face up to global challenges through strengthened relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union, which may help to attain the Sustainable Development Goals, improve productive structures and generate capacity for the digital economy in both regions.”

The importance of the EU to Latin America and the Caribbean in this sector acquires a key value in the implementation of mechanisms of technological cooperation, the use of new systems that simplify commercial exchanges and financial links, the construction of identity and the generation of appropriate methods of projecting the symbolic image of the region. This may be expressed in various aspects, among which we could mention the close cooperation in key areas and the aligning of positions to achieve bi-regional linkage strategies, as well as to deal with shared negotiations with third countries and regions. In more operational terms, the cooperation of both regions in sectors linked to technology and innovation may enrich discussion, modernise regulatory frameworks and reinforce these sectors by integrating the various diverse experiences of the countries in the region and the lessons learned in these areas. Regulatory cooperation could in itself boost regional markets by reducing barriers to the integration of technology and opening up markets to technological developers from both regions through coordination in the design and implementation of similar regulations. This would facilitate the creation of a broader and more flexible regulatory framework rather than a diversity of legal frameworks in each country making technological integration difficult.

As for financial cooperation for technological development, it is important to point out that “investment flows into the region should be reinforced by the growth and

economic recovery on the horizon, and the ever greater need to face up to global challenges through strengthened relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union, which may help to attain the Sustainable Development Goals, improve productive structures and generate capacity for the digital economy in both regions.” (ECLAC, 2018). In this context of strategies for development and support for the sector, bi-regional cooperation may help small businesses gain access to the sources of finance they need to advance their projects, such as incubators and accelerators, which would significantly improve competitiveness in this sector for the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe as against other hubs that are springing up in the United States, Israel, China, India and countries of South-East Asia. This link would in turn provide a competitive advantage for the European incubators and accelerators as they would be able to access technological enterprises in Latin America more easily than in other countries or regions. Many technologies that are being developed promise to be not only revolutionary for various markets and industries, but also to offer the chance of significantly tipping the balance of competitiveness between countries at the same time as reducing production costs, simplifying logistics, altering the map of the labour market and opening up spaces for new products and services to be consumed on the world market.

6. THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION

Produced by Detlef Nolte, Luicy Pedroza and Gino Pauselli

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 was one of the most important elements in establishing the international liberal order at the end of the Second World War. The idea that all human beings have certain freedoms and guaranteed rights by the simple fact of being a person was fundamental to the spread and consolidation of democracy, liberalism and humanitarian and cooperative actions for development. Yet this order would appear to be called into question in the current international situation. Barry Posen recently pointed out that there is a surge in illiberal dominance with the Presidency of Donald Trump in the United States turning its back on the world order that has led the way up to now and that there is therefore a reluctance to continue investing in institutions that are pillars of this order: free trade, multilateral organisations, democracy and human rights (Posen, 2018).

Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union are the two regions in the world where democracy, free trade and human rights have taken root to the greatest extent, albeit with varying levels of success. Despite the difficulties involved in promoting human rights, there is no doubt that one cannot imagine a place with a better quality of life or greater respect for human rights. So, faced with an international scenario where illiberal and nationalist forces are advancing to the detriment of the enjoyment of human rights in the world, it becomes essential to analyse those elements that could help defend and promote these rights, especially in two regions that belong to the nucleus of the western world that underlies the international liberal order.

According to the latest report from Freedom House, in 2017 there were 39 free countries at global level, that is, countries where civil and political rights are guaranteed to the whole population. However, that was the twelfth consecutive year which saw a decline in freedom in the world: in 2017, while 35 countries recorded improvements in respect of civil and political rights, 71 suffered a deterioration. The EU and LAC should be key players in maintaining the international liberal order in general, and protecting human rights at international level in particular. According to this report, out of all the free countries in the world, 56% are in one of these two regions, while only 4% of countries that systematically violate human rights are found in Latin America, the Caribbean or the European Union. At the same time, the gaze of the international community has fallen upon several countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, during the second cycle of the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council of

the United Nations, two countries in the region were among the 15 countries which received most recommendations from their peers to improve human rights protection internally.

Latin America and the Caribbean, and the European Union, are the two world regions which have specialist Courts for dealing with cases of violations of human rights. These regional institutions have in turn both been criticised by governments emphasising nationalist positions. In 2012 Venezuela denounced the Pact of San José, Costa Rica and the following year withdrew from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). More recently, the Head of the British Government, Theresa May, called for leaving the European Convention on Human Rights because, in her words, “it limits Parliament’s power and makes the United Kingdom less secure”. In other countries, candidates with nationalist and xenophobic agendas have come very close to winning elections.

Independently of the domestic, regional and international context being less favourable to liberalism and human rights, in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and of the European Union human rights violations can be observed whose root causes lie in institutional failings, cultural matters or the weakness of the State. According to reports published by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department, there are problems with the enjoyment of first and second generation rights in both regions. In the case of Latin America, we may mention situations of torture, extrajudicial executions, abuse by the military, prison overcrowding, violence against women, limited access to reproductive services, limits and impediments to the right of free expression, threats and attacks against human rights defenders and journalists, persecution of political opponents and the suppression of protest. These situations are reflected in the type of recommendations received by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean from States of the international community in the Universal Periodic Review.

The member States of the European Union, despite being classified as free countries where civil and political rights are widely respected, are not exempt from difficulties in the enjoyment of human rights. Some of the main challenges in the countries of the European Union are related to matters of discrimination and intolerance towards minorities, especially anti-Semitic and anti-Moslem violence, the abuse of power in counter-terrorism, and discrimination towards refugees.

Both regions could derive mutual benefit from cooperating in the area of human rights, at bilateral, bi-regional and multilateral levels. In the first place, the European Union is one of the principal donors of development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the Latin American and Caribbean countries having received less development assistance in the last twenty years, as it went down from 12% in 1995 to 7% in 2016, the EU and its member States were responsible between 1995 and 2000 for 40% of all funds sent to Latin America and the Caribbean while this percentage has increased to 45% over the last five years.

The EU fulfils an even more important role in financing measures that support the specialisation of employees in human rights institutions and mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels and in human rights NGOs. According to data from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in recent years only 0.2% of total development assistance was aimed at human rights matters, but that was still a considerable increase on the 0.04% of 1995. But the EU is the undisputed leader in this area, with the European institutions and their member States representing between 40% and 60% of the total funds directed towards human rights initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean. This leadership is, however, on the decline, as in the 1990s, the EU represented 90% of development assistance in the area of human rights in Latin America. In the face of the contemporary challenges represented by the advance of nationalism, isolationism and populism, the EU is in an excellent position to lead initiatives to promote and protect human rights in a region like Latin America and the Caribbean, where the largest number of 'free' countries is to be found, after the European Union itself.

Secondly, although there are similarities in some of the challenges to and violations of human rights in both regions, Latin America and the Caribbean share particular problems that bear no similarity to the current challenges of the European Union. For example, faced with abuse by the military and security forces, Colombia can share with its neighbours in the region its experience of how it managed to end the execution of civilians in the hands of members of the Armed Forces. At the same time, increasing abuse in Mexico and Central America has resulted in thousands of disappeared people and a surge in journalist murders, threatening freedom of expression. Here, Argentina can bring its experience in forensic investigation and human rights violations, particularly forced disappearances. South-south cooperation has grown in recent years and enables successful experiences to be exported to improve the human rights situation in other countries. This in no way means that the EU does not have a role to play. The leadership of the European Union and its members in the area of development assistance would enable successful triangular partnerships to be developed between the EU, a country with experience to share in Latin America, and another State with challenges to overcome.

Thirdly, the European Union and its member States have condemned the repression of human rights in Venezuela and imposed an embargo on arms and materials that could be used for internal repression. One area of multilateral cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean where coordination could be developed to improve the human rights situation in the region is the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations, specifically the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The UPR is a peer review mechanism created at the HRC, which came into action in 2008. In it States themselves review the human rights situation of every member of the United Nations and make recommendations to each State reviewed with the aim of promoting human rights

in the world. These recommendations are made in a tone of collaboration to avoid situations of 'naming and shaming'.⁴⁹

The member countries of the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean are those which made most recommendations during the first two cycles of the UPR (between 2008 and 2016). Among the 20 States which made the highest number of recommendations to countries under review, 16 were members of the European Union or Latin America or the Caribbean. Furthermore, both groups represent slightly more than a quarter of the total members of the United Nations, yet these countries made 48% of the recommendations in the first nine years of the UPR mechanism. The EU and Latin America and the Caribbean could have an even greater influence on the promotion of human rights in the rest of the world if they managed to coordinate the recommendations they make both by emphasising certain rights if many countries highlight one particular recommendation and by being able to encompass a wider range of recommendations, so that countries avoid duplicating recommendations.


6.1 Refugees

The international liberal order also implies the free movement of goods, services and people. To achieve this it is essential that migration should flow smoothly and that migrants should enjoy human rights. There is a special category of migrant in international law, that of the refugee: the person fleeing their country of origin because of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion; in other words, they have been forced to leave their countries because of armed conflict, generalised violence with serious violations of human rights. The European Union is one of the principal destinations for economic migration and for refugees. As for Latin America and the Caribbean, they continue to be a region from which economic migrants originate, but to a lesser extent than decades ago, and they are becoming a more frequent destination for those seeking asylum.

In recent years, the number of requests for asylum in the countries of the European Union has tripled, from 375,000 in 2011 to over 1,200,000 in 2016, according to the most recent data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Yet up to 2015, there was no increase in the level of acceptance of such requests in the member States of the European Union. The number of refugees who received no response from the European countries therefore rose from 50,000 in 2011 to almost 300,000 in 2015. The year 2016 saw an improvement in the response of European countries to asylum requests, and the percentage of requests with no response decreased by 25%.

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49 The strategy of 'naming and shaming' refers to situations where players seek to make public to the international community the human rights violations of one country and thus generate a reputational cost to the violating country (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). This strategy has been shown to be ineffective (Hafner-Burton 2008). There is evidence on the effectiveness of strategies that include reports prepared by the countries themselves such as the UPR (Simmons and Creamer, shortly to be published).

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the number of asylum requests per year fluctuated between 20,000 and 28,000 before 2016. For the last year for which the UNHCR has official data, 2016, the number jumped to 48,000. Although this is far from causing a critical situation like that in Europe, it was not accompanied by an increase in acceptance of such requests by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Consequently, the number of requests awaiting a decision in the region doubled between 2016 and 2017.



Patterns of refugee migration are different in the cases of the European Union and of Latin America and the Caribbean. The refugees who come to the countries of the European Union are mainly from Syria and from African countries such as Libya, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia. In the case of LAC, the majority of recent requests for asylum come from Venezuela, a country within the region: it is estimated that 1.5 million Venezuelans have been forced to leave their homes, and this has therefore become the largest migratory flow in the region in recent years. These people can be considered refugees because many of them have fled from the current insecurity, violence, and lack of food and medicines in Venezuela. Although not all the Venezuelans who have left their country have requested asylum in other countries, asylum requests from Venezuelans have doubled between 2016 and 2017, reaching a total of 52,000. The main countries in the region where Venezuelans seek to be recognised as refugees are Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico.

Concerning the challenges faced by refugees; in both regions they have difficulties of cultural adaptation and in using the language of the host country, as well as problems in accessing employment, health and education. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean some countries have very progressive legislation on the broad concept of

recognising refugees, as is the case in Brazil with Law 9.474 of 1997. Nevertheless, the main problem the region has in providing protection for refugees is the lack of economic resources that could help develop extensive integration programmes in the host countries. In this area the European Union can be a strategic partner for Latin America both by creating a bi-regional fund to help implement comprehensive policies for the reception of refugees from the region and from other parts of the world, and by exchanging successful policies of integration and awareness-raising of public opinion in the face of one of the most important humanitarian issues experienced by the planet in the second decade of the twenty-first century. This may be even more necessary in Europe than in LAC, given the growing strength of political movements and parties of the extreme right which present an agenda that is not only anti-immigrant, but anti-refugee.

6.2 Migration

Migration was mentioned as a theme, but not as a priority, at the first two EU-LAC summits (Rio Declaration 1999, Madrid 2002). But at subsequent summits the subject acquired greater relevance, probably due to the increased emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Since 2004, for example, there have been regular meetings between experts in migration from both sides (such as in Quito in March 2004 and in Cartagena in March 2006) (Stuhldreher, 2015).

Migration is one of the focuses of the current EU-CELAC Summit Action Plan. The principal objectives in this area are: i) intensifying bi-regional cooperation by determining common challenges and opportunities requiring common solutions; ii) constructing a more solid documentary basis on migration between both regions, for the purpose of better understanding this reality; iii) looking at the positive synergies between migration and development; iv) deriving the maximum benefit from the effects of migration and human mobility in development; v) tackling regular and irregular migration and other connected matters, such as the illegal trafficking of migrants and human trafficking; vi) promoting total respect for human rights for all migrants, including unaccompanied minors. Based on the declaration at the EU-LAC Summit in Lima (May 2008) in June 2009, the Structured and Comprehensive bi-regional Dialogue on Migration was initiated, to examine matters of mutual concern and interest to both regions. The first meeting under this umbrella was held in Brussels in September 2009. The tenth and up to now last High Level Dialogue Meeting took place on 10 and 11 November 2016 in Santiago de Chile. Although it is not possible to distinguish any striking results from these meetings, they did commission studies to create an empirical base of the migratory flows between both regions (IOM 2012a; IOM 2012b; 2015). It appears that migration has not been a matter of high priority lately in inter-regional relations between Latin America and Europe (see for example European Parliament 2017).

In Europe, discussion on migratory processes is almost exclusively focussed on refugees and immigration from the Middle East and Africa. In the period 2002-2007, people from Latin America and the Caribbean made up 10% of migration into the EU, a historic surge, yet shortly afterwards, in 2012, the proportion had gone down to 3% (IOM 2015). The net direction in the balance of flows between the regions has now reversed: since 2010 the net balance reveals higher migration from Europe to LAC than vice versa. In addition, we should note that these recent European emigrants have not necessarily gone to the “traditional” countries of immigration in South America (Brazil, Argentina), but to countries such as Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador (IOM 2015). Nevertheless, in Latin America and the Caribbean the predominant issues in migration are related to intra-continental and intra-regional phenomena, such as the repercussions of the anti-immigrant policy of the United States President, Trump, and the flows of refugees for economic and political reasons from Venezuela, Haiti and some countries in Central America.

The fact that the subject of inter-regional migratory flows is not a burning issue between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean could facilitate dialogue based on the mechanisms already in existence and the experience accumulated over more than ten years of exchange between experts and politicians. This could well take tangible forms. For example, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean may develop common positions in the international arena concerning the creation of an international migratory regime. We must not forget the many special features in the historical and contemporary migratory processes between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean that can help with exchange of experience and rapprochement of positions.

The most fundamental of these features to bear in mind, and more important than any other, is the high level of fluctuating and reciprocal migratory movements between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. From the time of the Spanish conquest and since the independence of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, many people crossed the Atlantic from Europe, attracted by the economic opportunities offered by the new States of LAC. However, this trend changed at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, when there was a significant growth in emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe. In the period 1999-2007 the flow of Latin American and Caribbean migrants into Europe increased six-fold (from 64,000 to 376,000). This trend ceased in 2007. In the period 2010-2012 more people left the EU to go to LAC than left LAC to go to the EU. In 2010, one in ten immigrants living in the EU originated from LAC and almost two in ten immigrants living in LAC originated from a country in the EU. Up to 2013, a total of 4.21 million people from LAC were living in the countries of the EU, half of them in Spain (IOM 2015). However, discussion of migration processes between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean should not be limited to inter-regional migration. Migration within Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean is more important, and both regions can share these experiences and speak in harmony in international forums

that are very relevant today (for example, in the framework of the recently concluded negotiations on a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration).⁵⁰

Migration is therefore one of the issues in relations between the EU and LAC which, despite its complexity, may enable discussion of shared interests and substantial elements in common. Not all these similarities are the product of free elections in sovereign countries; indeed, the majority are historical remnants of the colonial relationship between countries in both regions and of power relations that for a long time were heavily asymmetrical. However, there is now a relationship of similarities and reciprocities in terms of the treatment of migration between the two regions that enables a deeper collaboration between equals to be developed. In particular, we suggest that such collaboration can be maintained on the basis of three major areas of convergence that already exist in terms of migratory matters.

In the first place, the EU and LAC have (sub-)regional agreements that allow people to move legally between countries and which include extensive rights of residency and of participation in the labour markets and social provision systems of other member countries⁵¹. Secondly, both regions are global leaders in the trend of accepting dual or multiple nationality. Latin America, in particular, as well as being a pioneer in this respect is the region with the highest proportion of countries that tolerate multiple nationality for migrants (especially for its own emigrants) (Vink et al., 2015). Thirdly, both regions are world leaders in recognising the political rights of migrants, both emigrants and immigrants (Calderón Chelius, 2004; Escobar, 2007; Pedroza, 2013; Bauböck, 2005).

The bases of these three areas of convergence in respect of migration between the two regions originate in two phenomena, one contemporary and one historical. The contemporary phenomenon is the integration of sub-regional and regional blocs, especially the European Union and Mercosur. The historical phenomenon is the development of similar citizenship regimes across the two regions, which have largely been developed to be compatible – at least at bilateral level between some countries of both regions – or even designed to particularly favour the nationals of some countries in the other region. This legal base of citizenship and nationality between the two regions has very great consequences for contemporary migration.

Such consequences translate into preferential policies for citizens of the other region at various levels. At a high level of preference are found policies of multiple nationality and citizenship in countries of both regions, when the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*

50 Negotiations ended on 13 July 2018, and the agreement was to be formally approved within the framework of an inter-governmental conference in Marrakech (Morocco) on 10 and 11 December. The United States did not take part in the negotiations and Hungary withdrew from the negotiations shortly before they were concluded.

51 The EU has all these aspects integrated in broad fundamental rights that are valid for citizens of Member States, for example the Directive on the right of EU citizens to move freely and live in all the countries (Directive 2004/38/CE) and other Directives, all based on the Treaty on European Union which sees free movement as a fundamental right. In LAC, there are also several agreements which regulate this, for example the MERCOSUR “Residence for Member States’ Nationals Agreement” in 2009.

principles of nationality acquisition come together, conferring benefits upon the same person, who may enjoy rights of nationality and citizenship in two or more States in the two regions. Because dual/multiple nationality favours citizens “shared” by the two regions, much of the migration between the two regions is not counted as such, as it involves the mobility of nationals.⁵² For example, people from Argentina, who have arranged naturalisation because they are descendants of Italian nationals, under the principle of *jus sanguinis* in the Italian law of nationality, may immigrate to Italy and the European Union without being considered foreigners (unless they are counted as born abroad). This is no doubt advantageous to many Latin American immigrants who can come to Europe as citizens without having to fulfil the standard requirements that other immigrants do have to meet. They also have the benefit of an open door to the European community. Nevertheless, we should also note that the fact they are not counted as migrants means they are easily lost from the integration policies designed for migrants which might indeed benefit them. Furthermore, an even more ambiguous consequence of these nationality laws favouring Latin American and Caribbean people in Europe is that not *all* Latin American and Caribbean people are favoured equally – and not even equally to all the citizens of a particular country in Latin America, as they only favour people who can prove they are descended from some European country where they can request *jure sanguinis* nationality (Hansing y Hoffmann, 2019).

Among the preferential policies at intermediate level is the relaxation or facilitation of requirements for naturalisation or the recognition of broad political rights for all immigrants from certain countries in these regions. For example, this would be the case of the nationality law in Spain that favours the naturalisation of immigrants from the Latin American [or “Ibero-American”] countries, by setting a lower length of residency requirement for them than is required of others. In several countries in LAC, Spanish [or “Ibero- American”] citizens enjoy a similar privilege. One example of a preferential package of citizens’ rights for immigrants from some countries in the other region is the citizenship agreement in force since 1971 between Brazil and Portugal, which means that in either of these two countries the nationals of the other country enjoy citizenship rights that are not comparable to the rights of the other resident immigrants, and this has been endorsed in the most recent bilateral treaties (*Convenção sobre igualdade de direitos e deveres entre Brasileiros e Portugueses; Tratado de Amizade, Cooperação e Consulta entre a República Federativa do Brasil e a República Portuguesa*). These preferential policies at intermediate level have less ambiguous implications for inequality within and between countries, partly because they are usually of a universal nature – that is, they affect or favour all the nationals of a country and not just some who are eligible to claim them, as with dual nationality by ancestry. It would be desirable for both regions to seek an extension of the specific agreements in this area of preferential relations which go beyond favouring certain individuals. It would be particularly appropriate to envisage policies that favour citizens from *the whole* of the other region.

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52 There is data on the relationship between Brazil and Portugal, but no difference is made between whether or not the Portuguese in Brazil have Brazilian nationality or not: In 2000, 213,203 Portuguese people were living in Brazil, comprising the largest group of immigrants in the country. This number is both an indication of and a reaction to the favourable residency policies (<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/shaping-brazil-role-international-migration/>).

One powerful reason to go down this road is the set of specific characteristics underlying the migratory relationship of EU-LAC described above: migrations between these two regions have a marked counter-cyclical character for the countries of origin and are almost immediately felt in greater flows in the other region. That is to say, when there is a crisis in a country in Latin America and the Caribbean, there will be citizens who make plans to emigrate to Europe, where not only do they have the ability to integrate, especially because of their cultural and linguistic characteristics, but also where migration and citizenship regimes favour their arrival, permanent residence and naturalisation. It is here essential to emphasise that precisely because LAC has a similar legal basis, or even one that has been developed in a manner preferential to the other region, it performs the same function for some countries in Europe. This dynamic of migration between the two regions was evident during the economic crisis Spain recently underwent, when Spanish citizens emigrated to various countries in LAC in search of employment opportunities. On this same basis of shared values it was also possible to develop return programmes that are groundbreaking in the world. Given that these flows are kept within manageable levels from an administrative and economic point of view, one could say they achieve the real “triple-win” promised by circular migration programmes in both regions. However, to avoid the risk of making simplistic comparisons with circular migration programmes, we must stress very clearly the condition that allows this triple-win to be achieved: freedom for migrants to decide how much, when, how and with whom they wish to emigrate, a freedom based on their rights being recognised in advance in the other country.

The legal basis for preferential policies of migration and citizenship is precisely what enables the people who are migrating to make decisions concerning their own mobility. This in turn delineates a radically different model compared to the circular migration policies designed in contexts of asymmetry between countries, where participation in migration programmes is usually conditional upon being obliged to return or to leave their families in the country of origin. Therefore, the scenario to be promoted at political level between the EU and LAC in the future should involve extending the recognition of rights to all citizens in the other region to expand the potential of the “triple-win” and avoid exacerbating the inequality caused by emigration in the country of origin and the separation of families, which has serious psycho-social consequences on all those involved, especially the children and young people who are “left behind”.

Finally, among the most important convergences relating to how migration is treated in the EU and LAC we should point out the growing common agreement to decriminalise migration in both regions. This agreement has developed gradually, but its roots no doubt lie in the identity of many countries in these regions as countries constituted from immigration and emigration, now consolidated in sub-regional agreements validating the rights of people who move around and opening up borders. The limits of these political developments are at the borders of the regions.⁵³ In LAC, the restrictive

⁵³ Among the member States of the EU there are hardly any borders or frontiers; the single European market is expressed in the elimination of national borders to control people and goods, under the Schengen agreement. Control of the external border of the EU has entailed developing a common migration policy up to a certain level (since the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, further specified at the European Council in

migration policies of the US pose an enormous challenge to managing migration in Mexico and Central America in a decent manner. When considering relevant future scenarios and the challenges to these regions of external players and phenomena, such as the US or the instability in the Middle East, both regions can rely on these agreements, as well as on the common position they reached in the negotiations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (to be signed in Marrakech, Morocco, in December 2018).

Of course, not everything results in convergence. Efforts to integrate migrants in Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean have evolved in ways that even differ from the way the challenges posed by intense and unexpected “crisis” migrations are dealt with. In Mercosur, the legal basis provided for intra-regional mobility has enabled much more balanced management of the recent emigration of Venezuelan citizens. In countries where there were no visas for them, special visas have been created. Given the effect of competition and comparison between the countries of the region, it is likely no country wants to stand out for treating migrants badly. So, in LAC we have seen the opposite of the “race-to-the-bottom” effect seen in Europe since the summer of 2015, when more and more countries reintroduced border controls and altered their laws on immigration and asylum (Annan, 2016). Although we are dealing with migratory flows and reception contexts that are structurally different and difficult to compare, these few parallels may indeed lead to reflection on the type of regional dynamic that favours better handling of migration even in crisis situations.

There are also major divergences in how immigration is perceived by the indigenous population. According to a special survey carried out by Eurobarometer in October 2017⁵⁴, whereas almost 60 per cent of those surveyed felt comfortable (in various types of social interaction) with immigrants, and just over half of Europeans thought immigrants had a positive impact on society, four out of ten Europeans think that immigration is a problem rather than an opportunity (with large variations between the countries of the EU). The great majority of those surveyed agree that the EU can support the integration of immigrants into their member countries (to varying extents). This is a topic that must be included in a dialogue on immigration between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. Although xenophobic nationalism is currently more of a European (or United States) problem, Latin America and the Caribbean are not totally immune from it.

Tampere in 1999 with the aim of making the EU an area of freedom, security and rights). In Latin America, where none of the supra-regional organisations or agreements has led to a common territory without physical barriers, something different has been observed: there is no true geographical community that involves a common migration policy towards the outside. All the countries regulate immigration from non-member countries in their own way, complying separately with the agreements they have signed up to concerning the entrance of citizens from other countries which have signed up to the same agreements. So in contrast to the EU, being a migrant or refugee in a country of LAC that is a member of a supra-national organisation does not mean being able to travel within the common territory or anything similar.

54 Special Eurobarometer 469, Integration of immigrants in the European Union, Summary, April 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/results-special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union_en

Up to now, LAC may perhaps have been more robust than Europe in the face of these threats as its governments always have in mind the fact that, despite whatever recent immigration “crisis” may have arisen, LAC is a region heavily characterised by emigration: because they have many thousands of citizens who have emigrated abroad, it is incumbent upon the governments of LAC to adopt frameworks calling for coherence and solidarity in the way immigrants are treated. Even so, because migrants are in a vulnerable position, they can become scapegoats for tensions of a different nature, as has recently happened in several European countries where they were blamed for over-using social services. This has also occurred in countries in LAC that are relatively prosperous compared to their geographical neighbours, as in the case of Costa Rica (Sandoval Carvajal et al., 2008; López Ruiz, 2011; Voorend, 2016). Harsh immigration processes may exacerbate social rupture and increase economic and political challenges, especially when there is recession or economic stagnation. However, a far greater threat to democracies is allowing immigration to be used as an instrument of xenophobic discourse, which sometimes does not even require actual influxes of migrants for it to take up more and more space in public opinion with the construction of vague threats. To avoid migrants being dehumanised and used as instruments in this way, it is important that both the EU and LAC continue to respect the human rights of migrants, as well as adopting and implementing mechanisms for social integration, at national, regional and inter regional levels, which cover migrant as well as indigenous (non-migrant) populations.

6.3 Migration as a central theme for bi-regional cooperation on global issues

Following in the footsteps of recent publications on migration in these two regions (Pedroza and Palop, 2018), we believe that the legal links and reciprocal flows already mentioned provide the ideal basis for both regions to develop a joint position in global discussions of great relevance to migration. Why should we focus on this issue? Because the two regions clearly share an interest in protecting the rights of their common populations. This would in itself be a solid reason for the Structured Dialogue of EU-CELAC to take migration as a central theme. Migration has traditionally been considered a matter of “low politics”. On the one hand, this implies that at times of tension in “high politics” within the regions, migration may be an issue that enables progress to be made with agreements focussed on the well-being of the people, rather than on major political projects. On the other hand, migration has become an issue of huge global relevance, so that the benefits of paying it greater attention would be duplicated in the current regional and global context. We should recall that in 2018 negotiation of the aforementioned Global Pact for orderly, safe and regular migration followed a trajectory initiated by the United Nations High-level Dialogue on Migration in 2006, and by other high-level and regional dialogues and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. These developments show that more and more States, and whole regions, are recognising that the theme of migration is a global issue requiring global responses.

Some areas that lend themselves to bi-regional cooperation and generating responses in unison in global negotiations are: 1) recognising the citizens' rights of nationals from the other region, making fewer and fewer distinctions between migrants according to their nationality, and instead according to them more universal rights as people and as residents; 2) guaranteeing that migrant communities have access to basic services of social protection, such as the right to health and education, both in their countries of residence and of origin; specifically, strengthening cooperation between countries in order to achieve social security agreements or coordination between countries that already have such agreements (for example, the Multilateral Ibero-American Social Security Agreement); 3) working jointly to promote return programmes that are (truly) voluntary, legal aid, training and education for migrants (both in the country of destination and in that of origin and later of return); 4) promoting agreements between States to provide legal safeguards for all stakeholders involved in the sending of remittances, without expecting these to provide the solution to the development of localities and regions; and 5) providing resources to generate, collect and analyse data on matters of migration and State migration policies and on the integration of migrants in and between these two regions by universities, institutions and research networks, foundations, etc. in a systematic, transparent and reliable way.

The importance of the EU to LAC in the area of human rights and migration, especially refugees, becomes relevant in the design and implementation of public policy to promote the wide enjoyment of these rights. Bilateral, multilateral and bi-regional cooperation initiatives have the potential to make the EU a strategic partner in the elimination of human rights violations and to take care of the victims of such practices which will in turn help maintain the international liberal order that might appear to be on the retreat.

As for migration, from the history that unites them to their contemporary experiences of migration, the EU and LAC share an experience of migration that not only leaves a decidedly positive balance, but also enables cooperation and dialogue to progress, even if we only focus on the many deep and important consensuses that already exist. From a perspective of equals, the most productive way to take the lead globally in dialogues on migration would be a kind of "benchmarking", comparing which of the two regions has the best practice. In aspects where there is still no common position or even limited convergence, it would be worth contrasting points of view and reducing the distance between the diverging policies of the two regions towards migrants.

Generally speaking, to find out which region and which countries in which region have best practice, it is worth being guided by two principles: the principle of coherence in principles governing migration policies, remembering that each emigrant from their own State is an immigrant in another State, and the principle of shared responsibility, remembering that solidarity with others facing short-term immigration challenges means one might expect the same solidarity in other areas and that this might cement cooperation both regionally and between neighbours faced with a world reality where, owing to increasing socio-economic inequality and more armed and environmental conflicts, it seems only possible to envisage more, not less, migration.

7. LAC-EU RELATIONSHIP SCENARIOS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Retrospective and prospective analysis of European/Latin American/Caribbean relations in a changing global context, focussed on the five themed approaches described above, enables us to distinguish three scenarios that take account of the constraints, factors and stakeholders previously identified. The principal external constraint of future LAC-EU relations and of the relevance of the EU to LAC lies in the enormous uncertainty presented by the international context, from the challenging of the international liberal order and return to the Nation-state, to the commercial and “political” protectionism following a regression in the process of globalisation.

The corresponding matrix of five thematic approaches and three scenarios which we present allows various visions of the future to be contrasted and evaluated, concerning the decade from 2018 to 2028 in the case of LAC-EU relations. These scenarios should not be considered exclusive, and may be combined. The predominance of one or other of the factors or trends in each area of the relationship will determine the predominance of one or other scenario and does not have to be the same for each of the sectors analysed. In schematic form we can describe these three scenarios by the following hypotheses: *Decline and Fragmentation*. This scenario assumes that the partnership does not achieve any strategic relationship, and relations become dispersed and cease to be of mutual relevance. This scenario includes a loss of international influence for both regions that can lead to them becoming irrelevant on the international stage.

Selective or à la carte -inter-regionalism. This is an intermediate scenario in which inter-regional relations do make progress, but only partially, in certain specific sectors, and with alliances of variable geometry.

Global strategic partnership. In this scenario progress is made in establishing inter-regional partnerships above the bi-regional relationship and this allows both regions to achieve greater international influence on global matters.

To carry out a prospective analysis of these possible scenarios, a series of semi-structured interviews were carried out with Latin American and European diplomats⁵⁵, in which

55 In alphabetical order, Carlos Alzugaray, ISRI (Havana); Pedro Caldentey, University of Loyola (Cordoba); Ruth Diamint, Torcuato di Tella University (Buenos Aires); Andrés Malamud, University of Lisbon; Carlos Malamud, Real Instituto Elcano (Madrid); Janina Onuki, University of Sao Paulo (San Pablo); Eduardo Perera, University of Havana; Carlos Quenan, IEHAL; Lorena Ruano, CIDE; Miriam Gomes Saraiva, State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)-Brazil; Juan Pablo Soriano, Autonomous University of Barcelona. Also

they were asked these two questions: 1). What are the repercussions of the crisis of regionalism in the EU and LAC and what consequences could this have for inter-regionalism and for the relevance of the EU to LAC?, 2). What short-term and medium-term scenarios could be devised for relations between the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean in the five areas selected for this paper?

Currently and in the short term, scenario 2 (*à la carte* relations) would seem to be the most likely, as it corresponds to a format of multilevel cooperation developing at different speeds and represents a “variable geometry”: at regional level, with two inter-regional forums of dialogue (Summits and EUROLAT), in the sub-regional arena with Central America, SICA, Cariforum, Mercosur and the Andean Community and at bilateral level with the two strategic partners, Brazil and Mexico, with the same formal status as Canada and the US in the external policy of the EU in the Americas; followed by Cuba (after the ADPC). Some of those interviewed said that the EU could achieve better results at bilateral level with certain States that have an open, liberal view of the economy in LAC, i.e. Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Panama, than with regional groups, thus achieving greater relevance for these partners. This jigsaw of diverse relations, with its large number of countries and stakeholders, will necessarily have great difficulty in making progress all at the same speed, so that they form an asymmetrical cooperation in the five areas mentioned, with varying degrees of EU relevance.

Nevertheless, EU-CELAC Summits and EUROLAT Meetings at inter-regional level serve, or should serve, to define the major guidelines and directions of travel of relations and the effective relevance of the EU. It would be necessary and desirable to define global themes where the interests and positions of both partners converge, for example in such matters as sustainable development and the fight against climate change, where there is greater harmony. Although differences do also exist in this area, they are mainly due to the different states of development and the responsibilities of both parties. These differences are wider in other thematic areas, such as migration and human rights, or in security and defence, where cooperation is still in its infancy and only for specific circumstances between certain countries. This relates to the issue of national sovereignty and the fact that no region constitutes what Hänggi calls a “community of security”.

The vast majority of those interviewed agree that both European and Latin American integration are in a state of crisis, but for different reasons and with different perspectives.

In the case of Latin America, due to the proliferation of institutions with varying objectives, different evaluations are made by the different organisations. Some people point out that those with more specific objectives, such as the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur

included were the views of participants in the Seminar “The international EU-CELAC agenda in times of global inter-regionalism: a view from academia” held in Barcelona on 23 May 2018, with the support of the EU-LAC Foundation.

or SICA make greater progress and support each other better than those with more vague objectives, which are more affected by the winds of politics. The current fragility of some institutions such as UNASUR or ALBA and, to a lesser extent CELAC, is noted, as they are all affected by the tension created by the crisis in Venezuela. Several people express the view that the problem is that regional integration has never been institutionalised in Latin America and cooperation remains dependent on the will and consensus of presidents in terms of agreement, without there being a clearly defined model. The lack of intra-regional economic integration is also noted, as a consequence of a production model aimed at the export of raw materials.

In the case of Europe, problems are associated with the euro crisis, political tensions because of migration, Brexit and even the situation in Italy, as challenges to be overcome, but there is no expectation of a risk of collapse in the short term. Some people define it as a “crisis of maturity”, as it is the high level of integration that has generated asymmetries to be resolved. Others say that what is happening is that the EU does not have an institutional framework for dealing with crises and that what this is fundamentally about is the asymmetric effects of these crises, as occurred in the financial crisis and the refugee crisis. Some of the fundamental issues identified as critical for the future are consolidation of the Eurozone to help stabilise the financial system, improving the financing of common policies and strengthening Defence policy. This relates to the perception that Europe is actually facing a global crisis where its position in the world is being called into question and its role in the international system is seen to be declining. Many of those interviewed believe that the EU has difficulty understanding this new reality.

As for the possible scenarios in the inter-regional relationship, all those interviewed agree that the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement is the linchpin in promoting the partnership, and is particularly relevant because of the positioning of Trump in the area of trade. There is also agreement that the fragmentation of regional mechanisms in Latin America is an obstacle as it generates cacophony, yet progress can nevertheless be made in certain specific sectors. Some people go as far as to say that the diversity of instruments designed in response to the various realities may be enriching. Several suggest it is possible that the relationship with sub-regional blocs no longer functions and that there will have to be a more open approach in different formats.

Concerning the institutional framework, several experts point to the need to rethink dialogue with CELAC. They think the agenda is too broad and very generic and therefore intractable and that what is really needed is to replace macro agreements by specific agendas. Some of those interviewed think it possible that relations will remain at ministerial level, to tackle issues of cooperation (regional programmes financed by the EU), but summits appear to be losing their value. Several interviewees highlighted the role of non-governmental players in the trans-regional relationship and the need to find channels to fully incorporate them into instruments of inter-regional cooperation. The majority state that the greatest areas of convergence in the Global Agenda are: Climate Change and its impact on many areas; Renewable Energies and Agenda 2030;

social cohesion is already a well-established issue on the Agenda, but it has not made sufficient progress and a more global approach must be made. On this issue, it is stated that it might be a case of reinventing an old agenda and putting greater emphasis on issues such as the fourth industrial revolution and the end of work as we know it. The agenda must be drawn up in terms of strategic positioning on issues of the future, to accommodate the model of sustainable development that includes the objectives of Agenda 2030.

Other opportunities highlighted are cooperation in issues such as interconnection infrastructure, the digital revolution and cooperation in higher education and research and in training in general, including the professionalization of the civil service. On the issue of migration, some think that Europe's refugee crisis has greatly damaged its image and that we must develop approaches of a more global nature that do not act defensively and deal with the deterrence, management and integration of migrants from the point of view of respect for Human Rights.

Common interests were also identified in the management of what some call global criminal markets, to seek convergent regulations and joint actions in matters such as the trafficking of drugs, people and arms, and associated crimes including money laundering and corruption. These are issues that require a global response, but where rhetoric often comes up against reality and the lack of major initiatives.

In other spheres, positions are even more fragmented, both between and within the regions and especially in LAC, and this is reflected in the votes and proposals in the international bodies. They are alliances of variable geometry. From the Latin American side, there is much criticism of interventions and interference in weaker countries, particularly in the cases of Libya and Syria, whereas in Europe its traditional role as a civil power has been weakened by recent interventions, especially in Libya and Syria.

Figure 3: Matrix of the LAC-EU scenarios up to 2028

| Scenario/ Theme | Decline and fragmentation (1) | Selective or à la carte inter-regionalism (2) | Global strategic partnership (4) |
|------------------------|--|---|--|
| Economic- financial | There is a failure to sign an agreement with Mercosur. | The Partnership Agreement with Mercosur is not finalised, but a partial minimum agreement is reached. | The Agreement with Mercosur is finalised. |
| | The Doha Round fails and trade wars intensify. | Agreements of variable geometry, but which tend to converge, are reached. | A partnership is made to unblock the Doha Round and de-escalate the trade wars. |
| | Bilateral agreements of an asymmetric nature proliferate, damaging multilateralism. | Latin American integration bodies stagnate but do not disintegrate. In the EU there is no Brexit contagion, but tensions in the intra-regional trade balance are exacerbated. | Convergence is achieved between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance and regulatory convergence is improved through the ALADI. The EU closes ranks and the single market is strengthened. |
| | Fragmentation of integration bodies in LAC and in the EU (post Brexit) becomes more entrenched. | The financial system is maintained and partial agreements are reached at the same time as alternative initiatives are strengthened, such as the BRICS Bank. | An agreement is reached to reform the international financial system with a rebalancing of decision-making and instruments for crisis prevention and management. |
| | Differences within the G20 increase and the financial system becomes fragmented. | | |
| Security- defence | The agenda of the Action Plans is not achieved nor is progress made with the Development – Security Nexus, the EU and LAC fragment and divide. | Some countries (Chile, Argentina, Brazil) make progress with the EU quicker than others. There is no bi-regional agenda. | A LAC-EU security and defence partnership is drawn up at a Summit. Priorities are terrorism and the fight against drug trafficking and related crimes. |
| | Current initiatives are frozen and no new initiatives are undertaken. | Existing initiatives are improved as are some specific programmes. | A priority is selected (for example, Peace Missions) and progress is made in this area by establishing partnerships to act in the multilateral arena. |

| Scenario/ Theme | Decline and fragmentation (1) | Selective or à la carte inter-regionalism (2) | Global strategic partnership (4) |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Security- defence | <p>The distance grows between LAC and the EU in the fight against drugs and terrorism.</p> <p>Tax havens continue to exist and there is a lack of institutional collaboration concerning trans-national crime.</p> | <p>Bi-regional cooperation programmes are developed and extended to fight international crime.</p> <p>Specific agreements are made to collaborate in the fight against fraud and corruption.</p> | <p>A global plan is established to fight drug trafficking and corruption.</p> <p>Measures of international pressure are taken to eliminate tax havens.</p> |
| Sustainable development | <p>EU-LAC continues to be fragmented in blocs and in fragmented programmes.</p> <p>Political instability and increasing inequality give rise to populist movements and the abandonment of the global Agenda 2030.</p> <p>Climate Change Agenda commitments are not met and there are increasing numbers of catastrophes because of the effects of natural disasters.</p> <p>Growth is prioritised over sustainability, and extractivism and the exploitation of natural resources over clean production.</p> <p>The New Urban Agenda is abandoned and an urban development model is extended.</p> | <p>Partial agreements are reached in some selected SDGs in which joint agreements and international initiatives are developed.</p> <p>Partnerships are achieved to implement specific projects between certain States that develop good practice capable of being replicated.</p> <p>Partial agreements are reached to fulfil specific objectives in climate change and in technology transference based on specific projects.</p> <p>Partial cooperation plans are drawn up to introduce partial changes in production systems and in the productive matrix.</p> | <p>An EU-LAC global partnership agreement is established to implement Agenda 2030 with financial commitments and common agendas.</p> <p>A joint strategy is drawn up to fight inequality with political and financial commitments in accordance with agenda 2030.</p> <p>A partnership is established in the face of climate change and a firm commitment is maintained with strategies designed to change the energy matrix.</p> <p>A global cooperation commitment is agreed for the fair incorporation of new forms of production, promoting value chains and technology transference.</p> |

| Scenario/ Theme | Decline and fragmentation (1) | Selective or à la carte inter-regionalism (2) | Global strategic partnership (4) |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Science and technology | <p>Lack of coordination drifts into a diversity of regulatory frameworks that hinder the effective operation of justice in international courts, restricts the technological development of some countries and/or limits access to regional and inter-regional markets.</p> | <p>Similar imitative regulatory frameworks are followed for new technologies, which helps companies of both regions to penetrate the market but continues to generate problems of coordination to fight crime linked to new technological developments.</p> | <p>Bi-regional cooperation enables legal frameworks to be designed and implemented to regulate new technologies that build on the experience and good practice of both regions, help companies penetrate all markets and promote the evolution of bi-regional technological initiatives.</p> |
| | <p>Lack of inter-regional progress in adopting new technology reduces the efficiency of transactions, business and cooperation between regions, reducing the competitiveness of both markets.</p> | <p>Limited bi-regional cooperation in technology enables development in some areas that derive benefit from new technology, while others find themselves left behind.</p> | <p>Bi-regional cooperation enables technological solutions to be implemented that simplify inter-regional operations, decreasing bureaucratic obstacles, accelerating procedures and facilitating the integration of the markets in both regions.</p> |
| | <p>Cooperation in supporting technological initiatives continues to be geographically reduced, so Latin American initiatives find themselves with no access to initial financial resources for their enterprises, with a negative impact on the regional technological sector, reducing competitiveness and increasing dependence on suppliers from outside the region.</p> | <p>Cooperation allows access to finance for some regional initiatives, but in a limited way and often with control of these initiatives being taken over by companies from outside the region, limiting the future development of new technology in Latin America and the Caribbean and contributing to the brain drain.</p> | <p>Bi-regional cooperation facilitates access to financing for technological projects that strengthen the sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, increase bi-regional ties, promote the creation of new regional "incubators" and "accelerators", and create the conditions for sustainable growth of the regional technological sector.</p> |

| Scenario/ Theme | Decline and fragmentation (1) | Selective or à la carte inter-regionalism (2) | Global strategic partnership (4) |
|------------------------------------|--|---|---|
| Migration- Human Rights | Defensive national policies are established for migration with barriers to mobility. | Partial agreements are established on managing migration and protecting migrants, keeping restrictive policies for flows of people. | A common agenda is achieved to create an international migration system based on the IOM. |
| | Fragmented national procedures are maintained on migrants' rights that entail a loss of individual rights. | Exceptional agreements are made to facilitate mobility and maintain the rights of migrant workers. | A system of joint monitoring is established to guarantee that migrants' rights are protected. |
| | The Agenda on Human Rights becomes invisible and human rights violations are ignored. | Exceptional training and skill-building plans are established on specific aspects of human rights with third countries. | Regional monitoring mechanisms are established in respect of human rights and institutional reform so they can be applied in an effective manner thereby strengthening multilateral action. |
| | The humanitarian crises caused by migration are ignored and migration is dealt with in a repressive way, as a security matter. | Reactive measures are taken in response to exceptional crises that occur without regard to the cause and without any surcharge. | Mechanisms for the prevention and early warning of possible humanitarian crises are established together with mechanisms for a collective response with fair distribution of the load. |

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study started from the initial question “Why should the EU have any relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean?” and then went on to develop a response by advancing five thematic approaches and drawing up three scenarios. Although this response must be qualified and adapted to the various areas of cooperation, we should highlight eight features of the EU that differ from other external partners of the region:

1. The European Union continues to be a major international player and, above all, an implementer of regulations within a multilateral framework of International Law. Latin America and the Caribbean share this multilateral vocation for a clear commitment to global governance with the EU. Through multiple forums for dialogue, this convergence enables regular exchange between the governments and civil societies of both regions on a basis of equality, despite there having been an asymmetrical relationship in the past. This network of political channels and the greater horizontality in relations mark a major difference from other external players in the region such as China and the United States and show the relevance the EU acquires as a global partner for LAC.
2. The EU is a multilevel international player (local, national, supranational, international) which offers Latin America and the Caribbean various dimensions of cooperation including a wide spectrum of stakeholders. This provides a comparative advantage, for example when drawing up and implementing development cooperation projects.
3. The specific nature of the bi-regional EU-LAC relationship presents two comparative advantages: the convergence of perceptions and values on the form the international order should take and a similar view of the need for multilateral global governance, consolidated in institutions. Within this framework, a strategic alliance should be strengthened to defend the common interests of both regions in the face of current radical changes in the international system and the threat of an illiberal international order becoming established.
4. Unlike China and the United States, whose relationship with the region is more limited (to economic and political interests in the case of Beijing and to relations of neighbourhood and security in that of the US), the EU is relevant because it offers a broader range of external relations: development cooperation, political dialogue and summits, free trade agreements and coordination on global issues,

with Brussels, with the 28 governments of the member States, and also with civil society.

5. The closeness of values and cultures to those of the EU has great relevance to LAC and constitutes an important background to making progress jointly with the sustainable development agenda. Climate change likewise forms part of the positive agenda of relations between the EU and LAC where consensuses can be achieved in the face of global challenges. A partnership between LAC and the EU aimed at adopting good practice for the implementation of Agenda 2030, both in their bilateral relations and in the global arena, would give an essential boost to the effectiveness of the agenda. The experience of South-South and Triangular Cooperation could be a useful starting point.
6. The importance of the EU to LAC in the area of human rights and migration, especially refugees, becomes relevant to the design and implementation of public policies that promote full enjoyment of rights. Cooperation initiatives at bilateral, multilateral and bi-regional levels have the potential to make the EU a strategic partner in eliminating human rights violations and caring for victims of these practices, which will in turn help maintain an essential component of the international liberal order, which appears to be regressing.
7. In terms of migration, beginning with the common history that unites them and right up to contemporary experiences of migration, the EU and LAC share an experience of migratory flows that not only results in a decidedly positive balance, but enables progress in cooperation and dialogue. There is a wide range of extensive and major consensuses on this issue. The most productive route to achieving world leadership in global dialogue on migration would be a type of “benchmarking”, comparing which of the two regions has the best practice and making constructive contributions from both experiences. In aspects where there is still no common position or even limited convergence, it would be worth contrasting perspectives and minimising the distance between the diverging policies of the two regions towards migrants.
8. The EU shares a series of challenges with Latin America that could be tackled jointly: How to gain presence, visibility and significance on the international scene?, How to coordinate regional integration processes with national agendas?, How to promote and develop quality democracies that could protect human rights and prevent the development of populism?, Which are the most appropriate instruments to create fairer and ecologically sustainable societies? How can problems of security and defence be resolved within the framework of Rules of Law? And, finally, How can we achieve economic growth but in a sustainable way? From the viewpoint of Latin America and the Caribbean, all these and other shared questions should result in the relevance of the EU being

highlighted and – despite the differences and asymmetries – a new phase of relationship between the EU and LAC as equal partners.

The prospective review of the five strategic themed approaches for the future of bi-regional relations, starting from the relevance of the EU and the three scenarios developed, makes it possible to reach the following conclusions and recommendations that highlight this relevance:

1. The EU could be a key international ally of Latin America and the Caribbean in opposition to the administration of Donald Trump, which is questioning the international liberal order with unilateral initiatives and decisions provoking new international tensions, threatening world stability and opening up the possibility of new conflicts and ruptures in the world order, of both a geopolitical and economic nature.
2. The EU and LAC can reinforce balance in the multilateral trade system through new and renewed cutting-edge free trade agreements (intellectual property rights, investments, public system of investment tribunals).
3. In terms of drugs, and in the context of the Latin American debate of the failure of the war against drugs, Europe represents the opposite model: damage limitation and decriminalisation and even the legalisation of certain substances such as marijuana, which has recently been approved in Latin American countries such as Uruguay. In this sense it represents a different paradigm from that currently prevailing in Latin America and the Caribbean. On this basis it should strengthen its presence and visibility in this key area of cooperation where strong Rule of Law and greater regional and inter-regional cooperation could take a stand against transnational threats such as organised crime and terrorism. At the United Nations, Europe could be LAC's principal ally in this area, as both regions share similar visions for dealing with the drug problem and together they could present a new global policy.
4. In terms of global security, the incipient joint participation and exchange of experience between Europe and Latin America, with peace missions and processes and conflict resolution, also raises their profile as international mediators, opening up new possibilities for greater alignment of positions within the United Nations.
5. Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union are the two regions in the world where democracy, free trade and human rights have taken root most deeply, albeit with varying levels of success. Because of its nature and credibility as a supranational regulatory player, the EU could lead initiatives to promote and protect human rights at global level in partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean. The Parliamentary Friendship Groups (PFGs) between countries are an example of dialogue and discussion of good legislative practices. In this regard, the PFGs between member States of the EU and of LAC may serve as a learning channel on successful legislation in the area of human rights.

6. The Development Cooperation Agenda must be aligned with the SDGs, establishing a link with the bi-regional agenda and incorporating indicators designed on the basis of priorities established according to shared criteria. In this global agenda, division into sub-regional blocs makes no sense; on the contrary, we should work in a cross-cutting manner to seek socio-economic convergence in response to specific objectives.
7. Commitment to the global partnership entails making tangible commitments and acquiring adequate resources to achieve them through specific agreements that include civil society and the private sector. These must act at the various levels of planning, execution and control and are essential elements in achieving coordination and effective application of the principle of policy coherence and delivering results. The OECD has developed studies of good practice, but elements of this can also be taken from the experience of South-South cooperation of SEGIB and of other regional bodies. To be specific, all the specialised EU-LAC dialogues should have a mechanism for participation in and monitoring of agreements and agendas and of how consistent they are with the Development objectives.
8. Poverty reduction, besides reinforcing traditional policies for the exchange of public policy experience based on programmes such as Eurosocial must experiment with more innovative policies that help improve the prospects for more stable development that is less vulnerable to changes in the economic cycle and can deal with phenomena like the fourth industrial revolution, changes in labour relations and the need for sustainable social protection networks to handle approaching demographic changes. The EU is more advanced in the demographic transition that is under way and can offer elements to anticipate the challenges LAC will face in the decades to come.
9. The agenda to fight inequality must be central to the development agenda as this is a global trend that exacerbates political instability. To this end the emphasis must be placed on reforming taxation policies to be more progressive and fighting fraud and corruption, including eliminating tax havens. This is a serious issue affecting both regions. After the lack of precision at the last Summit of the Americas in Lima, the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean could launch a joint position and a renewed action plan that goes beyond the cooperation programme and proposes a global agenda. The EU-LAC Forum on Social Cohesion is an appropriate place for the exchange of opinions and experiences in development and strengthening social policies, as well as contributing to social cohesion in both areas. Relaunching it would be an important factor in revitalising bi-regional cooperation in this area.
10. In the Climate Change Agenda both regions must commit to the Paris Agenda – where common interests converge – fulfilling their commitments, reinforcing their joint alliance in international agreements and adopting effective programmes in coalition with various players. The EUROCLIMA+ Programme must be aligned with the Agenda of the Paris Agreement and the SDGs with contributions decided at national and regional level and the necessary resources committed.

11. Cooperation in energy transition is one of the aspects where there is a wide range of opportunities to establish programmes of technology transference, incorporating the public and private sectors jointly. It should be a priority to promote renewable energy programmes on a regional scale in triangular cooperation formats, within the context of the change in the energy matrix, aligning it with Agenda 2030. We must encourage programmes to raise awareness in civil society of the need to change the energy matrix and the consequences of not doing so.
12. The EU and LAC must establish a partnership to help reinforce national systems of socio-environmental protection in line with the “Equator Principles” to set minimum standards for investment in the region and develop a mechanism to monitor its implementation with participation from civil society. The approach to cooperation in terms of social cohesion must incorporate both the practical implementation aspect and a vision of medium and long term strategic planning.
13. EU-LAC cooperation should help reinforce national systems for socio-environmental protection by promoting political dialogue, and the exchange of experience and good practice. Taking as a starting point the “Equator Principles”¹⁵, and the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” of the United Nations¹⁶ such cooperation should lead to the construction of a common regulatory framework that establishes safeguards and minimum standards, incorporating the private sector and civil society.
14. LAC and the EU should draw up an inter-regional pact to conserve biodiversity as a global public asset which – in accordance with SDGs 15 and 16 – establishes guidelines for the conservation of life in the seas and on earth with specific commitments and an agenda of measures with allocated resources.
15. The commitments of LAC and the EU to the Global Urban Agenda must be reinforced by an inter-regional pact in which priority is given to the participation of cities in Agenda 2030. This pact should encourage local government to be fully involved in designing policies and mechanisms for social participation in a multilevel governance model. Experience of the two regional plans, that of LAC (2016-2036) and the European Urban Agenda, may be shared to define concrete objectives through an inter-regional agenda that contributes to the global agenda.
16. The cooperation of both regions in sectors related to technology and innovation may enrich applications and debates, modernise regulatory frameworks, and strengthen these sectors by integrating the various experiences of countries in the region and lessons learned in these areas.
17. Similar regulations between both regions would help promote the development of different areas within the technology and innovation sector as it would only be necessary to adapt to a broader regulatory framework and not to a diversity of legal frameworks in each country.
18. Bi-regional cooperation can help small businesses access the sources of finance they need to advance their projects, such as accelerators, which would significantly increase the competitiveness of this sector in the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe compared to other hubs that are springing up whether in the United States, Israel, China, India or the countries of Southeast Asia.

19. Many of the technologies being developed promise not only to be revolutionary for many different markets and industries, but also offer the possibility of significantly changing the balance of competitiveness between countries as they reduce production costs, simplify logistics, change the map of the labour market, and open up areas for new products and services to be consumed on the world market. This requires an analysis of these impacts to be carried out in multilateral spaces to help ensure there is global understanding of these phenomena and of their outcomes.
20. As human rights violations in countries with a high level of legislation in this area tend to be the result of the standards not being applied by civil servants because of lack of knowledge or skills, the European Union may have a positive impact by supporting technical training in human rights matters for civil servants at national and local level.
21. The capacity of a State to protect and promote human rights for all people who find themselves within its territory involves coordination between legislation, bureaucratic practices and the implementation of public policies. The National Human Rights Plans, promoted by the Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993, are an essential tool to coordinate the specific and regulatory actions of a country in matters of human rights. Such plans entail the joint, coordinated work of various areas of the State. To this end, the EU could become a key player in technical support for drawing up, participating in and evaluating National Human Rights Plans in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
22. The national contexts of the LAC countries are very different from the institutional and socio-economic challenges facing the European countries. For this reason, successful experiences in terms of protecting and promoting human rights in the Latin American and Caribbean countries are much more comparable. Given the limited economic resources of these States, the EU could support South-South cooperation initiatives for the transference of successful experiences by sending technicians and civil servants to countries requesting this type of cooperation.
23. In the face of the decreased involvement of the United States in promoting human rights at world level, the Latin American countries may also become a strategic ally of the European Union in this area. Starting by coordinating the recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council at the United Nations, an alliance between like-minded states in Europe and Latin America would not only increase the chances of positive change in the enjoyment of human rights in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, but also in countries in other regions of the world.
24. Faced with violations of human rights, active policies to accept refugees would help give their rights to people fleeing conflict situations or humanitarian crises. To this end, the European Union could collaborate with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to create a bi-regional fund for refugees and share successful experiences of integrating refugees into host societies.
25. With a view to the current major global negotiations concerning migration, on subjects ranging from citizenship to determining the status of migrant people,

both the EU and LAC are able to speak in unison in world forums and to use migration as a theme on which progress can be made, given the evident convergences. For example, it would be important for LAC to adopt the recognition of the rights of migrants independently of their status and to declare that confinement of migrants is a last resort of the State, illegitimate for resolving matters of status and which must in every case be clearly justified and limited.

26. It would also be helpful to look at the practice of several South American countries in order to coordinate migratory policies that are not only more effective but also show more solidarity with countries more exposed by their geography to the immediate arrival of migrants in the so-called “(im)migration crises”. LAC shows that there are other possible regional policies beyond containment, provided that there is coordination involved and that the objective is to take inspiration from the best practice and not indulge in a “race to the bottom”.
27. LAC can still take more inspiration from Europe to strengthen regional agreements on citizenship, in the sense of giving this regional citizenship real citizen rights not only in terms of facilitating mobility but also in employment, social and political areas.
28. The prospective review of these five strategic themes for the future of bi-regional relations and the three scenarios developed allow for the following conclusions and recommendations.

Based on these strategic thematic approaches to the relevance and potential of the EU for bi-regional relations, the following actions are recommended to the EU-LAC Foundation, which would help strengthen regional links, and make progress in these areas of work and in the general consolidation of a relationship of regional cooperation and collaboration to help strengthen the international system, promote bi-regional relations and reinforce national capacity in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in various areas:

1. Create a joint working group on Defence and Security with the aim of taking the lead in inaugurating a regular forum for consultation, training activities and creating a joint observatory on matters of security and defence that are increasingly relevant to Latin America and the Caribbean (organised crime-public safety focus) and the EU (terrorism-“self-defence” focus).
2. Contribute to initiatives on options for bi-regional cooperation on drugs issues with the aim of adopting a sufficiently broad focus to avoid: a) homogenisation of different drugs and different types of consumers, a dynamic that leads to criminalisation and suppression of demand; b) reducing the problem of drugs to drug trafficking, that is, the range of forms of illegal drugs trafficking, which is in itself a complex issue; and, c) simplifying ways of cooperating with the security dimension and, to a far lesser extent, the discussion on the use of the armed forces to eradicate only one of the main aspects of the issue: the supply.
3. The EU-LAC Foundation could play an active part in generating dialogue on what it does from innovation to planning to the drawing up of convergent regulatory frameworks. For this purpose it is essential to discuss the way technological

innovation is injected into the economies of both regions, not forgetting the opportunities, risks and tensions it might generate in social, political and military spheres. It likewise involves the need for discussion on integrating European capital and on the provision of adequate financing.

4. The EU-LAC Foundation may help encourage debate on the importance of the EU to LAC in the area of human rights and migration, especially concerning refugees, where its relevance is seen in the design and implementation of public policies that promote full enjoyment of rights. Cooperation initiatives at bilateral, multilateral and bi-regional level have the potential to make the EU a strategic partner to eliminate violations of human rights and to care for victims of these practices which in turn will help maintain the international liberal order that appears to be regressing.
5. The EU-LAC Foundation may contribute to the design of a multilateral strategy based on the convergence of initiatives from the EU and from partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the aim of strengthening capacity in multilateral spaces by encouraging multi-sectoral dialogue within the framework of activities that combine the presence of academics, civil society and decision-makers from both regions.
6. The EU-LAC Foundation may help encourage debates on the themes and issues presented in this study by organising academic events with thematic approaches and specific strategies identified in this report, with the aim of deepening analysis and creating input designed for decision-makers.

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