

***Realpolitik* or reinforcement of the EU's normative power**

A Case Study on the EU's relations with the CELAC

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Abstract

This research aims to understand the nature and underlying motives of the EU's relations with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The frequently claimed normative role of the EU will be examined in the context of the EU-CELAC summit relations, and the cases should be outlined that cause a switch to *Realpolitik* behavior. Thereby, the EU's engagement in regional integration and interregional cooperation will be illustrated and EU-CELAC cooperation areas concerning the fight against poverty and social inequality, the consolidation of good governance and the promotion of peace, and lastly, the regional integration, trade, and economic cooperation are analyzed to reach an understanding of their normative or *Realpolitik* content. The research illustrates the ways of understanding the EU's normative behavior and power, and the nature of the cooperation between the EU and the CELAC, whereby it should be shown that the EU acts according to normative consideration and only in few exceptions turns towards *Realpolitik* behavior.

Keywords

European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, normative power, *Realpolitik*, interregional cooperation, regional integration

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Abbreviation and Acronyms

AA	Association Agreement
CAN	Comunidad Andina de Naciones (The Andean Community)
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CELAC	Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States)
CFREU	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
EC	European Commission
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IR	International Relations
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)
MS	Member States
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
ODA	Official Development Assistance
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal of the 2030 Development Agenda
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
ToL	Treaty of Lisbon
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America
WB	World Bank

1. Introduction

“The people of Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe have a long history of common aspirations...nowadays, we share a wish for peace and prosperity that our cultural and historical roots have helped to strengthen from generation to generation.”

As stated by the High Representative/ Vice President of the Commission Mogherini at the EU-CELAC Summit in Brussels in 2015, the relationship between the two continents of Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) dates back to colonial times and reached a new level of institutionalization with the foundation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011. Despite the delicate common history, the colonial past also represents the grounds for the geopolitical preferences of the European Union (EU) and the consequent efforts to achieve interregional cooperation between the two continents. In addition to this common history, other factors have also encouraged an increased cooperation, such as the levels of development and proximity of values and lifestyle. (Sanahuja, 2015: 37; European External Action Service, n.d.) Nevertheless, the EU's attention towards the LAC region emerged relatively late in the mid-1970s, as prior engagement predominately concentrated on the African continent. A particular motivating moment for Europe to increase its involvement was the role of culture, as the CELAC is perceived as the only region of the Global South that is predominately influenced by Western culture and lifestyle. Additionally, conflicts in the region were mostly due to political disparities, and less of religious, ethnic or tribal origin, which made a European engagement more promising and less delicate. A final motivational aspect was the accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Community in 1986, who had as former colonizers a special interest and bonds to the LAC region. (Crawley, 2006: 172f)

The EU and CELAC as a whole comprise of 61 countries, with over one billion people inhabitants, representing around 15% of the world population, nearly one third of all United Nations (UN) Member States (MS), and eight seats of the G20. These numbers in themselves already picture the possibilities and chances, the EU-CELAC cooperation possesses in interregional relations and international politics. The large number of countries and the powerful combination of the two regions, which follow the

ideals of liberal democracy and human rights, can have great impact in the international realm, despite certain shortcomings in the current relationship. (EC, 2015: 3)

Two major approaches of foreign policy analysis are normative power and *Realpolitik*, which should hence be used to understand the nature of the relationship and of the EU's behavior within its relationship with the CELAC region. Most scholars that research about the EU's role as a normative actor claim that the central question consists in why the EU is a normative actor, and not whether the EU is a normative actor. The normative character of the EU in relation to the CELAC region will be further investigated in this paper, and it will thereby be assessed whether the EU is really acting according to its normative standards towards the CELAC and which role *Realpolitik* plays in the EU-CELAC relationship.

1.1. Research Interest and Relevance

The research interests of this paper comprises the aim to understand the nature of the EU's foreign policy towards the CELAC, as the region is economically, politically, and internationally gaining influence and importance. Despite the current priority setting of the EU on its neighborhood policies, the concentration of the EU's development policies on the African continent, and the prioritization of the Asian continent in regard to economic and trade matters, the CELAC is a crucial actor which is expected to gain more influence over the next decades and to increase its economic and political role in international relations (IR). The relations between the EU and the LAC region/CELAC do not only matter due to their historical length and the considerable amount of shared values and ideas that date back to colonial times, but also due to the shared interests in IR and regional matters. (Sanahuja, 2015: 30f)

Looking at the EU's relation towards the CELAC and its MS, it is not only interesting to grasp an understanding of the nature of the EU's foreign policy towards the region, rather should also further components be considered, such as the EU's aim in regard to interregionalism and regional integration. The EU is often seen as the leading example of how regional integration can be achieved and how close intergovernmental cooperation can be transformed into a supranational organization with extensive competences. The two predominant foreign policy approaches that will be used in this

paper to understand the EU's behavior towards the CELAC are normativity and *Realpolitik*. Following the hypothesis that the EU is a normative foreign policy actor, this paper will not only examine the underlying motivations for the EU to act as a normative actor in relation towards the CELAC, but also touches upon the question of possible *Realpolitik* elements and motivations that might at times replace the EU's normative ambitions. Furthermore, the aspects of interregionalism and regional integration should be taken into consideration when conducting the analysis on normativity and *Realpolitik* using the outcome documents and action plans adopted at the several EU-LAC/CELAC Summits, the foundational EU documents, and further treaties to outline the EU's normative character.

The relations between the EU and the LAC countries/ CELAC have been researched to some extent and also the existence of a normative role in the EU's foreign policy has been analyzed frequently and in-depth. However, the extent of the EU's normative power and the role of *Realpolitik* elements in the EU's foreign policy towards the CELAC has received relatively little attention. Consequently, the paper will use the EU's relations and its foreign policy towards the CELAC as a case study to understand the EU's normative behavior and possible *Realpolitik* elements within the EU's foreign policy.

1.2. Thesis Aim and Research Questions

The thesis will be led by research questions concerning the EU's normative character in its actions and behavior towards the CELAC. Furthermore, possible shifts towards *Realpolitik* considerations and interests will be taken into consideration and examined concerning their origin and consequences.

Thereby the following questions should be further analyzed:

- In what way can the EU be understood as a normative actor?
- Does the EU behave according to normative criteria towards the CELAC and has the EU's behavior changed over the period of cooperation (1999-2015)?

The aim of the research is to illuminate the relation between the EU and the CELAC and thereby define the nature of the EU's foreign policy towards the region of the CELAC. Another goal is to examine the EU's normative role and allocate cases that

lead to *Realpolitik* behavior and the underlying causes for the shift in behavior. Thus, the thesis aims to understand the EU's foreign policy behavior towards the CELAC and to understand the normative character of the EU.

1.3. Limitations

This paper underlines certain limitations caused by lack of accessibility, resources and the background of the researcher and of the literature used in this paper.

The first limitation comprises the limited access to documents that depict the EU-CELAC relations, as only publicly accessible documents of EU and CELAC could be taken into consideration. This also includes a lack of access to internal and non-public communications, negotiations, and conversations between the EU and the CELAC. Hence, one limitation concerns the insights into the decision-making processes and the goals and means utilized by the EU that could establish a perspective on the EU's normative or *Realpolitik* role.

The scope of the research was also limited by exclusively concentrating on the analysis of the outcome documents of the EU-LAC/CELAC Summits, as the Summits represent the only area of cooperation of the two regions that is limited to these two specific regional actors. Even though the actors also interact on other platforms and areas of IR, such as the UN or other international organizations, it is difficult to demarcate external influences and the impact of other actors that could impact the EU-CELAC cooperation.

Additionally, the research is conducted from the viewpoint of the EU, whereby the normative/ *Realpolitik* behavior of the CELAC towards the EU will not be part of the evaluation. This, however, would represent an idea for another research project. As the research is mostly based on EU documents, treaties, and EU-LAC/CELAC Summit outcome documents, a certain limitation concerning the bias of the material is possible as claims and statements in the official documents cannot be fully verified.

Last but not least, another issue is given by the researcher's origin, as the Western European background leads to certain limitations concerning the neutrality and the impartiality of the views expressed and the interpretations made in this paper. The

possible existence of bias due to knowledge and access to knowledge should therefore be acknowledged as a possible limitation of this paper.

These limitations should not diminish the value and results of this paper, yet they should be acknowledged and recognized as factors influencing this research and the conclusions drawn in this paper.

2. Research Design and Methodology

2.1. Epistemological Considerations: Interpretative Approach

The epistemological position is based on the interpretative approach, also called hermeneutics, as the method of the interpretation of human action. This constitutes a contrasting concept to the positivist approach, which is only limitedly applicable to social science research, as the motivations and underlying factors that define the behavior and interests of the EU towards CELAC are not fully understandable by positivism. Interpretivism assumes that the subject matter of social science, consisting of the people and institutions, is completely different from the one of natural science. Research in the social world therefore demands a reflection of this distinctiveness of humans against the natural order. The scholar Wright claimed that an epistemological clash exists between positivism and hermeneutics, which consists of the division of the positivist approach that attempts to explain human behavior and the hermeneutical approach that aims to understand human behavior. (Bryman, 2012: 28) The interpretative approach is a combination of objective and subjective meanings. The disclosure of the subjective meanings that motivate humans to behave in a certain way is the central aim of the method. Thereby, the cultural and social influences that determine an actor's or a person's behavior and decision-making should be detected. The interpretative approach is necessary as the reality is not objective but consists of a series of interpretations of humans that shape the society and actions. (Della Porta, 2008: 24f)

2.2. Research Design

The research design of this paper is composed of a case study based on qualitative research of EU treaties and EU-LAC/CELAC Summit documents. Furthermore, certain quantitative elements will be added by the usage of statistics concerning the status and development of economic, social and political factors in the EU and the CELAC. The case study examines the EU in the context of its relations to the CELAC. The main aim is to analyze the behavior of the EU within the cooperation with CELAC and ascertain the EU as being a normative or *Realpolitik* actor. The Declarations and Action Plans adopted at the EU-LAC/CELAC Summits in 1999 and 2015 should be assessed with a comparative approach in order to detect factors that strengthen the hypothesis of the EU

as a normative actor and that outline possible changes of the EU behavior directing towards normative or *Realpolitik* behavior. The aim is to analyze and understand the behavior of the EU and elucidate the factors that determine the decision-making process of the EU towards normative power or *Realpolitik* behavior. This is known as the idiographic approach as the research will assess the unique features of the EU-CELAC relationship and the specific behavior of the EU towards CELAC. (Bryman, 2012: 66-72) A case study aims at the understanding of complex social activities, whereby it assumes that the social reality, in this case the nature of EU-CELAC relations, is constructed by social interactions and by the context and history of the involved regions. The case study aims to examine the complex realities of implementation and the consequences of policies by the EU that affect the CELAC region. As the social and historical context are taken into consideration, the colonial relations, the EU as an example of regional integration and other particularities of the EU-CELAC cooperation should be part of the evaluation. (Somekh & Lewin, 2008: 33-5)

2.3. Research Strategy

The research strategy consists predominately of qualitative research elements, but also includes certain quantitative elements. The qualitative research will analyze the primary documents the paper is based on, which are the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), including the reforms introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the Copenhagen Criteria, and several declarations and actions plans adopted at the EU-LAC/CELAC Summits. The criteria used to undertake the analysis comprise of the commonalities of the fundamental EU documents and treaties, Art. 2 and 3(5) TEU, the CFREU, and the Copenhagen Criteria. The latter correlate with the Manners's five core norms, who claims that these core norms have emerged over the last 50 years and constitute in the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, respect for democracy, rule of law, and the human rights. (Manners, 2002: 242f)

This paper will use similar variables as Manners, however, it will extend the classical values slightly in order to receive an insight into the more recent priorities of the EU. The criteria used for the analysis are thus: democracy, rule of law, and human

rights. Additionally, the factors of sustainable development, the protection of minorities, and free and fair trade should be taken into consideration.

The declarations and action plans adopted at the EU-LAC/CELAC Summits in 1999 and 2015 will be examined concerning the normative or *Realpolitik* content of the outlined aims and cooperation areas. The choice of areas that will be analyzed concerning normative or *Realpolitik* behavior of the EU's in its relation to the CELAC are selected according to the central aims outlined in the EU-LAC Summits between 1999 and 2015 and in the Memo of the EC from 2014. These areas are the fight against poverty and social inequality; the consolidation of good governance and the promotion of peace; and lastly, the economic cooperation, trade development and support for regional integration. (EC, 2014, p. 2)

The quantitative part of the analysis is based on tables and charts retrieved from the data of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/ OECD Data, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/ CEPALSTAT, the European Commission's (EC) statistical database EUROSTAT, and the World Bank's (WB) statistical section World DataBank. The quantitative data will be used in a descriptive way to characterize the changes occurring during the period cooperation between the EU-CELAC.

The empirical data that will be used to conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis serves to underline and strengthen the analysis and argumentation concerning the EU's normative or *Realpolitik* nature towards the CELAC. The quantitative methods will mostly demonstrate the condition and changes in the LAC region over the years of EU-CELAC cooperation and show differences and disparities between the EU and CELAC. The employment of qualitative methods should picture the changes in emphasis and discourse in the outcome documents and action plans of the EU-LAC/CELAC Summits. It is assumed that the central areas of cooperation and the main goals have shifted over the time, whereby these changes should be detected and analyzed concerning their content, meaning and consequences for the cooperation of the two regions.

2.4. Empirical Data

Some of the primary documents, on which the research is based, are the foundational documents of the EU, which are the TEU (1992) with the additions of the

ToL (2007), the CFREU (2000), and the Copenhagen Criteria. The TEU, whose adoption by the MS created the EU, contains several references that depict the values and norms the EU wants to represent and promote. Article 2 proclaims the core values of the EU by stating that

“the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”

and Art. 3(5) TEU establishing that

“in its relations with the wider world, the Union [...] shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights [...], as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law [...]”.

Furthermore, Article 21(2) states that the international actions of the EU should be guided by the

“principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”

and that

“the Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and inter national, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”.

Several provisions of the TEU were extended and reformed with the adoption of the ToL. The ToL introduced the provisions in Articles 2, 21, and 6 and the external representation of the EU was extended and streamlined. The ToL also altered the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU by widening the competences of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The ToL also refers to the CFREU in Article 6 and confirms the rights, freedoms, and principles that the CFREU enforces. (EU, 2007: 11, 13, 21-27; EU, 1992; EU, 2012: 17, 19, 28-9, 30ff)

The CFREU is another leading document determining the content of the EU’s normative behavior in internal and external actions and representing the core norms of

the Union. The preamble of the CFREU refers to its “spiritual and moral heritage” and emphasizes its “indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”, whereby the Union acknowledges that the rights within the Charter entail “responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations”. The core norms set out in the CFREU are dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice. (EU, 2000)

Furthermore, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria illustrate the EU’s perception of their own normative framework and norms, with which the Union and its MS should comply. The Copenhagen Criteria regulate the prerequisites that states have to fulfill in order to achieve EU accession. They touch upon three main areas: political aspects, economic criteria, and the incorporation of the Community’s *acquis*. The criteria were adopted in June 1993, when the European Council set out prerequisites for accession, mainly directed towards the Eastern European states. The political aspects include stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; the economic criteria mainly pertain a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and the incorporation of the Community *acquis* concerns the adherence to the various political, economic and monetary aims of the EU. (EU, 2015)

The main documents under consideration concerning the EU-LAC/CELAC relations are the Outcome Documents and Action Plans of the Summits in Rio de Janeiro in 1999 and of Brussels in 2015. The Rio Declaration represents the first outcome document of an EU-LAC Summit fostering cooperation and collaboration among the regions. The outcome documents consist of the Rio Declaration and the Priorities for Action, whereby both sections are divided into the political field; the economic field; and the cultural, educational, scientific, technological, social and human field. While the Declaration and the Action Plan cover a wide spectrum of issues, a lack of concreteness and specific goals is existent. (EU-LAC Summit, 1999) The Brussels Summit in 2015 concluded with the adoption of the Brussels Declaration, the Political Declaration, and the EU-CELAC Action Plan. The Brussels Declaration main theme is: “Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens”. The Declaration accentuates the global challenges

and the role of bi-regional association within the theme of the Summit, and outlines the areas of an updated bi-regional Action Plan and the Future of the Partnership. The Declaration consists of four parts, global challenges, bi-regional association, an updated bi-regional Action Plan, and the future of the partnership. The Political Declaration highlights the commitments of the participating parties, consisting of the two regions with their respective MS, towards “A partnership for the next generation”. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a; EU-CELAC Summit, 2015c) The EU-CELAC Action Plan comprises 10 main areas of action, of which each section again contains a working program with the components of dialogue, cooperation activities and initiatives, and the expected results. Main cooperations areas are inter alia, science and innovation, environment and climate change, and the social, economic and political development. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015b)

Apart from EU treaties and EU-LAC/CELAC cooperation documents, the analysis will also be based on statistical data, which is mostly provided by the WB (World DataBank and LAC Equity Lab), the OECD (OECD Data), the EU (Eurostat), and the ECLAC (CEPALSTAT Databases). The statistics mostly refer to economic and social developments, which should underline or contradict the motivation behind the outcomes of the EU-CELAC relationship.

2.5. Literature Review

The relation between the EU and the CELAC region has not extensively been the focus of former research. While several publications about the EU-LAC relations have been published, none of those deals explicitly with the issue of normative power and *Realpolitik* of the EU towards the CELAC. A number of papers have been published about interregionalism and regional integration, comparing the relations of the EU and CELAC on this level, or using the attempts towards regional integration in the EU and the CELAC as case studies. Among these authors are Panagiota, Hoefkens, Meunier & Nicolaidis, Santander, and Gardini & Ayuso. Within these publications, the benefits of the relations on both parts are frequently emphasized and most scholars claim that the interregional connection results in positive outcomes for both regions. However, the asymmetries that persist between the two regions and their MS are also taken into consideration and the consequences of these asymmetries are analyzed concerning their

effects. Hoefkens (2013: 23-5) draws a very positive picture of the relationship, whereby he mostly refers to the mutual benefits of the relations, the positive impact of EU engagement in conflict settlement, the outcomes of the Association Agreements (AA) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and the effects of the development cooperation on the advancement of the CELAC. Gardini and Ayuso (2015: 3, 7-10) on the other hand highlight the higher level of integration in the EU, and the fragmentation, the disparities, and lack of leadership in the CELAC, which complicate an equal and mutually beneficial partnership. Santander & De Lombaerde (2007) and Panagiota (2013: 8-10, 24-6) focus on the issues of interregionalism and multilateralism as part of the EU-CELAC relation. Both publications point towards the levels of cooperation, which are regional, sub-regional, and bilateral, and show that the overlapping cooperation schemes also create complications and problems in the relations between the two regions.

Meunier and Nicolaidis (2006: 2010f) concentrate on the economic relations and describe the EU as “a conflicted trading power” that is attempting to use its position to achieve simultaneously its own interest, namely an increase of the EU’s trading power, and to promote development aims, sustainable economic growth and trade through regional cooperation.

In the area of interregional and inter-institutional cooperation, a great part of the research is published by Sanahuja and other scholars via the EU-LAC Foundation. The Foundation released several papers on the prospects and objectives of the EU-CELAC partnership. They particularly point towards the challenges and chances of cooperation within the area of climate change and the 2030 Development Agenda. Furthermore, the meaning and development of regional, mega-, and bi-regional partnerships are evaluated and the current condition of the cooperation is part of the research. (Sanahuja, 2015; Sanahuja et al, 2015)

Domínguez published several papers and books on the EU’s foreign policy in Latin America. Domínguez’ book (2015) analyzes the EU policies and interregionalism between the two regional actors, and thereby points towards the several differences between the two actors concerning the level of integration and institutionalization. Furthermore, the author assesses the EU-CELAC Summit relationship and directs

attention towards the emergence of EU-LAC relationships as an alternative to the dominance of the United States of America (U.S.) in the region. Another significant part of the publication deals with the EU's relations to individual LAC states and subregional relationships. The tensions that remain between the regions are also included and further assessed so that a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the regions with a particular focus on the EU foreign policy towards LAC is provided. Further publications of Domínguez deal with the diffusion of norms in individual LAC countries (2010) and the promotion of democracy (2013).

Apart from Domínguez' publications on EU foreign policy in the LAC region, the paper by García (2015: 621-6, 629f) is probably the closest related to the research aim dealt with in this paper. Her main focus lies on the conflict between the EU's transformative power versus its economic interests in the Latin American region. She outlines the various dimensions of EU power and identifies the factors of the EU's interest in LAC and points towards the EU's ambition to foster regional integration and interregionalism, as the EU considers regional integration as a strategy to advance peace and prosperity, including regional stability, economic growth, and investment. However, the problematic sides of the relation consisting of the reproach of soft imperialism and the prioritization of economic interest of the EU are also acknowledged. García underlines the statements of Meunier & Nicolaidis of the EU being a "conflicted trade power". Garcia particularly points towards the EU's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the aim to include conditionality into trade agreements, which complicated trade negotiations, for example with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and burdened the EU's relationship to the sub-regional organizations in the LAC region.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Normative Power

Already in the early 1970s, Duchêne asserted that the traditional military power in the EU was mostly replaced by progressive civilian power. According to his argument, Europe had already behaved as a civilian actor during the Cold War when pure military power had been losing its influence and power, and consequently Europe developed “amilitary” values. Europe’s “civilian power” was according to Duchêne “long on economic power and relatively short on armed force”. Duchêne aimed to “bring to international politics the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics” and therefore outlined the “civilian forms of influence and action” needed by Europe to overcome the “age-old processes of war and indirect violence”. This assumption was further developed by the assertion of Manners stating that “normative power” would be a more fitting way to describe the EU’s role. (Duchêne quoted in: Manners, 2002: 236, 238; Manners, 2002: 239f;) Over the years, Duchêne’s statement has been frequently discussed and evaluated, and despite the concept being further developed, still receives a high degree of approval. Scholars regularly describe Europe and the EU as a “civilian power”, a “post-modern power”, an “ethical”, “structuring”, “soft” or “normative” power. Despite the varying terms, most authors agree on the notion that the EU represents an exceptional and distinct international actor, whose power is not predominately based on military strength and coercive power. (Gerrits, 2009: 2)

To define “civilian power”, Maull related it to a state

“whose conception of its foreign policy role and behavior is bound to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilization of international relations”.

Furthermore, Maull and Twitchett assign three central features to the definition of “civilian power”; namely economic power as the crucial element to achieve national goals, the usage of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems, and the cooperation within supranational institutions that hold the power to make legally-binding decisions to enhance international influence. (Diez, 2005: 617; Manners, 2002: 236f) When Manners introduced his concept of the EU as a normative power, he

depicted it as neither military nor purely economic, but as a power concept that works through the utilization of ideas and opinions. This version of power carries the ability to “shape the conception of the *normal*” (Manners, 2002: 239f) Different approaches to military, civilian and normative power are introduced by Galtung, Carr and Manners. Galtung claims that “ideological power is the power of ideas”, which is “powerful because the power-sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient” through the means of culture. Galtung states that the sources of power are remunerative, punitive, and ideological power, and the channels of power are the resource and structural power. (Galtung, 1973, p. 33, 36) Carr introduced the division into civilian power within the economic realm, military power, and power over opinion as normative power. Manners’ conception simulates to Carr’s and Galtung’s concept, as he claims civilian power to be the ability to use civilian instruments, military power as the ability to use military instruments and lastly, normative power as the “ability to shape conceptions of normal”. (Manners, 2002: 239f; Carr, 2001: 97-128; Annex, Chart 3)

Tocci’s (2007: 2f) concept of “normativity” consists of a neutral versus non-neutral differentiation. Defining normative in a neutral way is closely aligned to what is considered normal in IR. With this interpretation, which is similar to Manners’ conception, norms become closely related to power, as power is the decisive characteristic to decide on what is normal and what is not normal. Based on this understanding of “normative”, great powers would automatically become normative powers as they are the primary actors that decide on norm-setting and definition in the international realm. The second classification of “normative” is non-neutral, and more complex to be defined as claims of objectivity and subjectivity, and the role of time, place, and power that shape norms must be taken into consideration. The second definition of “normative” is non-neutral in ethical terms, and is derived from universally accepted and legitimate set of standards. Instead of being a symbol of power, such as in the first definition, the second classification of normative power is the function of limiting and regulating power.

Tocci (2007: 3-7) introduces the dimensions of a normative foreign policy, which are normative goals, normative means, and normative impact. The goals of foreign policy can either be set according to the values (normative) or be driven by interests

(non-normative). However, the distinction between normative and non-normative goals can sometimes be quite blurry, as normative considerations and self-interest frequently overlap. Tocci states that while normative goals would include the promotion of peace, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and sustainable development, interest-driven or strategic goals would constitute in commercial interests, migration management or energy security. Nevertheless, the pursuit of strategic goals can contain normative components. The decisive aspect seems to be the prioritization of either normative or strategic aims within a foreign policy strategy, and the decision-making process in the case that the strategic, non-normative aims are not achievable when upholding the normative aims. Tocci provides the definition for normative foreign policy goals as aims that shape the milieu by actions through international regimes, organizations, and law. Normative means are often linked to civilian power, which means the usage of economic, social, diplomatic and cultural instruments in opposition to military instruments as non-normative means. Tocci also refers to Nye's soft power concept as a power that is based on cooperation instead of coercion. Normative impact as the last component of normative foreign policy raises the question whether non-normative goals and means can lead to a normative impact of foreign policy. Thereby a consequentialist and an utilitarian approach is used that allows all kinds of actions to achieve the desired and expected result. Tocci denies this and argues that normative impacts must origin in indirect actions or inactions that are connected to the effective building and establishment of a global rule-led milieu.

Tocci (2007:7-10; 2008: 2f) introduces an analytical system of four different foreign policy types that lead to the categorization into normative, imperial, status quo and *Realpolitik* foreign policy actors (Annex, Chart 1). A normative actor fulfills the conditions of value- and rule-led behavior in both goals and means, while a *Realpolitik* foreign policy actor pursues goals and means according to interest-led aims. An imperial actor follows normative goals but non-normative means, while a status quo foreign policy actor acts according to non-normative goals but normative means. However, another variable is the intention concerning the goals, means, and impacts, as the intention also contains an influence on the determination of a normative actor. (Annex, Chart 2) The system illustrates how unintended normative goals and means lead to non-

normative results and impacts, while unintended non-normative goals and means can result in normative outcomes.

Tocci also claims that the internal and external perception of an action and the characteristic behavior of an actor varies significantly, and that the external perception also differs depending on the relationship and status of another state. So while the EU is predominantly seen as a weak status quo actor by China, Russia, and India, it is seen as a status quo or normative actor by the U.S. One problem to determine the character of a state or an organization is the lack of coherence and consistency of most actors' behavior and the heterogeneous views on an entity's foreign policy. Hamilton even claims that "no nation on earth could pass this test with any consistency". Hamilton continues that the framework can be best used to determine "the degree to which" a global actor can be put in one of the four categories. (Tocci & Manners, 2008: 301, 303-4)

3.2. *Realpolitik*

The understanding of *Realpolitik* has been debated for decades, whereby the original concept was continuously changed to its current understanding, which is nearly interchangeable with realism. Bew investigates the fundamental idea of *Realpolitik*, which dates back to the origins of statehood and the thinkers Thucydides, Machiavelli, or Hobbes, even though the concept itself has only been invented in 1853 by Rochau. Rochau used the concept first in the context of the German cultural revolution *Vormärz* and under the influence of the French revolution, in which he saw the aims of freedom and constitutional rights disappear behind the political power phenomena. Rochau decided that it was time for some realistic and radical thinking when he saw his liberal ideas vanish, and acknowledged that the liberals misunderstood the nature of power and politics, and that this realist politic behavior required the implementation of a new *Realpolitik*. (Bew, 2014: 40,42f)

The German understanding of *Realpolitik* was particularly during the Great War negatively perceived, as it was widely related to the atmosphere and views of the pre-war period, during which the words "Real-Politik" and "Interessen-Politik" were used inflationary. During that time the views emerged that there is no objective worldview

and that opinions and “Weltanschauung” (ideology/world view) are shaped by the own interest and egoism. By the end of the Great War, *Realpolitik* was related to militarism, illiberalism, imperialism, self-interest and recklessness. During the Second World War and the post-war period, the concept was mainly influenced by the large number of German scholars that fled from Nazi Germany and emigrated to the U.S. By resuming their academic work, they introduced a number of German concepts into the international academia, whereby particularly the theory of realism received large attention. With that, realist foreign policy received the label of *Realpolitik*, and only the association with Kissinger and in the context of the Cold War allowed the concept to gain a new, less negative and less drastic understanding. Recently, the term has been used interchangeably with “realistic” and “realism”, whereby it describes a “non-ideological approach to statecraft and the primacy of the *raison d’état*”.(Bew, 2014: 47-51)

While the modern concept of *Realpolitik* and realism are frequently used interchangeably, without making a distinction concerning the difference in meaning and background, the traditional concepts follows the principles of *Might is Right*, which separates *Realpolitik* completely from morality in political behavior. The *Might is Right*-Principle can also be seen in *Realpolitik*’s conceptualization of legitimacy, as *Realpolitik* claims that “history cannot be judged except by historical standards” and that “nothing succeeds like success”. A major difference between the two concepts of *Realpolitik* is that the modern understanding of *Realpolitik* agrees with realism and doesn't reduce political policies to violence by not differentiating between *de jure* right to rule and *de facto* ability to do so. These quotes illustrate that *Realpolitik* represents the idea that legitimacy does not follow fixed rules and norms, but depends on “world history [as] the world court”. Responding to this extreme understanding, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial on *Realpolitik* in 1991, in which it acknowledged the danger to incorporate national interests and a common national morality into foreign policy, but it also claims that even *Realpolitik* is not so easily capable of separating itself from national values and a country’s common idea. (Sleat, 2014: 315, 323f, 327, 330; Bew, 2014: 49f)

In the following analysis of this paper, the modern understanding of *Realpolitik* will be applied, in which the commonalities of the traditional and the modern concept are highlighted. The commonalities consist predominately of the prioritization of the own interests and aims over considerations about the preferences and needs of other involved actors, or the “greater good”. Observing current IR, it becomes quite clear that states follow realist considerations at times, while however, states are unable to separate these interests from certain moral obligations and the influence of external perception and public opinion. The *Might is Right*-Principle depicts some valid considerations, however the behavior of states at the UN or at other international meetings shows that even the most powerful states are subjected to public opinion, as they are dependent on cooperation and forced to a certain degree of compliance to international law. (Hay, 2016)

Using the origins and different usages of the concept of *Realpolitik*, the modern perception of *Realpolitik* should be used to describe a realist behavior of the EU in relation to its foreign policy towards the CELAC. Thereby it should be acknowledged that *Realpolitik* behavior can overlap with normative behavior, as a certain behavior follows the norms and values set by the EU, but nevertheless was decided on *Realpolitik* assumptions and to achieve own interests. Nevertheless, the secondariness of moral considerations in *Realpolitik* foreign policy should be emphasized. Even though moral and even normative consideration might be taken into consideration during decision-making processes, certain aspects might be suppressed by the own interest and power considerations that lead to the employment of actions and foreign policy behavior according to *Realpolitik* standards.

3.3. Realism vs. Idealism

The Encyclopedia of Power states that idealism is a term to describe “any idea, goal or practice considered to be impractical”. This rather negative definition of idealism points towards a pessimistic understanding of the human nature and the historical experiences concerning the difficulties to achieve peace in world affairs. Generally, two understandings of the term exist in IR; the broad meaning describes idealism as a perennial doctrine that has existed over all historical periods of anarchy. The aim of

idealism as an optimistic doctrine is international anarchy and a cosmopolitan and harmonious world order. The second, more narrow conception of idealism ties the concept to the inter-war period between 1919 and 1939, during which this concept was dominant in IR theory, and emphasizes the growing interdependence and unity of human beings, realized in the foundation of the League of Nations. Idealists point towards the influence of reason to counter prejudice and the intrigues of evil forces. Democracy and education are seen as the decisive elements to foster public empowerment and a strong public opinion, and to counter the striving for power of governments and other public institutions. Another central element is the natural harmony of interest among the people that overweighs superficial conflicting interests of governments. While differences in cultural norms, values, religion, social and ethnic backgrounds persist, idealists claim that humans are fundamentally equal, and have the same desires concerning security, welfare, recognition and respect. The common morality of peoples is codified in the basic human rights. (Wilson, 2011: 332f)

According to Bull, a “distinct characteristic” of idealism is the belief in progress, which was in his opinion particularly prominent in the pre-war system of the 1920s and 1930s, when it was argued to have been “capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order”. The pre-war idealists thought that experiences from the pre-war period about anarchy and disorder could lead towards progress that was not limited by previous experiences.

Vasquez on the other hand does not emphasize progress as much but the ability of reason to overcome the problem of war. His assumptions originate in the belief that a harmony of interests between nations and the emergence of a world community are possible. Vasquez supports the “Wilsonian contention”, which claims that the “heart of the paradigm” of idealism is that dictatorship is the cause of war, while existence of democracy results in peace.

Taylor as a representative of the utopian school also supports the importance of reason and the actual or potential harmony of interests. However, he extends this view by stating that “in general utopianism is concerned with the formation of an ideal polity and, to a lesser extent, how such a polity might be established”. His position within the

utopian view follows the belief in a universal code of morality and objective justice, which can be detected through reason.

M. J. Smith aligns with other scholars in stressing the role of reason, progress, and the harmony of interests, but warns of simplifying IR. According to Smith's idealist theory, people are not naturally warlike, but neither are they peaceful and pacific. The conclusion of his idealistic understanding is that people follow passion instead of reason, and that people have the tendency to follow outdated and antiquated ideas and visions.

Some other scholars express the opinion that one core idea of idealism is the creation of institutions at the global level that aim towards a peaceful environment and the prevention of conflict at the national level. Consequently, the creation of international and regional organization leads to a higher level of peace and freedom. (Wilson, 2003: 12-15)

Realists, on the other hand, claim that the main actors in IR are the states, whose most dominant aim consists of securing their existence, and which exist in an anarchic setting without an existing supreme control over states. According to this view, the EU and CELAC as regional organizations do not play a decisive and influential role in IR and possess no important position. However, in this paper, the EU and CELAC are assumed to be state-like actors. States' co-existence is led by a "power-security"-principle, in which some states aim towards defensive security, while others work to improve their power position. Internal and external politics are separated and do not interact. Consequently, the behavior of states is according to realism predominately determined by the behavior of other states. The main exogenous factor influencing domestic policies is power and the main goal of a state is security. (Nicholson, 1998: 67) According to Mearsheimer, the existence of the EU is only explicable in the context of the Cold War, however, according to realist assumptions, the EU's presence with the disappearance of the bipolarity is no longer understandable or required. This is reasoned by the main aim of the EU to achieve peace and freedom in Europe, which has been achieved with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West-bipolarity. Therefore, the reason and right to existence of the EU disappeared and its existence

becomes unnecessary and incomprehensibly (Mearsheimer quoted in: Nicholson, 1998: 69)

Realists, such as Carr, claim that “international politics are always power politics; for it is impossible to eliminate power from them” and consequently foreign policies of states towards other states are always influenced by considerations concerning power politics. However, Carr also states that “pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power” and claims further that utopia and reality are both required for political thought. (Carr, 2001: 87, 91ff, 97f)

Morgenthau agrees with the centrality of power in IR, and claims that power is always the immediate aim in international politics. Even if the ultimate aim might be described as the search for freedom, security, or prosperity, it ultimately comes down to the struggle for power. While Morgenthau states that the threat of physical violence and the theoretical capability to exercise military power is an inherent part of power politics, he also stresses that the actual exercise of physical violence means the abdication of political power for the sake of military power. Political power is, according to Morgenthau, a psychological relation between those that exercise power and those over whom power is exercised. Morgenthau divides the struggle for power into the categories of those that entertain a policy of the status quo to secure the maintenance of power, those that use imperialism to extend their power, and those that exercise a policy of prestige as an instrument to either achieve a status quo or extension of power. The policy of prestige is mostly described as the typical instrument of IR in the diplomatic realm. (Morgenthau, 1948: 13f, 21ff, 26ff, 50ff)

Central items of idealism that correspond with the dominant perception of the EU and with the discourse used in most EU documents and treaties, is the belief in global institutions and the process and ability to overcome conflict and violence. The EU believes in the power of reason and morality, and seemingly prioritizes diplomatic and non-violent means to overcome conflict and to find common ground. This preference can be seen as reasoned by the absence of an EU army and the consequent need to concentrate on its non-military and normative power, but also by the EU's belief in normative power and the consciousness of the efficiency and influence of normative and soft power, such as the EU's engagement in mediation and peace negotiations. (Luengo-

Cabrera, 2015: 4). However, the pursuit of AAs and FTAs, and the analysis of the EU trade statistics also demonstrate the obvious ambitions of the EU's trade policies and the realization of non-idealistic policies that are oriented towards the EU's own interest. The EU's CAP and the inability to negotiate FTAs with MERCOSUR and Brazil are a good illustration of the realist aspects of EU foreign policy and the EU's relationship to the region of the CELAC. (Afionis & Stringer, 2014: 59f). Despite the obvious opposition between realism and idealism, the alignment of the EU's foreign policy towards the CELAC cannot be completely assigned to realism and idealism, as the two contrasting theories are not entirely separable. Many policies and actions of the EU depict an overlap of idealistic considerations and the realist pursue of own interests. The overlap of realism and idealism in the EU's foreign policy should be taken into consideration in order to adequately analyze the EU's behavior and to avoid one-sided conclusions concerning the EU's relations to the CELAC. This reiterates the power-security paradigm in EU foreign policies and stresses Carr's assumption of international policies always being accompanied by a power aspect.

3.4. E.H. Carr on Realism and Utopianism

Carr claims that political science is never able to completely free itself from utopian desires and that a utopia is easily attained if it is really aspired by everyone. Hence, no political utopia is capable of becoming reality without originating in political reality. Realism concentrates on facts and the analysis of causes and consequences, which are used to define goals and interests, whereby realism accentuates the power of existing forces and the role of existing tendencies. Therefore, Carr concludes that realism has a corrective function on utopianism, while utopianism should be used to fight realism's inability to achieve change. Both thoughts have their place in political science and are required for knowledgeable and profound political thought and political life. (Carr, 2001: 9f)

Sorel describes the relationship between utopia and reality as the "eternal dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world". Following this quote, the utopian believes to be able to shape the world according to their utopian imaginations and aims, while being

able to overcome the reality. The realist accepts the conditions of reality and examines the possibilities to change reality by adjusting the policies accordingly. This means that all human action should consist of a combination of utopianism and reality, between free will and determinism. While utopians are said to live in a dream world of “facts”, which diverge quite far from reality and might even contradict the phenomena of the real world, perceive realists these “facts” as aspirations. (Carr, 2001: 12f)

Politics, in Carr’s understanding, are in some ways always related to power. The lack of acknowledgment of the role of power politics is described as the reason that the establishment of an international form of government has failed so far. The illusion persists that states, which are satisfied with the status quo, are more preoccupied with security issues, and that dissatisfied states care more about power politics than satisfied states. Depicting the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfied powers as a conflict between morality and power is misleading, as power politics are on the contrary equally present on all sides and as part of all relationships. (Carr, 2001: 97-99)

Carr organizes political power in three categories: military power, economic power and power over opinion. Military power is closely related to war as the *ultima ratio* of power in IR, and Clausewitz (1989: 87) states that “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument [...] a carrying out of the same by other means”. A country’s foreign policy is limited by the level of its military strength in comparison to the military power of other nations, as potential war is seen as a dominant factor in international politics and military strength as an accepted factor of political values. Military power seems to be fed by the realist assumptions of Machiavelli (1517: 13) who claims that “it does not seem to men to possess securely that which they have, unless they acquire more from others” and Hobbes (1651: 61) accentuating that a man “cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of more”. This also relates back to the separation of satisfied and dissatisfied nations, and asserts that even satisfied states are in need of acquiring more power to increase the security of their citizens and their nation. One crucial assumption Carr makes is that foreign policy cannot be divorced from strategy and that the foreign policy of a nation is not only limited by its aims but also by its own military strength and by the military strength of other countries. (Carr, 2001: 102-5) Relating these assumptions

to the EU, which has a very limited military strength and is totally dependent on the provision of military force by its MS, it seems as if this shortcoming seriously delimits the power and the ability of the EU to diffuse norms and standards. Following the assumption that foreign policies are limited by military strength, and that the diffusion of political values is dependent on military strength, it could be concluded that the EU is a very weak foreign policy actor without significant influence and impact in IR. However, the remaining factors of economic power and power of opinion might explain the role the EU plays internationally.

Economic power has always been closely related to political power and also to military power, as economic success significantly influences the ability of states to increase their military equipment, force, and additionally their political influence in negotiations and international decision-making processes. Consequently, the strong international position of the EU can at least partially be explained with the economic strength of the Union and confirms Marx' assumption on the strong influence of economic forces on politics. Economic power is used to enhance political power and wealth; however, the international interdependence of the current economic system complicates the pursuit of economic autarky and self-sufficiency and thus produces certain dependencies and weaknesses. A certain degree of economic self-sufficiency, however, is not only indispensable to guarantee an orderly social existence and to maintain political power, but also a prerequisite to assure preparedness for war. Furthermore, a certain degree of autarky leads to the ability to use economic strength as a weapon of political power, which is predominately used in two forms: the export of capital and the control of foreign markets. However, the increasing level of globalization complicates the possession of economic power, as the aims and actions of one state affect a number of other states in their economic strength. Economic weapons, such as sanctions, are generally perceived as less immoral than military power. Yet, blockades and sanctions may have equally destructive and inhumane consequences on other countries and their citizens. The EU uses less military power than other internationally influential powers, hence appears often as morally stronger due to its ability to use the "less destructive" and more "civilized" means to achieve its goals. However, economic and military weapons are impossible to be separated and mutually

reinforce their effects if used efficiently combined, which means that the lack of military means significantly diminishes the EU's ability to utilize its economic power effectively. (Carr, 2001: 105-120)

The third part of the power concept of Carr is the power over opinion, which Carr labels as "propaganda". The modern weapon of propaganda is directed towards the masses whose opinion increasingly matters in domestic but also in international politics. Modern technologies have drastically elevated the need for governments to deal with their domestic and international perception. According to old liberal conceptions, opinion, just as trade and industry, should be free of any artificial regulation. However, while totalitarian governments might actively steer and control the media and public opinion, the public opinion even in democratic countries is vastly influenced and directed by monopolized media and corporations. Addressing the issue of truth and morality in propaganda, Carr proposes two assumptions; firstly, opinion is conditioned by status and interests, and secondly, opinion is forced on people by influential and powerful groups, the ruling class, nation or dominant groups of nations. The difference between power over opinion in comparison to military and economic power is the addition of thought and feelings of people to pure material factors of power. This also results in two significant limitations of power over opinion, which is firstly that some conformity with facts is required for propaganda to work, as otherwise the risk for the truth to come out would be too high. Another limitation is the inherent utopianism of human nature, as oppression at times has the effect of strengthening the will and sharpening the intelligence of the suppressed, which could result in a revolt of the unprivileged group against the control of the privileged groups that hold the ability to set the opinion. Power over opinion can never be completely achieved and fully controlled, and politics can not only be understood in terms of power, but requires further components to fully grasp the concept. Even though international politics is always about power, this is only one facet of international politics. Another area is common ideas and the belief that values outrank national interest. (Carr, 2001: 120-30)

Relating the EU to Carr's assumptions about power over opinion, the necessity of power over opinion to be accompanied by economic and military power seems to be most important for the EU's political power. Its lacking military power could therefore have

vast impact on the relation of the economic power and the power over opinion of the EU. Another issue is the limitations of the power over opinion in terms of political power, which could lead to a restriction of the available power for the EU to position itself and influence IR. Consequently, the EU faces two major challenges: the lack of military power to underline its economic power and the power over opinion, and the limitations of power over opinion in relation to the EU's heavy reliance of this particular area of power.

3.5. Theoretical Assumptions on the EU's relations to the CELAC

Based on the theories outlined above, this chapter will picture the theoretical assumptions concerning the EU's behavior towards the CELAC. From a realist point of view, the relations between the EU and CELAC origin in the motivation to widen the EU's influence and power, and to secure the continuation of their existence. The EU was motivated to widen its relations with the CELAC in order to interrupt the dominance of the U.S. on the American continent, and to benefit from the advantages of political influence and trade relations. (Dimon, 2006) The initiation of closer relations was therefore mostly a rational consequence of EU policy, as the relationship made sense to counter the U.S. hegemony in the LAC region and to extend trade relations and economic influence to another region with great economic potential and predicted economic growth. Furthermore, the EU seemingly aimed for ideological influence, as a continuation and intensification of the historical ties between EU and the CELAC and in order to move the relationship onto a new level of interregional cooperation. The realist assumptions align with *Realpolitik*, which means that the primary concerns are less about morality and a mutually beneficial relationship, but the central goal is the fulfillment of the EU's aims, which particularly consists of the EU trade interests and the political and societal influence on the CELAC and its MS.

From a normative perspective that includes a utopian/ idealist views, the EU entered into a more intense and close relationship with the CELAC to foster interregional relations and regional integration of the CELAC in order to improve the collaboration of the two regions on an international and regional level. The initial motivation was based on the wish of the EU to support the CELAC MS in their developments towards the

realization of stable and lasting democracies, the rule of law, the realization and respect of the human rights, the protection of minorities, sustainable development and fair trade. The EU MS with a colonial history are supposedly aware of their responsibility and heritage towards the LAC region and act according to reason and their moral obligations, which include certain obligations towards rectification of historical omissions and damages. The EU is also internationally engaged to promote its values and norms, and to foster a harmony of interest and conflict solution. In accordance with normative assumptions, the EU entertains a foreign policy towards the CELAC that follows the provisions of its leading treaties and laws with reason and moral behavior, whereby the harmony of interest and the overcoming of conflicts are central aims.

3.6. Interpretative Framework

The wider interpretative framework comprises the interplay between realism and utopianism. According to Carr, the two concepts are not completely separable, as realism has a corrective function on utopianism, while utopianism holds the function of forcing realism to accept change, moral considerations and reason. The hypothesis of reciprocity hence assumes that realism prevents utopianism from losing understanding of the facts, while utopianism supports realism in imagining and achieving change. The EU seemingly took Carr's advice that all human action, including political actions, should consist of both utopianism and realism, a combination of free will and determinism. (Carr, 2001: 9f, 12f) The interpretative framework should primarily apply the main components of realism and idealism (utopianism), whereby the acknowledged overlap and reciprocity of realist and idealist assumptions is central to the analysis. Realism focuses on power and security, and claims that power is inseparable from IR and that power is always the central goal of international actors. States either seek to secure the status quo or to extend their power, which is described as the power-security-principle. The struggle for power is frequently visible, and is also a present part in the EU-CELAC relationship. This will be interpreted by utilizing the concept of *Realpolitik*, which expects the prioritization of own interests in cooperation, which is also closely related to the primacy of security and power. The idealist considerations in this framework reflect moral thoughts as crucial, and follow the principles of reason and

progress. It should also be kept in mind that utopia is an integral component of the political realm and that a utopia is required to origin in political realities in order to be feasible and realizable. This means that actions of the EU are not underlying the assumptions of its own interests and goals, but that morality, and considerations concerning the reasonable action and the process-leading behavior are taken into account. It is assumed that the EU and CELAC ultimately follow the same objectives and share a harmony of interests, which also includes the understanding of the beneficial impact of global institutions and regional integration towards global peace and freedom.

3.7. Analytical Framework

The more narrow analytical framework aims to analyze the normative power of the EU that can be found in the the EU's foreign policy towards the CELAC. Therefore, different categories will be analyzing the extent of the normative behavior of the EU. The first applied category contains the discourse and communications that can be found in EU treaties and agreements and outlines to which extent they were introduced into EU-LAC/CELAC Summits outcome documents and the overall relationship. The second category examines statistical material that pictures and describes the current situation and the developments over the period of EU-LAC/CELAC cooperation (1999-2015). These materials can outline how the EU's normative power has affected the different areas of EU-CELAC cooperation. The third analytical category will consist in certain events and occurrences that happened over the period of EU-LAC/CELAC cooperation and illustrate the nature of the EU's engagement within the CELAC. These three categories should provide an insight towards the understanding of the EU as a normative actor and define the extent of the EU's normative power.

4. Background

4.1. Historical Background of the relations EU-LAC/CELAC

The LAC region experienced a long period of regulated markets and protectionism, during which most countries build up a considerable amount of debt, leading to the foreign debt crisis in the 1980s. The EU-LAC relations started to become closer after this so-called “Lost Decade” when many LAC countries began opening their economies and looked for international cooperation and partners. (Dimon, 2006: 185f) While the European Community already signed a cooperation agreement with Argentina in 1971, comprehensive interregional relations were delayed until the 1990s, when EU meetings with the Rio Group, several sub-regional negotiations, and bilateral relations were initiated. (Crawley, 2006: 173f) At the first EU-LAC Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, the parties claimed to possess common values as a result of their common history and stated their interest of building up a strategic partnership as part of the “profound cultural heritage” uniting the two regions. The commonalities, as historical links, cultural affinities, the heritage of immigration and further, which the two regions are allegedly sharing, are frequently pointed out at Summits and outcome documents. (Crawley, 2006: 169f)

The Summits in Rio de Janeiro (1999), Madrid (2002), and Guadalajara (2004) are described as the first phase of cooperation. The Rio Summit was the starting point of the institutionalized cooperation of the two regions in form of summits, declarations and actions plans contributing “to fostering peace, stability and the respect of international law”. In the Rio Declaration Janeiro (1999: Preamble, Annex), the participating nations agreed to

“advance in the consolidation of a strategic partnership of a political, economic, cultural and social and co-operative between both regions which contributes towards the development of each of our countries, as well as towards the achievement of better levels of social and economic well-being for our peoples, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by an ever more globalised, world, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and co-operation”

The results of the Madrid Summit were more of a rhetorical character aiming to increase the bi-regional cooperation efforts and the economic cooperation between both regions, strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing sustainable development towards

the eradication of poverty, the diversity of cultures, the improvement of justice and social equity. The Declaration of Guadalajara was again more specific, and defined multilateralism, social cohesion and bi-regional relations as the three central issues of the Summit. Furthermore, human rights were emphasized as a central issue and commitments towards their promotion as civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights were expressed.

The Summits in Vienna (2006) and Lima (2008) are considered as the second phase of EU-LAC relations, in which the economic crisis, the emergence of the new regional movements, and the stalled EU-MERCOSUR association negotiations were the main issues. Central to the Vienna Summit were topics related to energy, security and environment. In addition, promises to launch negotiations towards AAs with Central America and the Andean Community (CAN) were made. The Lima Summit chose poverty, inequality and inclusion, just as sustainable development as its main agenda items. The results of the Summit concerning trade negotiations were rather disappointing, as very little substantive progress was achieved. Conflicting issues were controversies and disputes among the LAC countries, but also the issue of biofuels and the regulations and the protectionism of the CAP, which concerned many LAC leaders in relation to the drastically increasing food prices. An achievement of the Summit was the launch of the EUroCLIMA, which started a bi-regional cooperation concerning knowledge exchange, establishment of dialogue and synergies, and the coordination of joint actions.

The third phase consisted of the latest Summits in Madrid (2010), Santiago (2013) and Brussels (2015) and was described as a combination between bi-regionalism and bilateralism. During the Madrid Summit the EC presented its renewed LAC-strategy, *The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership*. Furthermore, the engagement in Research and Innovation was deepened by agreeing on an *EU-LAC Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation* and establishing the EU-LAC Foundation. Apart from the Madrid Declaration, the Summit adopted for the first time the Madrid Action Plan 2010-2012 to foster further joint action and cooperation, and the Latin America Investment Facility was created to advance investment projects and loans. In 2011, the LAC countries created CELAC by signing the Caracas Declaration, whereby

the Santiago Summit became the 1st EU-CELAC Summit/ 7th EU-LAC Summit. At the Summit previous action plans were expanded by the EU-CELAC Action Plan 2013-2015 and the Santiago Declaration was adopted emphasizing the right of participation of citizens in public policies and the implementation of Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration about participatory rights of the peoples adopted at the Earth Summit. (ESO, 2014: 7-14; Garcia Rodriguez & Jiménez Valderrama, 2014: 10-14)

The 2nd EU-CELAC Summit in Brussels in 2015 stressed two important international events, the Conference of Parties in Paris 2015 (COP21) and the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Development Agenda at the UN. The Summit can therefore also be seen as part of the negotiation process towards the setting of the goals for the COP21 and the streamlining of the common EU-CELAC policy towards a more efficient and successful climate cooperation. Additionally, the Summit was a central event in the assimilation process of the EU-CELAC aims and areas of cooperation towards the SDGs. One of the main challenges was to address the principle of policy coherence in the areas of trade, agriculture, foreign investment, migration, peace, security, and development aid. Further areas that were addressed by the Summit was the new Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy of the EU, the increase of South-South cooperation and the effects on the EU-CELAC cooperation in the light of new emerging agents and instrument. (Sanahuja, 2015: 70-79)

4.2. Regional Integration

According to the EU, “regional integration processes are vital tools for the attainment of global integration”. The EU also claims that regional integration is imperative for regional stability, economic growth and investment, and for the empowerment of regions on the international level. (Garcia, 2015: 624) The EU is frequently named as the model par excellence for successful regional integration, whereby the achievement of the European continent to overcome its cultural differences and strong national identities is acknowledged. However, the inability of the CELAC to tackle the comparatively smaller barriers is frequently denounced, which Escudé attempts to explain by discussing the differences in regional integration in the EU and the CELAC. The extensive diversity in Europe in terms of language and the existence of

a high degree of national consciousness and identity is not ideal to integrate states into a union and form a collective that achieves to overcome national sentiments and primacy. In contrast to the EU, many people living in the region of the CELAC lack an equally strong national identity and language is no element of differentiation between the countries. However, the indigenous culture and historical background play a crucial role in many CELAC MS, and cause frequently disparities and conflicts concerning language, culture and acknowledgement among different peoples, ethnic groups, and MS. Nevertheless, the CELAC, or historically, Spanish America, holds a vast extent of commonalities that do not only include language, but also religion, social structure, literature, architecture and way of life. Despite these beneficial commonalities, the CELAC experienced a major turn towards fragmentation of the region, mostly due to elites that felt the need to reinforce and strengthen the individual states, which led to disparate economic and political interests. The construction of the “we” and the “other” by local elites increased possible existing differences and caused hostilities among the nations. (Escudé, 2015: 102-104, 109f) Escudé mainly refers to the construction of artificial losses that are strongly tied to territorial demands. Several CELAC MS make claims that other (mostly neighboring) states have “stolen” from them and construct a traumata out of this claims. Examples would be the argument between Argentina and Chile about the border in Patagonia, or Bolivia’s demand to access towards the Pacific Sea. Despite the multitude of these claims, particularly South America has never experienced a traumatizing large inter-state war, which would have demonstrated the necessity of regional integration. The Europeans took on the challenge of integration in the aftermath of the experiences of World War II and with the aim to avoid major violence and conflict among European states. (Escudé, 2015: 106-109) The efforts of the LAC region towards regional integration and the several drawbacks and failures are depicted by recent events in the region, such as the strengthening of ideological extreme and populist governments and the ethnic tensions, particularly with the surge of *indigenismo*. (Escudé, 2015: 110-112) These developments in connection with the pressures of instability, corruption, poverty, inequality and criminality represent challenges for CELAC MS that prioritize interstate politics over regional integration. (Roy, 2012: 14) The growing fragmentation through the increasing number of regional

organizations in the territory of the CELAC and the increasing asymmetries within the region in economic development, political and ideological aims do not only complicate the regional integration as a whole, but also negatively affect the cooperation with the EU. (Gratius & Nolte, 2013: 4)

Panagiota points towards several issues within the geo-political, economic, political and domestic political area that decisively determine the driving factors behind integration attempts in the LAC region. The geo-political factors consist of security consideration and the desire to increase independence from the U.S. The security considerations originate from globalization and liberalization of the international markets and the sentiments of many LAC states to be vulnerable and exploitable, and to be also perceived as such. Regional integration promises a higher degree of perception and influence of the LAC region in IR and the global economy. Another hope of many LAC countries in relation to regional integration is the achievement of stability and the reduction of conflicts. The second geopolitical aspect is related to the historically strong influence of the U.S. in the region, and the high degree of U.S. interventionism in the LAC countries' sovereignty and domestic issues. Regional integration provides the opportunity to oppose U.S. hegemony and the emancipation of the region from U.S. dominance. In the economic area, the main motivation is the opening of new markets for import, export and investments. Furthermore, regional integration frequently results in the reduction of trade obstacles, such as quotas, tariffs and barriers, whereby economic integration is capable of creating a spill-over effect leading to positive developments in other crucial areas, such as cooperation on gun and drug trafficking or interregional crime. Regional integration in the political area promises positive effects on democracy promotion, as economic gains smoothen the grounds for the transition to a democratic system as they create stability and progress. In return, the creation of stability and progress results reciprocally in increasing economic efficiency and cohesion, and enhances development. It can thus be concluded that security, democratization, economic reforms and regional integration are positively correlated and highly beneficial for the region. The last motivational factor contains domestic considerations, which in the LAC region are highly influenced by the elites, which desire regional integration in order to improve their own income sources by stabilizing

the domestic economies and to enhance their political stand. Apart from these general motivational factors of LAC countries towards regional integration, several countries of the LAC region carry along further specific motivations and driving forces that push towards more integration within the LAC region. (Panagiota, 2013: 8-12) However, it can be concluded that regional integration is a very heterogeneous phenomenon among the CELAC MS, as some countries prefer regional cooperation and the advancement of regional integration, while others give priority to sub-regional or even bilateral cooperation.

4.3. Strategic Partnership and Interregionalism

The Rio Declaration starts by stressing the decision to “promote and develop [...] relations towards a strategic bi-regional partnership, based upon the profound cultural heritage [...], and on the wealth and diversity of [...] [the] respective cultural expressions”. (EU-CELAC Summit, 1999) Even though the continuation of the summit relations was quite unclear during the first period of summits, the strategic partnership between the two regions was regularly stressed and the meetings became “a high-profile showcase for EU-LAC engagement and transatlantic interregionalism”. Over the years, a discourse that consolidated and outlined the commonalities of the two regions concerning their cultural affinities and common values led to the perception of a unique form of North-South interregionalism as part of the EU-LAC relations. As the realization of a common strategic partnership is regularly emphasized in outcome documents and action plans of EU-LAC/CELAC Summits, it can be seen as a central objective of the cooperation. (Crawley, 2006: 168-9, 175) The cooperation within the strategic partnership between the EU and the LAC region consists of three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and free trade. The dimension of political dialogue saw the introduction of a new framework for dialogue that meant to streamline the different levels of dialogues already in place. As part of the political endeavors the summit dialogues experienced an increased institutionalization by the foundation of the CELAC in 2011 which replaced the EU-LAC Summits with the EU-CELAC Summits, starting with the 2013 Santiago de Chile Summit. Furthermore, on the trade level several AAs and FTAs entered into force, such as between the EU and CARICOM, Central America,

Colombia and Peru, Mexico, Chile, and Ecuador. However, drawbacks can be seen in the stalled negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR. The final dimension, the development cooperation, experienced a shift in the relationship between the developing regions and the traditional Western powers. The increase of heterogeneity among actors in IR, the emergence of new instruments and patterns of cooperation, and the introduction of new standards of quality and accountability concerning political actions have led to a shift of perception and action in development cooperation between the EU and CELAC, leading to a more sincere inclusion of normative power instead of acting predominately according to *Realpolitik* considerations. (Gardini & Ayuso, 2015: 10-12)

While the strategic partnership advanced rapidly and efficiently in the beginning, the progress soon started to slow down. Some scholars attest the relationship a slow but steady positive trend, despite certain hazards and inequalities, while others claim that the strategic partnership already realized its central aims consisting of an institutionalized interregional dialogue and a network of subregional and bilateral AAs and FTAs. Therefore, the partnership would be required to set new goals and widen the scope of its cooperation. (Gratius & Nolte, 2013: 2; García Rodríguez & Jiménez Valderrama, 2014: 9) While both García Rodríguez & Jiménez Valderrama and Gratius & Nolte draw a quite positive picture of the EU-CELAC relations, Sanahuja is more pessimistic and suggests the need to renovate the relations between the two regions in order to overcome the “relationship fatigue”. However, Sanahuja also acknowledges the achievements that have been accomplished over the period of EU-LAC/CELAC relations since 1999. The institutionalization of the cooperation between the regions was successful by establishing a regular summit cooperation, and the institutionalization ambitions achieved to establish the CELAC, which depicts the convergence and increased cooperation among CELAC MS. The rise of the internal cohesion will expectedly lead to the facilitation of the relations with the EU and position the region as a cohesive and strong global actor. Furthermore, the levels of economic and social growth in the LAC region remain noticeably high despite the economic crisis, and the several democratic elections held during the last decades depict the progress of the democratization process in the region. The continuous adoption of FTAs and AAs between the EU with CELAC MS and blocs show the improvements in the economic

integration process, even though several shortcomings can be noticed. In the light of the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the Conference of the Parties in 2015 and the 2030 Development Agenda, the cooperation between the EU and CELAC received further impulses and goals to extend their cooperation and collaboration. (Sanahuja, 2015: 23-6) The results of the strategic partnership are noticeable, as the common objectives towards inter alia peace, democracy, human rights, sustainable development, and social cohesion, have not just been communicated as common interests and values, but also codified in several summit outcome documents and action plans. The dialogue between the regions through the regular summits is without equals, and does not only diversify and facilitate foreign relations, but also consolidates the perception and influence of the two regions on the international stage. Furthermore, the Summits have not only fostered the political dialogue among the national governments of both regions, but also promoted and facilitated the bi-regional interaction of civil society, academia, and businesses. Another achievement is the conclusion of several AA, as with Chile, and Central America, FTAs, as with Mexico, Ecuador, Peru and Columbia, and the Economic Partnership agreement with CARIFORUM. Additionally, the EU represents the largest donor of ODA in the LAC region, as around 60% of the received aid origins from the EU. (Sanahuja, 2015: 28ff; EC, 2016c)

Without any doubt, both regions have experienced vast transformations during the last years, and will expectedly face further changes and challenges in the upcoming years. These transformations pertain on the one hand the changes within North-South and South-South relations, which will also affect the North-South relationship of the CELAC and the EU, and on the other hand, also affect international economic competition and dominance, as regions of the Global South are challenging the Western political and economic hegemony. (Sanahuja, 2015: 30f)

5. Analysis

5.1. In what way can the EU be understood as a normative actor?

In this section, it should be discussed in what way the EU can be understood as a normative actor and what the EU's normative power entails. According to the discussion in the theoretical part of this paper, normative power consists of the compliance to rules and norms, even though this might be countering the own aims and goals in the short or long term. Several assumption of idealist/ utopian scholars go along with the descriptions of normative power. The aim to transform the global world order into a more peaceful and more just one is a central aspect of the ideal thought, and also represents the founding motivation of the EU. (Wilson, 2003: 12- 5)

The idealist idea asserts that despite certain disparities in norms, values, social and ethnic backgrounds, the commonalities concerning security, welfare, respect and recognition preponderate the gaps between the countries. (Wilson, 2011: 332f) The common history and the shared norms and values are also expressed in the introduction of the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro of 1999, which claims that the aim of the EU-LAC/ CELAC Summits are the enhancement of “the excellent bi-regional relations based upon shared values inherited from common history” and the strengthening of the “links of political economic and cultural understanding between the two regions in order to develop a strategic partnership”. The latest EU-CELAC Summit in Brussels in 2015 also emphasized the common grounds for cooperation and called for a “common future” and described in the Brussels Declaration a “Partnership for the next generation” referring to the ties that bind the two continents together, and outlined the willingness to work together on the creation of prosperous, fair, inclusive, cohesive, and sustainable societies. (EU-LAC Summit, 1999; EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a)

Generally, the EU is understood as an international actor that aims to behave successfully and credibly as a normative power, and as Falkner claims, the EU leadership departs “from the *Realpolitik* tradition in foreign policy and promotes the global common good over and above the national interest”. However, the most frequently mentioned shortcoming of the EU is the incapability to act according to a coherent policy, as the EU's foreign policy particularly diverges from its discourses when it comes to economic policies and trade interests, which is why the EU is in these

areas frequently perceived as a soft imperialist that entertains a normative rhetoric but acts according to self-interested objectives.

The most popular EU policy to exemplify the EU's soft imperialism is the CAP, which has frequently been criticized as contradicting the EU values and norms of free trade and the EU preferential trade agreement system that should support emerging economies to further develop and prosper. Afionis and Stringer describe this protectionism as a pragmatic realist approach of the EU that could particularly been observed in the free trade negotiations with MERCOSUR and the unsuccessful negotiations of the WTO Doha Development Round. One outstanding observation hereby is the fact that the EU's relative power is very much dependent on the counterparts power possession and entertainment, which means that the EU's behavior is to a large extent determined by the counterpart's behavior and power usage. (Afionis/ Stringer, 2014: 49ff, 60)

The understanding of the EU's role in IR and also in the academia has predominately agreed on the notion of the EU as a *distinct* power, as the EU's power and influence are perceived as varying quite significantly from those of traditional powers, in relation to Europe's ambitions, sources, instruments, policies, and results. Despite this mostly positive notion of the EU, which is according to Gerrits also due to the familiarity with the European traditions in education, socio-economic position and professional affiliation, there have also several critical issues been raised, which are not only related to the EU's agriculture and economic policies. Mahbubani points towards the disparities between the EU's self-perception and the perception of others. According to Mahbubani's perception, "Europe is an arrogant, inward-looking, self-obsessed and conservative entity in decline, which not only treats non-European cultures and societies with disdain and condescension but also fails to establish any kind of meaningful partnership with them". Relating to this statement it seems that the EU is still perceived as a colonialist respectively imperialist power, that acts self-centered and particularly exploits and uses the Global South to achieve its own goals and benefits. This can also be seen in the statement of another Asian author, named Wang, who assigns Europe a misplaced sense of universalism, messianism, and cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, he

accuses the EU of hypocrisy due to the incoherence and inconsistency of its policies. (Gerrits, 2009: 2, 5f)

The normative power entertained by the EU consists of the core norms, such as peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights as absolute norms that should be imposed, if necessary also coercively as part of conditions on negotiation partners. While the EU utilizes a normative discourse in its internal and international communications, meetings, and negotiations, which also contributes to its reputation as a normative actor, it seems to follow strategic and instrumental rationality in its external actions. This can be seen in the EU's promotion of its principles, which is accompanied by material incentives, positive and negative conditionality, and even robust sanctions if necessary. A crucial component concerning normative power is that it must be seen as legitimate, which requires norms to be convincing or attractive in order to be justifiable. Furthermore, norms must be presented in a coherent and consistent way in order to appear legitimate. (Manners, 2009: 12f; Rosamond, 2014: 133, 137)

Considering some of the contradictions and disagreements concerning the EU's normative role, it could be assumed that the understanding of the EU as a normative power is less based on the actual behavior of the EU, but is instead a result of the EU's normative reputation. According to Diez, one relevant aspect is not the actual behavior of the EU but the understanding of other actors concerning the behavior and the role of the EU. This external understanding and the construction of its identity by the EU leads to a certain reputation of the EU as an international actor. The question frequently discussed concerns thus whether the EU acts as a normative power, and less whether the EU has *de facto* normative power. The perception of the EU as a "different kind of actor" and the perceived characteristics of the EU are therefore of utmost importance for the understanding of the EU. (Diez, 2005: 614ff)

5.2. Does the EU behave according to normative criteria towards the CELAC and has the EU's behavior changed over the period of cooperation (1999-2015)?

5.2.1. Fight against poverty and social inequality

The fight against poverty and social inequality is directly and indirectly connected to a high number of other issues of IR, inter alia, trade and economic relations, political

stability and peace, ethnicity and gender. While poverty is only mentioned once explicitly in the CFREU, in Article 34 about social housing and social security, and social inequality cannot be found at all, the majority of the provisions of the Charter can be seen as directly or implicitly linked with the fight against poverty and social inequality. Aspects as dignity, equality, and solidarity contain several aspects that either affect or are affected by poverty and social inequalities and consequently, poverty and social inequality cannot be analyzed in an isolated manner. (EU, 2000)

The Declaration of Rio de Janeiro acknowledged in Articles 6 and 64 the importance of education in order to reduce poverty, social and gender inequalities. This is also related to the right to the own culture and linguistic identity. Furthermore, poverty, social exclusion, and marginalization are linked to the promotion of sustainable development, the need to reform the traditional consumption and production patterns, and the importance of the protection of the biological diversity and the global ecosystem (Art. 18). Article 39 in the Annex of the Rio Declaration calls for programs and initiative in the area of health and education that work towards the elimination of social exclusion, poverty, and marginalization.

Article 2 of the Rio Declaration states explicitly its determination “to persevere in the advancement of democratic processes, social equality, modernisation efforts, trade liberalisation and broad-based structural reforms”. Additionally, in Article 54 the aim of social equality is directly interlinked with education and calls for an improved quality and access to education and scientific and technological progress. (EU-LAC Summit, 1999)

The Brussels Declaration relates in Art. 25, 27, and 31 to the aim of poverty eradication as part of the 2030 Development Agenda, whereby sustainability and poverty eradication are connected to economic, social, and environmental development, which must be achieved in the long run in order to be able to sustainably eliminate all forms poverty. Thereby, the EU and CELAC commit themselves to the effective realization of the means of adaptation and mitigation to achieve the realization of the 2030 Development Agenda. The Declaration also acknowledges in Art. 57 and 59 the particular importance for Haiti to combat its high levels of extreme poverty, and points towards the achievements of the CELAC to improve significantly the numbers of

people living in poverty on the continent in alignment with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Article 64 relates to the achievement of

“higher levels of social inclusion and economic, social and territorial cohesion, equality and access to public services, in accordance with national policies and bi-regional programmes on a voluntary basis”.

Another particular emphasis is the interregional commitment towards gender equality and women’s empowerment in Article 71 of the Brussels Declaration. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a). While the Plan of Action of the Brussels Summit relates to poverty and social inequality in some of its aims, these two very important areas do not appear quite as often in the Action Plan as one might assume. Poverty is mostly mentioned in aim No. 3 that promotes social inclusion and cohesion, in which poverty eradication is mentioned as a main goal with a special emphasis on vulnerable populations and in relation to sustainable development as outlined in the MDGs and the SDGs. Additionally, aim No. 5, which deals with education and employment, calls upon the creation of decent and dignified jobs that lead to higher incomes and thus combat poverty. This goal also calls to include the vulnerabilities of certain groups, the different levels of development and abilities of countries, and the functions of the labor markets into analyses and policy development. Concerning the combat against social inequality, the Action Plan is quite selective and predominately concentrates on gender equality and women empowerment. However, concrete mentioning and goals towards the elimination of disparities within the society in CELAC is lacking. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015b)

The amount of people within the CELAC living with \$ 4 or less a day is illustrated in Chart 10, whereby Haiti (87.2% in 2012) , Guatemala (59.8% in 2014), Honduras (55.9% in 2014), and Nicaragua (41.4% in 2014) show the highest percentages of poor people, followed by El Salvador (31.4% in 2014), Dominican Republic (33.1% in 2013), Mexico (27.5% in 2014), Colombia (28.9% in 2014), and Bolivia (25.9% in 2014). Chart 11 shows the development of poverty in the CELAC (except Haiti) between 1999 and 2013. The countries with the highest rates over the whole period are Honduras (green line) and Nicaragua (red line). It could be assumed that if Haiti was included, it would be the country with the highest poverty rate. The countries with the lowest poverty rates are Uruguay (beige line), Chile (medium blue line), Costa Rica

(dark blue line), and Brazil (moss-green line). The general trend that can be observed in Chart 11, is that the poverty rates have decreased over the time, whereby the decrease in most CELAC MS is quite steady and modest, however, some states experienced a stronger decrease in poverty, such as Ecuador (light blue line), Brazil (moss-green line), and Bolivia (orange line). Some others, such as Venezuela (light yellow line) and Paraguay (turquoise line), experienced mixed results with poverty rates increasing and decreasing. (Annex, Chart 10 and 11)

The development of the poverty index shows a relatively positive picture compared to other regions of the Global South, and also the evaluations of the MDGs that measured the global development progress drew a relatively positive picture of the CELAC region by attesting it to be one of “the most advanced regions in terms of compliance with the MDG[s]”. However, the MDGs failed to consider certain components that would have showed the multidimensional inequalities in the CELAC, including the dimension of social exclusion, and the lack of participation and empowerment of the most vulnerable populations. (Sanahuja et al, 2015: 27f) This is also reinforced by Bárcena Ibarra who analyzes the possible areas of cooperation between CELAC and the EU in terms of the implementation of the 2030 Development Agenda, and claims that the main structural problem in the region of the CELAC is the persistence of social inequality and the lack of adequate measures to address these inequalities. (Bárcena Ibarra, 2015: 2)

Evaluating Chart 12, which illustrates the levels of inequalities in income and opportunity the LAC regions in 2014, it becomes clear that not necessarily the poorest countries are the most unequal. While Haiti (Gini: 0.605 in 2012) and Colombia (Gini: 0.535 in 2014) are the two countries with the highest Gini Coefficient and consequently face the highest levels of inequalities concerning their income and their opportunities in their countries, several other countries also show relatively high Gini Coefficients, despite their higher level of development and economic success. It can be seen that Brazil (Gini: 0.515 in 2014), Paraguay (Gini: 0.517 in 2014), and Chile (Gini: 0.505 in 2013) have also comparably high positions in the ranking concerning levels of inequality, whereby especially Brazil and Chile are usually seen as the economically more successful countries in the region. Chart 13 shows that the trend of the Gini

Coefficient and thus the level of income inequality in the region has also experienced an improvement over the last years, whereby Chart 14 shows that particularly the Southern Cone and additionally the Andean region have been able to present promising developments, while the Caribbean region continues to face serious struggles to combat the levels of income inequalities in their region, which also affects the whole region of the CELAC. According to Chart 14, Central America has the highest Gini Coefficient to describe income inequalities in the region with 0.52, followed by the Andean Region with 0.49 and the Southern Cone with 0.47. The whole CELAC had a Gini Coefficient of 0.51 in 2014, which is still relatively high when comparing with the EU's Gini Coefficient of 0.309 in 2014. The EU has been the region with the lowest Gini Coefficient in the last decade and has additionally experienced a very stable value over the last ten years. The Southern Cone and the Andean region suffered a brief increase of inequality levels until around 2003, while the region otherwise has experienced vast improvements concerning their inequalities since the launch of cooperation with the EU. The CELAC has generally seen a drastic improvement in its inequality gap, however, the region has been described as the most unequal region worldwide, which can be affirmed by Chart 16 that illustrates the global income Gini Coefficient. Looking at the position of the LAC region in a global comparative manner, the high level of the Gini Coefficient and consequently the high disparities of equality in many CELAC MS are standing out. It can thus be discussed to what extent EU measures and involvement have led to this positive development, however, the cooperation did clearly not harm the improvement of the inequality gap in the CELAC. (Annex: Chart 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; World Bank, 2015)

The ECLAC also stressed the problematic situation in the LAC region at the World Economic Forum in 2016, as the region has achieved great advances concerning the fight against extreme poverty, however, it has failed to address extreme inequalities caused by the lack of taxation of high-level income and wealth inequalities in order to advance sustainable growth and social inclusion. In 2014, the richest 10% of people in Latin America possessed 71% of the region's wealth, and this disparity is about to increase according to ECLAC's predictions, claiming that in six year's time the richest 1% in the CELAC will have more than 50% of the region's wealth in their possession.

ECLAC representatives identify the taxation system as the main component to cause and reinforce these high levels of inequalities in the CELAC. (ECLAC, 2016a) Despite the apparent prioritization of social equality and cohesion of the cooperation between the EU and CELAC and in the common outcome documents of the several summits, the major problem of disparity and an enormous inequality gap remains, which leaves the question on how normative the EU's action can be with so little success and improvement to the current day.

5.2.2. Consolidation of good governance and promotion of peace

Good Governance

While Good Governance has become a very popular phrase in recent years, its definition has been rather vague and disputed. In the context of this paper, the applied definition should follow the UN's definition, which states that a country's institutions and processes are transparent and follow elections and legal procedures. Central to the UN's understanding is that "good governance promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring". Corruption, poverty, and violence are seen as the greatest threats to Good Governance, which is why Good Governance is communicated as one of the central aims of the EU-CELAC cooperation. (UN, n.d.; EC, 2014)

While the Rio Declaration mentions Good Governance as a central element on which the EU-LAC partnership is built and also acknowledges that cooperation and common action should inter alia be based on the principles of Good Governance (EU-LAC Summit, 1999), the Brussels Declaration does more frequently refer to Global Governance instead of Good Governance, which is not explicitly mentioned at all. Article 6 underlines the importance to "strengthen the multilateral system and to promote more effective and inclusive global governance, respectful of international law", however, in addition to that, governance is only mentioned in relation to the combat of transnational organized crime and internet governance (Art. 12, 42, 43), and to raise awareness to achieve development progress in Haiti by assuring security and governance (Art. 57). Furthermore, the EU-CELAC Action Plan refers even less to Good Governance, as it only mentions governance once in relation to the European

Development Fund and the ongoing dialogue between the two regions (Art. 3a). The omission to adequately include Good Governance to the EU-CELAC Action Plan appears quite irritating considering that Good Governance is one of the central cooperation areas of the EU and CELAC. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a; EU-CELAC Summit, 2015b)

Chart 18 depicts the WB survey from 2014, which measured the levels of Good Governance using the criteria of control of corruption, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, voice and accountability, and rule of law, in which Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, and furthermore Barbados, Aruba, and the Bahamas showed quite exhaustively positive developments and consequently, represent the countries with the highest level of Good Governance in the region. (World Bank, n.d.) Comparing the levels of Good Governance of the most successful countries in the CELAC from the 2000 and 2014 WB Survey, Uruguay and Aruba can be highlighted for vast improvements concerning the different aspects of its Good Governance, while the situation deteriorated significantly in Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. The level of Good Governance was most worrisome in the 2014 survey in Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay. These results match relatively well with the findings of the 2000 Survey, as most problematic issues have not drastically changed over the period. Concerning the indicators of Good Governance, the country with the least positive level of Good Governance is Venezuela, whose indicator deteriorated even more over the period of 2000 and 2014 and showed very low levels in all six categories. As a positive development, Paraguay was able to noticeably improve its standards and enhance its level of Good Governance. Of all six criteria, most unstable in the CELAC is the area of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. This is particularly the case in Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, whereby the level of political stability deteriorated most drastically in Mexico and Honduras and improved significantly in Paraguay between 2000 and 2014. It can be summarized that the level of Good Governance in CELAC is quite heterogeneous, as a few countries show a relative stable levels and high standards of Good Governance, while the majority countries seem to face a high level of discontinuity and instability. (Kaufmann et al, 2010; Annex, Chart 18) The EU has been

involved in promoting Good Governance, inter alia by promoting transparency and democracy in monitoring the elections in Mexico, which the Mexican government only reluctantly accepted under EU pressure. (Dominguez, 2013: 10) Nevertheless do the developments over the period of cooperation not show any conclusive result, as some countries show very positive and promising developments, while other countries stagnate or show relatively inconsistent and unstable developments, due to which it is not possible to make valid conclusions about the effects of the EU-CELAC relationship.

Promotion of Peace

The Preamble of the CFREU starts by stating that “the peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values”. This epic way of entering the Charter not only repeats the frequently used term of “the peoples” (compare: UN Charter: “We the peoples of the United Nations...” and U.S. Constitution: “We the people of the United States...”), but also already emphasizes the determination to promote and achieve a more peaceful future, which should be realized according to the EU’s values and norms that form the basis of the EU’s alleged normative behavior.

The Rio Declaration names international peace as a common value and ambition that is aligned with other fundamental values, such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law. Thereby, the connection between peace and stability is reinforced and emphasized (Art. 4, 11 and 22). Furthermore in the Declaration relate the parties peace closely to disarmament, international arms control (Art. 22), and the combat against all actions of terror (Art. 27). Another interesting agreement can be found in Article 59, which aims for “more enduring relations between our peoples and promoting cultural creativity as a dialogue for peace and tolerance”. The description of the commonalities but also differences between the two regions seem to be emphasized in order to outline the importance of the promotion despite or maybe just because of certain differences. This seems to be an attempt to implement the strategy used by the EU to solve intra-EU conflicts and disagreements among MS, whereby the commonalities and common aims are utilized to solve the conflicts instead of letting conflicts separate the states and undermine peace and prosperity. (EU-LAC Summit, 1999)

The Brussels Declaration emphasizes the importance of addressing common challenges that are shaping the EU's and CELAC's common future. Within this, the regional organizations stress in Art. 5 their commitment towards the provisions of the UN Charter, which are inter alia the peaceful solution and settlement of conflicts. The EU and CELAC reinforce their ambitions to cooperate towards international peace and the peaceful settlement of conflicts, which also includes the engagement of both regions in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Hereby, the engagement of CELAC towards the establishment of a "Zone of Peace" is acknowledged and highlighted (Art. 16). In the following, the Declaration addresses the ongoing conflicts and instabilities in the CELAC region, whereby in particular the current peace process in Colombia is outlined, and the EU and the CELAC express in Article 17 their willingness to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. Particularly interesting is Article 20, in which the parties express their concerns about the "coercive measures of unilateral character with extraterritorial effect that are contrary to international law" that have been adopted by the U.S. against Venezuela. The parties point towards their commitment to peaceful means of conflict settlement, which the CELAC has also pointed out in their Special Declaration 24, in which the CELAC designates the region as a "Zone of Peace" and urges all states to respect the provisions of the Proclamation and the principles of non-intervention into the internal affairs of another state, directly or indirectly, and thereby respect the principles of national sovereignty, equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Lastly, the Brussels Declaration encourages in Art. 42 the peaceful usage of the possibilities of modern information and communication technologies to promote peace. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a; EU-CELAC Summit, 2015c; CELAC, 2015)

Within the EU-CELAC Action Plan from the Brussels Summit in 2015, the promotion of peace is predominately included as part of citizen security, as the parties commit themselves in Article 10 to the "promotion of culture of peace and non-violence". Furthermore, the achievement of peace is connected to gender aspects and the parties aim to discuss the experiences concerning the advances of peace and the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015b)

The Global Peace Index Report 2015 demonstrates that all the EU MS are in the top area of the peace ranking (dark green and green painted area), whereby Denmark (2.)

and Austria (3.) are highest and Cyprus (68.) and Greece (61.) are lowest ranked. The CELAC is mostly positioned in the medium area of the Index, whereby Chile (29.), Costa Rica (34.), Uruguay (44.), and Argentina (60.) stand out as the countries with the high peace index. Most worrisome are Colombia (142.), Mexico (144.), and Venezuela (146.), which are among the 20 countries with the lowest state of peace worldwide. (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015: 8, 10, 12; Annex, Chart 17) Comparing the Index from 2008 and 2015, several deteriorations among CELAC MS can be observed, such as Chile (very high → high), Panama (high → medium), Cuba (high → medium), Mexico (medium → low), Guatemala (medium → low), El Salvador (medium → low), while visible improvements have been rather rare, only Haiti managed to be shifted from low to medium. (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2008)

The case that pictures the engagement of the EU in the promotion of peace most comprehensively and in-depth, is the peace negotiations between Colombia and the guerrilla group *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). While Norway and Cuba currently serve as the guarantors in the peace talks in Havana, the EU has been engaged as a mediator. Despite several setbacks during the talks, major advancements in form of consensus on the land reform, political participation and drug trafficking have been achieved between the Colombian government and the representatives of the FARC. (Dominguez, 2015: 105ff; Luengo-Cabrera, 2015: 4) Since 2014, noticeable progress has been achieved, and even a date for the signing of the peace agreement had been set, which however passed unsuccessfully as both sides failed to meet the deadline. The negotiations are currently stalled on questions concerning the decommission and destruction of the weapons of the FARC and the lack of progress on the disarmament of the guerrilla group. (BBC, 2016) The case of Colombia also shows how the EU connects economic interests with political aims, and how economic power is entertained to achieve political aims. The economic policies included in the EU's Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru have had a mutually benefiting effect, as the EU is investing in the cooperation with Colombia by allocating humanitarian assistance and development aid, while Colombia has become a security partner for the EU in the region by participating in and contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. (Dominguez, 2015: 105-9)

Apart from the Colombian peace talks, the involvement of the EU towards the normalization of the relationship between Cuba and the U.S. was a central issue of the EU's involvement in conflict settlement. A relaxation of the relations with Cuba would also weaken the tensions with Venezuela and open the possibility to a more moderate and less hostile relationship. The solution of the tensions related to Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba would not only facilitate IR, but also advance regional integration for the CELAC as the focus could be relocated to other pressing issues and instabilities in the region, such as drug trafficking and social and ethnical disparities. (Luengo-Cabrera, 2015: 4)

The engagement of the EU in the advancement of peace and conflict solution can quite clearly be described as normative behavior. While the pacification and relaxation of tensions in the region also clearly benefit the EU's economic interests, the efforts invested by the EU into the pacification and conflict solution in the CELAC clearly outnumber the direct (and unilateral) advantages for the EU.

5.2.3. Economic cooperation, trade development, and regional integration

Economic Cooperation

In the Rio Declaration, economic cooperation is closely connected to social and political cooperation, whereby Article 16 outlines the “opportunities and benefits of political, economic and social development, with full respect for their identities, cultures and traditions” and Article 17 mentioned the necessity for “sustainable development strategies [to realize] compatible economic growth, environmental protection and social progress”. While the Declaration highlights the importance of “international direct co-operation“, the cooperation is mainly seen as means to enhance trade liberalization and to stabilize the financial sector and volatile financial flows. Asymmetries in development are supposed to be abolished by the implementation of economic cooperation. (EU-LAC Summit, 1999: 4ff) The Brussels Declaration also remains quite vague concerning the achievement of economic cooperation. The Declaration acknowledges in Article 45 that “economic links are drivers of sustained and inclusive economic growth, and should further allow the protection of the environment and promotion of social equity and inclusion, and dignified and productive

employment and decent work in both regions“. Furthermore, Article 56 reaffirms the commitment of the two regions towards “the priorities of regional economic integration, environment, climate change and energy, and crime and security”. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a) The lack of precision and concreteness concerning economic cooperation is also visible in the Brussels Action Plan, which sets out more specific areas of cooperation. While economic cooperation is present in most of the emphasized EU-CELAC cooperation areas, no precise aims and goals concerning economic cooperation are named. Goals number 3.), 7.), and 8.) implicitly include economic cooperation as a crucial component to achieve social inclusion and cohesion, gender equality and sustainable development. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015b)

While the economic crisis put certain restraints on the EU’s ability to extent its external relations and foster economic cooperation, as the Union was instead concentrated on internal disputes and conflict management, the CELAC was relatively little affected by the global economic crisis.

The former Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moreno, stated that

“the difficult economic times for Europe come in contrast to the sustained growth for the majority of the countries of our continent and point out that, for the first time, Latin America is part, not of the problem, but of the possible solutions to the global crisis”.

This statement shows the extent of damage that was caused by the economic crisis to the economic cooperation of the two regions, which can also be observed by the increasing cooperation of the CELAC MS with several Asian countries. Particularly China benefited from the EU’s economic and institutional crisis, and enhanced its relationship with and widened its influence within the CELAC. (Panagiota, 2013: 24f; García Rodríguez, 2014: 23) The EU’s ongoing inability to implement successful measures to address the crisis in a united and coherent manner, damaged not only its reputation, but also the Union’s normative power due to the implementation of *Realpolitik* policies and internal quarrels. (Tonra, 2011: 1199)

Taking the statistics on the financial flows of ODA and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the EU towards the CELAC into consideration, economic cooperation doesn't seem to be a marginal part of EU-CELAC relations. According to the OECD Development Cooperation Report from 2015, the main ODA flows of the EU

institutions are directed towards Eastern Europe and the African regions, however, around 7% of the EU institution's ODA is flowing towards the CELAC. (OECD, 2015: 200) Germany is within the EU the largest donor of ODA towards the Americas, however, particularly interesting are the ODA flows of the former colonial powers Spain and Portugal. Neither Spain nor Portugal have achieved the aim of spending 0.7 % of their Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA, whereby Portugal spend 0.19 % and Spain 0.13 % of their GNI on ODA in 2014. However, despite the very low numbers of both former colonizers concerning their total ODA, Portugal only spend \$ 5.78 million on the Americas, while Spain directed around ten times more to its former colonies (\$ 51.44 million). Interesting hereby is that while Portugal's spendings on ODA towards the Americas has remained relatively stable during the period of the economic crisis, the expenditures of Spain have drastically decreased after peaking in 2008. (Annex, Chart 5 and 6; OECD Data, 2016b) The behavior of Spain in the pre-crisis period shows the historical attachment with the LAC region, however, the reaction to the economic crisis also depicts *Realpolitik* behavior, as the own interests of Spain are prioritized and the consequences of the drastic cut of ODA flows towards the CELAC are seemingly less important than Spain's own interest to decrease its spendings due to the crisis. Assessing the sectors the EU's ODA is spent on, it can be seen that the majority of the ODA is used for social and economic infrastructure projects, with 32 % being spent on economic infrastructure in 2012-2013 and 22 % on other social infrastructure. (OECD, 2015: 201) In particular the engagement in the economic infrastructure could be reasoned with the economic interest of the EU in the region of the CELAC and the aim to improve the infrastructure in order to improve and facilitate trade cooperation. Thereby, the statistics and the spending behavior of the EU don't give any further information about the inclusion of its normative power by involving its norms and values of free and faire trade, human rights, equality, or sustainable development.

The EU is one of the major investors in the CELAC's region, with FDI stocks of €505.7 billion in 2013, which represents 10.3% of EU FDI stocks approach and 35% of the CELAC's FDI stock. Brazil and Mexico are the main recipients, who also represent the main trade partners of the EU, however, the EU is also the major investor in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela. The EU's investments in the CELAC are

higher than the EU's FDI stock in Russia, China, and India combined, which shows that the CELAC possesses a certain importance and priority for the EU concerning their investment policy and strategy. (EC, 2015: 7f)

Within the EU it could be assumed that either the economically strongest countries, which are Germany, UK, France, or the former colonial states would be the states with the highest FDI contributions. Interestingly, the Netherlands are the greatest single investor in the CELAC region, with investments rising from 14% of all inflows in the CELAC regions in 2013 to 20 % in 2014. Currently, the Netherlands' investments are most dominant in Brazil. The second largest investor is not too surprisingly Spain, which is mostly investing in Mexico and Colombia, where the country invests approximately 18 % and 13 %. By increasing its share to 10% in 2014, Spain became the major investor in several CELAC countries. The third largest European investor is Luxembourg with a share of 8 % of the total inflows. (ECLAC, 2015: 30; Annex, Chart 7, 8 and 9) The economic crisis had harsh effects on the FDI of the EU and the individual MS in 2009. While this breakdown can be seen as an act of *Realpolitik* behavior, the quick recovery of the investments also showed that the crisis had a limited effect on the interests of the EU to invest in the CELAC and to thereby increase its own economic output. (Annex, Chart 8 and 9)

Trade Development

Trade is a major component in the relation between the EU and the CELAC. According to the EC Directorate for Trade, Brazil is ranked on the 10th position of total EU trade, with a share of 1.9%, whereby the trade balance is located at 3,709 million Euros. Mexico is also placed within the main trade partners of the EU with a share of 1.5% of the EU's total trade. Apart from the dominant positions of Brazil and Mexico, several countries of the CELAC are involved in trade with the EU and despite the lower trade balance, they are nevertheless important partners. Particularly by taking the CELAC as a whole, the importance of the CELAC as a trade partner for the EU becomes visible, as it represents a stable and reliable trade partner, despite its inability to keep up with many of the Arabic or Asian countries. (EC, 2016a, p. 1; EC, 2016b)

Already in the Rio Declaration, the cooperating partners committed to the advancement of trade liberalizations and stressed their economic cooperation in

accordance with the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Until the Brussels Summit in 2015, the rhetoric changed quite significantly, as the parties still stressed their commitment to eliminate protectionism in all forms in the Brussels Declaration, but also express their aim towards an “open and non-discriminatory, rules-based multilateral trade system and the full respect of its disciplines” (Art. 23). Furthermore, the Brussels Declaration outlines the increasing trade between the regions as a positive development and the engagement of both regions towards socially and environmentally responsible investment is stressed, whereby the ultimate aim should be sustainable development and economic growth. However, the Declaration also outlines the equal basis of the partners, and the principles of solidarity, cooperation, and complementary (Art. 45-8). Despite the shift in rhetoric from the Rio Declaration to the Brussels Declaration in 2015, the central aims continue to target economic growth and increasing trade relations. Despite the importance of trade for both regions, and particularly for some of the CELAC MS, such as Brazil whose dominant trading partner is the EU, the issue of trade is only marginally mentioned in the Brussels EU-CELAC Action Plan. Trade appears only twice, in relation with the promotion of social inclusion and cohesion (aim No. 3) and concerning investments and entrepreneurship for sustainable development (aim No. 8). The lack of concrete aims and advancements in the area of trade cooperation is not quite understandable considering the importance of the trade relations, particularly for Mexico and Brazil, but also for other CELAC MS and the EU. (EU-LAC Summit, 1999; EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a; EU-CELAC Summit, 2015b)

Following the provisions in the Brussels Declaration, the EU is fostering and advancing free and fair trade that follows the aims of social cohesion, equal opportunities, sustainable and inclusive development. Furthermore, the regions affirm that trade and investment should benefit mutually and take individual capabilities into consideration. However, the actions of the EU do not exhaustively match the rhetoric used in the Declarations of the EU-LAC/CELAC Summits. The most prominent example is the EU’s CAP, consisting of agricultural tariffs and subsidies that have already led to several conflicts and discontent with EU trade partners. (Meunier & Nicolaidis, 2006: 920) The EU has engaged in dialogues concerning trade agreements

with MERCOSUR, but also with Brazil individually, and has thereby also used its position to emphasize the necessity to foster environmental policies and combat climate change. The issue of deforestation, particularly of the Amazonian area, has been a major issue in EU-Brazil dialogues. However, the issue also relates closely to biofuels and bioethanol, on which the EU puts high tariffs and subsidizes its own products, which harms the Brazilian economy noticeably. (Afionis & Stringer, 2014: 58f) The policy to employ tariffs and subsidies is clearly against the provisions in the Declarations of Rio and Brussels, also violates the WTO regulations, and furthermore contradicts the EU's normative rhetoric. This has also vastly impacted the advancement of the negotiations towards FTA with MERCOSUR, which has so far failed partly due to disparities and lack of unity among the MERCOSUR MS, but also due to the EU's protectionism on agricultural products. (Garcia, 2015: 626-30) The conditionality, asymmetry and inconsistencies of the EU's behavior in trade relations and trade agreements have led to the reproach of the EU being perceived as a soft imperialist. (Afionis & Stringer, 2014: 59)

Another noteworthy aspect is the choice of countries and subregional organizations, with which the EU achieved to agree on trade agreements. The correlation between successful negotiations leading to the adoption of an AA or FTA and the level of economic relation seems quite strong, which would mean that the EU is more motivated to conclude AAs or FTAs with the partners that are most important and advantageous for the EU. Currently, the EU has signed agreements with several bilateral partners in the LAC region, the first FTA was signed with Mexico (2000), followed by the AA with additional protocol with Chile (2003/2005), the Economic Partnership Agreement with CARIFORUM (2008), which has provisionally been applied, the AA with Central America (2012), and the FTA with Peru and Colombia (2012). The latest achievement represents the FTA with Ecuador (2015). Several agreements are under negotiation, but have not achieved a successful conclusion. (EC, 2016c; Annex, Chart 4) According to *Realpolitik* consideration, it would be assumed that the EU directs its efforts to negotiate FTAs and AAs according to the trade volume it shares with the relevant actor. Considering the trade statistic of the EU, it attracts attention that the EU has concluded AAs or FTAs with all the CELAC MS that share more successful and important trade

relations with the EU, apart from Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. (EC, 2016a) The three outlier face individual challenges that could explain the lack of interest or the lacking ability to conclude agreements, however, another commonality that unites the three countries is that they are MERCOSUR MS. Within the negotiations between EU and MERCOSUR, the EU CAP has been playing a major role. The EU is unwilling to abolish the CAP, consisting of tariffs on agricultural imports to the EU and subsidies on European agricultural products, as part of its intra-EU policy. This is one of the major obstacles towards the conclusion of a mutually beneficial AAs or FTAs, nevertheless, also the hesitance of the MERCOSUR MS to reduce their trade barriers and protectionism on own products and the lack of unity and consensus among the MS complicates the negotiations substantively. (Dimon, 2006: 209ff)

Furthermore, several intra-MERCOSUR disparities and tensions complicate the negotiations on a EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement. One issue is the Argentinian and Venezuelan economic and political instability, which is in Venezuela caused by the high dependence on oil, the currently extremely low oil price, and disturbingly high inflation. Argentina on the other hand faces repeatedly occurring defaults on debt, whereby the country continues to be affected by the consequences of the major debt default in 2001. (Country Watch, 2015b: 143; Country Watch, 2015a: 93) Additionally, Argentina is blocking the negotiations as it is afraid to lose its dominant position on the Brazilian market due to the cheaper prices of EU products. Brazil currently attempts to initiate a process at “different speeds”, which would mean that willing MERCOSUR MS, such as Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay could continue negotiations with the EU, while Argentina and Venezuela could work on individual agreements with the EU. However, the EU is very reluctant to such a bilateral or sub-regional approach and is determined to reach a regional agreement, which would create an agreement with the whole MERCOSUR region instead of several agreements with individual states. (Paczkowski, 2015)

Taking all these factors into consideration that explain the exposed situation of Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, it becomes clear that the complex and multicausal problems do not only exist between the EU and the CELAC MS, but also among the three countries and their relationships. The refusal of the EU to enter individual

negotiations and to follow the aims of regional integration and interregionalism instead of bi-regionalism and fragmentation shows a certain degree of normative behavior by the EU. On the other hand, though, the EU's refusal to follow its own provisions concerning free trade and liberalization that would lead to the abolishment of the CAP, shows *Realpolitik* considerations as the CAP is only benefiting the EU MS, but represents enormous problems for other actors. The tariffs and subsidies influence widely the world prices of the affected agricultural products and harm in particular the less developed and economically weaker states.

Regional Integration

The regional cooperation between the two regions started out as a rapprochement of the EC and the LAC region in the 1970s, and continued to be institutionalized in 1999 with the establishment of the EU-LAC Summits. The foundation of CELAC in 2011 and the first EU-CELAC Summit (7th EU-LAC Summit) in Santiago de Chile in 2013 represented a further step towards an increasing institutionalization of the EU relations towards the LAC region, and also enhanced the level of regional integration. (Crawley, 2006: 169f, 173f) The Declaration of Rio de Janeiro in 1999 already expressed in Art. 10 the aim to "reinforce the existing institutional dialogues between both regions" (EU-LAC Summit, 1999), while the Brussels Declaration of 2015 then went further to emphasize in Article 36 and 52 the importance of north-south, triangular, and south-south cooperation and the strengthening of bi-regional cooperation and institutional mechanisms. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2015a) The creation and formalization of the intra-LAC cooperation with the foundation of CELAC can be seen as a major success to advance interregional cooperation, particularly for the EU who emphasized in the political section of the Copenhagen Criteria the goal to support the creation and reinforcement of stable institutions that enhance the standards of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. (European Union, 2015) Especially the Santiago Declaration, which was adopted at the 1st EU-CELAC Summit in 2013, shows the relevance of the new institutionalized and formalized relationship between the two regions; Article 2 of the Declaration writes that

"for the first time, Latin America and the Caribbean gather today for the bi-regional dialogue at the highest level within the framework of CELAC, the

representative mechanism of this region that shall promote its interests and objectives on integration and development”.

In this context the role of the EU in the cooperation is also outlined and seen as a catalyst towards regional integration and the enhancement of interregional relationships, as stated in Article 3 of the Santiago Declaration, that

“we are confident that this new approach will result in an even more balanced, efficient, constructive and symmetrical relation with complementarity and solidarity between the two regions. We reaffirm the importance of relying on a socially constructive, inclusive and diverse dialogue to achieve the commitments outlined in this Declaration”.

These quotes from the Santiago Declaration do not only show the common interest in regional integration and the willingness to outline the role of the cooperation between the EU and CELAC, but also the EU’s rhetoric for its own enlargement policy shines through as the Copenhagen Criteria particularly emphasize the role of stable institutions, while Article 21(1) TEU calls for partnerships with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations and outlines the importance of multilateral solutions to common problems. (EU-CELAC Summit, 2013; European Union, 2015; European Union, 1992)

The strengthening of regional and international cooperation by institutionalizing regional cooperation on the global level is also part of the idealist beliefs in peace and freedom that are fostered through regional and international organizations as they provide a platform for communication and negotiation and thus facilitate diplomatic and non-violent means of conflict solution. For Vasquez and Knutsen, international institutions are a chance to achieve peace and freedom if the structures of these global institutions themselves are directed towards non-violent conflict solving and the achievement of peace. Consequently, they point not only towards the creation of new global institutions, but also the reform and improvements of established institutionalized cooperation. (Wilson, 2003: 13) Consequently, the EU’s engagement in the institutionalization of the LAC region can predominately be described as normative behavior.

6. Findings

The ways in which the EU can be understood as a normative actor are multifaceted and diverse, so that no unequivocal answer is possible. Considering the EU-LAC/CELAC Summit relationship and particularly the outcome documents of these Summits that occurred between 1999 and 2015, the normative power of the EU has been observable. The foundational principles and core norms of the EU are included in the EU-LAC/CELAC agreements, declarations, and action plans, whereby the commonalities between the regions are frequently highlighted. The general discourse entertained in the Rio and the Brussels Declaration show the commitment of the EU to support the development of the CELAC towards peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights. The academic literature agrees generally on the notion of the EU being a normative actor in its foreign policy and its behavior in the international realm. The EU seemingly holds an outstanding position that differs from other international actors, so that the EU is characterized as a distinct power even by those that do not agree with the EU being a coherent and credible normative actor. However, the nature of the EU is also distinct from other actors in IR, which complicates the comparison of the EU with state actors or international organizations that lack the EU's level of integration and cooperation. It is widely agreed that the EU has been showing certain shortcomings to comply with its own rhetoric, whereby these shortcomings mostly comprise the disparities between discourse and action, and a lack of coherency and consistency of the EU's actions. However, some of the shortcomings can very easily be related to the EU's special nature, consisting of the diversity in opinions and aims of the 28 EU MS that frequently causes difficulties to find a compromise that takes the goals and considerations of all MS into considerations. Weber claims that the foreign policy behavior of states is determined by the perception and situation analysis of the individuals with power and furthermore states that the "collective action is a sum or combination of individual actions" (Hollis & Smith, 1990: 74) This should not excuse the inconsistencies and incoherence of the EU policies, and thus the occasionally appearing non-normative behavior of the EU, however, the nature of the EU explains to a certain degree the switches between normativity and *Realpolitik*. This is certainly one of the weaknesses of the EU, and requires not only a higher level

of integration and commitment of the MS towards the EU but also measures to increase the streamlining of EU policies and external EU representation that lead to a higher level of credibility and coherency of the EU's foreign policy in general and towards the CELAC.

The analysis of the three core areas of EU-CELAC cooperation, which are the fight against poverty and social inequality, the consolidation of good governance and promotion of peace, and economic cooperation, trade development, and support for regional integration, showed quite diverse and inconsistent findings.

The discourse at the Summits concerning the fight against poverty and social inequality has included quite limited areas of cooperation and concentrated to large parts on education, however, with the introduction of the MDGs and recently the 2030 Development Agenda, the issues have experienced a prioritization. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the combat against poverty and the elimination of social inequalities is quite selectively, and mostly related to education and gender issues. The statistics show a noticeable decline of poverty in the region, but also illustrate the differing results in the CELAC MS and the strong disparity concerning gender and ethnicity. Furthermore, the recent Brussels Summit failed to include concrete aims concerning social inequalities in its Action Plan. While the evaluation of MDGs attested the CELAC a quite positive result, the major problem in the region is the multidimensional inequalities that exclude particularly the vulnerable populations and create high disparities among population groups. These structural problems seem to have hardly been addressed by the EU-CELAC cooperation and have experienced little improvement over the period of cooperation. The EU has apparently not achieved to successfully use its normative power to advance the region's poverty and inequality problems in an effective and beneficial manner, which is why it can be assumed that *Realpolitik* assumptions have dominated and led to a low engagement of the EU in the CELAC. According to the EU-LAC/CELAC Summit outcome documents, the interest to advance the combat against poverty and social inequalities was not a major priority of the EU's policies in the region.

Good Governance is a quite neglected concept in the EU-LAC/ CELAC outcome documents, as no concrete and specific aims are mentioned and planned, it is

nevertheless highlighted as a central and fundamental concept, on which the EU-CELAC relations are built. Even though the WB certifies the LAC region a quite high and stable level of Good Governance, several CELAC MS show deviating and worrisome results, such as Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador and Paraguay. Apart from the generally worrisome performance of these countries concerning Good Governance, the WB also outlined the area of political stability and absence of violence and terrorism as the category with the least positive results. While the results for Good Governance are relatively positive in the LAC region compared to the conditions in other regions of the Global South, a crucial issue is the lack of continuity and permanent stability. The cooperation of the EU with the CELAC has only had limited success in increasing the levels of Good Governance, which affirms particularly the success of populist movements and the political and economic instability in the CELAC that counter Good Governance. It also has to be considered that several CELAC MS are still challenged by the historical burden and reappraisal caused by the authoritarian and totalitarian governments that many CELAC MS experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. The efforts established by the EU apparently followed normative considerations, as no obvious advantages for and interests of the EU can be identified, however, the engagement of the EU in this area could easily be extended, wherefore the EU can be assumed to entertain both *Realpolitik* and normative considerations.

The Summits highlighted the aims concerning the promotion of peace frequently over the period of the EU-LAC/CELAC cooperation. The outcome documents show clearly that the promotion of peace is a central issue for the EU, and can be therefore found particularly in relation to gender, citizen security and the principle of non-violence. Despite the establishment of a “Zone of Peace” and the good results of the region in the Global Peace Index Report, certain countries struggle to address violence and non-peaceful incidences. Especially worrisome are Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico, whereby the EU is actively engaged in initiatives to encourage peace settlements and the establishment of peace, such as a mediator in Colombia, or as a intermediary between the CELAC and the U.S. concerning the American sanctions on Venezuela and Cuba. Furthermore, the EU has been engaged in the peace process and

democratization efforts in Central America, and has supported the efforts against the production and trafficking of drugs in the CAN region. (Bacaria, 2002: 414f) Even though the EU's efforts in the area of peace promotion certainly include some *Realpolitik* considerations to enhance their economic relations and trade, it can be assumed that a great part of the EU's engagements are without direct and explicit benefits for the EU, wherefore the EU can be described as a normative actor in the promotion of peace in the region of the CELAC.

The findings concerning the economic cooperation between the CELAC and the EU are particularly interesting as the economic realm experienced a significant change of discourse over the period of cooperation of the regions. While the Rio Declaration mostly emphasized free trade and described economic cooperation as the most efficient mean to decrease asymmetries and advance comprehensive development, introduced the Brussels Declaration the importance of sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and also takes further aspects, such as social equity and inclusion, environmental protection, and dignified and productive employment into consideration. Despite these acknowledgements, the outcome documents of the Brussels Summit lack concreteness and specific goals to advance the economic cooperation between the two regions. A major restraining factor is the economic crisis, which caused lower investments flows of the EU in the area of the CELAC. The reaction of the EU to the economic crisis can quite clearly be described as *Realpolitik* behavior, as the flows of ODA and FDI were noticeably reduced due to the internal financial and economic difficulties, whereby the consequences for the recipient states in the CELAC were apparently of secondary importance. While the ODA spendings have been seriously affected by the economic crisis and have been showing constraints until the current day, the FDI only decreased drastically for a short period of time and then recover quite quickly to original levels of spending. Furthermore, the EU is particularly spending ODA and FDI in the area of economic and social infrastructure, which underlines the assumption that the EU at least partially attempts to advance its own interests when fulfilling its normative aims and responsibilities. It can thus be concluded that despite certain normative elements, which can be seen in the ODA flows towards the CELAC, the EU predominately entertains *Realpolitik* considerations in its economic cooperation with the CELAC.

Trade is probably the area of EU-CELAC cooperation that is most controversial concerning the *Realpolitik* or normative behavior. On one side, both regions are very anxious to satisfy their own needs and to attain the highest possible benefit from the trade relationship, which frequently leaves the necessities of the population and the long-term perspective and developments as a subordinate priority. On the other side, the EU-CELAC cooperation continues to be a quite asymmetric relationship concerning the trade capacity and the dependency on the relationship. The analysis showed that the CELAC possesses quite high intra-regional disparities concerning the trade capacities and development status, which leads to the dominance of certain countries, such as Brazil or Mexico, while other actors remain very dependent and without much influence within intra-regional and interregional trade. The comparison of the outcome documents shows some change in relation to the agreed aims of the regions, as they shifted from the pure promotion of economic growth and the increase of trade towards the inclusion of further aspects, such as social cohesion, sustainable and inclusive development, and also includes the acknowledgment of the importance of individual capacities and mutual beneficial trade relations. However, particularly the ambiguous behavior of the EU in trade agreement negotiations that clearly prioritized the EU's own interests and involved the usage of the EU's dominance in the trading sector, showed the EU's prioritization of *Realpolitik* assumptions. The protection of the own market, particularly concerning agricultural products, has not only led to the failure of closing a FTA with MERCOSUR, but also proves the protectionist behavior towards the own advantages and benefits. Instead of supporting the development of the CELAC by granting generous and mutually beneficial trade conditions that allow the continent to further prosper, the EU's behavior hinders the regional economic growth and decelerates social and political development. Thus, the EU's behavior in the trade sector can quite clearly be described as predominately following *Realpolitik*, whereby normative considerations are of secondary importance.

The final analytical category is the aim of the regional integration of the LAC region, whereby the rapprochement of the CELAC and the EU can generally be described as a normative aim of the EU. The cooperation of the EU with the CELAC provided not only a platform for the LAC region to assemble, to negotiate, and to act as

a united and unified actor, but also encouraged the idea of a common regional organization of all LAC countries. The achievement of the foundation of the CELAC in 2011 can be seen as a major success of the EU's efforts and support the picture of the EU as a normative actor that supports the regional integration globally. The regional integration also facilitates cooperation of the EU with other regions, and thereby also serves the EU's own interest. Not only for partnerships in the economic sector and trade, but also concerning cooperation on the international level, such as in the UN, or other international platforms, does regional integration enhance the possibilities for increased influence and importance. Therefore can the achievement of the foundation of the CELAC be seen as a normative goal of the EU with some overlap of *Realpolitik*, which demonstrates that the goals and means of the EU are often not clearly separable as normative or *Realpolitik*. The outcome nevertheless can quite certainly be described as normative, as the regional integration is one of the fundamental aims of EU norm and regulations, but also of the EU rhetoric and reputation.

It can be concluded that the analysis was not able to outline a concrete pattern that could be applicable to determine the EU's decision towards normative behavior or *Realpolitik*. It became clear that particularly economic interests and trade are crucial factors that influence the decision making process and that increase the probability for the shift towards *Realpolitik* policies. The economic crisis for instance has clearly affected the relationship to the CELAC and impacted the EU's interests and the efforts made by the EU to enhance the cooperation and to advance the promotion of its norms and values in the region. Another significant factor influencing the EU is the MS that do frequently have difficulties finding consensus and continue to pursue individual policies towards the CELAC. It can be seen that certain developments and statistical evaluations differ remarkably among EU MS. Even though the EU's policies might frequently consist of a mixture of *Realpolitik* and normative considerations, many policies show a clear normative aspect, and many actions and policies are not explainable and comprehensible by purely applying *Realpolitik* considerations. In order to decrease *Realpolitik* behavior, the EU would need to increase its level of integration in order to avoid fragmentation and disagreement within its internal decision-making processes. Furthermore, the centrality of economic growth and trade which is frequently prioritized

not only by the EU, but by most actors in IR, is one of the major causes for the prioritization of *Realpolitik*. The EU and the CELAC have a relationship that is currently quite mixed with *Realpolitik* and normative elements, and only the future will show whether this relationship is able to prosper further and reach a higher level of interregional cooperation and collaboration.

7. Conclusion

The EU and the CELAC are said to have a long common history that entails sharing common norms, values and traditions. However, the relationship between the two regions has also often been complex and delicate, starting out with the European countries as colonizers and the consequences of the colonial times that have been affected many CELAC MS and their people until today. The relationship continues to struggle with the many asymmetries, different understandings, and disparities, which complicate prosperous and mutually beneficial relations. However, the relationship also promises many advantages for both sides, not only due to the size and population numbers of both regions, but also due to their economic strength and common normative understanding. The EU is widely perceived as a normative actor, and has also proven to act normatively in many aspects concerning the CELAC. Several authors argue whether the CELAC is actually important for the EU, and opinions diverge significantly, whereby Panagiota argues that the cooperation with the CELAC is crucial for the EU due to the size of the continent and its economic perspectives. Trueb, however, claims that the CELAC has not been a priority for the EU and that the relations between the two regions have only covered the minimum level of external relations. (Panagiota, 2013: 31; Trueb, 2012: 267) The level of importance can be argued, however, even if the CELAC was of limited importance for the EU, the likelihood is reasonably high to assume that the CELAC's importance is about to increase. The EU should thus intensify its normative efforts in order to advance the strategic partnership and regional integration with the CELAC and to build a comprehensive and close relationship that is mutually beneficial and prosperous in political and economic terms, but also addresses future challenges, such as economic hardships, migration, and terrorism.

As the EU only possesses limited economic power, and hardly any military power, the Union needs to take care of its main strength, the normative power, and use it to advance and deepen useful and attractive relationships and to consolidate its position and influence in IR. Manners outlines that the EU's *raison d'être* in IR should be the promotion of peace, promotion, and progress, which thus would reinforce the EU's normative character and perception worldwide. (Manners, 2009: 22) *Realpolitik* is

certainly an ever present concept in political decision-making and strategic behavior, as values and interests are frequently inseparable, however, the pursue of the own interests might sometimes only be an advantage in the short-term perspective, but turn into a harming factor for power and reputation in the long run, particularly for actors that are highly dependent on normative power. Concerning the EU's capacity to use *Realpolitik*, Kurtonov claims that

“non-European players will always be better at realpolitik than the EU. For many reasons, the Union is not likely to develop military capabilities comparable to those of US, China or Russia”

Kurtonov's opinion about the inability of the EU to keep up with other states in terms of hard and military power, is reinforced by Grabbe who argues that interests should trump values. Grabbe states that it is often overseen that

“realpolitik is pseudo-realism. It simplifies the challenges and assumes we can identify consistent ‘European interests’ in complicated situations. Moreover, it ignores three important realities about foreign policy: countries are not monoliths; many foreigners also cherish the values we hold dear; and a lack of respect for rights and freedoms does not bring long-term stability for third parties nor does it bring security for us”.

Many scholars claim that *Realpolitik* has found its way back to IR and that the period of ignorance and avoidance of *Realpolitik* has ended. However, many scholars also agree with the EU's limited ability to use and access *Realpolitik* and claim that the EU should concentrate on its real strength, the ability to influence IR by using its normative power. (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2016: 48, 54, 105)

It can be concluded that the EU is widely a normative actor in its relations to the CELAC, however, not exclusively, particularly as certain *Realpolitik* elements have been introduced in terms of trade and economic cooperation. On one side, the special character of the EU should be considered, as the opinions and aims of 28 MS influence the Unions behavior and actions, which might lead to a contradictory and ambiguous picture of the EU's cooperation with the CELAC. Secondly, it should be emphasized that *Realpolitik* and normative behavior are not mutually exclusive categories, as *Realpolitik* and normative considerations frequently coincide, so that no clear determination and separation is possible.

In terms of overall significance, important outcomes have been demonstrated, which describe normative power as a highly complex and multifaceted concept, which can not easily be applied. The EU clearly involves normative consideration into its foreign policy decisions, not only in its relationship to the CELAC, but also in general. However, it has been shown that no such thing as pure normative power and behavior exists, and that several subliminal factors and indirect or implicit goals increase the complexity and ability to understand the nominative power of the EU. The complexity and multilevel considerations lead to the behavior of the EU along *Realpolitik* lines, and create disputable foreign policy behavior of the EU. The context and the understanding of normative power play a crucial role in the assessment of the EU's foreign policy and lead to varying and diverse results. From the understanding achieved in this paper, the EU has been proven to be a normative actor with some shortcomings and exceptional situations that result in to the realization of *Realpolitik* policies.

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9. Annex

Chart 1: Normative, imperial, realist, and status quo behavior

Source: Tocci, N. (2007). Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners. *CEPS Working Document No. 279*, p. 8.




Chart 2: Intended and Unintended Normative Behavior

Source: Tocci, N. (2007). Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners. *CEPS Working Document No. 279*, p. 9.

Type of actor	Normative		Realpolitik		Imperial		Status Quo	
	Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended
Goals								
Means								
Impact								

Non-normative

Normative

Chart 3: Civilian, military, and normative power

Source: Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2), p. 240.

	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Normative</i>
Carr	Economic	Military	Opinion
Galtung	Remunerative	Punitive	Ideological
Manners	Ability to use civilian instruments	Ability to use military instruments	Ability to shape conceptions of 'normal'

Source: Manners (2002) based on Carr (1962, p. 108), and Galtung (1973, pp. 2, 7).

Chart 4: Main trade partner by reporter

Source: European Commission. (2016d). *The State of EU Trade, February 2016*. Retrieved April 18, 2016, from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149622.png.




Chart 5: Distribution of Net ODA towards the Americas

Source: OECD Data. (2016a). *Distribution of net ODA*. Retrieved April 6, 2016, from: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/distribution-of-net-oda.htm#indicator-chart>.




Chart 6: Net ODA in total

Source: OECD Data. (2016b). *Net ODA in total*. Retrieved April 6, 2016, from: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm#indicator-chart>.

Net ODA Total, % of gross national income, 2000 – 2014

Source: Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows




Chart 7: GDP and main components EU

Source: European Commission. (2016g). *Eurostat: GDP and main components (output, expenditure, and income) [namq_10_gdp]*. Retrieved April 29, 2016, from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/namq_10_gdp.

GDP and main components (output, expenditure and income)

[namq_10_gdp]

Last update: 28-04-2016

[Print Table](#)

UNIT: Current prices, million euro

NA_ITEM: Gross domestic product at market prices

S_ADJ: Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data)

TIME ▾	2011Q4	2012Q4	2013Q4	2014Q4	2015Q4
GEO ▾					
European Union (28 c)	3,392,244.9	3,459,420.2	3,509,700.2	3,620,351.0	3,784,454.9
European Union (15 c)	3,112,190.0	3,166,324.5	3,210,484.7	3,314,846.5	3,465,654.8
Euro area (EA11-200)	2,502,970.6	2,503,990.6	2,542,610.0	2,598,567.6	2,688,530.7
Euro area (19 countr	2,516,538.5	2,518,502.1	2,557,719.6	2,607,845.1	2,688,530.7
Euro area (18 countr	2,508,505.0	2,509,925.4	2,548,740.3	2,598,567.6	2,679,030.5
Euro area (12 countr	2,464,597.5	2,465,308.9	2,503,380.3	2,551,792.4	2,630,619.0
Germany (until 1990	685,180.0	695,280.0	717,280.0	740,380.0	772,920.0
United Kingdom	480,701.5	525,807.5	529,805.9	584,571.2	651,317.8
France	527,219.0	534,345.0	540,995.0	546,949.0	561,630.0
Italy	428,547.2	420,692.5	421,796.8	423,674.0	430,438.4
Spain	274,965.0	265,890.0(p)	266,318.0(p)	270,924.0(p)	281,571.0(p)
Netherlands	165,133.0	166,510.0	168,407.0(p)	172,745.0(p)	175,779.0(p)
Switzerland	127,740.9	131,814.2	132,020.7	136,351.3	150,290.4
Poland	100,082.6	109,313.5	111,206.2	113,300.1	119,251.5
Sweden	103,920.0	110,672.0	111,745.6	111,269.8	118,055.3
Belgium	100,520.0	102,477.0	104,377.0	105,957.0	109,119.0
Austria	80,108.9	82,771.4	84,951.7	86,319.4	88,419.0
Norway	95,705.7	104,240.3	98,551.5	95,008.4	85,797.0
Denmark	63,169.2	64,687.4	65,630.0	67,364.5	67,687.4
Ireland	44,236.4	43,543.9	45,051.7	49,248.6	56,405.7
Finland	51,540.0	51,482.0	52,924.0	53,306.0	53,936.0
Romania	38,590.0	38,961.1	43,011.6	44,638.3(p)	47,575.6(p)
Portugal	44,574.4	42,575.2	44,037.2	43,917.9	45,279.9
Greece	51,349.6(p)	47,875.5(p)	44,777.9(p)	44,694.2(p)	44,227.6(p)
Czech Republic	41,904.7	41,869.8	40,728.2	40,504.7	43,387.2
Hungary	25,709.4	27,458.7	27,551.7	28,434.7	29,638.8
Slovakia	18,164.3	18,434.4	18,818.9	19,361.6	20,168.9
Luxembourg	11,182.0	11,811.3	12,283.4	13,468.8	13,820.7
Bulgaria	10,635.4	11,362.2	11,661.7	11,968.0	12,117.4(p)
Croatia	11,096.6	11,025.5	10,714.7	10,721.4	10,972.7
Slovenia	9,182.4	8,869.8	9,098.1	9,409.7	9,820.1
Lithuania	8,033.5	8,576.7	8,979.3	9,277.5	9,500.2
Serbia	9,229.6	8,641.2	9,114.3	8,756.1	8,856.8(p)
Latvia	5,535.1	5,935.0	6,129.9	6,331.9	6,465.1
Estonia	4,402.3	4,709.4	4,977.8	5,254.3	5,355.3
Cyprus	4,891.3	4,843.9	4,404.2	4,332.1	4,363.7
Iceland	2,743.6	2,778.6	2,987.0	3,452.3	3,985.0
Former Yugoslav Rep	2,022.0	2,012.2	2,178.1	2,256.3(p)	2,326.5(e)
Malta	1,730.4	1,821.3	1,929.1	2,085.3	2,263.7
Montenegro	810.1	788.7	834.7	868.8	895.4
Albania	:	:	:	:	:
Kosovo (under Unite	1,270.9	1,390.4	1,395.4	1,448.3	:

No footnotes available

Available flags:
b break in time series
c confidential
d definition differs, see metadata
e estimated
f forecast
i see metadata (phased out)
n not significant
p provisional
r revised
s Eurostat estimate (phased out)
u low reliability
z not applicable

Special value:
 : not available

Source of data: Eurostat

Chart 8: EU direct investment flows 2013-2014

Source: OECD Data. (2016c). *FDI Flows*. Retrieved May 4, 2016, from: <https://data.oecd.org/chart/4x34>.




Chart 9: EU direct investment flows 2008-2012

Source: European Commission. (2016f). *Eurostat: EU direct investment flows breakdown by partner country and economic activity (NACE Rev. 2) [bop_fdi_flow_r2]* (Last update: 18-09-2015). Retrieved April 7, 2016, from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/bop_fdi_flow_r2.

PARTNER: Latin American countries

STK_FLOW: Net

POST: Financial account, Direct investment, In the reporting economy

CURRENCY: Million euro

NACE_R2: All FDI activities

TIME ►	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GEO ▼					
European Union (28 countries)	13,277	5,616	12,998	18,419	12,333
European Union (27 countries)	13,277	5,617	12,996	18,423	12,334
European Union (25 countries)	13,232	5,597	13,075	18,373	12,332
European Union (15 countries)	12,515	4,176	11,647	18,215	11,522
Euro area (17 countries)	12,392	3,942	11,085	17,814	11,852
Euro area (16 countries)	12,390	3,945	11,081	17,811	11,846
Euro area (15 countries)	12,386	3,714	11,166	17,814	11,832
Belgium	1,381(d)	-816(d)	-1,619(d)	4,243(d)	1,980(d)
Bulgaria	55	21	-5	-2	13
Czech Republic	-77	213	-30	2	-17
Denmark	40	38	-10	188	-23
Germany (until 1990)	63	1,069	163	-1,507	-50
Estonia	1	-4	4	3	6
Ireland	-263	358	-100	:(c)	77
Greece	6	2	-4	-19	-17
Spain	2,130	411	3,400	3,934	2,209
France	676	34	-130	192	-67
Croatia	0	-1	2	-4	-1
Italy	383	28	337	85	390
Cyprus	0(d)	-2(d)	0(d)	:(cd)	18(d)
Latvia	1	6	0	1	0
Lithuania	3	0	-4	-1	-2
Luxembourg	1,575	133	1,600	1,069	995
Hungary	-10(d)	25(d)	-15(d)	-28(d)	-43(d)
Malta	-3	0	-4	7	-13
Netherlands	:	:	:	:	:
Austria	-1(d)	300(d)	361(d)	884(d)	430(d)
Poland	0	-49	-102	4	12
Portugal	14	212	607	-112	-600
Romania	-10	-1	-74	51	-12
Slovenia	1	-1	1	0	0
Slovakia	4	231	-85	-3	14
Finland	-13	1	3	-8	28
Sweden	:(c)	:(c)	:(c)	:(c)	:(c)
United Kingdom	21	-56	156	8	74
Iceland	0	0	:	:	:
Norway	59	34	:	:	:
Switzerland	:(c)	:(c)	:(c)	:(c)	:(c)
Montenegro	:	:	1	0	2
Former Yugoslav Rep	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	35	7	5	3	5
United States	:	:	:	:	:
Japan	:	:	:	:	:

Chart 10: Poverty Rate in 2014 in LAC


Source: World Bank. (2016d). *LAC Equity Lab: Poverty Rate in 2014 in LAC: Poverty \$4 (2005 PPP)*. Retrieved April 8, 2016, from: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/overview>.

Subregion:
Alle

Year:
2014

Measure:
Poverty rate

Line:
Poverty \$4 (2005 PPP)



Source: LAC Equity Lab tabulations of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank) and World Development Indicators.

Note: Since the numbers presented here are based on SEDLAC, a regional data harmonization effort that increases cross-country comparability, they may differ from official statistics reported by governments and national statistical offices. The nearest year is used for countries in which data are not available in a particular year. The LAC aggregate is based on 17 countries in the region for which microdata are available. In cases where data are unavailable for a given country in a given year, values have been interpolated using WDI data to calculate regional measures. Updated April 2016

Disclaimer: This map was produced by Staff of the World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Chart 11: Population living in poverty in LAC region

Source: ECLAC. (2016b). *CEPALSTAT Databases: Population living below the extreme poverty and the poverty lines, by geographical area (ECLAC)*. Retrieved April 10, 2016, from: http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/engine/index_en.html.





Chart 12: Inequality in Income and Opportunity in 2014: Gini Coefficient

Source: World Bank. (2016a). *LAC Equity Lab: Inequality in 2014: Gini Coefficient*. Retrieved April 8, 2016, from: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/overview>.

Subregion:
Alle

Year:
2014

Inequality in 2014 Gini coefficient




Source: LAC Equity Lab tabulations of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank) and World Development Indicators.

Note: Since the numbers presented here are based on SEDLAC, a regional data harmonization effort that increases cross-country comparability, they may differ from official statistics reported by governments and national statistical offices. The nearest year is used for countries in which data are not available in a particular year. The LAC aggregate is based on 17 countries in the region for which microdata are available. In cases where data are unavailable for a given country in a given year, values have been interpolated using WDI data to calculate regional measures. Updated April 2016

Disclaimer: This map was produced by Staff of the World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Source: World Bank. (2016b). *LAC Equity Lab: Inequality Trends: Gini Coefficient LAC countries*. Retrieved April 8, 2016, from: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/income-inequality/inequality-trends>.



Source: LAC Equity Lab tabulations of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank) and World Development Indicators (WDI).

Note: Since the numbers presented here are based on SEDLAC, a regional data harmonization effort that increases cross-country comparability, they may differ from official statistics reported by governments and national statistical offices. The LAC aggregate is based on 17 countries in the region for which microdata are available; they do not include Haiti. In cases where data are unavailable for a given country in a given year, values have been interpolated using WDI data to calculate regional measures. Updated April 2016

Chart 14: Income Inequality Trends in LAC regions: Gini Coefficient

Source: World Bank. (2016c). *LAC Equity Lab: LAC Equity Lab: Inequality Trends: Gini Coefficient LAC regions*. Retrieved April 8, 2016, from: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/income-inequality/inequality-trends>.

Country:
Mehrere Werte

Indicator:
Gini coefficient



Source: LAC Equity Lab tabulations of SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank) and World Development Indicators (WDI).

Note: Since the numbers presented here are based on SEDLAC, a regional data harmonization effort that increases cross-country comparability, they may differ from official statistics reported by governments and national statistical offices. The LAC aggregate is based on 17 countries in the region for which microdata are available; they do not include Haiti. In cases where data are unavailable for a given country in a given year, values have been interpolated using WDI data to calculate regional measures. Updated April 2016

Chart 15: Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income

Source: European Commission. (2016e). *Eurostat: Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income [ilc_di12]*. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from: <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/print.do#>.

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source: SILC)

[ilc_di12]

Last update: 15-03-2016

[Print Table](#)

INDIC_IL: Gini coefficient (scale from 0 to 100)

TIME ►	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
GEO ▼					
European Union (28 c)	:	:	:	:	:
European Union (27 c)	30.6(s)	30.3(s)	30.6	31.0	30.6
European Union (25 c)	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	28.0	27.8	26.3	27.5	26.4
Bulgaria	:	31.2(b)	35.3	35.9	33.4
Czech Republic	26.0(b)	25.3	25.3	24.7	25.1
Cyprus	28.7(b)	28.8	29.8	29.0(b)	29.5
Latvia	36.2(b)	38.9	35.4	37.5	37.5
Lithuania	36.3(b)	35.0	33.8	34.5	35.9
Romania	:	:	37.8(b)	36.0	34.9
Slovenia	23.8(b)	23.7	23.2	23.4	22.7
Finland	26.0	25.9	26.2	26.3	25.9
Sweden	23.4	24.0	23.4	24.0	24.8

TIME ►	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
GEO ▼					
European Union (28 c)	30.5	30.8	30.4	30.5	30.9
European Union (27 c)	30.5	30.8	30.4	30.5	30.9
European Union (25 c)	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	26.6	26.3	26.5	25.9	25.9
Bulgaria	33.2	35.0	33.6	35.4	35.4
Czech Republic	24.9	25.2	24.9	24.6	25.1
Cyprus	30.1	29.2	31.0	32.4	34.8
Latvia	35.9	35.1	35.7	35.2	35.5
Lithuania	37.0	33.0	32.0	34.6	35.0
Romania	33.3	33.2	33.2	34.0	34.7
Slovenia	23.8	23.8	23.7	24.4	25.0
Finland	25.4	25.8	25.9	25.4	25.6
Sweden	24.1	24.4	24.8	24.9	25.4

TIME ►	2015
GEO ▼	
European Union (28 c)	:
European Union (27 c)	:
European Union (25 c)	:
Belgium	:
Bulgaria	37.0
Czech Republic	:
Cyprus	:
Latvia	35.4
Lithuania	:
Romania	:
Slovenia	:
Finland	:
Sweden	:

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
Available flags:
b break in time series
c confidential
d definition differs, see metadata
e estimated
f forecast
i see metadata (phased out)
n not significant
p provisional
r revised
s Eurostat estimate (phased out)
u low reliability
z not applicable

Special value:
 : not available

Source of data: Eurostat

Chart 16: World Map of Income Gini Coefficient (2010)

Source: World Bank. (2014). *World Development Indicators: Distribution of income or consumption*. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from: <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9> (chart retrieved April 12, 2016, from: <http://www.statsilk.com/maps/world-stats-open-data?l=income%20gini%20coefficient>)



<http://www.statsilk.com/maps/world-stats-open-data?l=income%20gini%20coefficient>

Chart 17: 2015 Global Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace. (2015). *Global Peace Index Report 2015, 9th Edition*. Retrieved April 13, 2016, from: http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf.







Chart 18: Measuring Good Governance

Source: World Bank. (2016e). *World DataBank: World Wide Governance Indicator*. Retrieved April 14, 2016, from: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators#>.




Government Effectiveness: Estimate

2014




Regulatory Quality: Estimate

2014



Voice and Accountability: Estimate

2014



Rule of Law: Estimate

2014

