Social Protests and Democratic Responsiveness: Assessing Realities in Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union
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Social Protest and Democratic Responsiveness: Assessing Realities in Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union

This publication has emerged out of the Workshop “Social Protest and Democratic Responsiveness: Assessing Realities in Latin America & the Caribbean and the European Union”, organised by the EU-LAC Foundation and GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies on 10 October 2014 in the city of Hamburg, Germany. The Workshop brought together experts from both the European Union (EU) and Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC) who have worked on different forms of social protest in both regions with the goal of assessing similarities and differences as well as the potential for joint learning from each other's experiences. The scholars debated the causes for the recent waves of protests and explored the implications of these protests amidst changing social, economic and political landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, they analysed the responses of democratic regimes to these phenomena in both regions.

Democracy has expanded and consolidated in the last 20 years both, in the EU and in LAC. With some exceptions until the recent international financial crisis, both regions have passed periods of considerable economic growth and social advancements. As these processes have moved forward, societies have also evolved in regard to the nature and extension of their expectations and demands. These dynamics have prompted some analysts and policy makers to inquire whether there was a need to draft new social contracts in the respective states. While it is not the intention of the Foundation to enter into the peculiarities of this important and necessary debate, it finds that it is also worthy
to explore an aspect that seems substantial for the strengthening of democracy: After all, protests in public spaces and the ways public authorities respond to these protests should tell us something about the vitality of democracy, taking into account that these protests occur because of changes in social expectations, or due to the discomfort of interest groups who perceive changing contexts as potential or real threats, or even as a means of social agents to highlight structural weaknesses.

In all these cases, however, protesters occupy public space to transmit their grievances, instead of using the mechanisms of political intermediation—essentially political parties—that are considered important elements of democratic systems. Thus, social protest is also an indication of a perception that neglects these mechanisms and their role in democracies. Political mechanisms appear to fail certain sectors of societies in order to address their concerns; and as these practices become more frequent and extended, citizens’ perceptions of democracy as such may also become altered. Indeed, some citizens perhaps do no longer find the answers for their aspirations in democratic systems.

The international context within which this Workshop took place was a timely moment for collective action studies. We have witnessed the revitalization of social movements around the world, as exemplified, among others, by the so-called Arab Spring or the Occupy Wall Street movement. Several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union have also undergone political transformations as a result of various forms of grassroots activism and protest.

Distinct root causes have lied at the heart of the protests in Latin America and the European Union. Many Latin American and Caribbean states enjoyed some years of prosperity, high economic growth rates, an increase of foreign direct investment flows, the expansion of the middle class and the reduction of poverty. Some states became relevant players on the international scene, for instance Brazil and its inclusion in the club of emerging States, BRICS. However this stability has also caused the awakening of citizens and the emerging middle class, whereas the economic model based on extractive industries in the region has also caused serious discontent in the population. In the European Union, in turn, protests have coincided with the economic and financial crisis, considerable fiscal deficits, austerity measures, high unemployment rates—especially in the younger population—, and deteriorating living standards of European citizens.

At first glance, this situation suggests that social protests in both regions were primarily motivated by economic demands. But an in-depth look on both regions allows for a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. Scholars like Mary Kaldor and Joseph Tulchin argue that these new actions, campaigns and initiatives were above all an expression of frustration with formal politics as it was currently practiced. Social
movements in both regions represented people’s rising expectations of what democratic capitalism could and should offer to them. In other words, using the expression of Mary Kaldor, “subterranean” actions are about politics, not austerity per se. Many movement constituents were thus concerned with the failures of democracy as the main reason for engagement and protest.

Indeed, the European Union Eurobarometer and LAC Latinobarometro, which regularly monitor the evolution of public opinion, have confirmed this assumption: by the time of the Workshop, the EU survey indicated that democracy satisfaction had fallen to 36%, while Latinobarometro indicated that only 38% of the region’s people were satisfied which the way in which democracy worked in their countries. On the one hand the European Union has long been criticized for its democratic deficit. On the other hand, although nearly all Latin American countries have established democratic regimes over the past decades, they displayed varying levels of fragility and challenges. In this sense, democracy has faced a credibility problem on both sides of the Atlantic. Looking at this issue from a bi-regional point of view opens opportunities for cooperation, exchange of experiences and mutual learning to strengthen democratic governance.

Based on the results of the case studies presented during the Workshop, some striking similarities on the recent waves of protest can be identified. First, the widespread use of social media as a tool for engagement in collective action. Platforms like Twitter or Facebook have arisen as important alternatives for traditional channels of communication. Among their advantages are the fact that they imply lower organisational and communication costs and great power of diffusion and community mobilizing. A second feature is the massive appropriation of public spaces such as streets and plazas. Public spaces represent points for contact and interaction while also serving as political forums. Donatella della Porta considers the use of the public space as a massive exercise of direct democracy. Third, young people often emerge as the main actors in protest. Indeed, high levels of youth participation in both regions broke up the myth of their political indifference. A widespread feeling among the young generation is that protests were the only realistic venue to bringing about change. Fourth, heterogeneity. Despite the different backgrounds and multiple or even opposing identities, social movements were flexible and strong enough to incentivize and maintain mobilisation. As Della Porta argues, diversity does not impede collective action, it enriches it. We could add other features of this heterogeneity, such as the lack of rigid power structures to reach equality and the central role of emotions.

The dynamics of the recent wave of social protests in both regions put into question the traditional logic of collective action and extend the debate to different ways of understanding their evolution. Recent protest movements reveal that modern societies have moved away from material problems of industrial societies. Donatella della Porta,
who has closely observed social mobilization around the world, argues that in a context of altered political opportunity structures, struggles, incentives and dynamics of collective action have also changed. We can learn from EU and LAC experiences that even though these manifestations are fuelled by discontent and distrust in the way political institutions function, most participants still do believe in democracy. But they are envisioning a different notion of democracy, where inclusion, integration and transparency are guaranteed. Acampadas – discussed in Della Porta’s contribution – provide a good example for this generalised sense: the use of public space to debate, identify problems and think about solutions, the mediation through social media and the respect and celebration of qualities beyond representation.

In addition to Donatella della Porta’s contribution who held the key speech during the event, this publication compiles the academic works presented in the two panel sessions of the Workshop. During the first panel, “Social protests in Latin America and the European Union”, experts analysed and discussed the new dynamics and characteristics of social protest in EU and LAC.

Moisés Arce presents the case of social protests in Peru against mineral extraction. He advances a framework that explains how the extraction of natural resources encourages protest activity. This framework helps to differentiate the various types of protests surrounding resource extraction. In addition, he draws our attention to the salience of subnational political conditions, namely, the electoral and partisan dynamics that make subnational units more protest prone. His results provide evidence for the fact that political fragmentation encourages protest activity.

Sabine Kurtenbach makes a significant contribution to the literature on youth participation in social movements. She frames youth as a social condition and analyses social protest and mobilisation through a “youth lens”. She argues that the common underlying trigger of current protest movements resided in blocked transitions to adulthood. State and societies’ responses to youth protest shaped either virtuous cycles of reform or vicious cycles of violence and repression. Unless there were serious attempts to support young people to transit to adulthood either in their countries or via migration, protests would remain one possibility for youth to acquire voice. If unheard, violence might become a second choice. Considering that protest was just one option for youth to act, the author argues that politicians should consider that it is not necessarily young people that need to be changed, but rather the societies they live in.

Camilo Cristancho emphasises the important role of new social media to mobilise claims. He explores social media use in anti-austerity protest in Spain in order to compare classic
organisations that have traditionally contested economic policy such as unions and leftist parties, with young and loosely coupled organisations in their use of social media for mobilising against austerity politics. He links the theoretical expectations drawn from previous studies with evidence on contestation to the austerity policies in the context of the economic crisis that has hit Europe since 2008. Data from protesters on the streets and Twitter users allow for a comprehensive description of social media use practices as well as patterns of organisations staging the demonstrations and protesters online and offline. The evidence meets the expectation that social media use is related to self-organisation and a diminishing role for organisational involvement in the mobilisation processes.

Antônio Sampaio also reviews the massive use of social media in social protests, but emphasizes the challenges involved, especially in countries where state capacities to cope with instability are limited. In view of the expansion of the Brazilian middle class, the expectations of this sector about public transportation, food, energy and urban security have been altered. Those expectations far outpaced the capacity of the state to provide public goods. In June 2013, more than a million people went to streets in several Brazilian cities to protest against bad public services – followed closely by the violent network of anarchist rioters called Black Bloc. Sampaio argues that shortcomings in Brazil’s economic and political structures led to large-scale grievances which, combined with a significant increase in Internet connectivity, gave rise to one of the largest and most violent protest waves in the country’s history.

In the second panel of the Workshop “Participatory Processes and Democratic Responsiveness in Latin America and the EU”, scholars analysed whether and how the democratic systems on both continents were able to respond to these phenomena.

Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Annegret Kuhn show that, while planned resource extraction projects in Western countries have often offered a breeding ground for mobilization, Bolivian communities have tended to see these projects as a window of opportunity for economic benefits. Only in very few gas licensing processes of the past years local communities in Bolivia have entirely rejected the planned projects. Rather, contention has focused on the concrete conditions under which extraction should take place. The reasons for the relative absence of outright opposition reside in a combination of a predominant frame of “neo-extractivist” development projects in Bolivia and the economic hardships of the communities, which have made them more receptive for compensation payments, employment offers, and other benefits. The authors also find that previous experiences with similar extraction projects have tended to increase confrontational positions of local communities.

Thorsten Faas presents the case of Stuttgart21, a project that has evoked major protests in this German city, and which had not only affected federal state elections, but which
became the subject of a referendum and was also dealt with by other mechanisms of citizen participation. By using a ten-wave panel study covering the period from 2010 until autumn 2012, the author analyses how citizens perceived and evaluated the different modes of participation and why some citizens evaluated certain modes of participation differently than others. His results reveal that citizens differed considerably in their assessments of the available different modes of participation, not only in terms of their level of awareness and participation, but also in terms of their overall evaluations.

Closing the debate, Yanina Welp analyses the case of #yosoy132, a student movement that protested against the manipulation of information by the mass media, through the lens of the Political Opportunities Structure framework. This framework refers to the consistent, although not necessarily permanent or formal, dimensions of the political context that make collective action more or less likely. The author highlights the particular features of recent social movements such as the participation of the youth, the use of public spaces and social networks, the role of emotions as an incentive to be part of the movement, among others. The main goal of her chapter is to understand under what conditions #yosoy132 has developed its strategy, and which were the weaknesses and limitations faced by the movement to take part in the definition of public affairs, or in other words, what explains its failure to achieve its political goals.

The EU-LAC Foundation hopes that this publication can offer new and valuable insights into the dynamics, mechanisms and processes that have been driving recent waves of mobilization as well as democratic responsiveness in both regions. The Foundation believes it is worth pondering these issues to restore confidence among citizens in democratic institutions. At the same time, it is important that governments conceive of social movements not simply as expressions of discomfort but also as instruments which actually might strengthen and enhance the quality of their democratic systems.

Jorge Valdez

Executive Director EU-LAC Foundation
Conceptions of democracy in movements: an introduction

In 2011, within a few months a form of protest, the *acampada*, spread across three continents. Its relevance in the very identity building of these mobilizations pushed indeed activists and scholars alike to speak of ‘square movements’ (Pleyers and Glasius 2014). While often Tahrir is consider as at the origin of the chain of diffusion, forms of acampadas had already developed in Latin America in the struggles against neoliberalism in the 1990s and years 2000s (Silva 2009), even if they had not had, then, such a strong identifying function. Looking at the organizational dynamics within social movements, I shall address the search for a prefigurative politics that characterized the most visible moments of the anti-austerity protest, the *acampadas* (as long lasting protest camps in public spaces), comparing them with the most innovative organizational form of the global justice movement, the forum.

A complex development of adoption and adaptation can be observed if we compare conceptions and practices of democracy in the global justice movement and the anti-austerity protests (della Porta and Mattoni 2014). In what follows, I will discuss this perspective on cross-time diffusion by looking at the adoption by anti-austerity protests of some ideas coming from the global justice movement, but also at adaptation of those ideas to a changing context.

Building upon normative democratic theory, I have defined a participatory-deliberative model as made up of the following elements (della Porta 2009a and 2009b; 2013a):

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1 Ideas presented here are developed in my Social Movements in Times of Austerity, Polity Press, 2015.

2. **Orientation to the public good**, as it ‘draws identities and citizens’ interests in ways that contribute to public building of public good’ (Cohen 1989: 18-19).

3. **Rational argumentations**, as people are convinced by the force of the better argument (Habermas 1981, 1996).

4. **Consensus**, as decisions must be approvable by all participants.


6. **Inclusiveness**, as all citizens with a stake in the decisions to be taken must be included in the process and able to express their voice.

7. **Transparency**, as a deliberative democracy is ‘an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members’ (Cohen 1989: 17).

These seven elements might be distinguished in terms of conditions, means, and effects: we have participatory deliberative democracy when, under conditions of equality, inclusiveness, and transparency, a communicative process based on reason (the strength of the good argument) is able to transform individual preferences and reach decisions oriented to the public good (della Porta 2009a).

In different combinations, these elements are indeed present in anti-austerity protests as an idea spread from Latin America to the Global Justice Movement and then to anti-austerity protests in Europe and the United States. This contribution aims indeed at developing some theorization on cross-time development of repertoires of action, using secondary analysis of existing research on anti-austerity protests and on one of its precursors, the Global Justice Movement (GJM).

**Democratic practices in social movements against austerity in Latin America**

The protests that developed against austerity since the 1990s in the world-system periphery were path-breaking, not only from the perspective of the emergence of new collective identities, but also from the organizational point of view. In fact, while unions and other historical institutions of the developmental state were targeted by neoliberal reforms as jeopardizing the free market, new organizational forms gradually developed,
promoting and practicing alternative models of democracy. The ideas of democracy developed from the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Sem Terra in Brasil, the piqueteros in Argentina, the indigenous communities in Bolivia, Peru or Ecuador, travelled all around the world, challenging the representative and majoritarian models dominating in the West. First and foremost, all these experiences promoted participatory and deliberative formula, with an emphasis on the equal role of all citizens, of consensus building through argumentation, in recognition of differences but also of the common aim of constructing the commons.

The importance of differences and ways to accommodate them was addressed by the Zapatistas in Mexico, which then influenced the GJM. The positive stress on the encounters of diverse people open to mutual understanding is deep-rooted. Often quoted is ‘subcommandante Marcos’ greeting to the activists participating in the first Intercontinental encounter in the Lacandon Rainforest: ‘Some of the best rebels from the five continents came to the mountains of the Mexican South-East. All brought things, brought words and ears, brought their ideas, their hearts, their worlds. To meet with other ideas, with other hearts, with other worlds … A world made of many worlds is to be met these days … A world made of many worlds opens its space and conquers its right to be possible … A world of all worlds that rebel and resist the power’. In fact, consensus is rooted in communitarian forms of democracy: “No major strategic or policy decision is made until it has been considered and approved by consensus in every community’s assembly”. Here, “There is little imposed order or structured to the discussion; it proceeds organically until eventually two or three ideas or positions emerge and the coordinator summarizes them. The process continues in the same lively, chaotic manner until eventually someone asks, “Acuerdo, ya?” (Do we have agreement?)’ (Starr, Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2011: 105). Good communication implies an often promoted capacity to listen as well as a training to act as mediator in assemblies of different types. The stress on the inclusion of citizens as equal is visible in the compulsory form of participation as well as in the rotation of tasks. Participation also in governmental role is indeed considered as a school of democracy for the citizens as it also teaches to hold governmental actors accountable.

Also the Argentinean piqueteros, which emerged in 1996 calling for full employment and reincorporation of the poor, formed as an alliance of groups going from Christian based communities to communist and from unions to human rights associations. At the pickets, community ties were built around the occupation and expressed in the assemblies, where decisions about agreements with the state were made (Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Rossi 2013). Claims for “cleaner government, greater transparency, and improved accountability’ were also reflected into internal forms of democracy that relied upon transparent, open and inclusive processes. The multisectorial mobilization was in fact
organized through “assembly style of decision making which later became generalized as popular assemblies. Popular assemblies were new brokerage instruments because they were open air, freewheeling gatherings”, with a progressive shift of power from organizational leaders to rank-and-file activists (Silva 2009: 74). Also, on the tradition of the popular protests in Argentina, ollas populares were organized, “creating spaces where people congregated, exchanged experiences, recognized their common plight and took courage” (Silva 2009: 84).

In the long occupation of the Sem Terra in Brasil as encampments were created and then run by land-less peasants, a similar emphasis was put on inclusion of all members in the decision making processes that often addressed main choices in the everyday management of the occupied land. In fact, “immediately, everyone is participating in governance and building trust and community”(Starr, Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2011: 109). Rotation in main position has to insure broad involvement. Consensus through high-quality communication is considered as a main value, as “in the MST people are in meetings much of the time” (Starr, Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2011: 109) Self-governed communities aimed at the construction of different conception of politics and humanity.

The importance of gradually constructing new organizational forms, alternative to the corporatist ones that neoliberalism had weakened, emerges as central from research on Latin America. In general, episodes of contention began with separate streams of protests, which then linked, as ‘the common origin of highly varied grievances and demands facilitated the articulation of horizontal linkages among protest organizations’ (Silva 2009: 41). Brokerage mechanisms included summit meetings, organizational networks, open assemblies and communal forms of social organization. In these developments, the indigenous conceptions of democracy as involving all the community in discursive interactions spread to other movements.

This type of evolution has been described in the Bolivian case, where anti-neoliberal contestation grew up during three waves of protest before Evo Morales’ election as president in 2005 (Silva 2009). The only South American country to experience a social revolution, Bolivia had militant and independent unions. After the 1952 revolution, in the 1950s and 1960s, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) had built the national populist state and corporatist system, with strict links with the union (COB). In the 1960s and 1970s, under a populist military rule, the military promised a land reform, which was only partially accomplished. After the democratic transition in 1982, since 1985 protests developed against IMF sponsored neoliberal reform – in particular the New Economic Policy, based on a shock economic stabilization programme that eliminated state control on prices, wage controls and public sector salaries. As shock treatments caused political and economic exclusion, weakening the unions (about 500 unionists were arrested in
1985), the COB framed resistance in a Polanyi-like defence of formal sector employment, pay and working conditions and nationalist state intervention. As many former miners had become coca growers, they organized roadblocks against coca eradication, stressing the cultural and identity framing of coca use. Local mobilizations of cocaleros put the basis for transformation in the popular sector. The years 1993–97 brought about a portentous increase in anti-neoliberal contention, with alliances of campesinos, urban workers and lowland indigenous population plus teachers, cocaleros and students.

It was during these protests that coordination increased, exploiting dense ties in community networks. After the ‘March for Life, Coca and National Sovereignty’, a new wave of contestation developed in 1995, with the growth of coordination during water and gas wars in the early 2000s. Initially, these were characterized by mutual support and loose coordination. The so-called ‘water war’ then developed against the privatization of water in Cochabamba, as private entrepreneurs asked for changes in customary water rights. The new law in fact advantaged large private corporations against local cooperatives and neighbourhood associations, resulting in price increases and expropriation of water access rights, with ensuing disruption of everyday life. A loose alliance of various groupings converged then in the Coordinadora of civic committees, which organized roadblocks in April 2000, linking rural peasant irrigators, water collectives, urban workers, middle classes, shantytown dwellers and the traditional Left (Silva 2009, 127). Coca-growers blocked roads to Cochabamba, while neighbourhood assemblies claimed ‘water is ours’, ‘Pachamama, Woracocha and Tata dios gave it to us to live, not to do business with’ (Silva 2009, 128). Unions of cocaleros and campesinos joined in against neoliberalism. In this process, there was a development through traditional ayllus, of self-government, with revival of ayllu democracy. Claims included suspension of the general water law, cocalero union participation in policy-making, reestablishment of a state bank, creation of an agrarian university, titling of indigenous areas and direct administration of protected areas. The alliances strengthened thanks to a horizontal structure, based around assembly conceptions of direct democracy.

The Coordinadora was very open and tolerant; it welcomed any organization interested in joining the struggle; it helped interested groups, such as shantytown dwellers whom traditional unions had ignored, to organize. It promoted an assembly style of decision making to build confidence and support for its decision. The Coordinadora introduced the idea of direct democracy to the political agenda as a means to overcome persistent government neglect and denial of the legitimacy of the popular sector. Last, but not least, the Coordinadora framed the issue as an assault on the necessities of life for all in the interest of international capital and its domestic allies who were in cahoots with corrupt government officials (Silva 2009: 131).
A third wave of protest then spread with the ‘gas war’ in 2003. Again, cocaleros staged roadblocks, pensioners joined in asking for adjustments in pensions, workers revolted against income taxes (rather than corporate taxes) by workers. Here as well, local networks were mobilized within broad coalition.

A similar history of slow accumulation of organizational resources and adaptation of mobilization strategy to changing social, cultural and political conditions also characterized Ecuador, where national populism, with the military in power in the 1960s and 1970s, had expanded state planning and services, subsidized food, energy and transport and introduced agrarian reforms. After the return to electoral democracy in 1979, under IMF and US pressure neoliberal reforms developed in the mid-1980s to address the debt crisis. Since the beginning, protests against neoliberalism involved weak urban labour but very strong indigenous groups, against the increasing power of the executive.

Adapting participatory and deliberative democracy: from the Global Justice Movement to the 2011 movements

Those who protested in Tahrir, Kasbah, Sol, Syntagma, or Zuccotti have not just criticized existing representative democracy as deeply corrupted, but also experimented with different models of democracy. In part, conceptions and practices of democracy were inspired by the participatory and deliberative models of previous citizens’ mobilizations. In part, however, they also innovated on them, in a process of collective learning from detected weaknesses of those models in the past, and adaptation to new endogenous and exogenous challenges.

In all the protest waves mentioned in the incipit, the acampada – at the same time repertoire of protest and organizational form – represented a major democratic experiment, adopted and adapted from one context to the next. If the social forums had been the democratic invention of the global justice movement of the previous decade, the acampadas represented in part an updating of those, but in part also a development oriented to overcome their perceived failures. Conceptions of participation from below, cherished by the progressive social movements, are in fact combined with a special attention to the creation of egalitarian and inclusive public spheres.

The anti-austerity activists’ discourse on democracy is articulate and complex, taking up some of the principal criticisms of the ever-decreasing quality of liberal democracies, but also some proposals inspired by democratic qualities other than representation. These proposals resonate with (more traditional) participatory visions, but also with new
deliberative conceptions that underline the importance of creating multiple public spaces, egalitarian but plural. To a certain extent, the acampada can in fact be seen in continuity with the social forum model, although with increased emphasis on some democratic qualities of participation and deliberation.

In particular, I will point at the shifts synthetized in Table 1. As I will argue, while the social forums mixed both associational and assembly-type forms, with an emphasis on consensus, the acampadas refused associations privileging the participation of the persons – the citizens, the members of the community. From the relational point of view, whereas the social forum process was oriented to networking, the acampadas follow a more aggregative logic (Juris 2012). From the cognitive point of view, while the forum aimed at building political alternatives, the acampadas were more prefigurative. In fact, referring to existing research on Tahrir Square, Puerta del Sol and Place de Cataluna, Syntagma Square, Zuccotti Park (but also to the failed acampadas in Italy), I will single out the product of learning processes, after a perceived decline in the innovative capacity of the social forum process. However, they also reflect adaptation to a context characterized by a legitimacy crisis of late neoliberalism, and by its social and political consequences, but also to national opportunities and constraints.

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Transparency, equality and inclusivity

Transparency, equality and inclusivity are values cherished by both movements, with however some important differences. The camps are set in open-air space in order to enforce the public and transparent nature of the process. Meeting in public spaces also stresses the inclusiveness of the process, and the refusal of delegates represents a further emphasis upon equality.

The social forums have been an innovative experiment promoted by the global justice movement. Distinct from a counter-summit, which is mainly oriented towards public protest, the social forum is a space of debate among activists. The format of the social forum epitomized the cognitive processes that developed within protest events as arenas for encounters. The charter of the WSF defines it as an ‘open meeting place’, as participation is indeed open to all civil society groups, with the exception of those advocating racist ideas and those using terrorist means, as well as political parties. Its functioning involves the organization of hundreds of workshops and dozens of conferences (with invited experts) during a very short span of time, and testifies to the importance given (at least in principle) to the production and exchange of knowledge. In fact, the WSF has been defined as ‘a market place for (sometimes competing) causes and an “ideas fair” for exchanging information, ideas and experiences horizontally’ (Schoenleitner 2003: 140).

Different activities converge on the aim of providing a meeting space for the loosely coupled, huge number of groups in order to lay the groundwork for a broader mutual understanding. Far from aiming at eliminating differences, the open debates are designed to increase awareness of each other’s concerns and beliefs. The purpose of networking-through-debating is in fact openly stated as early as the first ESF in Florence, where the Declaration of the European social movements read: ‘We have come together to strengthen and enlarge our alliances because the construction of another Europe and another world is now urgent…’ (see della Porta 2009a).

What seems to make cognitive exchanges especially relevant for the global justice movement in general, and for the social forums in particular, is the positive value given to the openness towards ‘the others’, considered in some activists’ comments as a most relevant attitude in order to ‘build nets from the local, to the national and the supranational’ (see e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=62, accessed 20 December 2006). The development of inclusive arenas for the creation of knowledge emerged as a main aspiration in the social forum process.

Diversity and transparency were highly valued, but difficult to practise. If the organizational process of social forums wanted to be open, in reality at the global level some main
associations, as mentioned, tended to dominate decision-making. In Europe, the preparatory assemblies were open to all participants, but still held in closed places. With the occupation of the public squares, the Indignados movements stressed even more the open and transparent nature of their democratic model, as the very essence of parks and squares is public.

Not only are Tahrir, Kasba, Puerta del Sol, and Syntagma open air spaces, but they were also most important points of encounters for the citizens. Keeping the main site of protest in the open, the movements also put a special emphasis on the inclusivity of the process, aiming at involving the entire agora. Not only parties and unions, but also associations of different types were indeed unwelcome.

The camps, in open air, respond to a re-claiming of public spaces by the citizens. So, in Egypt, in a society characterized by gated communities for the rich and slums for the masses of poor, the encounters at Tahrir but also the painting of murals represented a reappropriation of public space, especially after thirty years of emergency law had prevented gatherings (Winegard 2012). With the creation of a protest camp, Tahrir Square became the heart of the mobilization in Egypt, ‘participants ranging from Cairo’s poor to middle and upper class people, across the political spectrum, as well as across religious divides’ (Warkotsch 2012). The heterogeneity of the participants was mentioned with pride – ‘people of different backgrounds, of different classes, just sitting together talking’ (Gerbaudo 2012: 69). Also in Europe, the acampadas were to reconstruct a public sphere in which problems could be discussed and solutions looked for. Differently from the very temporary global convergence spaces of the social forums, the acampadas are presented as ‘rather occupation and subversion of prominent urban public spaces’ (Halvorsen 2012: 431). As activists noted, ‘we recovered and utilize the public space; we occupied the squares and the streets of our cities to meet and work in a collective open and visible way. We inform and invite every citizen to participate. We debate problems, look for solution and organize actions and mobilizations. Our digital tools and networks are open: all the information is available on the Internet, in the streets, in the squares’ (15M manifesto, How to cook a nonviolent revolution’, cit. in Perugoría and Tejerina 2013: 436). Similarly, an American activist defined Zuccotti Park as ‘a sort of beautiful, exciting thing, which does not happen in public space in New York. Public space here is not really utilised in the way that it is utilised in the rest of the world.’

If in the forums associational and participatory conceptions sometimes clashed on issues of representativeness and accountability, in the camps direct, unmediated democracy was often called for. In Spain, as it organized assemblies in the streets and the squares, the 15M introduced a political logic in these spaces (Pestaña Moreno 2013), thus allowing people to learn new skills —protesting being one of them. The assemblies in the
encampments were described by activists as ‘primarily a massive, transparent exercise in direct democracy’. As a speaker of a commission in Sol declared: ‘What unites us is a general dissatisfaction. We want a new model of society, based on the participation of all persons, an effective participatory democracy, where people can take part in decisions on the social, economic and political plans’ (Nez 2012: 80). And an American activist recounts one of the first evenings spent in Zuccotti Park as follows: ‘there were people who maybe they were there supporting like a union, or there were people who were there with signs saying they were professors ... we just stayed there and talked, it was a beautiful fall night ... and we stayed there on a ledge of the park ... and sort of just listened to other people’s conversations, and there were a lot of debates. ... It was like a spirit, something that had life in it, and it was really reaffirming’ (Gerbaudo 2012: 122-123).

As it emerges from these cites, differently from the forums, that referred to themselves as spaces for “the movement of movements”, welcoming associations of different types (della Porta 2009a), the camps are presented as spaces for “the people”, or the “citizens”. The general assemblies as main institutions of the acampada testified to a broadly inclusive effort. In the social forum process, the assemblies were important but somehow separated from the forum itself through the formula of the ‘social movement assemblies’, usually held after the forums. In the forum itself, the main structuration was around workshops, where activists exchanged information and networked, rather than properly deciding.

In the acampadas, the assemblies took a central role for the elaboration of strategic and tactical decisions for the movement: from the creation of a general program, either specific claims or at least statements of intent, but even more for the everyday management of the camps. In fact, ‘the aim is to promote in all movement assemblies a transparent and horizontal way of functioning that would allow to each person to participate on an equal foot’ (Nez 2011a). General assemblies often broke down into committees, which then reconvened within it, the spokes of the various commissions referred to the general assemblies. Commissions on topics such as communication, mutual respect, infrastructure, laws, and action coordinated working groups that worked through consensus. Liaison persons had to keep contacts between the various subgroups (Botella-Ordinas 2011). Thousands of propositions were thus put forward and in part approved by consensus: on politics, economy, ecology, education. On the model of the one in Puerta del Sol, all general assemblies in Madrid neighbourhoods worked as spaces that had to be ‘transparent, horizontal, where all persons can participate in an equal way’ (Nez 2012, 84). In the U.S. as in Spain, ‘each camp quickly developed a few core institutions: if it was any size, at least there would be a free kitchen, medical tent, library, media/communication, center where activists would cluster together with laptops, and information center for visitors and new arrivals’ (Graeber 2012: 240). Inclusion, absolute and of all, is a main principle
of the assemblies: ‘Inclusion. The strength of this movement is that we are many and different … the spaces that make us strong, happy and active are those that everyone can perceive as her own’ (toma la plaza, 12/8/2011, cited in Romanos 2011).

The more or less permanent occupations of squares were thus seen as creating a new agora in publicly owned spaces (“Because the squares belong to us and they are locations of a new communitarian and participatory democracy”). Assemblies aimed at mobilizing the common people, not activists but communities of persons, with personalized handmade placards and individualized messages.

Consensual methods

Another main democratic formula, coming from the global justice movement but further elaborated in the anti-austerity protests, is the consensual method. Consensual methods were adopted by several (but not all) organizations of the forum process in their internal decision making, but they were actually practised in different ways by different groups: in some cases pragmatically aiming at reaching agreements, in others in the ambition of creating a community (della Porta 2009b). In the camps, through inclusivity and respect for the opinions of all, a collective thought is expected to emerge.

In Spain, consensual deliberative methods were proposed by young autonomous activists. While in previous movements direct democracy through consensus had been experimented with in spokes-councils, during the acampadas it was applied to the general assemblies, involving often hundreds of thousands of people. The aim was, according to a Spanish activist, to ‘try to convince the other, and if the other disagree, develop the discussion in a constructive way’ (ibid.). Consensual methods were similarly elaborated in the Occupy movement in the U.S. A consensual, horizontal decision making process developed based on the continuous formation of small groups, which then reconvened in the larger assembly. According to David Graeber, ‘The process towards creative thinking is really the essence of the thing’ (ibid.: 23).

Deliberation through consensus is in fact seen as an instrument against bureaucratization, but also against the routinization of the assembly and a way to build a community. While the global justice movement developed upon parties, with puppets and a carnival-like atmosphere, it was noted that ‘OWS, in contrast, is not a party, it’s a community’ (Graeber 2012: 240).

Consensual decision-making implied some structures which were in part derived from the consensual processes devised by the horizontals in the GJM (della Porta 2009c). Building upon those experimentations, the Indignados further developed those rules that had to implement equality and inclusivity. In Spain, regulations for the assemblies included limits on times for talking, hand gestures, rotating speakers, the preparation of *compte rendus* (read at the next assembly meeting). A commission on conflicts, managed by students, used techniques of psychology and group dynamics in order to improve participation and deliberation. Organizers also developed special techniques for assemblies; for example, participants were arranged in semicircles and with corridors that allowed them to move around, with mediators, and so on. Following horizontal practices, anyone could call for a working group; people then divided into small circles, coming back together after some time, with a speaker reporting on the debate in each group (Nez 2012). In the U.S., instead of voting up or down on a controversial proposal, groups that made decisions by consensus worked to refine it until everyone found it acceptable (Taylor et al. 2011, 47). There was moreover the acknowledgment that ‘consensus process only works if it is combined with a principle of decentralization’ (Graeber 2012: 227) and decisions are to be made on the smallest scale, the lowest level, possible’ (ibid.: 229).

Democracy in the square was in fact defined as first of all inclusive and respectful of people’s experiences. As Graeber (2012: 211) noted about OWS, ‘anyone who feels they have something relevant to say about a proposal ought to have their perspectives carefully considered. Everyone who has strong concerns or objections should have those concerns or objections taken into account and, if possible, addressed in the final form of the proposal. Anyone who feels a proposal violates a fundamental principle shared by the group should have the opportunity to veto (“block”) the proposal.’ So, after someone made a proposal, the facilitator, after asking for clarifying questions, started to look for consensus. This process foresaw friendly amendments, temperature checks, hand signals (ibid.: 214-215).

Consensus was thus assigned a deep meaning as capable of developing a truly collective thought, as very different from the sum of individual ideas. The *Rapide guide for the dynamization of the popular assemblies* thus explained: ‘Two people with different ideas put their energy together to construct something. It is not a question of my idea or yours. It is the two ideas together that will build something new that before neither of us knew. It is for this reason that an attentive listening, during which we are not just busy preparing our answer, is necessary. The collective thought is born when we understand that all opinions, ours and the different ones, are necessary in order to form consensus’ (toma la plaza, 31/5/2011, cit. in Romanos 2011).
Arguments, preference transformation and orientation to the common

Similarly to the social forum, the acampadas have been sites of contention, but also of exchange of information, reciprocal learning, individual socialization, and knowledge building, in which however emotions and prefiguration were give a larger role in the construction of the commons. Cognitive mechanisms of frame bridging were very important in the social forum process. During the forums themselves, but also during their preparation – sometimes up to a year long – a most important aim was the sharing of knowledge by activists from different countries, groups, ages, and so on. In this process, alternative visions were built about globalization, Europeanization, the development of capitalism. Knowledge was exchanged mainly among activists, and in many cases exchanges were facilitated by associations of various types. In the acampadas, the cognitive function was central, but its production extended – so to speak – from the activists to the citizens. The aim was often stated as building a community.

In Tahrir, slogans were shouted such as ‘bread, freedom, and dignity’, as well as ‘the people want the removal of the regime’, and bystanders were called to join in. Cognitive processes developed, as ‘Tahrir was not all fun and festivity. The space was also infused with serious politics: fierce battles were waged against government thugs trying to break in, fiery speeches were delivered denouncing the regime, and animated discussions about Egypt’s political future resounded in the night air’ (Shokr 2012: 43). Similarly, interactions intensified in the many Tahrir squares that were built all over Egypt. There was an atmosphere of permanent parties (‘like a night of Ramadan’) but also political speeches.

While the forums had been described as sort of universities, where abstract knowledge was embedded in specific contexts, the acampadas privileged the personal knowledge of the individual participants and their direct experiences. While the forums privileged indeed reason, emotions are more openly emphasized in the camps. Postill (2012) vividly recalls, ‘the strong sense of connection to the strangers I spoke to during that fleeting moment. … Under normal circumstances – say, on an underground train – we would have found no reason to talk to one another, but the present situation was anything but normal. The 15-M movement had brought us together, and the sense of “contextual fellowship” … cutting across divides of age, class and race was very powerful.’

Camps were places of talking and listening, where however the building of collective identities is sustained through the development of strong emotions. While the social forum process was also fed by the intense moments of transnational encounters, as Naomi Klein herself observed, the stationary nature of the camps help in building longer-lasting relations. So, the global justice movement had chosen summits as targets, and
'summits are transient by their nature; they only last a week. That made us transient too. We’d appear, grab world headlines, and disappear’ (van Gelder et al. 2011: 46). In contrast, she noted, *acampadas* put no end to their presence, and ‘this is wise. Only when you stay put can you grow roots’ (ibid.).

Emotions were particularly strong in Tahrir, given the danger of the action and the dimension of the change; but they seem to have been more reflected upon in OWS, where the political culture of the activists most involved in the camp was more oriented to address individual feelings. Emotional charge was mentioned about the camps in Tahrir, whose establishment on 28 January 2011 was said to represent an acceleration of history, with a cognitive shift from a language of demonstration to a language of revolution (El Chazli 2012). So an activist recalled, ‘It was one of the most profound moments of my life. The sight of the square filled with tens of thousands heralded the long-awaited dawn. As we entered the square, the crowds installed there cheered the coming of a new battalion, greeting us with joy. I wept’ (cited in El-Ghobashy 2011). Tahrir has been described as ‘the square that sings, dances, cries and hopes’ (Guibal and Tangi 2011: 39), as ‘Tahir vibre, Tahir exulte’ (ibid.: 40). The events were presented as part of a moment of epiphany: as a ‘truly historical moment’, a ‘revolutionary moment’ – in the words of an activist, ‘everybody understood that it was, in fact, a moment’ (Nigam 2012: 54).

In Spain, as elsewhere, activists talked of the joy of being together, developing a narrative of becoming (Perugoría and Tejerina 2013: 437). Open public spaces in fact facilitated the creation of intense ties, through encounters among diverse people who suddenly feel they share a common belonging. As Postill (2012) pointed out, ‘Many participants later reported a range of psychosomatic reactions such as goose bumps (*carne de gallina*) or tears of joy. I felt as if a switch had been turned on, a gestalt switch, and I had now awakened to a new political reality. I was no longer merely a participant observer of the movement, I was the movement.’ In the same vein, in this Spanish activist’s recollection, the encounters of so many and so different people produced an intense atmosphere of expectation: ‘When I arrived to Calle de Alcalá and I saw all the people there I was very happy. And to see that there were so many people of different age, and to see that it was growing, and to see that we were a lot ... and now that I am telling you this I get goosebumps ... really I was so happy. When we arrived to Puerta del Sol, people starting sticking big posters on the buildings. People who were there were so unbelievably happy.’ Similarly in the U.S., the activities in the OWS are defined as energizing, inspiring, producing ‘tears of inspiration. I did not know that popular power could bring with it such an overwhelming sensation. It is a chill ... a tremble that is both incredibly powerful ... and also a little scary, feeling how much power we can actually have together, side by side’ (Taylor et al. 2011: 31). Both cognitive and affective mechanisms are embedded
into networks of relations. Camps have at least two most relevant functions: to express protest, and to prefigure new relations.

The prefiguration of different relations was important for those who camped in Tahrir. This concern developed during the occupation, as ‘when protesters arrived at Tahrir on January 29, they did not come with the intention of creating a radical utopia. ... In many ways, Tahrir had come to represent the overall decline of public space – people could barely congregate or mingle, let alone protest – under Mubarak’s thirty-year rule. The commune that Tahrir was to become was wholly improvised through the lived experience of sharing the area and protecting it from the regime encroachment. As the revolution unfolded, Tahrir was elevated from a rally site to a model for an alternative society’ (Shokr 2012: 42).

Also in Spain, Greece, and the U.S., in their discontent with mainstream politics, the Indignados saw the acampadas as experimentation with another form of democracy. As an activist wrote, ‘What they want ... is to do exactly what they are doing. They want to occupy Wall Street. They have built a campsite full of life, where power is exercised according to their voices ... they are practicing the politics of space, the politics of building a truly public space. ... It has become many things. Public square. Carnival. Place to get news. Daycare center. Health care center. Concert venue. Library. Performance space. School’ (cit. in Castañeda 2012). Activists declared that ‘With 15M we have recovered that part of person who wants to share, a part we had long forgotten.’ A discourse of management of the commons develops pragmatically around the management of the occupied spaces.

Similarly, when Occupy Wall Street started in the United States, quickly spreading in thousands of American cities, the occupations represented not only occasions to protest but also experimentations with participatory and deliberative forms of democracy in the everyday life of the occupation. As an activist wrote, democracy starts with people caring about one another and acting responsibly on that sense of care, taking responsibility both for oneself and for one’s family, community, country, people in general and the planet' (cited in Langman 2013). In the OWS, decisions about how to spend the relevant sums donated and how to manage the camp took much time. Describing Occupy Boston, and citing an activist who talked about the ‘small slice of utopia we are creating’, Juris (2012: 268) singled out some tactical, incubating, and infrastructural roles of the occupied free spaces: among the first were attracting media attention and inspiring participation; among the second, ‘providing a space for grassroots participatory democracy; ritual and community building, strategizing and action planning, public education and prefiguring alternative worlds that embody movement visions’; among the third, networking and coordination.
Differently than for the movements of the previous decades, which had used a varied and plural repertoire, the *acampadas* became much entrenched with the very identity of the movement, not just, as in occupations for other social movements, an action form among others. Beyond the prefiguration of a different society, which the activists already imagined, these spaces, as Razsa and Kurnik (2012) noted, were also important in the invention of alternative, but not yet imagined, futures, through what has been called a ‘politics of becoming’. In the Occupy movement they studied in Slovenia, the encounters of diverse minorities transformed their respective visions. Occupied spaces have been seen, in fact, as ‘vibrant sites of human interaction that modelled alternative communities and generated intense feeling of solidarity’ (Juris 2012: 268). Aims included ‘engaging in direct and transparent participatory democracy, exercising personal and collective responsibility … empowering one another against all forms of oppression’ (van Gelder et al. 2011: 25).

With more emphasis than in the social forums, what is considered as important is the process. In the U.S., ‘the encampments were consistently unwilling to make the effort to coalesce around what would conventionally be called demands and programs. Instead, what they seemed to relish most was themselves: their community and esprit, their direct democracy, the joy of becoming transformed into a movement, a presence, a phenomenon that was known to strangers, and discovering with delight just how much energy they had liberated. For indeed, in a matter of days, their sparks had ignited a fire’ (Gitlin 2012: 29).

**Learning democracy: some conclusions**

While both movements stressed therefore participation and consensus, we can see how some ideas, travelling in time, needed to be adapted to perception of previous mistakes. In particular, not only in the most visible periods of protest picks, but also in its doldrums, self-critical reflections continued to develop on the functioning and dis-functioning of some organizational models. The camps grew indeed from a critique of the forum, which had been at the centre of the global justice movement. In particular, they developed upon the strategies adopted by the horizontal wing of the global justice movement.

Organizational structures are, for movements, much more than instruments. Even if choices are often strategic, they are limited by a sort of repertoire of available instruments that is, as an action repertoire, built upon previous knowledge and only marginally innovated (Clemens 1996). Not only knowledge, but also norms define the realm of organizational possibilities. There is a learning process, too. Movements are,
as Alberto Melucci (1989) stressed, self-reflective actors. Even from one generation to the next, the pros and cons, successes and failures of specific democratic devices are reflected and intervened upon. In the short term as well, in the intense moments of mobilizations in protest cycles or waves, movement activists develop their conception of democracy, introducing innovations that then travel across countries and from one movement generation to the next. Learning processes and contextual adaptation are main processes in this.

As we have seen, in the acampadas, the principle of deliberative and participatory democracy – inherited from the previous movements – were adapted to the characteristics of a movement of ‘common people’ rather than activists, that privileged persons over associations (della Porta 2013b; 2013c; 2013d). Equality and inclusivity in public spaces was indeed more radical than in the global justice movement as testified from the camps’ appeals to ‘the 99%’. To a certain extent, the emphasis on plurality as a positive value and the related need to be inclusive increased with the diversity of the citizens affected by the austerity measures. Radical inclusivity and equality were reflected in the choice of public spaces – such as parks and squares – as the pulsating heart of the movement, where no walls or fences had to reduce the transparency and publicity of the process.

The orientation to public goods to be obtained through the participation of all citizens in a high quality discourse was embedded in the generalization of the use of consensual methods, even to large assemblies. The alternative management of the commons was indeed prefigured in the camps.

The complex rules and norms of these horizontal conceptions of participation and deliberation were adopted from various groups, more or less embedded in national traditions, and adapted to a changing context. Spanish activists thus cited anarchism and U.S. ones pointed to the Quakers as progenitors of horizontalism. But equally important were the ways in which the original ideas had been transformed through and by other movements, from the feminist to the anti-nuclear and the autonomous squatted youth centres. Protest camps against the deployment of nuclear missiles, nuclear power site or for peace were key the political socialization of several generations of activists. While also these camps contributed to the prefiguration of a different society, the anti-austerity protests put more emphasis on the re-claiming of public spaces, by organized their activities in the very central squares of many cities and involving ten thousands of citizens. The strength of these streams of national movement cultures influenced however, and limited, the capacity of the acampadas, as specific democratic forms, to travel from one country to the next (Roos and Oikonomakis 2014). Moreover, it affected the adaptation of a long lasting form of protest, the camp, as it travels from Iceland to Egypt, and then to Europe and the U.S., becoming along the way more and more conceptualized by activists as a prefiguration of a different society.
Learning from previous movements does not, however, mean just adopting their forms by imitation, but more reflecting upon their mistakes. As mentioned, even the experiences of the global justice movement, the immediate progenitor, were not taken for granted, but criticized because of an allegedly increasingly associational, or even hierarchical, vision of participation and deliberation, that especially the new generations did not find resonant with their taste and experiences. While representative democracy became increasingly affected by a deep legitimacy crisis, conceptions of direct democracy (re)emerged as more apt to organize highly critical citizens.

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To date, the bulk of the existing resource curse literature emphasizes the pervasive and negative outcomes that are typically associated with a country’s abundance of natural resources, such as poor governance, low levels of economic development, civil war, and dictatorship (e.g., Karl 1997; Ross 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2005; Dunning, 2005; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005). These studies have also privileged cross-national comparisons, using aggregate national data that, more often than not, conceal significant variation within countries. In contrast, scholarly work on the local impact of resource wealth is relatively uncommon. Specifically, does the value of a country’s resource wealth increase protests? If so, why, then, do apparently similar resource-abundant subnational units within the same national democratic regime have different levels of contention?

Departing from the conventional wisdom that emphasizes economic conditions as central to explaining protests over natural resource extraction (e.g., Spronk and Webber 2007, Arellano Yanguas 2010), I draw attention to the salience of subnational political conditions, namely, the electoral and partisan dynamics that make subnational units more protest prone.¹ As the social movement literature reminds us (e.g., Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2006), economic conditions in and of themselves seldom explain variations in the dynamics of protest movements. Thinking about resource extraction, for instance, one could easily argue that the economic history of South America in general, and Peru, in particular, is essentially a history of mining. Yet grievances related to resource extraction consistently outnumber outbreaks against mining, and one does not always see protest movements emerge to challenge them. In contrast, a focus on electoral and partisan dynamics draws attention to the political context or environment in which protests emerge, and provides a better approach to explore the variation of protest across geography and

¹ On the relationship between parties and protest cross-nationally, see Arce (2010). On the relationship between parties and protest sub-nationally, see Arce and Rice (2009), and Arce and Mangonnet (2013).
time. These political conditions help explain why similar resource-abundant subnational units within the same country experience different levels of contention.

The paper probes these questions for the case of Peru, which provides an ideal environment to analyse the relationship among resource wealth, partisan dynamics and protest. First, the country is geologically blessed with an abundance of natural resources, such as gold, silver, and copper; and has the highest concentration of the world’s top mining companies in the Latin America region. The country has also experienced an impressive economic bonanza due to rising commodity prices and the growing Chinese demand for raw materials. Second, starting in 2002 the country embarked in an important process of political decentralization. The election of regional governments across Peru’s 25 regions (akin to states in other countries) sought to advance the supposed virtues of decentralization, which are often advocated by international donors, democratic theorists, and local activists. The election of regional governments, as explained below, was meant to improve resource governance. Third, and finally, Peruvian regions, which are very similar to each other when it comes to the abundance of natural resources, experience different levels of protest. To elaborate, the protest movements over natural resource extraction share similar claims (e.g., conflicts over land and water, conflicts over the redistribution of resource wealth), networks of actors in opposition to mining (e.g., local villages affected by extraction, environmental NGOs, etc.), and networks of actors in support of extraction (e.g., the extractive industry, national governments, etc.), yet the dynamics of these movements throughout the country has been very dissimilar.

The contributions of this paper are twofold. Theoretically, I advance an alternative framework to explain the link between resource wealth and protest activity. To date, the resource curse literature remains the most influential paradigm to understand the relationship between resource wealth and several important outcomes, such as poor governance, low levels of economic development, civil war, and dictatorship (e.g., Karl 1997; Ross 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2005; Dunning 2005; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005). Yet the core arguments of the resource curse literature as it relates to civil society, in particular, are not well-suited to explain the social unrest that the extraction of natural resources generates. To elaborate, the resource curse literature suggests that resource wealth inhibits the growth of civil society, and makes the rise of contentious activity less likely, as resource wealth allows governments to relieve social pressures through a mix of low taxes and patronage spending (e.g., Karl 1997; Morrison 2009; Ross 2001; Smith 2004). Resource wealth also prevents the types of social and cultural changes that facilitate political accountability and democratization, such as rising education levels and occupational specialization. Accordingly, an active, prone to mobilization civil society should not be expected, much less so in the context of resource abundance or a commodity price boom. In contrast, my framework suggests
how resource wealth encourages the emergence of broad coalitions with diverse sets of new actors in response to resource extraction. This framework also differentiates the various types of protests surrounding resource extraction (Arce 2014b). Empirically, I provide a cross-subnational time-series analysis on the relationship among resource wealth, partisan dynamics, and protest activity across Peru’s 25 regions for the 1996-2010 period. This subnational comparative analysis provides greater sensitivity to within-nation heterogeneity and complexity, which is largely concealed in studies which rely upon aggregate national data. In so doing, it helps to formulate better causal inferences on the factors that shape contentious activity locally and over time. My empirical results show that the relationship between protest and subnational political conditions is closer than that between protest and natural resource rents, which can be seen as a useful indicator of resource-based economic conditions.

I begin by outlining the expansion of resource extraction in Peru following the economic liberalization policies of the 1990s and 2000s, and its structural importance to the country’s economy as a whole, and for subnational governments especially. Second, I present a framework to distinguish the different types of protest that are associated with resource wealth, explaining how resource extraction creates incentives for protest activity. Third, I explain the subnational political conditions that influence societal responses to resource extraction, specifically the underlying level of political fragmentation across the newly created regional governments. The fourth section of this paper presents the results of the empirical analysis, showing how regional politics and resource wealth shape subnational protest activity. The conclusion highlights a number of contributions that can be drawn from this study.

Resource Extraction in Contemporary Peru

Resource extraction is not new to Peru. Large-scale mining developed in the central highlands of the country, involving the regions of Huancavelica, Junín, Pasco, and the northern provinces of the region of Lima. In the early 1900s, the operations of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC), an American mining company, expanded quickly, and CPC became “the only company in Peru to engage in the large-scale extraction, processing and commercialization of mineral ores and metals” (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979: 45). CPC bought concessions and smelters from competing mining companies in the area and a railroad line connecting all of its plants to one another and to the coast. The early history of large-scale extraction is also associated with the development of a labour movement of mining workers as CPC became the largest private employer in Peru. For example, the miner’s confederation known as the National Federation of Miners, Metallurgical
and Steelworkers of Peru (FNTMMSP) traces its origins to the operations of CPC in the central highlands (Pajuelo 2010). The operations of CPC, however, ended with the reformist military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75), which nationalized its holdings under the state-owned company known as Centromín Perú. The military also expropriated all of CPC’s hacienda (estate), which covered a total of 247,000 hectares and included 87,284 sheep, 2,681 heads of cattle, and 936 horses (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979: 54). Large haciendas like CPC’s pushed peasants off their land, creating a surplus of labourers to work in the mines.

In the 1990s, the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) reversed this pattern of state ownership of so-called “strategic industries,” and privatized Centromín Perú as well as hundreds of other state-owned enterprises (Arce 2005). Weakened by the economic crisis and political violence of the 1980s, the FNTMMSP resisted Fujimori’s privatization goals, albeit unsuccessfully. In congruence with the arrival of market reforms, Fujimori made foreign investment in mining a very attractive industry. Mining claims by extractive companies skyrocketed from two million to fifteen million hectares during the 1990s, and to twenty million in the late 2000s. Similarly, investment in mining rose from US $400 million in the 1980s and early 1990s to a record level of US $2.76 billion in 2009 (MEM 2004, 2010). Moreover, thirteen out of twenty-one member companies of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the association of the world’s largest mining companies, currently operate in Peru. This is the highest concentration of large mining companies in the Latin American region (Oxfam, 2009). Thus, the increasing economic importance of resource extraction, specifically mining, rests on Fujimori’s economic liberalization program.

By the end of the 2000s, Peru occupied a leading position in the global production of gold (fifth), silver (first), copper (third), lead (fourth), tin (third), and zinc (third). In the same period across Latin America, Peru was first in the production of gold, lead, silver, tellurium, tin, and zinc, and second in the production of bismuth, copper and molybdenum (Gurmendi 2008). Mining has been the main driver of the country’s impressive growth during the 2000s, and its effects on the economy multiplied as a consequence of a commodity price boom also during the same period. The price of gold, for instance, increased from US $344 in the early 1990s to US $1,225 in the late 2000s (per troy ounce). In the same period, the price of silver rose from US $4 to US $20 (per troy ounce), and the price of copper increased from US $1.03 to US $3.42 (per pound) (MEM 2010). In addition to rising commodity prices, the aggressive Chinese demand for raw materials has also contributed to this economic bonanza. In recent years, China has surpassed the United States as the main destination of Peru’s exports. These exports include copper, iron, zinc, and fishmeal (BCRP 2012).
The central government accrued significant revenues from extractive industries, a portion of which is devolved to the regions where mining is located. The devolution of mineral rents (also known as canon minero in Peru) changed considerably in the years leading up to, and immediately following, 2002, the year of the decentralization initiative. Traditionally, 20% of the profit taxes paid by mining companies to the national government were transferred to subnational governments. However, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the amount of mineral rents transferred to the regions had become more limited because these taxes, though legally prescribed, were not strictly enforced. Following the decentralization initiative, which called for the elections of regional governments to represent each of Peru’s 24 twenty-four departments and the constitutional province of Callao, new legislation was put in place to support the newly created subnational governments. Specifically, revenue transfers from profit taxes paid by mining companies increased to 50%. These transfers became the major source of investment for subnational governments. In short, the creation of regional governments created centrifugal forces for the rapid devolution of revenues to mining regions. The sequence of competitive regional elections (2002, 2006, and 2010) further expanded the political authority of regional governments, and, as a result, placed constraints on executive powers at the national level. Consequently, Lima’s long-standing, centralized control of the regions began to erode.

Demanding Rights and Services

Protests over natural resource extraction are the most common type of mobilizations taking place in the country (Arce 2008). These protests provide an ideal venue to understand the new circumstances that have arisen as a consequence of the expansion of the extractive economy (or “new mining” as other authors have called it). According to Bebbington (2009: 8), these changes include “the scale and pace of expansion, the financial flows involved, the domiciles and governance of the companies and finance houses investing in extraction, [and] the interaction between extraction and investment.”

Under “new mining,” technological conditions have reduced the need for unskilled labour, and labour disputes between mining companies and workers have become less visible. Instead, “new mining” has an increased need for water, energy, land and landscape. New open pit and heap leaching techniques demand far greater access to each of these resources. These technological conditions imply that the actors involved in protests against the extraction of natural resources are largely the rural and urban populations affected by extraction. And the claims of protestors often include land, water quantity and quality, landscape, and the protection of the environment and their livelihoods (Bebbington
2009). Seen in this light, “new mining” allows us to understand the types of coalitions that aggrieved groups have forged in opposition to extraction, including the new actors that have emerged to challenge the extractive economy. These coalitions often cut across classes, the urban and rural divide, as well as environmental and nationalistic discourses (Arce 2014b).

However, not all of the protests against “new mining” deal with the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment. The commodity price boom alluded to earlier has yielded remarkable profits for extractive industries, and taxes collected from mining have become the most important intergovernmental transfer linked to the extraction of natural resources. These intergovernmental transfers have also encouraged a sizeable number of mobilizations over their distribution and use across the different tiers of government—local, provincial, regional and national (Arellano Yanguas 2010). Windfall profits from extractive activities have also encouraged a revision of previous tax and royalty agreements between national governments and mining corporations.

Here I advance a framework to differentiate the diversity of mobilizations surrounding resource extraction. I argue that some of these mobilizations are driven by “demands for rights,” which are encouraged by the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment; and other mobilizations are driven by “demands for services,” which arise as a consequence of disputes over the distribution and use of revenues generated from resource extraction.² Both types of mobilizations suggest how the extraction of natural resources makes contentious activity likely, albeit for different reasons.

The ‘Bad News’ of Resource Extraction: Demands for Rights

Environmental concerns in defence of the water supply or the protection of agricultural lands exemplify the mobilizations over demands for rights. Most of these protests simply oppose mining. In some cases, protesters concerned about the environment aim to prevent the mining activities from getting off the ground, as in the case of Tambogrande in the Piura region. In other cases, environmental activists seek to halt the expansion of already existing mining activities, as in Mount Quilish in the Cajamarca region. In Piura, Canadian-based Manhattan Minerals Corporation (MMC) sought to construct an open-pit mine for the extraction of gold near the San Lorenzo Valley and Tambogrande. The project called for the relocation of thousands of residents as well as the rerouting of the tributaries of the Piura River. The mobilizations against MMC extended over a period of

² The distinction between “demands for rights” and “demands for services” follows Arce (2014b).
almost five years, starting in 1999 through 2003. In Cajamarca, U.S.-based Newmont’s Yanacocha mine became the largest gold producer in Latin America, and one of the largest foreign investment operations in Peru. The Yanacocha mine began to extract gold in the early 1990s. Several years later, buoyed by high prices, it sought to expand its operations to other areas, such as Mount Quilish in 2004 and Conga in 2012.

Local communities often feel marginalized or excluded from the decision-making process regarding natural resource extraction. This has also triggered a number of important protests demanding consultation rights on development projects that affect indigenous people. The 2008-09 mobilization in opposition to opening the Amazon up for development in the province of Bagua is an example of protests over demands for rights: in this particular case, consultation rights. The U.S.-Peru free trade agreement signed in 2006 encouraged the expansion of the extractive frontier, and in the case of the Amazon region, the agreement sought to facilitate logging and the commercialization of indigenous communal lands. Mobilizations invoking consultation rights often incorporate an environmentalist discourse to further resist the exploitation of natural resources.

The ‘Good News’ of Resource Extraction: Demands for Services

Protests over demands for services revolve around disputes over how wealth from extraction is distributed. These protests are not necessarily opposed to mining and often do not involve mining companies directly. Rather these mobilizations entangle local populations and political authorities representing the different tiers of government where the natural resource is extracted. These mobilizations are common in areas where mining may be the only activity that is economically viable and does not compete with other activities, such as agriculture. Regional and local governments thus seek to integrate extractive activities already present with the development of the localities in which mining takes place.

The allocation of revenues from extraction across different levels of government has changed over time. As several studies have shown, the perceived inequities in the distribution of revenues among presidents of regional governments, mayors of provincial municipalities, and mayors of district municipalities have triggered a sizeable number of protests. In terms of the use of revenues, the disputes have to do with the efficient management of resource incomes, where efficient management refers to both its proper use and the capacity of local governments to deliver improvements where resource extraction takes place. These revenues are often spent in the delivery of services or infrastructure projects such as roads, schools and health centres.
In sum, not all the mobilizations against resource extraction are created equal. On the one hand, the protests over demands for services acknowledge the “good news” of extraction, and seek a more equitable distribution of the revenues generated from mining. These mobilizations do not oppose extraction but rather seek material improvements, such as a better provision of social services, higher wages for mine workers, and so on. The claims of protesters are very specific and negotiable. These mobilizations typically result in a pattern of non-stop protest whereby short-lived protests lead to small concessions, which later encourage other short-lived protests and other concessions, and so on. Protests thus become a bargaining tool to achieve political objectives or policy demands. On the other hand, the protests over demands for rights follow the “bad news” of extraction, and seek to protect the water supply and lands from the perceived threats that are associated with mining. These mobilizations oppose extraction and seek to stop it. Compared to protests over demands for services, these mobilizations raise broader claims that are more difficult to accommodate, and consequently, more likely to produce organized and sustained challenges against extraction.

The mobilizations over “demands for rights” approximate the sort of economic threats (or grievances) that typically encourage people to participate in protest activity. In contrast, mobilizations over “demands for services” come close to an economic opportunity insofar as individuals mobilize to better their situation, particularly in the presence of mineral rich government coffers as a consequence of rising commodity prices. From a perspective that emphasizes the importance of economic conditions (either threats or opportunities), both of them could be seen as fomenting mobilizations, yet for different reasons.

Fragmented Regional Politics

The election of regional governments that began with the process of decentralization in 2002 sought to advance the supposed virtues of decentralization, which are often advocated by the international donor community, democratic theorists, and local activists. According to its proponents, local officials, such as regional presidents, by virtue of their close association with local conditions, are more likely to take into account the concerns of local communities, which in the past were freely ignored by the central government. In turn, citizens are more likely to participate in local politics where they can more easily influence outcomes, and thus hold regional governments accountable by virtue of their proximity. Thus, the anticipated outcome of the decentralization process is greater accountability and responsiveness that will then lead to better local governments. According to this logic, the election of regional governments was meant to improve resource governance. However, as discussed below, the parties representing regional governments tend to
be institutionally weak and fluid in nature. Consequently, these parties do not provide adequate points of access to shape policy, irrespective of their number or proximity to voters as a consequence of decentralization. In some cases, regional governments became an easy target for protest. In other cases, they actively encouraged mobilizations against extraction. In both cases, they complicated resource governance.

Three factors associated with fluidity and weakness of regional parties help explain how the decentralization process has complicated resource governance. First, the decentralization process has led to a fragmented, multiparty environment, which can be seen across the regional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010. In fact, the average effective number of parties (ENP) across these three regional elections is 5.25, with a minimum of 1.7 parties in the northern region of Lambayeque in 2010, and a maximum of 8.86 parties in the southern region of Puno, also in 2010 (see Table 1). The level of political fragmentation across the regions (5.25 parties) is actually greater than that of the national legislature, which approximates 4 parties across the 2001, 2006, and 2011 national elections. In addition to the high number of parties competing across the regions, very few regional parties prevail beyond a single election or two, and on average almost two-thirds of the parties competing in each regional elections are new parties (Seifert 2011).

Second, several authors have observed the disconnection between parties representing the national government (located in the coastal capital of Lima) and parties representing regional governments (Vergara 2011). This disconnection, again, reflects the fluidity and weakness of the Peruvian party system. While in office, for instance, Toledo’s Perú Posible, controlled only one regional government (Callao), and García’s APRA controlled two regional governments (La Libertad and Piura). Across the three regional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010, APRA is the only national-level party that has had an important presence across regional governments, but the party’s gains were not lasting. During the first regional elections of 2002, APRA won 12 regions (or 48% of all regions). Yet APRA

### Table 1: Average Results for Regional Elections, 2002, 2006, and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Winner’s Share</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>ENP</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28.10</td>
<td>19.28</td>
<td>50.90</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>31.49</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>49.61</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>31.80</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>49.75</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 runoff</td>
<td>43.20</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>71.08</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Min.” (minimum) and “Max.” (maximum) are the lowest and highest share of votes, respectively, for the winner of the regional presidency. “Min.” (minimum) and “Max.” (maximum) are the lowest and highest values of ENP, respectively.

Source: ONPE 2012
only controlled 2 two regions after the 2006 elections, and only 1 one region after the 2010 elections. The bulk of regional governments are controlled by a large number of amateur politicians who are only loosely connected to any party organization at all. Hence, these parties are better described as personalistic electoral vehicles (Levitsky 2013).

Third, and finally, across the regional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010, regional parties have been able to win a subnational office with very low percentages of the popular vote. To elaborate, in this period subnational parties have secured an office with an average of 30% of the regional vote, and in some cases, they have done so with as low as 18% of the vote (see table 1). In response to the fragile bases of support for regional governments, starting with the regional elections of 2010, the central government stipulated a plurality of 30% to win office, which would then offset a runoff election between the top two contenders. In the 2010 regional election cycle, there were 10 runoff elections nationwide, representing 40% of all the regions. The low bases of electoral support for regional parties suggests that these regional parties do not need to mobilize support across all groups of society or make broad appeals to their constituents. These parties instead “have an incentive to focus their attention on smaller segments of the voting population” (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004: 171). Moreover, rather than providing public goods, these parties are more likely to distribute club or private goods to the groups they are courting (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004). Along these lines, Levitsky (2013: 303) argues that the fluidity of regional parties allows politicians to pursue their “naked ambitions” rather than some longer-term public good. Because these politicians quickly jump from one party to the next, their ambitions simply go unchecked by the party organizations that sponsored them.

To sum up, the decentralization process provided new outlets for political representation at the subnational level, and these new outlets were meant to improve decisions about resource governance. However, amateur politicians, elected with fragile pluralities and few ties to national-level parties, make up the bulk of regional governments. Consequently, the presence of weakly developed regional parties damaged the mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness that are often associated with decentralization. Thus protest activity became the preferred mechanism to influence those who govern, particularly in a context of an economic boom.

A Subnational Comparative Analysis

The regions of Tacna, Ancash, Cusco and Pasco nicely illustrate the variation of subnational protests in Peru. These are resource-rich regions and their government coffers are overflowing with mineral rents. These rents, again, originate from the extraction of
natural resources. In the sample (described below), for instance, the region of Tacna is the second-largest recipient of mineral rents in the country (1,011 soles per capita), followed by the region of Ancash (547 soles per capita), the region of Cusco (493 soles per capita), and the region of Pasco (438 soles per capita). Yet despite this similarity (as it relates to the distribution of mineral rents), and across the sample period, the regions of Ancash (25.7 protests) and Cusco (42.7 protests) have more protests than the sample mean (17.6 protest) and also more protests that the regions of Tacna (14.7 protests) and Pasco (8.7 protests). This variation suggests that there are other factors beyond natural resource rents that shape the incidence of mobilizations locally and over time. These other factors reflect political conditions and are associated with the subnational electoral and partisan dynamics described earlier.

In the empirical analysis, the dependent variable PROTEST is the annual number of protests taken from the *Base de Protestas Sociales del Perú*, and is based on the print media (Arce, 2014a). These data measure the variation of protest activity across Peru’s 25 twenty-five regions and across time in each region. In the sample, the region of Cusco has the highest level of protests (42.7 protests), and the region of Madre de Dios has the lowest level of protest (4.4 protests). The unit of analysis is the region-year.

My main explanatory variables of interest are MINERAL RENT and POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION. First, MINERAL RENT is the annual *canon minero* transfers per capita at current values. The *canon minero* represents the devolution of mineral revenues collected by the central government to subnational governments. This variable directly measures the value of a region’s geological endowment, which is determined by the quantity and quality of minerals that are available, as well as the investment made in extracting these minerals at any given time. In the sample, the measure ranges from a high of 1,277 Peruvian soles for the region of Moquegua to a low of less than 1 Peruvian sol for the region of Lambayeque. This variable serves as a useful indicator of the resource-based threats (demands for rights) and the resource-based opportunities (demands for services) that are associated with the extraction of natural resources. MINERAL RENT, therefore, should be positively correlated with protest.

Second, POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION is the effective number of political parties competing in the regional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010 using the Laakso and

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3 Including the region of Moquegua, these are the top five regions receiving the greatest volume of mineral rents (similar Avellano Yanguas 2010: 16).

4 These protest figures exclude the region of Lima. As one would expect, the populous region of Lima concentrates the greatest level of mobilizations in Peru.

5 To be clear, the dependent variable does not restrict protest to solely contentious episodes involving resource extraction, as in Arellano Yanguas (2010). Restricting protest to contentious episodes involving resource extraction provides little variation on the main dependent variable of interest: virtually all episodes of protest involving resource extraction include some level of mineral revenues.
Taagepera’s (1979) formula. Because not all regional parties are created equal, the measure weights each regional party by the number of votes it receives, preventing the count from being inflated by very small regional parties. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION implies the presence of a large number of regional parties that are elected with fragile pluralities. It serves as an indicator of the weakness and fluidity of the Peruvian regional party system. In the sample, the region of Junín has the highest level of fragmentation (6.5 parties), and the region of La Libertad has the lowest level of fragmentation (3.3 parties). I theorize that higher levels of POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION impair the mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness that are typically associated with decentralization, in general, and resource governance, in particular. Therefore, POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION should be positively correlated with protest.

My control variables are GDP MINING, POVERTY, and POPULATION (LOG). GDP MINING is the share of mining production in relation to the total GDP of the region at constant 1994 prices. This variable is used as a proxy for the level of mining activity in a given area. The variable POVERTY is the percentage of the regional population below the poverty line in terms of income measured against a region-specific variable demarcation of poverty. It is used as a proxy for the economic grievances that are said to increase protest activity. The variable POPULATION (LOG) seeks to control for the possibility that more populated regions would experience higher levels of mobilization compared to less populated regions. All of the variables in the analysis are measured annually for each region. To control for the temporal dependence of protest activity, I include the lagged dependent variable PROTEST\(_{t-1}\). Tarrow (1998), among others, argues that protests follow a cyclical pattern in which waves of protest increase rapidly in some periods, and then recede in the same manner in other periods.

I proceed by estimating an unconditional, fixed-effects negative binomial event-count model. Event-count models use maximum likelihood estimation to assess the probability of event occurrences. As event counts always take on nonnegative integer values, the distribution of events is skewed and discrete, producing errors that are not normally distributed or homoskedastic (Long 1997). In addition, overdispersion and goodness-of-fit tests indicated that a negative binomial model is the best method of estimation for my data. I estimate an unconditional fixed-effects version of the negative binomial model in order to account for unobserved (or unobservable) unit heterogeneity in the data. Simply put, I need to control for all of the idiosyncratic factors that may make a particular region more or less protest prone. I accomplish this by including a set of regional dummy variables in the regression model—one for each region in the sample, minus one. Because I am concerned about the nonindependence of observations within regions over time, I present the models below with robust standard errors clustered by region.
Empirical Results

The analysis is divided into two sections. The first part examines the relationship between resource wealth and protest using the earliest data available involving mineral rents, which is 1996. As noted earlier, resource extraction by large mining companies resumes with the economic liberalization policies of the 1990s under Fujimori. The second part of the analysis builds on these results, and examines the effects of regional politics on protest by taking into account the underlying level of political fragmentation across the regional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010.

Table 2 presents the results of the first part of the analysis. To better capture the effects of resource wealth on protests locally and over time, Table 2 splits the data before (model 1) and after the decentralization process of 2002 (model 2). As reported in model 1, the variable MINERAL RENT has no effect on protest prior to Toledo’s decentralization. In contrast, in model 2 the variable MINERAL RENT has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of subnational protest. The models in Table 2 present trimmed results, controlling only for the log of population and the lagged dependent variable PROTEST. These trimmed results help to confirm that the effects of resource wealth on protest are not driven by the inclusion of control variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Mineral Rent and Protest Before and After Decentralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral rent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest_{t-1}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region dummies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models are unconditional fixed effects negative binomial regressions.a

6 These results were also robust to the exclusion of regional dummy variables.
The comparison of the results before and after Toledo’s decentralization initiative suggests that something changed with the arrival of regional governments starting in 2002. For the period 1996-2001, in fact, resource wealth is not statistically correlated with protest. At that time, resource wealth was centrally-controlled, and the absence of political organizations at the subnational level (e.g., regional governments) did not provide an outlet to articulate possible demands for rights or services over the extraction of natural resources. For the period 2002-2010, in contrast, the statistical results suggest that resource wealth increased the incidence of protest. Arellano Yanguas (2010: 89) summarized this association as “more money, more conflicts,” though his analysis only focused on the 2005-08 period, when mineral commodity prices were already on the rise. Paradoxically, as the next set of results discusses, the introduction of regional government did not serve to improve resource governance.

Table 3 incorporates the effects of regional politics by examining the underlying level of political fragmentation across the regional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010. As shown in this table, the variable POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION correlates positively with the level of subnational protest in a statistically significant fashion. The results in the trimmed model 4 were robust to the exclusion of regional dummy variables (see model 3). The effects of POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION also remain positive and statistically significant with the inclusion of the variable MINERAL RENT (model 5), as well as the control variables POVERTY and GDP MINING (model 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political fragmentation</td>
<td>0.0658**</td>
<td>0.0900**</td>
<td>0.0893**</td>
<td>0.0981**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0298)</td>
<td>(0.0390)</td>
<td>(0.0373)</td>
<td>(0.0390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral rent</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>1.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0076)</td>
<td>(1.466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP mining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>0.547***</td>
<td>3.587***</td>
<td>2.932**</td>
<td>3.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0809)</td>
<td>(1.001)</td>
<td>(1.140)</td>
<td>(1.999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest_t-1</td>
<td>0.0055***</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0012)</td>
<td>(0.0010)</td>
<td>(0.0010)</td>
<td>(0.0010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region dummies</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−4.984***</td>
<td>−44.04***</td>
<td>−35.62**</td>
<td>−37.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
<td>(12.93)</td>
<td>(14.73)</td>
<td>(26.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−845.1</td>
<td>−811.0</td>
<td>−783.2</td>
<td>−760.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models are unconditional fixed effects negative binomial regressions.
As previously discussed, the decentralization process advanced new outlets for political representation at the subnational level, and these new outlets, by virtue of their proximity to local conditions, should, in principle, boost the connection between public preferences and government output. These new outlets could also be seen as points of access to shape policy, inviting assimilative strategies for groups to work through the established political institutions.

However, amateur politicians, elected with fragile pluralities and few ties to national-level parties, make up the bulk of regional governments. The parties at the regional level are also better described as personalistic electoral vehicles that rarely endure from one election to the next. Consequently, the weakness and fluidity of regional parties produced a power vacuum and encouraged the use of protest activity to influence those who hold political office. These weak parties thus impaired the mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness that are often associated with decentralization. All said, while the empirical results suggest that resource wealth and regional politics affect the level of subnational protest, the effect of resource wealth is visible only after 2002, the year when the decentralization initiative took place. For this reason, I have argued that the relationship between protest and subnational political conditions is closer than between that of protest and mineral rents, which again can be seen as a useful indicator of resource-based threats or opportunities.7

To give more substantive interpretations around the quantities of interest, I now provide the effect of MINERAL RENT and POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION using a statistical simulation. Based on King et al. (2000), Table 4 presents the predicted event counts of PROTEST with statistical uncertainty using Model 6 (Table 3). The predicted event counts of PROTEST are computed for three different levels of MINERAL RENT and POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION (low, mean, and high) based on their minimum, mean, and maximum values in the sample. All the estimates are statistically significant at the conventional level. First, the predicted number for PROTEST almost triples, from 16.20 at the low level of MINERAL RENT to 46.65 at the high level of MINERAL RENT. Second, the predicted number for PROTEST almost doubles, from 12.96 at the low level of POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION to 22.48 at the high level of POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION.

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7 It is also worth reiterating that the political environment in the post-Fujimori period was simply more favorable to mobilization (Arce 2008).
Table 4: Estimated Effects of Political Fragmentation and Mineral Rents on Protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>12.96(1.80)</td>
<td>17.51(0.89)</td>
<td>22.48(2.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral rent</td>
<td>16.20(0.83)</td>
<td>17.51(0.89)</td>
<td>46.65(13.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are the estimated event counts of PROTEST, calculated using Clarify 2.1. The levels of political fragmentation and mineral rents are measured around minimum, mean, and maximum values in the sample. The minimum values indicate low levels; the maximum values indicate high levels. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

Returning to the previous example, the regions of Tacna, Ancash, Cusco, and Pasco are very rich as a consequence of the distribution of mineral rents, yet the level of protests across these regions varies considerably. As it turns out, the level of political fragmentation in Ancash (5.9 parties) and Cusco (5.9 parties) is higher than the sample mean (5.25 parties), and also higher compared to the regions of Tacna (4.8 parties) and Pasco (4.9 parties). Thus the regions of Ancash (25.7 protests) and Cusco (42.7 protests) have more protests than the sample mean of 17.6, and the regions of Tacna (14.7 protests) and Pasco (8.7 protests). The focus on electoral and partisan dynamics (namely, political fragmentation) helps to explain why apparently similar resource-abundant regions within Peru experience different levels of protest.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that the association between resource extraction and protest is likely due to perceived economic threats (demands for rights) or opportunities (demands for services). However, an approach that solely emphasizes economic conditions, regardless of their type, does not provide a complete account for the incidence of subnational protest activity. Following the social movement literature (e.g., Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2006), this paper brings political conditions back into the analysis of antimarket contention. At the subnational level, it focuses on the electoral and partisan dynamics that make regional governments more protest prone. As the analysis shows, regional politics in Peru have grown increasingly fragmented and fluid, and it has affected protest activity, but in a manner opposite to what advocates of decentralization had anticipated. The presence of weakly developed regional parties, rather than improving decisions over resource governance, led to the escalation of protest activity as a mechanism to influence those who govern.
A couple of additional contributions can be drawn from this study. First, in examining the relationship among resource wealth, regional politics, and protest across Peru’s 25 twenty-five regions, the subnational comparative analysis presented in this paper corrects for the national bias of the existing resource curse literature when studying the consequences of resource wealth. This subnational analysis allows us to coalesce changing patterns of mobilization and demobilization within a single country; all of which helps us to formulate better causal inferences on the factors that shape protest activity locally and over time.

Second, and finally, the resource curse literature remains the most influential paradigm towards understanding the relationship between resource abundance and several important outcomes, such as the persistence of dictatorships and the malfunctioning of the economy. But the core arguments of the resource curse literature as it relates to civil society, in particular, are not well-suited to explain the social unrest that the extraction of natural resources generates. To elaborate, the resource curse literature suggests that the abundance of natural resource inhibits the growth of civil society, as resource wealth allows governments to relieve social pressures through a mix of low taxes and patronage spending. Accordingly, an active, prone to mobilization civil society should not be expected, much less so in the context of resource abundance or a commodity price boom. The analysis presented here, in contrast, suggests that resource abundance encourages various demands for rights and demands for services. To put it differently, resource abundance encourages claim-making. Although protests could be seen as a mechanism to generate responsiveness and accountability from those who govern, this is probably not what decentralization advocates had in mind.

REFERENCES


When protesting youth swept the streets during the last years, there was a growing perception that the world was seeing a wave of youth protests similar to 1968. Now and then a critique of the educational system played a major role and, although specific demands and grievances differed, the protests had a shared underline. In 1968 these topics were related to the decolonisation struggles, the war in Vietnam, as well as demands for women and minority rights. Today many protests criticise the lack of accountability and democratic control of the international financial system. So why is it mostly young people that protest and voice certain demands? The frame of youth is mostly used for young people age 15 to 29. Analysing the relation to protest one might argue that this is the typical age where you experiment with certain behaviours and have spare time to do so. But if this was true, how can we explain why the majority of young people do not protest?

In the analysis of young people’s political behaviour the dominant narratives is that they lack interest in formal politics, neglect the print media and do not join political organizations; at the same time they seem to spent hours after hours playing computer games or using social media. The high levels of youth participation in the protest movements during the last years contradict this assumption as well as the Scottish referendum in September 2014. In Scotland young people age 16 and 17 were allowed to cast their vote for the first time. While they participated in a similar high level as adults, exit polls claim that their vote was very different and that more than three quarters voted for independence from Great Britain (Lord Ashton Polls 18.-19.9.2014). Hence young people are neither apolitical nor lack interest in formal politics. However, only few studies on the current protest movements have analysed the role and motivation of young people beyond the acknowledgement that most protesters are young. Obviously the specific motifs for youth mobilization differ between demanding rules for the international financial markets in the occupy movement, the respect of political and civil rights in Mexico, or access to jobs and better education in Chile and Spain. But beyond these differences, these young people share a more profound concern: They face blocked status passages to adulthood and
express mayor concerns regarding the future of their respective society. Hence a youth lens on social protest allows identifying the underlying conflicts on the future political, economic and social development model in these societies.

In the following I will frame youth as a social condition and analyse social protest and mobilisation through a “youth lens”. This has an added value because it allows for the identification of conditions and factors for mobilisation beyond age as well as for the analysis of context specific factors and broader comparison. The concept of youth is closely related to processes of social change. Historically it comes into being during industrialisation and the disruption of the unity of work and life. As a consequence the definition of youth differs across time and space. However, youth across the globe have to accomplish transitions to adulthood that provide a comparative frame for the following analysis. Under this perspective this article argues that the common underlying trigger of the current protest movements are blocked transitions to adulthood. State and society’s response to youth protest shape either virtuous cycles of reform or vicious cycles of violence and repression.

Youth as a social condition

Youth is mostly conceived as the life span between puberty and adulthood, including late childhood, adolescence and early adulthood.¹ But youth is a social construct and not just a biological process or a life-stage varying according to the context “in which people are making transitions from the dependencies of childhood to assume the responsibilities of adulthood” (Flanagan and Syvertsen 2006:11). Growing up in the developed countries of the global North (or in the middle or upper classes of the South) opens a variety of opportunities and options for the future while growing up in poor and marginalized environments of the global South (or in marginalized parts of the North) shapes a quite different set of (im-)possibilities.

Shifts in the public-private divide of society e.g. through the expansion of public policies (education, health care) influence and change relationships between age and gender groups. Extended formal schooling and vocational training has prolonged the life phase “youth” in almost all regions. This can either strengthen the social fabric and forms of social cohesion or cause tension and conflict – not exclusively but to an important degree between generations. Thus “youth is both a social position ... as well as part of a larger societal and generational process, a state of becoming” (Christiansen et al. 2006:11).

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¹ There is no global definition of youth as this is a highly context specific concept. International organizations and institutions use different age boundaries, the United Nations World Youth Reports (UN-DESA 2003, 2005, 2007, 2011) include the cohort aged 15 to 25, the World Health Organization that from 15 to 29 (WHO 2002), the World Bank’s World Development Report (2006) young people between age 12 and 24.
Under such an interactive perspective, the importance of a focus on youth for understanding social mobilization and protest is quite obvious: First of all, young people mirror broader developments of social change like in a spy glass as they are the link between a society’s past and future. Second, under a quantitative perspective, the current world population is overwhelmingly young, a trend that will continue at least for the next two decades. How today’s 1.5 billion young people (1.2 living in developing countries) relate and interact with society will define the future not just at the local level but on a global scale too. Demographic changes are a central component of the processes of social change. At the beginning of November 2011, the United Nations welcomed the seven billionth world citizen. Both the region in which this child was born and the demographic realities of the immediate environment will decisively impact its life prospects. Industrial societies such as Germany have a steadily aging population. Many countries in Latin America are at the verge of demographic transition. However demographic developments in European and Latin American societies differ across countries as well as within both regions (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Youth (age 15-24) as Share of Total Population in % (2010)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (incl. Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic change confronts states and societies with challenges as well as with opportunities. Latin America and Europe show quite distinct patterns but in both contexts the main challenge is the necessity of adapting priorities of public policies:

- Very young and youthful societies such as Nicaragua with a share of children and adolescents of more than 50 per cent of the overall population need to provide health, education and other public goods for the young.

- Aging societies such as Germany where close to 50 per cent of the population are over age 50 need to adopt their health and social security systems to the special needs of the elderly.
Between these contexts and in the process of demographic change the so-called “demographic dividend” provides growing opportunities as dependency ratios decrease and the percentage of economic active and working population is high (World Bank 2006: 33-36). Nevertheless, academic and public discussions have mostly highlighted the dangers of demographic change. The very popular “youth bulge” hypothesis claims that a high percentage of young males without jobs increase levels of conflict and violence. Despite its popularity the youth bulge thesis is not really sustained by empirical research. While the lack of opportunities in the labour market is an important factor, empirical evidence for a direct link between violence and “idle young men” is rather scarce. Other factors such as the development model and the political regime intervene and shape dangers as well as opportunities of demographic change.

Although youth is a context specific concept, the central interface between youth and society is socialization. At the individual level it is “the process by which people acquire the behaviours and beliefs of the social world – that is, the culture – in which they live” (Arnett 1995: 618). At the macro level it is the process of “how polities and other political societies and systems inculcate appropriate norms and practices in citizens, residents, or members” (Sapiro 2004: 2). Hence socialization is a complex process with a certain conservative bias favouring the internalization of existing forms of social cohesion, norms and rules. At the individual as well as at the collective level it provides elements of societal continuity and path-dependency rooted in historical and cultural experiences as well as day-to-day social practice. Nevertheless socialization is not static but – at least theoretically – a dynamic process able to adapt and change according to structural as well as to context specific developments and needs. Young people are not passive recipients of socialization but active agents influencing and shaping the process itself as well as the outcome depending on their agency (Youniss and Yates 1999: 8).

The every day socialization sources of youths – family, school, peers and media – do not exist in a vacuum. They are interrelated and interact with existing institutional and political processes and the relations between state and society that are an important part of the (re-) production of social and cultural patterns of socialization. These rules and arrangements need continuous support provided by political socialization as “the way in which youths are brought into a political society established by preceding generations” (Dawson et al. 1973: 27). This is an important part of intergenerational relations, relevant for social cohesion at different levels. Political socialization is closely related to the agency of citizens in the public sphere and the processes of political learning, including the formation of political cultures and the acquisition of norms and values as well as patterns of civic engagement.

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2 Urdal (2006, 2011, Barakat and Urdal 2009) has shown that there is no direct causation between youth bulges and armed conflict or internal wars indicating that other factors have to step in like the lack of secondary education and job opportunities.
Socialization processes produce expectations, both on the part of youths and on the part of adults, as to the necessary rites of passage and conditions for complete membership in the particular society.

Transitions to Adulthood

While the transition from child to youth is closely connected with puberty and the reaching of sexual maturity, the transition from youth to adulthood is tied to the completion of central rites of passage. Through the associated processes, and sometimes in connection with rituals, youth become an active part of the society; responsibility for their own lives, as well as for the respective community, is handed over to them. The concrete possibilities and conditions for the completion of these transitions are historically and culturally defined and thus very different (Lloyd 2005; Lloyd et al. 2005). However, there are three central rites of passage into adult life that apply worldwide:

- Marriage and the starting of a family: In most societies, particularly in the countries of the Global South, this was and is the most important milestone for achieving adulthood.

- Entry into the labour market: The resulting economic independence from parents or other family networks is in many cases simultaneously a central condition for starting a family.

- Acquisition and exercise of civil rights: This is dependent to a large degree on the particular political system and the specific possibilities for participation and entails, for example, active and passive voting rights once one has reached a particular age or participation in other societal decisions in various contexts (local, national, state, civil society, etc.).

Despite historical changes and the different weight assigned to them, these rites of passage remain important markers along the path into adult life worldwide. Across the globe young people face a series of universal challenges in the transitions to adulthood.\(^3\) In many societies the transition into adult life is blocked as a result of economic, social or political developments extending the length of the “youth” phase involuntarily. It is for this reason that in some societies 30-year-olds are still considered youths; without their own income, they are economically dependent on their parents or families and thus unable to

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3 These pathways and experiences are gendered, as they are different for girls and boys, young women and men. In most societies young males are “sent out to prove themselves” while control over young females (and their fertility) may increase during adolescence. The (re-)production of gender relations is an important part of the socialization process reflecting cultural differences as well as changing patterns and global influences (Brown et al. 2002).
start a family themselves. Thus, the process of becoming an adult resembles an obstacle course with an uncertain outcome. In contexts of blocked status passages young people have different possibilities: They can just try to cope adapting themselves to difficult circumstances; they can seek to navigate or try to change the contexts they live in. An analysis of the experiences of youth in Europe and Latin America is thus important to identify the major challenges in their transitions to adulthood.

School to work transition

Formal (and informal) education aims – among other things – at providing young people with the necessary skills for a productive life. The current youth generation in Europe and Latin America is much better educated than the generation of their parents. In many countries compulsory education is between 10 and 14 years; in others such as the Andean region (except for Colombia) and Eastern Europe it is seven to nine years (Fiske 2012). Levels of school enrolment provide some information on the spread of formal education. Enrolment is increasing to over 90% in most developing regions, but gains in education are far from universal and show differences according to gender as well as to wealth, residential status and region. Latin America and the Caribbean are the only part in the developing world where the gender gap in education is closed and girls’ literacy rates in most countries surpass those of boys (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Youth (15-24) and Education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate 2005-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNICEF 2011:104-107
However, differences in access to education exist according to residence and social status. The quality of public education in many Latin American countries is poor and fees for private schools and/or universities are high. Hence poverty is a major cause for school drop-out when families lack resources to pay for school fees or other requirements (such as books or uniforms) or when children need to work for a living and support the family. On the other hand, a lack of infrastructure and funds goes hand in hand with insufficient political interest to invest in the education of marginalized youths.

The poor perception of school education is obvious in the answers of Latin American, Spanish and Portuguese in a youth survey of 2013 (PEJI). A quarter to a half of the interviewees describe the school environment as violent, schools as dysfunctional and think that what they learn does neither help them in life nor to find work. In Europe 55% of young people think that their education system is not well adapted to the world of work (European Parliament 2014: 2). Hence it is not astonishing that the quality and the cost of schooling stood at the core of youth mobilization for protest during the last years (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>country</th>
<th>issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>education conflict in Oaxaca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>new law on education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Increase in tuition fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–2010</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>privatization of public universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>increase in university registration fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>education reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–2013</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Role of state in public education, change of constitution to use copper revenues for public budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>education reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>education privatization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Increase of tuition fees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ortiz et al. 2014: annex

A lack of access to quality education has consequences beyond schooling as Tienda and Wilson (2002: 13) note: “Poor urban youths are systematically more isolated from mainstream social institutions (such as schools and job opportunities) that inculcate social norms and responsibility. In turn, this not only leads to cultural and societal exclusion, but also encourages them to develop maladaptive strategies as they negotiate the developmental challenges of adolescence.” In many countries this is the basis for vicious circles and escalating violence perpetrated by and committed against young people.

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4 On the intergenerational transmission of poverty see the Human Development Report on Latin America 2010 (PNUD 2010).
While education is important, the feasibility of school to work transitions and the related patterns of youth’s inclusion or marginalization depend on the interaction of different factors. On the youths’ side individual skills and abilities acquired in formal and informal education (family, schools, peers) are the foundation for employability. This encounters the necessities of the specific job market as well as formal and informal prerequisites established by employers. This interaction is shaped by different factors at the local, national and global level like economic resources, demographic development and economic cycles.

In Latin America as well as in Europe young people currently face severe problems in their school to work transition. According to ILO data (2013, 2010, 2008, 2006) unemployment rates of youth across the globe are much higher than for adults. This can have different reasons: There might be a mismatch between youth’s skills and the necessities of the labour market. This is discussed for Latin America with a focus on inadequate schooling and a need to increase education’s quality (Welti 2002; Hopenhayn 2008). Gaps between youth’s aspirations and accessibility of the labour market can be another cause when university alumni prefer to wait for jobs in the public administration instead of working in the private sector.

However, another problem is the lack of “decent work” in the formal labour market (ILO 2014: xxiii). Here globalization and the prevailing development models are a major source for blocked transitions and a minimum of economic independence for young people. Challenges differ for European and Latin American youth. The financial and economic crisis during the last years produced levels of youth unemployment not experienced since the great depression of the 1920s. In 2012 in „Greece and Spain youth unemployed accounted for more than half of the economically active youth population” (ILO 2013: 13), Italy and Portugal did not fare much better. The problem in Latin America is somehow different. Here jobs in the formal economy have always been rare. However despite macroeconomic growth the current resource extractive development reproduces these patterns. The model is based on either low level unqualified jobs or expertise (e.g. in mining) that is imported from foreign countries as most of the enterprises are foreign owned (Canadian or US among others).

But unemployment or restrictions to work outside the house are not the only problem in school-to-work-transitions: A significant group of working young people are unable to survive on what they get paid. According to ILO data (2006) one out of five youths is working but living in extreme poverty at one US-Dollar a day. The feminization of labour in the export-oriented assembling and manufacturing industry (e.g. textile and computer) is another example. Export-producing zones (including tourism) provide possibilities for young women to enter the labour market: Nicaragua and Jamaica are leading with 90
per cent females (Boyenge 2007). But most of these female workers are not allowed to establish unions, have to work long extra hours, lack health and safety regulations and can easily be dismissed due to pregnancy, marriage or “misbehaviour”. This makes them easy victims of forced labour as well as of sexual harassment as the supervisors are mostly men. Another important sector for working women is domestic services with 100 million employees worldwide, 90% of them young women and girls (Plan UK 2009:107-108). Working inside a private house makes them invisible and keeps them in the realm of the private sphere although they are part of the labour force. It leaves them without a minimum of protection and with no or little access to social security and basic social services.

As a consequence many of the protests during the last years have focussed on the international financial markets, working conditions and labour rights. Examples are among many others the campaigns for “Robin Hood Taxes” in the UK since 2010, the occupy movements in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. While protesters were not exclusively youth, young people had an important part in the demonstrations, occupation of public spaces and other activities. Besides protest migration is a common pattern to cope with blocked school-to-work transitions. Latin American youths try to get (legally and illegally) to the United States, while youth from the most crisis ridden European countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece) try to find jobs in the richer EU countries such as Germany (The Economist 16.2.2013).

Young people’s exclusion from the labour market as well as instable and insecure work conditions have not only severe impacts on the current life-worlds and future perspectives for the viability of young people's livelihoods. The ILO (2013: 2) summarizes the possible consequences of the blocked transition to employment: “Perhaps the most important scarring is in terms of the current youth generation’s distrust in the socio-economic and political systems.” At the same time these problems cause permanent insecurity as young people are neither able to make plans for the future nor to accomplish other essential status passages. This leads to postponement in their most important status passages into adulthood – marriage.

Marriage and starting a family

Marriage and starting a family has been and still is the most important marker on the way to adulthood across the globe (Boehm 2006; Booth 2002), at the same time it is intimately related to school-to-work transitions and different for male and female youths. Marriage

5 There are many reports on the harsh work conditions in export producing zones (see e.g. ICFTU 2004).
patterns are highly influenced by socialization, by social norms and expectations about the social role as spouse and parent. Marriage patterns are changing across the globe, postponing the age of women’s marriage while first marriage age of young men has been quite stable.6

There are various reasons for these changes and arguments can be made in both directions: Increase in education for youth seems to be an important driver for delaying marriage. Women and men with more than eight years of schooling will rarely marry early compared to those with no or only three years in school. Education is a more important predictor than residence. But the relationship is not as simple as it seems at first sight. But there is hardly a change in Latin America despite significant educational gains. On the other hand girls that want to marry later will stay longer at school. Taking fertility as an indicator for the status passage of starting a family, Latin American data show that this is closely related to the size of town of residence as well as to the educational level of girls and young women. In Mexico 60 percent of women who did not attend school were pregnant before age 20 (Welti 2002: 290). Overall in Latin America 15% of adolescents in the lowest income quintile become pregnant while only four per cent in the highest (UN-DESA factsheet).

A few other factors related to social change and socialization delay marriage although there is no statistical evidence (Mensch et al. 2005: 153-158): Urbanization seems to play a role through changing norms and decreasing social control on timing and partner selection. Latin American data show that early motherhood contributes to intergenerational poverty as fewer years of schooling and early pregnancy are highly correlated to socio-economic and geographic factors: poor rural girls are four to ten times more likely to have a child at age 17 than urban middle class or rich girls (UN-DESA 2007: 58). According to Mensch et al. (2005: 159-161) the explanation for male postponement of marriage is neither related to education nor urbanization but mostly to economic reasons like poverty, lack of financial security and lack of access to land.

Another important factor influencing family formation directly as well as indirectly in Latin America is violence. Looking at interpersonal violence, young people, specifically young men, are the most affected group. Latin America is the region with the highest level of interpersonal violence with lethal outcome and a homicide rate of 36.4 (homicides per 100,000) for young men between 15 and 26 according to PAHO and GTZ (2009:1). For each victim of violence there are 20 to 40 young men more hospitalized due to violence. In the same age group Western Europe has a homicide rate of just 0.9. Violence not only affects everyday life, but has consequences for demography. In the case of Brazil the sex

ratio will have a sharp disequilibrium by 2050 if levels of violence remain high, as there will be six million more women than men (out of a population of around 200 million; Barker 2005). A second consequence of violence is migration. The humanitarian crisis regarding the migration of unaccompanied minors to the United States showed the devastating impact of violence on families. Hence family formation is not a motif for youth mobilization in protest, young people rather choose to migrate (legally and illegally).  

Citizenship and civic engagement

Acquiring citizenship is closely related to entering the public sphere and participating in community decision making and taking over responsibilities at different levels. Civic engagement and youth activism are shaped by socialization as well as by

- Formal rules and the political regime define the criteria of full citizenship and associated legal rights and responsibilities – like voting and being a candidate. Most countries in Latin America and the European Union share the legal frame of representative democracy providing young people with established channels of participation and accepted rights (elections, association etc.). Here youth gain legal equality mostly when reaching their 18th birthday.

- Gender: in both regions men participate more actively in public affairs than women (World Bank 2006: 163; Tilley 2002).

- Socio-economic status, education and demography are significant determinants of political participation. It “is the more resourceful parts of the citizenry that participate more than average in all dimensions of the participatory spectrum and therefore create a biased input into the political decision-making process” (Kaase 2011: 548).

On the other side, citizenship is more than the right to vote, it includes voice as well as agency (Lloyd 2005:347). Long-term studies on youths’ political participation have shown that their early engagement has long-term effects on the norms and values they stand for and is a good indicator of their political attitudes as adults (Youniss and Hart

7 Young people do protest for the legal recognition of same sex couples or against the discrimination of gays and lesbians or the right of self-determination.

8 In relation to youth activism the main perspective – of researchers as well as of practitioners – is either on violent and other extreme forms of behaviour or on political apathy both considered as a source of fragility (Kassimir 2006: 21; Verma and Saraswathi 2002:124). But most young people do not turn to violence, they engage in a variety of commonplace activities in their neighbourhood, communities or even at the national level.
If youths are to become responsible citizens, they therefore require not only a vote (in elections or other decision-making processes) but also an active role in shaping their life-worlds. Although young people’s political activism varies across the globe, it is much higher than those of older generations. Variations across regions are influenced by different historical experiences and the related development of civil society organizations providing opportunities for civic engagement. Compared at the global level youth activism is lowest in former authoritarian countries in Latin America as well as Eastern Europe (Tilley 2002: 244-246).

While there are formal channels of youth participation such as the Iberoamerican Youth Organization or the European Youth Parliament, most policies lack an explicit focus on youth. Recent surveys on youth in Latin America and Europe show what young people perceive as their biggest problems. While variations are significant in both regions, challenges differ: In Latin America violence is seen as the most important problem across all sub-regions. In Europe the majority of young people feels marginalized and excluded from the labour market. However, young people do engage and try to get voice in formal politics as the Scottish referendum or the Mexican elections show. Young peoples participation and mobilization in the protests during the last years can be seen as a form of civic engagement and nonconventional political participation. Under a youth lens it is a response to the neglect of young people’s current needs and their concern regarding future livelihoods. The problems facing the youths who took to the streets in 2011 and 2012 had long been known; however, no measures to overcome them had been undertaken. Protest is a response to the neglect of young people’s current needs and future livelihoods. Hence an analysis of the different transitions helps to understand how young people cope.

Whether such protests become violent – as in Greece and Great Britain – also depends upon whether youths are taken seriously, not only in “pretty speeches” but also as central actors of the future. Where this is not the case, the sporadic protests could very likely transform into calls for more radical changes. Thus the specific patterns of response by state institutions and society are important for the direction of future development.

Responses to Youth Mobilization

State institutions and society have different possibilities of response: Integration – neglect – repression. Youth civic engagement is an important part of political socialization, as the experiences young people make here will shape their future behaviour. Recent research
on youth in the United States has shown that a variety of socialization influences during adolescence – family interest and involvement, school climate and civic education, community engagement, media, religiosity as well as class and race – relates to civic behaviour such as voting or participation in civil society organizations (Sherrod 2006). Hence the response from the state and society to youth activism is important beyond specific topics and issues and a lack of response or repressive strategies can lead to vicious circles of protest and violence.

The main sources of disconnect between youth and society can be summarized under the labels of agency, subordination and control. Integration and participation are not one-way processes. While young people need some capacities to participate in the labour market or in the political process, the relevant institutions must also allow young people to be an active part of development. Hence, the question is if young people are perceived as and allowed to be active members of society with a right to citizenship or if their role is restricted and their activities controlled. Under this perspective the experiences of young people in and inside Latin America and Europe vary considerably but also show similar patterns: strategies vary between limited response and repression.

In some countries protests were followed by political initiatives. Chile is an example here. Four leaders of the student mobilizations – Giorgio Jackson, Camila Vallejo, Karol Cariola and Gabriel Boric, were elected to congress on different lists. While even the outgoing government of Sebastián Piñera recognized the need for changes in the educational system, the government of Michelle Bachelet made this a central pillar of her government program. Only two months after coming to office she signed a first law in May 2014. However student organizations claim that this is not enough and that their demands have not been met.

In the case of Brazil the protests of the last two years endangered the re-election of president Dilma Rousseff. Contrary to Chile protests in Brazil were based on a variety of issues and opinions on where and what protesters came from differ. Former president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva sees “demonstrations are largely the result of social, economic and political successes” (New York Times 17.7.2013). Others claim that it is the old middle classes mobilizing against the growing competition of the emerging middle classes (Stolte 2014).

The European Union reacted to the protests with the adoption of a “Youth Guarantee” in 2013 to counter the high levels of youth unemployment. However, until today there is little progress in the short run and – similar to many other initiatives – the main focus

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of these policy interventions is on changing youths through training, education, and second chances. What remains unaddressed in Europe as well as in Latin America are the more structural problems of blocked transitions such as development models based on unqualified or low paid jobs instead of “decent work” in the formal system.

Despite of the democratic context youth mobilisation has also encountered repression from the state security institutions as well as from non-state actors. Police forces dissolved demonstrations with tear gas in Santiago de Chile as well as in Brazil. When the police shot a young man, London experienced a week of severe riots. A study by the London School of Economics and The Guardian (2012: 4-5) explains the dynamics at work in the escalation process. There was “anger and frustration at people’s every day treatment at the hands of police” and “rioters identified a number of other motivating grievances, from the increase in tuition fees, to the closure of youth services and the scrapping of the education maintenance allowance.” Ignoring young people’s demands, responding to protest violently or criminalizing protest can thus trigger more protest.

Where governments are unwilling (or unable) to address young people’s grievances migration can serve as a safety valve. The way this mechanism works can be studied in Mexico and the northern triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador) where governments try to keep the borders open or at least porous. At the same time the US government builds ever-higher fences to keep mostly youthful and illegal migrants out; a strategy that European countries pursue similarly against young migrants from outside the European Union (e.g. North African).

As long as there are no serious attempts to help young people to transit to adulthood in their countries or through migration, protests will remain one possibility for youth to acquire voice. If unheard, violence might be the second choice.

Youth mobilization

So why is it most of all young people that protest and voice certain demands in Europe and Latin America as well as in other regions? Under a youth lens, that is a perspective that analyses the main transitions into adulthood the answer is that that youth mobilisation in social protests is caused by blocked transitions. However protest is just one option for youth to act. Despite of the media hype and the comparison with 1968 rather few young people participate in protests. Hence youth also have other options that can be framed under A.O Hirschman’s (1970) distinction between exit, voice and loyalty: Social protest as well as violence can be a mechanism to gain voice and to press for policy approaches
at different levels. But many young people opt for exit—and migrate either from Latin America to the US or inside Europe. However—at least until today—most young people still opt for loyalty. This can take the form of conventional participation or political apathy and just “navigating” at the individual level.

The future will show what patterns of youth activism the demands for economic, social and political participation encounter. Maybe politicians across Europe and Latin America should consider that it is not necessarily young people that need to be changed but the societies they live in.

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4 SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE MOBILISATION OF ANTI-AUSTERITY PROTEST

Camilo Cristancho

Introduction

In the spring of 2011 journalists were surprised as they fruitlessly intended to contact, as in an alien invasion, with the leader of an unexpected and unprecedented political challenger. “The Facebook revolutions” had arrived, and their leaderless nature is still an unresolved mystery which the social sciences are trying to solve. The role of social media in political mobilisation is uncontested by scholarly and public opinion accounts of the recent wave of contestation worldwide since the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010. Contentious responses all over the world have followed on the successful mobilisations by the Indignados/Occupy in many countries and their communication practices have been adopted for varied issues and circumstances. This paper looks into different uses of social media in the mobilisation to anti-austerity protest in Spain. The analysis is contextualised in other European cases and compares the Occupy/Indignados with the trade unions in their responses of to welfare state retrenchment.

The Spanish case for anti-austerity protest is of particular interest as it provides a combination of trade union responses to government policies and the mobilisation of unprecedented Indignados/Occupy movements characterised by a minor involvement of conventional bureaucratic organisations (Anduiza et al. 2014). Notwithstanding, a line cannot be clearly drawn between unions and the Indignados movement as the initial reaction of unions to austerity policy has been shared by a broad part of society unaffiliated to unions. In spite of the Indignados’ attribution of part of the blame for the crisis to unions, who they consider to be part of the political elite, civil society organisations contesting the drawback on citizens’ rights share some of the goals, targets, and publics of unions. Consequently, they have evolved together within the same contexts, and have common repertoires and practices, such as an intensive use of social media.
The use of social media has provided unions the opportunity to connect with broader publics and profit from the Indignados momentum. It has also enabled the organisations involved in the Indignados movement to mobilise a broader public than the experienced and politically motivated followers of unions (Anduiza et al. 2014). Anti-austerity contestation thus reflects different approaches to mobilisation, ranging from loosely coupled movements to long standing organisations based on formal membership and hierarchical decision making. This scenario provides the opportunity to explore different uses of social media in the mobilisation to anti-austerity protest.

This chapter has a three-fold aim:

1. Review the literature on social media and protest and narrow down the broad definition of mobilisation by providing a precise description of its processes in the context of social media communication.
2. Describe anti-austerity protest and the role of social media by looking into protest survey data in nine European countries from 2009 to 2012.
3. Explore social media use in four cases of anti-austerity protest in Spain in order to identify mobilisation patterns and question the importance of organisations between events in Twitter.

This paper intends to address a central question in the literature of political mobilisation that has studied the role of organisations in changing media environments and in the context of evolving associational patterns (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Bimber et al. 2012; Castells 2013; Agarwal et al. 2014; Bennett et al. 2014;). Scholarly research has also provided some insights into the mechanisms of social media use for achieving collective action by focusing on the dynamics of recruitment, and the dynamics of information diffusion (González-Bailón et al. 2011; Fábrega and Sajuria 2014). The chapter looks into the role of organisations in multiple anti-austerity demonstrations that have generated very different reactions within the same issue and national context. It follows on previous work on social media use in large protests in Europe (Theocharis 2012; Mercea et al. 2013) and explores differences between organisational involvement in mobilisation networks.

The analysis builds on a central interest to compare classic organisations that have traditionally contested economic policy such as unions and leftist parties, with young and loosely coupled organisations in their use of social media for mobilising against austerity politics. It starts with a brief review of the literature and derives five points that are used as a working definition of social media use for political mobilisation. The definition provides the structure for the analysis.
Defining social media mobilisation campaigns

The concept of mobilisation can be taken as an activation of political action as a result of grievances, organisation and opportunity (Kriesi 2014) or as “the process by which candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 25). Both definitions share the agency of organisation and move on to distinguish mobilisation types. In his account of responses to the economic crisis, Kriesi turns the attention to the responses initiated by the political elites (e.g. party organisations, labour unions) in contrast to those by grassroots movements. Referring to the latter case, he writes

“Such mobilisation from below typically follows a radically different pattern: it is characterised by what Gerlach and Hine (1970) have once called SPIN-structures: these are integrated network-structures which are at the same time segmented (composed of many groups) and polycentric (composed of many different leaders). These structures ‘self-organize’ without central or ‘lead’ organisations. The mobilisation in these networks builds on what Nedelmann (1987: 196) has called ‘organisational dissatisfaction’, the dissatisfaction with ‘the large bureaucratic bodies and the time-consuming procedures and complicated decision-making structures that exist within traditional established parties and trade unions” (Kriesi 2014: 6).

This account of organisations, dissatisfaction and network structures resume the outrage of Indignados against formal politics and representative institutions, including parties and unions, and their strategic use of social media.

Rosenstone and Hansen propose a similar distinction between a direct mobilisation process that refers to a targeted encouragement to take action, and an indirect process in which individuals share the call to action and thus diffuse the information and mobilise others (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). This second process is at the basis of the social logic of politics (Zuckerman 2005). A closer look into the detailed mechanisms of networked interactions is crucial to understand the role of social networks in political action. This implies focusing on information, identity and exchange; three building blocks at the base of current explanations of our everyday networks in social media (Kitts 2000). This is also a reminder of the importance of the social networks over the buzz of new media, or as in Mario Diani’s words, a reminder that “The angry Parisians that gathered on the ramparts of the Bastille on that fateful day of July 1789 were unlikely to own mobile phones; nor had they enjoyed many chances, in the weeks leading up to the big event, of being updated on developments by bloggers or twitters. Still, they made it there. And
they made it in sufficient numbers, with sufficient unity and commitment, to start what can be safely regarded as a quite successful and impactful mobilisation” (Diani 2011: 1).

This section proposes a broad definition of mobilisation by providing a precise description of its processes in the context of social media communication. It draws from research that has identified similar processes in varied cases using multiple designs and dealing with different social media platforms.

Drawing from the research on the political use of Internet 1.0 and the first steps of Indymedia, social media is considered in first place an alternative to mainstream media and an unprecedented potential for broadcasting, where the key difference with internet 1.0 lies in the power of social diffusion, as in the case of the Turkish uprisings in 2013, where social media was crucial to recruit and mobilise protesters in the absence of coverage by traditional media (Barberá and González-Bailón 2013). This information diffusion processes have also been proposed to encourage protesters’ perceptions of the likelihood of success (Lynch 2011).

In second place, from a media diversity perspective, social media enables information integration from mass media, opinion leaders and the reports of citizen journalism that feed traditional media outlets (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira 2011; Wang et al. 2013). This media phenomena, combined with the expression of opinions and emotions in Twitter or Facebook logics, blurs the lines into a hybrid media system (Chadwick 2013). Social media is also closely linked to mobile internet, which in the context of protest politics raises the importance of first person accounts of events for meaning production as well as for counter-vigilance purposes as used by the 15M channels (Toret et al. 2012), and elsewhere to raise public awareness for repressive responses.

In third place, social media enables organisation without depending on traditional, rigid organisational structures. Associations and the concept of membership has changed into more flexible, horizontal or hybrid institutional forms that can adapt to the circumstances of engagement (Chadwick 2007). Social media enables maintaining multiple contacts and holding various engagements for different causes simultaneously (Walgrave 2011) and communities self-organise without formal structures or co-presence (Earl 2010; Earl and Kimport, 2011; Shirky 2008). Consequently, organisations are not indispensable anymore for enforcing sanctions and providing selective incentives (Bimber, Flanagan and Sthol 2005). Twitter played a coordination role in Occupy by acting as an organisation that linked multiple networks through users who provided contents and shared links to valuable resources (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). Social media facilitates reaching out to like-minded individuals and organisations and leveraging weak-tie linkages. Within this logic, massive open calls have permitted to organise, coordinate and crowdsourcing
the logistics of participation more effectively (Theocharis et al. 2014). In contrast to
the resource mobilisation paradigm in which large-scale action depends on brokered
organisations which facilitate cooperation, social media “self-organize without central
or ‘lead’ organisational actors, using technologies as important organisational agents”
(Bennet and Segerberg 2012:17). The fact that the most popular social media platforms are
among the top companies worldwide should not impede recognising the value of open-
source community tools. The re-appropriation of private social networks like Facebook
and Twitter and the creation of community tools have been central to the Indignados in all
the phases since its foundation,1 and in their learning processes (Romanos 2013)

In fourth place, regarding the cognitive resources involved in participation, the issue-
based attention dynamics of social media facilitate the formation of collective identities
across communities that share common grievances (Bennett 2003; Diani 2009). This
implies that action frames, which used to be centralised within organisations in order
to control signifying processes and generate common identities (Benford and Snow
2000), tend to leave the realm of organisations and flow within social media. Social
networking sites provide new creative possibilities for engagement and collaboration in
different formats that incentive individual autonomy and enable un-mediated audiences.
Castells has termed these phenomena the “mass communication of the self” (Castells
2009). Individuals contribute symbolic and interpretative contents which provide shared
meanings that constitute collective identities and practices (Fuchs 2008) in a co-creation
processes that turns into personal interpretations and understandings of the issues and
frames (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). Personalised action frames are thus produced
through a performative or interactive process in which social feedback online provides
the potential for a re-appropriation of politics.

In fifth place, shared cognitive processes in social media have the potential for enhancing
collective awareness and the formation of community bonds with no boundaries in
place or time. Multiple studies have looked into the expansion and re-appropriation of
social identities within movements and between them. In the case of the Indignados, the
community formation process has been clearly documented by studying the convergence
of networked movements by quite diverse organisations2 as well as its adoption and
appropriation of practices from the Arab spring (Castañeda 2012; Gerbaudo 2012). The
evolution of the Indignados has also been of great interest, considering its potential to
adapt and evolve to particular identities issue-specific interests, electoral opportunities
and contextual needs (e.g. the Yayoflautas, the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca,
its proximity to the United Left party in Andalucia, and the citizen tides). Furthermore,

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1 A detailed account of this is provided by Toret et al. (2012). These include initiatives such as n-1.cc, propongo.
tomalaplaza.net, demo4punto0.net, takethesquare.net, oiga.me.
2 This include the Democracia Real Ya platform: Estado del malestar, Juventud Sin Futuro, and the Anonymous and other
organizations such as Nolesvotes opposing the SINDE Law (SOPA,PIPA, ACTA in Spain).
the potential for capturing attention among global publics is also a defining trait in social media mobilisation (Cottle 2011) in terms of diffusion and global identity (Gerbaudo 2013) as well as in reaching out for international support (Lynch 2011).

The previous points can be put succinctly into five defining elements of social media for political mobilisation (Table 1). These will enlighten the study of how traditional organisations contesting economic policy such as unions and leftist parties compare to young and loosely coupled organisations in using social media for mobilising against austerity politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Defining functions for political mobilisation in social media</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Social diffusion / Broadcasting</td>
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<td>2. Media integration / Autonomous communication</td>
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<td>3. Self-organisation / Fluid engagement</td>
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<td>4. Collective identities / Social feedback</td>
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<td>5. Collective awareness and boundless communities</td>
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Source: own proposal based on the literature review

Organisations in Anti-austerity politics

Anti-austerity contestation in Europe has been led to a great extent by unions, not only representing worker’s interests, but also following on a long tradition of leftist mobilisation for social justice and the transformation of capitalism. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), as well as national unions acted as watchdogs against speculation from financial markets and laissez fair regulation by national governments and EU treaties. They have also organised coordinated demonstrations in multiple European cities. The European days of action were the first series of organised events in multiple countries; they took place from 14 to 16 May 2009 under the campaign “Fight the crisis: put the people first” in Berlin, Brussels, Madrid and Prague. These actions were followed by radical anti-capitalist unions that rallied against supranational governance summits, following previous campaigns against EU economic decisions and the intervention in the Iraq war. The year 2010 witnessed the first reactions against government cuts and bailout packages in southern Europe with a strong intervention of leftist parties, and the first strikes directed at pension reform, as well as student protests against cuts to education budgets.

Other European-wide events followed such as the transnational strike of 14 November 2012, which had a major response in the countries hardest hit by the austerity measures

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intended to face public deficit. Massive events followed one year later on 1 June 2013 when anti-austerity demonstrators rallied “United against the Troika” in a dozen European countries. The policy recommendations of the committee comprising the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund were broadly contested by social movements, public workers, and other organisations that mainly included organised groups of those most heavily affected by government cuts.

Unions have been indispensable in organising and sustaining action strategies against austerity policies, considering they provide organisational structures and resources, as well as accepted representative functions with a stable link to government policies. The demonstrations of force and numbers in multiple strikes and rallies have been supported by a broad participation of social movements with some identification with organisations and not necessarily through formal membership. The central role of unions was however challenged by the 2011 explosion of Indignados/Occupy all over Europe and further on in the United States. The emergence and development of the Spanish Indignados and Greek aganaktismenoi has been described in detail elsewhere (Calvo 2013; Peña-López et al. 2013; Theocharis et al. 2014), as well as the Occupy movements throughout Europe (Mercea et al. 2013).

The following section presents the context for the Spanish case between 2011 and 2014 in order to connect the development of Indignados’ organisations with European anti-austerity contestation.

**Anti-austerity contestation in Spain**

Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, the political equilibrium between government and unions has been shifting with increasing contentious actions (Hyman and Grumbell-McCormick 2010). The main national unions Comisiones Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores (CCOO and UGT) have traditionally shared a common agenda and they have lead general strikes in 1985, 1988, 1992, 1994, 2002, 2010, 2011 and two in 2012 (TUW 2005: 317; van der Meer 2000:580). Both unions have been closely involved with the ETUC and they both ratified the London Declaration on September 2008, calling for effective measures to ensure capital for investments, as well as to put an end to outrageous financial speculation, made under public control and an increased regulation of financial markets at the international and European levels.

CCOO and UGT were behind the “Fight the crisis: put the people first” demonstration in Madrid, which was quite successful with over 150,000 demonstrators. They have also been
involved in nation-wide mobilisation and many other local events staged by sub-national branches and local unions. In Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia unions are linked to independence parties with large popular support. These latter union organisations have some links with anarchist groups, especially when organising demonstrations independently from the major union confederations. This implied a wide variety of subnational understandings of the crisis as well as in the support from nationalist parties to anti-austerity protest. More radical unions have framed their responses with varying degrees of intensity and with multiple targets as they blame government, the European Union of particular policy decisions taken by national institutions. However, most of the events claimed against worsening job conditions and the rise of unemployment, within the frames that proposed that workers should not pay for a crisis they didn’t bring about.

The activity of unions in staging protest events grew since 2006, with important changes in 2009 and 2011. Unions played a central role in staging demonstrations and strikes since the first announcements of austerity measures that included budget cuts and bank bailouts. They lead national strikes in 2010 and two in 2012 with a big response from civil society organisations. However, even if unions have partnered with other civil society organisations in multiple platforms staging demonstrations on different issues, they have failed to adapt to a growing working population with seasonal jobs and to younger generations who suffer the hardest conditions of job market deregulation. Furthermore, union membership is closely linked to productive activity, so it has been severely reduced with unemployment (from an already low 17% when compared to the EU average) as a consequence of dropping employment rates and increasing informality.

In January 2011 the government announced a reform to the pension system with a rise in the retirement age from 65 to 67. This was a red line for unions and this response had broad contestations which were staged rather unexpectedly on January 27th 2011 by nationalist and radical unions all over the country (CNT, CGT, CIG, ELA, LAB, STEE-EILAS, EHNE, Hiru and Bloque Obrero), and social movement organisations under the platform *Hay que pararles los pies* calling against the national unions CCOO and UGT on account of their involvement with the socialist government. Another demonstration was called for March 12th framed specifically against the “Social pact” negotiated between PSOE and the national unions and a “social way out of the crisis”. These reactions preceded the unexpected Indignados mobilisation.

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The DRY platform and the Indignados kick-off movement

On May 15th 2011, a week before the municipal and regional elections, Madrid and 50 other cities in Spain witnessed people taking the streets to demand “real democracy now”. The demonstrations were staged by civic organisations without the endorsement of parties, unions or political organisations. The event in Madrid turned into the occupation of the public square “Plaza del Sol” and later on other campgrounds were established in the main squares of cities all over Spain.

Since May 2011, the organisations and individuals taking part in 15M have maintained high levels of contentious activity by joining and creating organisational networks targeted at different dimensions of anti-austerity protest and political grievances. The story of the formation of the Indignados on the following days and their transformation into an organised resistance organised into assemblies and committees has been described in detail elsewhere (Charnock et al. 2011; Hughes 2011). It is worth stressing the widespread support that this demonstration received among the Spanish public opinion and making reference to their claims for more participation, transparency, accountability, and proportionality –all political goals-, besides social justice.

In this study, the main relevance lies in how social organisations did not rely entirely on formal associations, established identities or group membership. Multiple alliances and action strategies have been possible since the beginning of the movement by challenging traditional ideological and cultural differences between trade unions, community and civil society organisations. A broad identity based on the 99% frame and an explicit rejection of cloistered partisanship, made possible political involvement and engagement in broad coalitions. The connection with the Occupy movement worldwide and the success of the October 15th global protest “United for #GlobalChange” in 2011 was the grand finale to an emergence phase. The Indignados redirected their encampments since October 2011 and focused on organised activism by agglomerating neighbourhood organisations and enabling movement assemblies. In this way they formed successful coalitions in a bottom-up networked approach. This call for direct participation, deliberative politics and loosely coupled, flat organisation stood in direct contrast to the vertical power structures of parties and unions, but also reduced their prominence as compared to union-led protests. Notwithstanding, the Indignados did encourage union responses and supported the two general strikes that followed the escalation in labour disputes in 2012. Unions joined the Indignados demands by questioning democratic procedures and making an open call that resulted in massive response. The leftist parties got closer to the Indignados in their opposition to the newly elected Conservative government and in the attempt to profit from shared positions and the high levels of attention on issues that belonged naturally to the leftist parties (i.e. social justice, citizen rights, etc.).
25S - Rodea el Congreso

On May 2012 the Indignados took the streets in a celebration of their anniversary and took different paths that responded to the internal diversity of the movement. The more contentious forces joined a platform (Coordinadora 25S) calling a massive concentration that aimed at surrounding the Spanish Congress. This event took place in Madrid on 25 September 2012 with an estimated turnout of 6,000 participants. An unprecedented and controversial police intervention was contested by additional concentrations on the 26th and a new major demonstration on 29 September with an estimated turnout of 6,000 participants.

Between the agitated massive strikes and demonstrations in 2012, the Indignados base grew by promoting local initiatives and coalitions with standing organisations of groups most affected by the crisis. Families evicted from their homes, users of public services threatened by government cuts, public employees and students’ associations. The main unions as well as the sub-national union organisations were central in mobilising the most affected public workers along with aggrieved citizens in multiple events all over Spain. These were the outset of the Mareas Ciudadanas (citizen tides); groups of organised citizens around particular policies or grievances who contested policy changes on their particular sectors with varying degrees of intensity and different repertoires depending on their targets and level of threat to their status quo or expectations. They use coloured t-shirts for each Marea as to identify themselves (i.e., white for the health system, green for education, yellow for public schools, grenade for the emigrated and red for scholars).

1J - People United against the Troika

The Marea Ciudadana platform staged demonstrations in over 80 cities on 23 February 2013 questioning public debt by framing it as a “coup from markets”. These had a massive support and were highly controversial for disproportionate police charges and arrests. The platform was formed by almost three hundred civic organisations that draw on multiple Indignados assemblies and founding organisations, along with more traditional associations like Greenpeace and Ecologistas en Acción, and leftist and eco-socialist parties such as IU, ICV, EQUO or the Chunta Aragonesista (CHA). A second celebration of the Indignados anniversary followed these events on May 2013, and these were the precedent for the People United against the Troika demonstration in Madrid on 1 June, led by the Marea Ciudadana platform with the support of the major unions CCOO, UGT and USO.
22M - Marchas de la Dignidad 2014

By the spring of 2013 *Mareas* from many cities started marching in six columns toward Madrid in order to meet on March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2014. The call was promoted by the Andalucian workers’ union (Sindicato Andaluz de Trabajadores SAT), the *Campamentos Dignidad de Extremadura* and the *Frente Cívico Somos Mayoria*. The Andalusian worker’s movement was established in 2007 from the traditional peasant’s union. Local coordination committees were organised in Cádiz, Madrid Este and Madrid Norte\textsuperscript{5} in order to support the event. The Manifesto was framed against the payment of public debt and government cuts, and received the support of the CGT, CNT and students unions, as well as multiple *Indignados* assemblies and organisations (i.e., PAH, Yayoflautas) and leftist parties.

**Characterising social media mobilisation campaigns**

The central interest in this section is to provide a descriptive account of social media use in anti-austerity protest by looking into demonstrators in Europe and online publics to Spanish anti-austerity contestation in the social network Twitter. A comparative analysis between the *Indignados*/Occupy, which have been natively digital movements, with unions and parties will provide a rich description of social media use in the contestation of austerity policies. Anti-austerity mobilisation is expected to reflect these different approaches to organisational forms between movement assemblies and hierarchical, institutionalised, large membership unions.

Data from two different sources provide a comprehensive view of social media use in Europe and a detailed account of four cases of anti-austerity protest in Spain. Protest surveys conducted on-site with postage-paid mail-back questionnaires and face-to-face surveys to demonstrators in eight countries from 2009 to 2012 provide data for social media use by anti-austerity demonstrators in Europe. It shows a rich picture of the differences between unions and *Indignados*/Occupy in 40 events that include anti-austerity protest and strikes, where unions played a central role in staging the events, the *Indignados* kick-off demonstration in Spain and Occupy demonstrations in Europe that followed, and Mayday events that took place in the context of anti-austerity contestation (Table A1.1 in the annex).

The second data source is a convenience sample of Twitter that includes four demonstrations that cover an important part of anti-austerity contestation in Spain. In

\textsuperscript{5} A complete list of organizations that supported the rallies can be found in: http://wiki.15m.cc/wiki/Lista_de_colectivos_que_apoyan_las_Marchas_de_la_Dignidad (accessed 23 September 2014).
In order to study mobilisation processes, only the days up to the major event of interest are considered (Table A2.1 in the annex). The selection of the periods of study is based on the assumption that organisations intensify their use of social media in order to raise issue attention within a short timeframe before the events.6

Evidence from the streets – Social media as a mobilisation channel by Anti-austerity demonstrators in Europe

Figure 1 shows the percentages of individuals in each event (numbered points) that either reported having used social media as an information channel to find out about the demonstration and those who believe that social media was the most important channel among others. There is a wide variation between events, and despite the different effects of the crisis and the differences in social media adoption, differences between countries or in time are not significant.

6 Voting prediction studies on Twitter data have looked into the potential impact of the selection of the study period in predictions. This implies the need to carefully identify and justify the reasons for possible variations (Jungherr et al. 2012). This is the case of the 25S event in which we considered tweets before 8 pm in order to study the call to action, as after that time most of tweets referred to police clashes.
Differences in social media use between events may be explained by the type of events. Three types of anti-austerity demonstrations were considered: Union-led, which include strikes and mobilisations mainly dealing with bread-butter issue staged by unions or having unions as members of the staging platforms; Mayday demonstrations, which are taken as anti-austerity demonstrations considering the context in which they took place and the particular claims and targets of otherwise celebratory or commemorative rituals (Peterson et al. 2012); and the demonstrations led by *Indignados*/Occupy all over Europe contesting anti-austerity policy within a wide frame of political rights. Table 2 reports differences in social media use between these types of demonstrations and includes as well a comparison with other 32 demonstrations on many issues unrelated to the economic crisis or materialistic claims. As expected, demonstrators in *Indignados*/Occupy events use social media significantly more than those in Mayday or Union-led events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union-led</th>
<th>Indignados/Occupy</th>
<th>Mayday</th>
<th>Non-austerity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>-0.192***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.190***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-austerity</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>-0.100***</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences defined as column-line (**p<0.001**)

The use of social media in political mobilisation has been criticised as a techno-optimist perspective that implies that social media will substitute organisations in mobilisation processes. The report of demonstrators’ affiliation and social media makes it possible to analyse the extent in which social media use and organisational affiliation occur together in mobilisation to protest. A description of the proportion of demonstrators in each event that reported social media as most important mobilisation channel and membership in the organisations staging the event is presented in Table 2.

The strong negative correlation between organisational membership in staging organisations and social media signals they can be alternative structures. However, this evidence does not imply that there is a tendency from one to another. It confirms that unions rely on membership and that the use of social media permits other organisations to mobilise without the need of formal structures. This relationship holds when controlling for age and other individual and contextual differences (Cristancho and Anduiza 2013).
Evidence from Twitter – The Spanish Indignados and union contestation of Austerity policy

Mobilisation processes can be traced on Twitter records by looking into information flow patterns and the role of actors in diffusion processes. An empirical examination of the role of the Indignados and unions contesting austerity policy will provide some insights on how social media affects mobilisation processes.

The analysis is based on Twitter users related to the organisations staging the events in the sample, as well as users from unions and the leftist and socialist parties for a total of eight groups, in order to distinguish Indignados between the original organisations staging the 15M and subsequent organisations, such as the Marea Ciudadana and the Democracia Real Ya! platform (Table A2.2 in the annex). Not all groups had active users for each of the events (as some events occurred before the groups were created) and, most importantly, the presence of users from these groups account for a minimal proportion of the users. The extent in which users from the staging organisations are present in the networks is a key indicator for analysing their mobilisation effectiveness. This users would need to have
highly influential positions in order to motivate action and get out the contents that enable others to perform the central mobilising functions in social media (as stated in Table 1) during the period before the events.

Groups staging organisations are compared between them and with a reference group of users who do not fall into these categories. The tweeters in the reference group include those who are interested in the issue or the demonstrations (i.e. following the hashtags), or the users involved during the mobilisation period. They could also be drawn to the networks by direct targeting (i.e. mentions) by others who are interested in their broadcasting potential; this includes the media or other public figures mostly unrelated to the anti-austerity demonstrations. The main interest for the analysis is comparing the influence of actors in the diffusion process between types of organisations, between events and in the timeframe considered (three days preceding the demonstrations).

Influence in social media is the potential for capturing attention in particular structures of Twitter networks. This implies two conditions: firstly, reaching out to a large number of users relative to the network structure, and secondly, receiving attention for your own activity (González-Bailón et al. 2013). In the first condition, the potential for reaching out implies being highly visible by others who follow you. Visibility can thus be tapped by looking at the number of users following a particular user (who is the object of analysis) as compared to the number of those she follows. In the second condition, users need to be integrated into conversations by the endorsement of their contributions through social signals (i.e., favourites, retweets) or by direct targeting (i.e. mentions, replies). This condition makes them central to the thematic or issue-specific conversations. Centrality is then measured by the ratio of sent tweets compared to the ones received.

A first look into the potential influence of each group shows large variations between users and events when looking at the mean values of centrality and visibility by groups (Figure 3). However, the number of users in each group varies significantly and the study of the role of users provides a more comprehensive picture that central tendency measures.

The analysis identifies user roles following the model proposed by González-Bailón, Borge-Holthoefer & Moreno (2013), which is a four-fold category resulting from the measurement of visibility and the measurement of centrality divided at the mean values for each event sample. Crossing the two variables it is possible to depict the distribution of users and their potential influence roles (Figure 4).
Table 3. Potential influence roles in Twitter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received messages / Sent messages</th>
<th>Influentials</th>
<th>Hidden influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasters</td>
<td>Common users</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Following / Followers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: Adapted from González-Bailón et al. 2013 - Distribution of users according to network position and message activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Influentials are the most visible users as they act as hubs, who are followed by many and receive the most attention (i.e., celebrities). Hidden influential have below average values for network centrality, but they receive a high volume of messages. They are likely
to start long cascades of information (2013: 57) and activate diffusion processes even though they are not the most visible in issue-specific networks. Broadcasters are relevant as they are the most visible users. They have large numbers of followers and thus the potential to reach a larger number of users. However they are not recognised as important issue-related actors and therefore they do not receive issue-specific messages. Most mainstream media users and celebrities are in this category on political topics. Common users receive low levels of attention and have the lowest influence potential. This characterization provides a straightforward account of influence potential by simplifying centrality and visibility attributes into categorical measures.

**Figure 4. Potential influence in anti-austerity demonstrations by user type**

![Graphs showing potential influence in anti-austerity demonstrations by user type](image)

Los nombres de los eventos basados en los ID se presentan en la tabla A1.1

Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of all users classified by groups. The scales are adjusted for each case in order to provide an idea of the types of users in the network. The distribution of the users in the Indignados network shows the mostly broadcasting role of staging organisations, with the exceptions of Juventud sin Futuro and Anonymous, which are important influencers along with the regional organisations who share the users DRY_ “city name” and less central influencers.
The influence roles in 25S were evenly distributed among the different types of staging organisations, and the unions and leftist parties. This may be caused by the fact that surrounding the Congress was a highly contentious event with a long period of media attention as the legality of occupying Congress (as the event was named in the initial call) was questioned by government. The role of unions stands out as the students union and multiple CGT\(^7\) users have influential, broadcasting and hidden influential roles. The Indignados were as well highly influential with the lead of the Yayoflautas and Anonymous, even considering that central organisations in the movement decided not to take part in what they considered a risky event that would easily become violent. The green citizen tide (education) and the young faction of the leftist national party Izquierda Unida (IU) were also highly influential, probably among the young demonstrators.

The case of the People united against the Troika demonstration was clearly biased by the high influence of the staging organisation Marea Ciudadana and the involvement of popular politicians such as the leaders of IU and the Regionalist Party of Cantabria. One of the most significant evidence of social media use in anti-austerity contestation is that the Indignados most influential users (i.e. Juventud Sin Futuro, Anonymous and the multiple DRY users) were more influential than unions that were supporting the international call of the ETUC. However, unions played important broadcasting roles. This evidence supports the idea of different types of using social media depending on the nature of organisation.

Social media use patterns in the Marchas de la Dignidad are substantially different than the other events considering the number of users from the staging organisation (yellow circles) and their even distribution among other types of users with mostly broadcasting roles with low centrality levels. The Marchas and 22M users who were in charge of the logistics of a vast demonstration play a modestly influencer role. The Mareas were also part of the staging organisations as they contributed their issue-specific publics, who had been quite active contesting policy changes and budget cuts in their specific areas not long ago before the event. The issue-specificity of the Mareas, explains the prominence of the PAH in being the most influential user of the Indignados. Other organisations of the Indignados that attended the 25S event, such as the local assemblies and the organisations that lead the occupation of public squares, acted as broadcasters and had high influence levels.

The previous analysis provides an account of the influence potential of users considering the day of the demonstration and the three days preceding it. However, social media records can inform also on the dynamic processes of how users change their influence roles in time. A simple dynamic analysis is proposed in order to consider changes in the potential influence roles on a daily basis. Centrality scores change in response to user activity posting contents or receiving feedback on their posts, while visibility scores

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\(^7\) Anarchist / third largest trade union in Spain.
change with users’ networking activity (i.e. following or being followed by other users). A first picture of changes in the network can be seen by analysing the distribution of users in terms of their influence indicators on a daily basis. Figure 5 shows high concentration patterns for centrality scores with minimal differences between days. The patterns for visibility are similar for all the events (not shown). This means that mobilisation networks in social media have few actors that draw most of the attention (which is the usual pattern in scale-free networks with long-tail distributions of user activity).

In addition to differences in overall network patterns, temporal changes in the roles of users depict their importance within mobilisation networks. Figure 6 graphs changes in centrality and visibility chronologically for the demonstration and the three days preceding them. These patterns illustrate a broad tendency of the role of users from staging organisations and regular users. The evidence shows a general tendency that partially meets the expectation that social media use decreases the relevance of staging organisations in the mobilisation process. Such a conclusion can be drawn by the
Figure 6. Changes in centrality and visibility in time

Centrality (blue) and visibility (red) scores in time (Quadratic line fit)
decreasing influence of organisations and the upward tendency for regular users both in terms of their centrality and visibility.

**Discussion**

The exploratory approach provided in this paper makes a contribution to the literature on social media by linking the theoretical expectations drawn from previous studies to comparative evidence on contestation to the austerity policies in the context of the economic crisis that has hit Europe since 2008. Rich data on demonstrators on the streets and Twitter users provides a comprehensive description of social media use practices, and patterns of organisations staging the demonstrations and protesters online and offline. Evidence from the two data sources fits possible expectations derived from the working definition of social media in political mobilisation.

Evidence from demonstrators on the street provides two main points: first, social media use has played an important role in anti-austerity protest as compared to the more traditional channels, but there are significant differences between Union-led events, such as strikes and Mayday celebrations, and events that were staged by the Indignados in Spain and the Occupy wave in multiple EU countries. Second, social media stands as an alternative for organisational membership, thus endorsing the self-organisation or fluid engagement function of social media in mobilisation. These two points confirm previous findings based on multiple issues (Cristancho and Anduiza 2013) and emphasise the relevance of social media mobilisation in the contestation of austerity policies.

The second part of the analysis explored the role of central actors in Twitter networks in four cases of anti-austerity protest in Spain. It explored mobilisation patterns by describing the importance of Indignados, unions and leftist parties within and between events. The analysis of Twitter data shows in first place that coordination in European level and national demonstrations between unions and loosely coupled organisations such as Indignados/Occupy have been crucial to challenge austerity policies and motivate broad popular support. The ubiquitous involvement of Indignados/Occupy movement organisations and their subsequent re-accommodation into issue-specific and sectorial organisations, such as the Marea Ciudadana and the PAH has implied their co-existence with unions and leftist parties. This is relevant considering that the broad identity frames based on the 99% used by Indignados/Occupy signalled unions as institutionalised adversaries on account of their proximity to the government, and tried to avoid any link with parties or electoral politics.
Studying unions as a single category ignores the importance and the wide variety of anarchist, local and student unions in Spain. However, this categorisation is relevant to show the involvement of unions even in the most contentious repertoires that targeted banks and financial institutions. Solidarity between groups of citizens aggrieved by the crisis and the unprecedented potential of the first calls of Indignados to mobilise large numbers may have moved unions from their limited focus on labour policy and workers’ rights, thus signalling collective awareness of common grievances and claims against capitalism and the so-called 1%.

Twitter records suggest as well the expansion of communities in time as the events have increasing volumes of highly influential users related to the Indignados platforms and the Mareas Ciudadanas. Further research on social network analysis can provide a better perspective into this matter. However, the increasing volume of users may be capturing an effect of the increasing popularity and progressive adoption of social media in time.

The dynamic analysis illustrates a mostly decreasing tendency in the centrality of users from staging organisations as compared to regular users. This evidence meets the expectation that social media use decreases the relevance of staging organisations in the mobilisation process for the majority of cases. Taken together with the fact that regular users tend to increase their centrality and visibility in the days previous to the events, the findings can be interpreted as evidence for self-organisation or at least a diminishing role for organisational involvement in the mobilisation process. It is important to note that this does not mean flatter structures in the mobilisation networks. These networks have a much centralised structure that does not change in time as the analysis of concentration patterns reveals. Some staging organisations share with a few individuals the most important positions as influentials and broadcasters during the whole mobilisation period. This tends to change as the demonstration day comes closer as regular users become more influential, but the mobilisation process is still led by few users.

The Spanish anti-austerity cases shed some light on the processes of social diffusion, self-organisation and community formation. Further analysis is needed to tap into the contents of the tweets, to identify media users and to analyse network dynamics in order to better understand social feedback mechanisms and the role played by the mainstream media in the mobilisation against austerity in social media outlets.
REFERENCES


Hughes, N. (2011) “‘Young People Took to the Streets and All of a Sudden All of the Political Parties Got Old’: The 15M Movement in Spain.” Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, pp. 37–41.


### ANNEX 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Id</th>
<th>Demonstration</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Co</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1st of May March (Antwerp)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2010</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Not in Our Name (Brussels)</td>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>07/05/2011</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>No to Austerity (Brussels)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>29/09/2010</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Non-Profit Demonstration (Brussels)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>29/03/2011</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>No Government, Great Country (Brussels)</td>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>23/01/2011</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>We have alternatives (Brussels)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>02/12/2011</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>March for Work (Brussels)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>29/01/2010</td>
<td>BE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Organized By</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Stop the Government (Prague)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>17/11/2012</td>
<td>CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>No Monti Day (Rome)</td>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>27/10/2012</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Euromayday (Milan)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2011</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Marcia Perugia-Assisi (Assisi)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>25/09/2011</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>General Strike (Florence)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>06/05/2011</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>10+10/Joining forces for another Europe (Florence)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>10/11/2012</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>May Day (Florence)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2011</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>May 1ste demonstration 2011 (Geneva)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2011</td>
<td>IT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Stop budget cuts (care &amp; welfare) (The Hague)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>19/09/2011</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Military demo (The Hague)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>26/05/2011</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Culture demo Amsterdam (Amsterdam)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>20/11/2010</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Occupy Netherlands (Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam)</td>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>05/11/2011</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Together strong for public work (The Hague)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>17/02/2011</td>
<td>NL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Retirement demonstration (Rotterdam)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>21/11/2009</td>
<td>NL</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Culture demo Utrecht (Utrecht)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>20/11/2010</td>
<td>NL</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>30/06/2010</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Celebration May Day (Vigo)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2011</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2010</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>28/01/2010</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our rights (Vigo)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>01/05/2011</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Real Democracy Now! - Indignados (Madrid)</td>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>15/05/2011</td>
<td>ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Against Labor Law (Madrid)</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Event Type</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2010</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (Gothenburg)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2012</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2010</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmö)</td>
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<td>01/05/2011</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>01/05/2012</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>May 1st Demonstration (Zurich)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2010</td>
<td>CH</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Take Back Parliament (London)</td>
<td>Indignados/Occupy</td>
<td>15/05/2010</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>May Day Labour March (London)</td>
<td>Mayday</td>
<td>01/05/2010</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>TUC’s March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London)</td>
<td>Union-led</td>
<td>26/03/2011</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNEX 2 – TWITTER DATA**

Twitter is a directed social network where users have a set of subscribers known as followers. Users post messages short messages (tweets - maximum 140 characters) which are displayed on the user’s profile page and streamed to followers. Direct messages to other users (by directing them to user handles @userid) and retweets –forward of tweets originally made by another user (marked by RT and author handle) - are the standard protocol for communication. Retweets are a means of endorsement and are generally used for propagating interesting posts and links through the Twitter community. We focus our analysis on the demonstration day and the three preceding days. Our dataset consists of over 600,000 tweets accessed by querying the Twitter’s streaming Twitter Application Programming Interface (API) for the T-Hoarder project by Mariluz Congosto. Along with the text, the structure of each tweet returned by Twitter API includes metainformation with an individual ID, the timestamp and user status which includes his or her number of followers and followings, tweets released and localization among other data.
### Table A2.1 – Twitter data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Period of study</th>
<th>Number of tweets</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Unique users</th>
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<td>15M - Democracia Real Ya!</td>
<td>May 15th 2011</td>
<td>13/05/2011</td>
<td>5,725</td>
<td>9.53</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14/05/2011</td>
<td>10,511</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15/05/2011</td>
<td>43,840</td>
<td>72.97</td>
<td>60,076</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25S - Rodea el Congreso</td>
<td>September 25th 2012</td>
<td>22/09/2012</td>
<td>16,212</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>24/09/2012</td>
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<td>50.93</td>
<td>212,040</td>
<td>81,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1J - People united against the troika international protest in Madrid</td>
<td>June 1st 2013</td>
<td>29/05/13</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>17.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30/05/13</td>
<td>2,609</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31/05/13</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>20.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/06/13</td>
<td>10,159</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>20,481</td>
<td>10,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22M - Marchas de la Dignidad</td>
<td>March 22nd 2014</td>
<td>19/03/2014</td>
<td>2,549</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20/03/2014</td>
<td>8,677</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21/03/2014</td>
<td>55,053</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22/03/2014</td>
<td>262,264</td>
<td>79.83</td>
<td>328,543</td>
<td>96,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A2.2 - Twitter users related to the organisations staging the events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor type</th>
<th>Query in user name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>ccoo, ugt, cgt, sat, RosaTristan, Jamusatt85, sindical, SindicaEstudian, cnt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indignados</td>
<td>asamblea, acampada, yayoflautas, iaoiflautas, pah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15m</td>
<td>adesorg, dry, ponte_en_pie, democraciareal, anonymous, juventud_accion, nolesvotes, coordinadora25s, ocupaelcongreso, rodeaelcongreso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mareas</td>
<td>marea, mareaciudadana, 22m marches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>iunida, iu, IU, comunista, PCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>socialista, PSOE, PSC, PSV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A complete list of actors in each category can be obtained from the author
5 GRIEVANCES AND CONNECTIVITY IN BRAZIL’S PROTESTS

Antônio Sampaio

Brazil witnessed a wave of protests that spread through cities across its territory in 2013, with more than a million people going to the streets on 20 June of that year, and many more marches and related episodes of violence being registered in the subsequent months. The mobilisation took place not long after another wave of popular protests halfway around the world, in the Middle East – which led some international media outlets to briefly nickname the Brazilian protests ‘tropical spring’, in reference to the Arab Spring. The developments in the streets of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were, of course, very different from those in Tunis and Cairo. Despite producing similar images to those of the Arab Spring movement, the protests in Brazil had the key difference of taking place amid a thriving democracy with relatively low rates of unemployment.

The banners and slogans of the Brazilian protesters did not offer much help in understanding their motivations. A bewildering range of issues were cited by the protesters in the streets, going from urban transportation to education, crime, corruption and so on. In a country with low levels of social mobilisation for protests, Brazilians themselves seemed perplexed, attempting to describe what was happening through a Twitter hashtag that quickly spread: ‘the giant has awoken’ (#OGiganteAcordou). Whereas the trigger for the large-scale protest movement seems to have been the mega-sporting events taking place at the time and the perceived waste of public resources, the demands and issues raised were clearly broader in scope. They generally reflected a desire for better public services from a layer of the population that became much larger and angrier in the past decade: the middle class.

The process of economic and social transformation linked to the rise of the so-called ‘new middle class’¹ in Brazil is one of the trends that this chapter will analyse. The core argument is that shortcomings in the economic and political structures of the country

¹ The term is used by the official think tank linked to the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE). The expression ‘new middle class’ is mentioned several times, both at the titles of their studies on this social class and within the reports themselves, which were published from September 2012 onwards.
(especially inefficiency in the provision of public goods) have led to large-scale grievances which, combined with a significant increase in connectivity to the Internet, gave rise to one of the largest and most violent waves of social mobilisation in Brazil’s recent history. Crucial to the understanding of events in Brazil (and in fact in other recent protest waves in Latin American countries such as Chile) is the observation that expectations have risen alongside the growth in per capita income of the population and outpaced the provision of public-goods – as shown by the protesters’ recurrent demand for better public transportation. In other words, grievances generated by rapid social shifts have exploded spectacularly on 20 June, when more than a million people went to streets in several Brazilian cities to protest – followed closely by the violent network of anarchist rioters called Black Bloc.

Socio-Economic Development and Its Discontents

The 2014 FIFA World Cup became a symbol of Brazil’s ambitions as well as of its unbalanced rise. The middle class, enlarged by 37 million people between 2002 and 2012, was protesting against a national infrastructure that was fundamentally at odds with Brazil’s global ambitions. The expanding income of those in the lower sectors of Brazilian society was just enough to create massive expectations. In the decade of fastest growth in Brazil’s middle class – which numbers over 100 million people (according to the government’s estimate) and is one of the largest in the emerging world – the demand for transportation, food, energy and urban security skyrocketed. State resources to fulfil their aspirations grew at a much slower pace than these demands – and sometimes decreased.

Despite the absence of a widely accepted criteria for inclusion in the middle class, the government’s definition of middle class includes those with per capita income as low as R$ 291.00 (US$ 130.00) until R$1,019 (US$ 393.00) per month. The lower levels of that continuum are at ‘low probability of falling into poverty in the near future’, which implies a risk factor inherent to middle-class life for a large segment of the population (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos 2012: 12). As many as 29 million people, or 80% of this ‘new middle class’ are recent entrants coming from poverty – or ‘lower class’ in the definition by the official government think tank, the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE). Millions are doubly afflicted by socio-economic woes: not only they face poor public services but live under a state of economic insecurity.

The contrast between the country’s investment in a global outreach and the insufficient public services at home became increasingly obvious for this well-connected and frustrated middle class. In a context of rising costs for middle-class living, the marches of
a small protest group in the south of Brazil asking for free public transportation suddenly
gained size and visibility. It reached its peak on 20 June as more than a million people
protested in several cities for a range of issues that can be broadly summarised as middle-
class demands: not political liberties or regime change, but quality of life, reasonable
prices, efficient public services. A common request was hospitals and schools ‘along
FIFA standards’, in reference to the R$ 8 billion investment then underway to build football
stadiums. The seemingly prosaic issue of a R$ 0.20 (approximately 9 US cents) increase
in bus fares was the trigger for unrest following long-accumulated anger of a sector of
the population that went from being a privileged fringe at the start of this century to the
majority of the population now.

Expectations jumped, driven not only by the socio-economic advancement of this newly-
emerged class of people, but also by the model of Brazilian economic growth. The decade
between 2000 and 2010 was one of the periods with higher growth in gross domestic
productivity in the country’s recent history, culminating in 7.5% growth in 2010. But it
was driven by rising commodity prices and incentives to consumption via easier credit
and cash-transfer schemes during the mandate of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
(2003-2011). With economic growth driving up wages and the ghost of hyper-inflation
more or less exorcised, interest rates were allowed to gradually fall and public banks,
both public and private, were encouraged to lend. Expectations were driven up by the
combination of a massive shift in socio-economic composition of the population and the
rising enthusiasm for consumer goods encouraged in part by federal government policies.

Whereas the expanding level of consumption succeeded in encouraging industrial output
during some time, it also exerted pressure on sectors with little flexibility in their supply
capacity. Beef consumption grew by 14% in the past five years (Portal Brasil 2014). The
monthly expenditure on food in general increased by 26% between 2003 and 2009.
The number of vehicles in the streets more than doubled (Previdelli 2012). Supply of
goods and services, especially those that depend on the public sector, grew much more
slowly. Agricultural productivity grew by 1.1% % on average each year; investment in
infrastructure projects (including construction and maintenance of roads) decreased as a
percentage of GDP from the 1990s level, averaging just 2.19% (Carneiro 2013).

Middle Class, Brazilian Style

While the authorities were busy making plans for the construction or reform of football
stadiums, Brazilians searched for meaningful change in their standards of living. Take
public transport, one of the most common issues being raised during recent protests.
The country’s economic hub, São Paulo, registers a daily average of 180 kilometres of traffic jam. The underground rail system has expanded to a few neighbourhoods ahead of the World Cup, but if you were unlucky enough to be driving at 7pm on 23 May 2014, just three weeks before the mega event, you would be in the middle of a record-breaking 344km-long traffic jam. Despite living in one of the world’s main food-exporting countries, Brazilians saw food prices increase by almost 10% in 2012 and then 8.4% in 2013. Some items caused nationwide commotion: after the price of tomatoes went up by 1,000% in the first half of 2013, several Italian restaurants decided to boycott the product in protest against high inflation. The average restaurant bill increased by 11%, double the average inflation rate (Versignassi and Prado 2013).

Urban dwellers in Brazil go home to enjoy amenities such as flat-screen TVs or Ipads – perhaps bought from the first Apple store in Latin America, opened in February 2014 in Rio de Janeiro (with the massive queue that Brazilians have come to expect). A Pew Global Attitudes research published in June 2013 showed that 74% of Brazilians considered their financial situation ‘good’ (Horowitz 2013). This reflects the rapid rise of incomes during a relatively short amount of time, but it is far from granting this newly-empowered population in Brazil and many other Latin American countries a sense of security or comfort. The average income of the country’s middle class rose by 50% during the last decade, reaching R$576.00 (Época 2013a). That income, which many average families in the developed world would probably consider near poverty level, qualifies Brazilian families to boast membership into the eye-catching category of middle class. The same Pew Research poll found that 70% of respondents said rising prices and lack of job alternatives are big problems (ibid.).

The income of this stratum of society, enlarged as it may have been after a decade of high growth, has to accommodate expenditures on basic services expected from the state but delivered in a clunky or precarious state - or not at all, as in the case of security in Brazil’s expanding urban centres. It is what the World Bank calls a ‘fragmented social contract’: large swaths of society opt out of public services – paid by their own money – due to poor quality or their overcrowded state. Private alternatives for education, health and security are widespread, following a trend common throughout Latin America. Brazilians, however, pay the highest tax rate in Latin America (35% of GDP). Whereas the population officially labelled by the government as ‘middle class’ grew from 38% of the country to 53% of the total population between 2002 and 2012, the demands and frustrations with insufficient public services and infrastructure grew at an unsustainable rate.

The pace of economic growth leading to the rise of the middle class in Latin America has decelerated after 2010, partially reflecting reduced demand for commodities from China and other large economies. However, growth and its positive effect in reducing
social inequality during the 2000s created a positive narrative that, as it turned out, could not be sustained neither by macro-economic performances nor by existing capacity of public services and infrastructure. Whereas Brazilians were part of the positive story in Latin America – the expansion of the middle class population by 50% in a decade – it also discovered its limitations: above all, the fact that a significant portion of people who emerged out of poverty are in what the World Bank calls the ‘vulnerable’ section of society (Ferreira et al. 2013: 3). This layer of the population is estimated to comprise 37.5% of the population of Latin America, the largest social segment in the region. Those considered ‘vulnerable’ suffer a constant 10% risk of falling back into poverty within a five-year interval. Brazil’s usual definition of the middle class includes the majority of these ‘vulnerable’ people into the lower middle class – or Classe C (C Class), with family income starting at US$ 443 (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos 2012). This C Class expanded by astonishing 60% between 2003 and 2011, reaching 105.4 million members (UOL 2012). The positive story of the rising middle class, celebrated as part of Latin America’s overall advances in economic growth and social inclusion, obfuscated for a time the ugly truth of economic insecurity.

Recent studies conducted by researchers in the private sector have discovered significant variations in the income of the lower middle class – due to informal types of jobs and ad hoc employment engagements of these families. A research conducted by a private consultancy specialised in the C, D and E classes in Brazil has highlighted that some families classified in the C Class go back and forth between social classes in a space of a few months (Salomão 2014). Whereas unemployment rates in Brazil have remained persistently low in recent years, a deeper look at the economic conditions of the so-called ‘new middle class’ reveals the same pattern identified by the World Bank: marked by vulnerability and persistent difficulty to belong to a middle class lifestyle. As one member of the C Class told Reuters news agency at the height of the protests last year, public transportation was ‘shabby, slow, dangerous and infuriating’ (Prada 2013).

The growth story in Brazil, therefore, has been marked by the contrast between an immense rise in demands and a more modest growth in supply of services and infrastructure. This correlation can be translated as an imbalance between expectations and the real capacity to acquire the desired goods and services. This disparity has been a traditional source of unrest within social movements, and was famously put forward by Ted Robert Gurr in the 1970s as ‘relative deprivation’:

“Relative deprivation (RD) is defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and
conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping… The emphasis of the hypothesis is on the perception of deprivation; people may be subjectively deprived with reference to their expectations even though an objective observer might not judge them to be in want” (Gurr 1970: 24).

This idea reflects the political-economic dynamics of Latin America during the beginning of this century, with large-scale protests affecting precisely the most stable and economically-advanced countries – the cases of Brazil, Chile and Peru. Whereas the middle class in general has expanded by 50% in the last decade, the lower end of this segment – what the World Bank calls ‘the vulnerable’ – is now for the first time a majority of Latin Americans, comprising 38% of the total population (Ferreira et al. 2012: 3). With the new middle class’s unfulfilled demands and constantly insecure grip on the social ladder, Brazil was taken by a large-scale sense of relative deprivation.

Grievances and Connectivity

The protests, which started peacefully and turned increasingly violent, displayed the destabilizing effects that such rapid shifts in demographics and popular demands have on developing nations, when combined with a crucial tool for mobilisation: connectivity. This is another leg of social mobilisation reflected in social movement theory as ‘resource mobilisation’: “the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization…. Resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1221). In this case, social media provided a crucial resource for communication of grievances, calls for mobilisation, coordination of protests (in terms of time, location and causes) and communication of images and ideas.

Research on resource mobilisation has outlined the strong link between reduced costs of mobilisation and the formation of social movements, especially among ‘aggrieved groups’ (Jenkins 1983: 532). Furthermore, and also of relevance for the case of Brazil, is the observation by J. Craig Jenkins that increased levels of grievances by ‘cohesive and moderately resourceful groups’ often result in successful social mobilisation – and he cites the intermediate and upper middle classes as examples of such resourceful groups ripe for mobilisation when their interests are frustrated (ibid.: 531).

The dimension and speed of the changes in people’s access to the Internet and mobile devices in Brazil gave rise to a new range of online resources for mobilisation. It changed,
in a matter of a few years, the way the population regarded political contestation and formed a permanent tool for large-scale mobilisation. The organizational capacity and mobilisation power for the marches of June 2013 came from social media websites, mirroring other protest movements around the world – such as Turkey around the same time and the Middle East during the Arab Spring. But Brazil is a more mature society and a stronger democracy than most nations that recently faced large-scale protests. Whereas the Turkish government moved to ‘eradicate’ Twitter from the country, blocking the microblogging website alongside Youtube last March (Welch 2014), Brazilian policymakers recognised the people’s right to protest and the country remains the second-largest user base of Twitter in the world after the United States, with 41 million accounts and 8% of all users (Semiocast 2012). In an age of multiple communication and information tools, the cost for the government of controlling the flow of information is too high in terms of public image and physical requirements for intelligence infrastructure. For protesters, the cost was as low as a hashtag.

The decade between 2002 and 2012, which saw the middle class jump to 53% of the population, was also the decade in which Internet access went from being a luxury of the elite to being regularly available to over 100 million people (Portal Brasil 2013). Brazilians are not only the second-largest population on Twitter, but also on Facebook. Smartphones, which were key to share images of police repression that triggered public outrage, were traditionally expensive in Brazil and only became commonplace very recently. The number of Internet-enabled mobile devices jumped by 43% in the past three years, providing a crucial tool for political activism - through hashtags, images and fast-spreading ideas. The higher educational levels that come with rising incomes also provided new tools for political contestation: access to higher education among the age group key to both social media engagement and civil unrest, those between 18 and 24 years of age, went from 15% in 2002 to 29.9% in 2011 (Buscato and Fillipe 2013).

With such connectivity, when ideas expressed in typical information-age style via hashtags spread, they spread large and wide. Shortly after the start of small demonstrations against the increase in bus fares in 2013, three hashtags calling for protests were posted 1,584,000 times in two weeks (De Luca 2013). On 20 June, over one million people went to the streets in the largest popular mobilisation since the fall of the military dictatorship more than two decades ago. Tellingly, 46% of demonstrators had never been to a protest before and 80% said they joined the movement through social media, according to a poll by Brazilian firm IBOPE (Época 2013b).
Volatile Combination: Mobilisation and Violence

Connectivity and grievances are a source of strategic instability because they make such a volatile combination. Connectivity increases communication power for a variety of social movements willing to challenge the state, even in the most mature democracies of Latin America. Countries saw violent clashes in the streets as democratically-elected governments struggled to understand what was the driving force behind such widespread unrest. In Brazil, images of violent clashes between police and demonstrators dominated headlines during the 2013 Confederations Cup – and the wave of unrest did not stop there. Violent groups damaged buildings and attacked or provoked police officers in several occasions throughout 2013 and 2014. On 10 February 2014, a cameraman hit by a mortar fired by a demonstrator became the first casualty of the protests.

The drastic lowering of costs for mobilisation has expanded the number of movements and proto-groups focused on disruptive or confrontational attitudes as a way of protest. Movements have gained traction without the need for mediation from formal organisations such as political parties or workers’ unions, both of which played a crucial role in previous protest waves marking Brazil’s transition to democracy from the military dictatorship that ruled until the late 1980s. Political figures and organisations were key players in the campaign against the military dictatorship and later against President Fernando Collor de Mello, who ended up impeached in 1992 after reports of corruption and economic mismanagement. The marches against Collor, more than two decades ago, were the last large-scale and enduring popular mobilisation before the 2013 marches. A start contrast to the un-hierarchical and seemingly faceless character of the recent protest wave in Brazil, in which no individual or organisation even tried to exert leadership claims. In fact, political parties and the unions were verbally and sometimes physically attacked by other protesters for displaying their banners or flags during 2013 (O Globo 2013).

People have been able to mobilise more spontaneously and more quickly around political perceptions and images shared through Twitter and Facebook. In December 2013 and January 2014, another style of protesting became common in big cities such as São Paulo, consisting of large gatherings of young people from poor suburbs in upmarket shopping malls. While the first gatherings bore few similarities to protests, images of clashes with the police and the use of tear gas in the attempt to expel the youth from the malls led to a sudden amplification of the movement. Many other gatherings were organised via social media - this time with a much higher political connotation, as it was interpreted as a protest against social inequalities evident in public spaces of Brazilian cities. The protests became known as ‘rolezinhos’, a street slang for ‘little strolls’ through the malls. The episode showed that usual security tools to disperse protests can harm the government’s cause in the crucial information domain, where most of the battle for public
perceptions is fought. Images of the police crackdown accelerated engagement with the #rolezinho movement: the number of tweets sent with that hashtag increased by almost 1,000% between 5 January and 12 January 2014 (Sampaio 2014).

The information domain (text, pictures and images shared through social media, other Internet websites and traditional media) has become an arena for networked forms of contestation and, sometimes, violence. The trend for leaderless movements, including in its violent shapes, is not new and has been most effectively described by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt back in 2001 as ‘netwars’, a form of conflict waged by non-state groups operating without formal leadership and being able to quickly assemble and come together for specific events in the form of ‘swarms’ of participants, which later disperse in an equally quick (and easy) way. The authors also anticipate the hurdles this trend imposes on governments as security operations are become increasingly disconnected from the traditional models that they are prepared to face:

“[States’] sovereignty and authority are usually exercised through bureaucracies in which issues and problems can be sliced up and specific offices can be charged with taking care of specific problems. In netwar, things are rarely so clear. A protagonist is likely to operate in the cracks and grey areas of a society, striking where lines of authority crisscross and the operational paradigms of politicians, officials, soldiers, police officers, and related actors get fuzzy and clash” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001: 14).

The disruptive effect of networked movements was clearly felt in Brazilian streets in 2013: police officers sometimes cracked down heavily on protesters, with negative impacts for the government’s narrative of democratic engagement with them. In response, authorities sometimes tried the opposite: after masked protesters waged widespread destruction in the streets of São Paulo on 26 July 2013 officers alleged they had received orders not to intervene, even as shops, bank branches and cars were being damaged (IG São Paulo, 2013). A majority of police officers said they had not received proper training and orientation to deal neither with peaceful nor violent protests, and that they had to improvise tactics, according to a survey carried out by the Public Policy Analysis Directorate in the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV), a Brazilian think tank (2014: 16).

The Black Bloc movement was responsible for most of the violence. This loosely-organised group of masked youth was active in Latin America and Europe during 2013-2014, swarming marches of predominantly peaceful demonstrators and provoking violent clashes with police before dispersing. Despite being a semi-organised movement like others that gathered for Brazil’s protest wave, the Black Bloc displayed a more
sophisticated organisational capacity. They coordinated their movements carefully via the Internet in order to harness the power of connectivity in their favour: by using the presence of national and international media in marches and kidnapping international headlines. The group took the protest movement in Brazil by storm - or more precisely by social media, where members organise themselves in a non-hierarchical way. It showed resilience in face of widespread popular rejection to its violent methods, as shown in opinion polls. A bill proposing a new definition of terrorism to include vandalism during marches, clearly targeted at the black blocs, was considered in the Senate during February 2014. It later stalled, as lawmakers and local authorities struggled to find a balance between security and freedom to protest, displaying once again the disruptive effects for the state of networked movements borne out of grievances and connectivity.

Conclusion

The scenes of violence in the streets of several cities in Brazil and its neighbourhood, despite not telling the whole story of the protest movements, showed the world that frustration over basic staples of modern lives can be a lasting source of domestic instability. It is clear that grievances alone are not sufficient to explain the surge in protests during 2013, since many of the structural faults being highlighted have existed and been the subject of media attention for years if not decades. It is the relative aspect of these grievances which offers a more accurate analysis of the mobilisation of the protest movement. The socio-economic change underlying the main grievances (the rapid expansion of the middle class) also contributed to a simultaneous plunge in mobilisation costs, through increased tools for connectivity.

As a result, the protests have caused important policy shifts as governments in Brazil and neighbouring countries scrambled to make up for decades of neglect to crucial middle-class demands. In Brazil, the government had to revise many of its strategic priorities in a space of a few weeks. It sent to Congress and quickly got approved a bill to direct nearly all royalties from its recently-discovered offshore oil reserves to education and health. A proposal for a reform of the political system to make it more responsive and curb corruption began being debated for possible approval before the end of 2014. Urban mobility campaigners were rewarded with a US$ 25-billion investment commitment on infrastructure. These measures were all announced by President Dilma Rousseff days after the large-scale protests of June 2013, which are now known among Brazilians as the ‘Journeys of June’.
Timing is important as Brazil and other emerging countries move to quell the demands of their protest movements. Successive administrations in Brazil - like in most of Latin America - have used the times of plenty since the 2000s to provide cash transfer schemes to the poor and those in the lower middle class. But societies have moved faster than policies, and the middle classes have been demanding services and structures that will take time to deliver - such as complicated subway construction projects and sensitive reforms of the political system. In Brazil, the combination of grievances and connectivity has overwhelmed the government even as the country appeared to be living a golden age of social progress in the 2000s. The country observed a particularly steep and simultaneous rise of grievances and connectivity, but the same pattern may affect other emerging countries as the days of sky-high commodity prices fade away. As emerging countries struggle to adapt to social changes, they now have to do so with less economic prosperity to distribute. In this context, the experience of Brazil may also be an important pointer for other countries.

REFERENCES


6 CONTENTIOUS STATE-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS OVER NEW GAS PROJECTS: LESSONS FROM BOLIVIA

Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Annegret Kuhn

Introduction

Previous research about contentious politics over the siting of large scale energy or infrastructure projects has largely focused on the United States or other “Western” countries (see Aldrich 2008; Boudet and McAdam 2012). The few publications on controversial facility siting in Latin America covered cases wherein local and oftentimes indigenous communities completely rejected specific mega-projects – such as the Belo Monte hydroelectric project in Brazil (McCormick 2010), the construction of an international road through the protected area and indigenous territory Isiboro Securé (TIPNIS) in Bolivia (McNeish 2013) or the expansion of the Conga mine in the north of Peru (Triscritti 2013). In contrast, there has been very little comparative research based on more comprehensive, representative samples of cases, which could help to better understand levels of contention – and respective variations – over extraction projects in this region.

This study aims to contribute to reduce this research gap by exploring contestations that emerged within the 42 environmental licensing processes that included prior consultation with locally affected indigenous or peasant communities, carried out in Bolivia between 2007 and 2013. This case selection does not only help to produce more in-depth knowledge about contestations over new extraction projects in the “developing world”, but also avoids the common practice to select the highly visible and very conflictive cases for further research.1 A more structured and comprehensive comparison of cases of local contention and its absence could consequently generate valuable new insights concerning the pending question about to what extent, and under which specific conditions, contention to resource extraction emerges or not.

1 This critique has also been formulated by McAdam and Boudet (2012).
The actual practical and political relevance of these questions lies at hand, particularly when taking into account that worldwide resource extraction and energy production have further increased in the past few decades and have expanded into territories that were previously untouched by similar industries (see Bebbington and Burry 2013). Like in the Bolivian cases that are in the centre of attention here, such expanding activities in post-colonial contexts oftentimes have affected indigenous peoples and have led to manifold conflicts between the state, local communities and the operating or interested corporations, as well as to different types of rights violations (Anaya 2013).

Inspired by McAdam et al. (2010) and McAdam and Boudet (2012: 33-37) the paper focuses on communities at risk for mobilisation or, more specifically, communities subject to the ‘threat’ of large, environmentally sensitive energy projects. We scrutinise such cases in the context of Bolivia’s gas sector, where gas extraction has expanded significantly in the past few years. As, due to our previous country expertise, we already knew that high-level community contention about gas projects is relatively rare in this Andean country, we decided to select only those cases with considerable impact on indigenous communities. In theory, such large projects with a significant environmental impact that affects indigenous peoples are particularly conflict prone (McAdam et al. 2010: 410-412). This selection criterion also has the advantage that, since 2007, the environmental licensing process of gas extraction projects that affect Bolivian indigenous or peasant communities includes prior consultation with these local populations – processes that reveal valuable insights into different levels of contestation vis-à-vis the planned activities.

We found that between 2007\(^2\) and 2013 a total of 42 environmental licensing processes, wherein prior consultation with local affected communities took place, were concluded. Based on comprehensive empirical data collected about all of these cases, we analysed whether, how and why communities contested the planned projects – before, during or after the consultations (until the environmental license was granted). For this study we systematically analysed ministry reports (Ministerio de Hidrocarburos y Energía 2007-2013), carried out over eighty interviews and focus group discussions with indigenous peoples, the state and corporation staff, participated as observers in two consultations, and drew on a great number of secondary literature on specific cases. In addition, we used a database about social conflicts in Bolivia (1990-2013) with data from the social observatory of Latin America of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences,\(^3\), Observatorio social de América Latina-Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (OSAL-CLACSO), and a collection of newspaper articles about conflicts in Bolivia’s

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2 After the Supreme Decree 29033 that regulates prior consultation with indigenous and peasant communities in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector was released in February 2007.
gas sector (2000-2013) with data from the Bolivian NGO Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB), both of which have been established by the authors.

By scrutinizing our ample empirical data we found that 15 of the selected environmental licensing processes were characterised by stronger local contention: in 11 of them substantial critique expressed during consultations led to long and contested licensing processes and in four of them opposition was expressed that finally led to open conflicts between indigenous protesters and security forces or to the (at least temporary) suspension of the planned activities. We also discovered that contestations focused more on the specific conditions under which new projects should be implemented than they expressed an overall rejection of these projects. The paper, thereby, does not analyse the emergence of social movements per se, but rather sheds light into local struggles about new extraction projects. In doing so, it proceeds as follows: The following section reviews existing literature about facility siting in the context of resource extraction, and gives a short overview of the theoretical framework and arguments applied in this paper. In the third section we then provide an overview of Bolivia’s gas sector, environmental licensing processes and prior consultations. The fourth section answers the central questions of why in general there have been so few cases with high levels of local contention in the Bolivian gas sector, and how the specific variation in local contentious collective action can systematically be explained. Moreover, we provide several more in-depth examples of the interaction of explaining conditions at work. In the concluding section we finally summarise our core contributions to the contemporary research debate.

How to Explain Contestations Over Facility Siting?

Research about facility siting and respective opposition by affected local communities has quite a long trajectory (e.g. O’Hare, Bacow and Sanderson 1983; Carmin 2003; Boholm, 2004). Aldrich (2008) has established the term “site fight” for cases of controversial facility siting (including, for example, struggles about airports, dams, nuclear power plants, liquefied natural gas terminals, hazardous-waste treatment plants and fossil-fuel facilities), which he studied in Japan, the USA and France. Drawing on such previous literature – stemming from diverse strands like social movement theory, research into the NIMBY (not in my backyard) phenomenon, social psychology and facility siting – more recently McAdam et al. (2010) and McAdam and Boudet (2012) have developed a comprehensive analytical framework for comparatively analysing site fights. In contrast

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to common research about social movements and in line with our own research interest here, these scholars focus on local policy disputes and not on social movements per se.

Empirically, previous research about site fights has concentrated on „Western“ countries, foremost on the United States (Aldrich 2008: 20; see also McAdam et al. 2010). This geographic focus has been related to the fact that social movement research was developed in the democratic West and is only slowly triggering to being used for analysing contentious processes in the Global South. The studies from McAdam et al. (2010), who cross-regionally compare potential site fights in 17 developing countries, and Hochstetler and Tranjan (unpublished), who compare site fights about the installation of 302 electricity projects at subnational levels in Brazil, are first pioneers in this regard.

For explaining variation regarding mobilisation and non-mobilisation, McAdam et al. (2010), McAdam and Boudet (2012), Wright and Boudet (2012) and Hochstetler and Tranjan (unpublished) draw on two interrelated bundles of conditions: the political opportunity and the community context conditions. In very general terms, they highlight the importance of opportunities, threat (a motive) and resources for explaining opposition to projects: “The provisional decision to site a facility in a particular location is precisely the kind of ‘exogenous shock’ that has the potential to trigger collective action, as community groups come to define the decision as posing either a significant new threat to, or an opportunity to advance, their interests” (McAdam et al.: 404). These scholars defined and operationalised specific conditions that are apt to explain the emergence or absence of opposition against projects through intensive dialogue with the empirical cases studied. When carrying out cross-country analyses, more general national-level conditions such as varying democracy scores were chosen for analysis (e.g. McAdam et al. 2010). When scrutinizing different cases within one country, dynamic political opportunities, sub-national differences and community context conditions were used for explaining variation within levels of contention (McAdam and Boudet 2012; Wright and Boudet 2012; Hochstetler and Tranjan, unpublished).

The concept of political opportunity as applied by McAdam and Boudet (2012: 50) is basically operationalised through electoral vulnerability of decision makers, temporal proximity to upcoming elections, and (national or subnational) jurisdiction; whereas Hochstetler and Tranjan (unpublished) operationalise political opportunity by analysing “the presence of allies and institutions that can offer strategic openings to challengers” (ibid., unpublished: 12). Besides political opportunities, local communities must also have a motive and resources for mobilizing in response to planned projects. McAdam and Boudet (2012) distinguish between the following community context conditions for explaining opposition or its absence: economic hardship, civic capacity, previous opposition, similar industry and threat perception. In a nutshell, the authors assume that communities that
suffer from economic hardship are more likely to accept planned projects in expectance of potential economic benefits⁵; that civic capacity (e.g. NGO support, higher levels of education) and previous opposition against similar projects increase probabilities to mobilise; that communities, which are familiarised with similar industry, tend to feel more comfortable about them, what makes mobilisation less probable (see also Aldrich 2008: 12); and that perceptions about the threats posed by a planned project are important for mobilizing opposition (see also Wright and Boudet 2012). In this paper, we will analyse the relevance of political opportunities and of the mentioned community context conditions, adapted to the Bolivian context, for explaining varying levels of contention regarding new gas projects in indigenous and peasant communities’ vicinity.

Bolivia’s Gas Sector, Environmental Licensing Processes and Prior Consultation

The gas sector has turned into the most important source of revenue for Bolivia’s economy in the past few decades. It has also continued to stand at the centre of contentious politics, among them the “Gas War” in 2003 – wherein social movements at first demanded that Bolivia’s gas should not be exported to the United States via a Chilean port. As the movement grew in number and strength, its claims became increasingly radical – including the nationalisation of the gas sector, and the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Assies 2004). All of these propositions were subsequently put into practice. Due to the nationalisation of this strategic resource – combined with the relatively high international prices for gas – the country has significantly increased its revenue from this sector, which has been used to enhance public corporations and to expand social policies (Kohl and Farthing, 2012). Not only the benefits have been growing, however, projects to explore, exploit, and transport gas have themselves also expanded – producing manifold direct and indirect socio-environmental impacts. A large majority (about 80%) of these activities have taken place in Guaraní territories (Perreault 2008: 9).⁶

Gas projects in Bolivia are regulated by domestic legislation. The obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) exists since 1992, with the promulgation of the Law of the Environment (Law No. 1333). This law is complemented by further regulations of environmental control, prevention and management, the hydrocarbon law (Law No. 3058 from 2005) and its regulating environmental decree for the hydrocarbon sector (RASH

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⁵ Hochstetter’s study, however, challenges the assumption that economic hardship explains the absence of mobilisation, as the Brazilian cases she analysed gave evidence of the contrary.

⁶ According to the Bolivian census from 2012, the Guaraní peoples only account for approximately 1 percent of Bolivia’s total population and their communities are spread over the departments of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, and Tarija.
The competent national authority for overseeing EIAs is the Ministry of Environment and Water. In addition, since its ratification of ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples in 1991, Bolivia has been formally obliged to conduct prior consultation whenever implementing measures that affect indigenous peoples. Despite this duty, the state only began to organise state-led prior consultations in 2007, after the passing of the regulating decree No. 29033 on prior consultation in the hydrocarbon sector (16 February 2007). Indigenous rights to prior consultation and to compensation – in Bolivia granted to both, indigenous and peasant communities – have been introduced into the Bolivian legislation after repeated indigenous protests and lobbying. At this point it is also worth mentioning that currently Bolivia is the country that recognises the rights of indigenous peoples to the greatest extent worldwide: it promulgated the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as domestic law in 2007 and declared the state as “plurinational” in its new Constitution of 2009, recognizing comprehensive indigenous rights as a transversal issue.

In practice, an environmental licensing process proceeds as follows: 1) the project proponent submits the “environmental and project information sheet” to the sectorial ministry (the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy – MHE), 2) the MHE classifies the project according to its expected socio-environmental impacts, 3) whenever a project is classified with category 1 (meaning that it will have significant impacts on indigenous peoples or protected areas) an analytical integral environmental impact assessment study is obligatory, including prior consultation with any affected indigenous community, 4) public and prior consultation processes are carried out, and the final agreements between the state consultation team and the indigenous communities must be incorporated into the draft EIA, 5) the EIA, which is conducted by an accredited consultant and paid by the interested corporation, is submitted to the Environmental Ministry, and 6) the ministry reviews and finally approves the project by granting the environmental license.

Prior consultations with indigenous and peasant communities normally include several meetings with the affected groups and their advisers. The concrete work schedule of these processes is established conjointly between the representatives of the local communities and the state consultation team (directed by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy). Most processes comprise meetings to inform local populations about the relevant legal framework, to present technical details of the planned projects and on the expected socio-environmental impacts, and to give them the opportunity to identify additional impacts.

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8 Such processes involving indigenous communities should be distinguished from processes of public participation, which are carried out with the general citizenry and are prescribed by the environmental legislation. While public consultations generally only have lasted for a few hours with the aim to inform and answer questions, prior consultations with indigenous communities have had a duration of several weeks.
from their perspective as well as to propose additional mitigation measures (for more
details see Schilling-Vacaflor, forthcoming). Each consultation process has concluded
with a final agreement, signed by both parties (the state and the local communities),
which is included in the EIA and should be complied with by the operating corporation.

Between 2007 and 2013, 42 gas projects supposed to affect indigenous communities
were classified with category 1, thus, they required comprehensive EIAs and prior
consultations. Table 1 in the annex gives an overview of these cases regarding the
interested corporation, the affected communities, the specific type of the planned
project (including technical data and investment volumes) and the level of contention
that emerged until the approval of the respective EIAs as well as of the additional data
sources (beside MHE consultation reports, interviews and participatory observation) that
were consulted on each case.

Explaining Contention Over New Gas Projects and Its Absence

For a better understanding of contentious politics between the affected indigenous and
peasant communities and the Bolivian state it is necessary to draw on profound empirical
knowledge of our universe of cases (Table 1). From the total of 42 cases 35 cases
were carried out with indigenous lowland minorities, among them Guaraní (31 cases),
Weenhayek (3 cases) and Leco and Moseten communities (1 case), and seven cases were
carried out with peasant or intercultural communities. The planned activities consisted of
exploration projects, the construction or amplification of gas ducts, and the building of
new or the expansion of existing exploitation facilities. Less than half of these processes
(15 cases) could be characterised as “contentious” or even “highly contentious”. The
range of contestation varies from no or minor critique against the planned project (very
low or low level of contention), to substantial criticism that led to the delay of licensing
processes (high level of contention), up to outright project rejection accompanied by
protests and mobilisations (very high level of contention). Table 1 shows that among
the analysed cases the majority had very low (24 cases) or low levels of contention (3
cases). In contrast, less than half of the cases had “high” (10 cases) or “very high”
(4 cases) levels of contention. The selected cases indicate that environmental licensing

9 The total number of environmental licenses that have been granted in the hydrocarbon sector in this period was major.
For example, in the first semester of 2013, 70 licenses were granted in this sector, only about 20 of them classified as
category 1-projects (interview with environmental ministry staff, 15 January 2014, La Paz).
10 It might be that this classification is a bit biased and that more in-depth knowledge about the less contentious cases
would have led us to re-classify some of the cases with very low contention to cases with low levels of contention. This
possible bias has to do with the fact that those cases that were characterised by a considerable amount of contention
were widely covered within the newspapers and academic publications, while less conflictive cases went almost
unperceived (see additional sources mentioned in Table 1).
processes involving indigenous lowland minorities tended to be more contentious than the ones involving peasant communities. In the following we will provide explanations for both, 1) the fact that relatively few new gas projects were confronted with very high levels of community contestation and 2) the fact that some licensing processes were more contentious than others.

We found that the prior consultations conducted as part of the environmental licensing processes provided important insights about community contestation vis-à-vis planned gas projects in their neighbourhood. When they were longer and more comprehensive, this was normally due to disputes about a planned project. The blockage of consultation processes has been incorporated within the repertoire of contentious performances by indigenous communities in Bolivia, as a powerful tool for bringing decision makers at the dialogue table. The consulted communities in Bolivia generally used this blockage for pragmatic reasons – e.g. for correcting or complementing the information prepared by the corporation, for achieving higher compensations, or for achieving agreements about employment opportunities – and not for expressing their absolute rejection of planned projects. In this sense a representative from the Guaraní organisation Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (Assembly of the Guaraní Peoples – APG) explained:

„I always remember that our Canadian brothers told us, we were always opposing and dying from poverty, but now? We are entrepreneurs, we play with the state, with the corporations’. Why not? This is my vision; you must know how to play. And if we do not do it, other people will continue to enrich themselves“ (Interview 20 November 2013, Camiri, Bolivia).

In a similar vein, when interviewing members of the Guaraní capitania Parapitiguasu about their experiences with the prior consultation about a planned seismic exploration in their territories, one of them explained:

“There were several meetings were we discussed about the planned activities. Therein we expressed our opinions and demands. When debating about the question of whether the project should go on, the majority of us said that it shall be implemented, but only in return of a good compensation” (Interview with community member from Parapitiguasu, November 2013).

In some cases the disputes emerged outside of the formal consultations. For example, the state broke up an ongoing consultation with the Guaraní capitania Takovo Mora due to land property changes, which provoked the communities’ protest (case 27 of table
1). Another example is the Guaraní capitán Parapitiguasu, whose members protested after the formal consultation process already concluded – particularly due to internal debates that became increasingly critical towards the planned project and the concluded consultation, which led to an ex-post revision of the environmental license that was already granted (case 30 of Table 1). We included information about both, contestations within and outside of formal consultation processes, into our analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case number, date (MM.YY-MM.YY)</th>
<th>Corporation and case name</th>
<th>Project- type, investment, technical data</th>
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<tr>
<td>Case 1 05.07-11.07</td>
<td>Total E&amp;P: Sísmica 3D; Bloques Aquio e Ipati</td>
<td>Seismic exploration: paths of 1354 km; investment: 24.000.000 USD</td>
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<td>Case 2 06.07-08.07</td>
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<td>Chaco S.A.: Lineas para Campos Percheles y El Dorado</td>
<td>Duct: total 51 km; inv.: 8.300.000 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 6 07.07-03.08</td>
<td>Chaco S.A.: Lineas para Campos Percheles y El Dorado</td>
<td>Duct: total 51 km; inv.: 8.300.000 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 7 09.07-10.07</td>
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<td>Case 13 03.09-06.09</td>
<td>Total E&amp;P: Pozo Exploratorio Aquio X-1001</td>
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<td>Case 14 03.09-12.09</td>
<td>Total E&amp;P Pozo Exploratorio Incahuasi X-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case 1</td>
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<td>Total E&amp;P: Sísmica 3D; Bloques Aquio e Ipati</td>
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<td>Case 8</td>
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<td>Transredes: Interconexión Campo Percheles con el GAA y OCSZ II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case 14</td>
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<td>Case 16 12.09-06.10</td>
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<td>Case 17 2010-2012 (no exact data)</td>
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<td>Case 18 09.10-01.11</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>YPF: Planta de Extracción de Licuables de Rio Grande</td>
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<tr>
<th>Case 28: 2012 (no exact data)</th>
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<td>Case 30 07.11-12.11</td>
<td>YPF Petroandina SAM: Sísmica 3D, Itaguazurenda</td>
<td>Seismic exploration: paths of 1267 km; 108.500.000 USD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case 31 concludes in 12.12</td>
<td>Total E&amp;P: Perforación y Línea de Recolección Pozo Incahuasi – X3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case 32: 2013 (no exact data)</td>
<td>BG Bolivia: Perforación Pozos: EDD 9 y EDD 10</td>
<td>Two wells</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why Have There Been Few Cases With Very High Levels of Contention?**

In our systematic analysis of the investigated environmental licensing processes, we found that it was particularly due to a mix of limited political opportunities and the economic hardship of the local communities that relatively little outright community rejection has emerged against planned gas projects. Importantly, the historically-grown and dominant public discourse over extractive industries in Bolivia has been quite positive and uncritical. The “Gas War” and the following nationalisation further boosted most Bolivian citizens’ and the states’ view that gas must be exploited for financing the country’s economy and ample social policies (see Postero 2013).

This means that Bolivia is a good example of a country wherein a “neo-extractivist” development strategy currently predominates (see also Svampa 2013). In accordance with Burchardt and Dietz (2014) we define neo-extractivism as a “renaissance of the developmental state, which (1) steers and regulates the economies of extraction, appropriates extra revenue and mediates between diverging interests; (2) acts as an agent of development and addresses the social question via supporting development projects in the region; and (3) creates political legitimacy for itself through democratic elections and a development narrative” (ibid. 2014: 470-471). Neo-extractivist frames have shaped the investigated environmental licensing processes and are shared by many indigenous and peasant representatives and community members (see interviews and participatory observation). Statements that are part of neo-extractivist discourses, such as „[t]he hydrocarbon politics of the Plurinational State of Bolivia is centred on the recuperation of the property of hydrocarbons and the redistribution of
resulting revenues, for the benefit of the population’s majority" could frequently also be found within the information distributed during prior consultations and are contained within EIAs. In this context, indigenous lowland minorities that mobilised against gas projects were oftentimes framed by the government and the media alike as blockaders of the development or as egoistic.11 While the current government under President Morales did repress mobilisations by force on very few occasions, it used means like delegitimizing public discourses against protesters or negotiating solely with those groups that were less critical toward the proposed project at stake; these means turned out to be quite effective. Another governmental strategy that contributed to de-escalate rising conflicts has been the establishment of agreements with claimants, which have, though, not always been complied with (interviews and statements APG).

We found that economic hardship of the consulted communities is a further central condition for explaining the absence of outright rejections of gas projects. Despite the decreasing of the overall poverty rate in Bolivia’s recent past, the last census from 2012 indicates that the living conditions of indigenous people are still below the ones of persons who did not identify as indigenous. For example, while 11.5% of non-indigenous citizens did not have access to piped water in 2012, this was the case for 21.5% of Bolivia’s Guaraní, 29.5% of Bolivia’s Quechua and 28.4% of Bolivia’s Aymara population. Similarly, while only 8.8% of non-indigenous Bolivians did not have access to electricity in 2012; 37.3% of citizens who self-identify as Guaraní and 29.5% respectively 21.5% of the ones

who identify as Quechua or Aymara did not have access to electricity in the same year. In the face of such lacking basic living conditions, indigenous and peasant communities seem to be quite receptive to benefits and incentives that are coupled to the construction of gas projects.

This finding is supported by dozens of our interviewees, focus group discussions and secondary literature (e.g., Jaskoski 2014). All of these sources indicate that the approval of gas projects under specific conditions, such as the expectation of cash compensations, is linked to a general experience of persisting economic hardship within indigenous communities. In this context Ribeira Arismendi, head of the Bolivian NGO Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (LIDEMA), explained:

“The problem is the decade-long void the State has left in many regions. Thus when the enterprise comes and offers things [work, new roads, reconstruction of the school or the hospital], ooohhh finally the government want’s to support us, the enterprise supports us, one has to support the enterprise” (Interview 18 January 2014, La Paz).

Why Have Some Licensing Processes Been More Contentious Than Others?

When trying to explain the varying level of local contestation over planned gas projects, we generally follow the recent empirical studies about site fights outlined above and assume that dynamic political opportunities and different community context conditions account for this variation (see above). Before doing so, it has furthermore to be underlined that our cases share several conflict-relevant characteristics, which can be ruled out as (further) explanatory factors. For example, at the macro-level they are all part of the same national political system providing similar broader political opportunity structures for contentious mobilisation. In this section we will outline the conditions that according to our analysis account for variation within the level of contention against planned gas projects. However, we assume that it is the specific interplay of several conditions that help to better understand how contestations emerge or why they are absent. Consequently, after the discussion of isolated conditions, in the next section we will discuss concrete environmental licensing processes and thereby illustrate how the respective level of contention can be explained by taking into account specific combinations of these conditions.

We argued before that political opportunities for contestation against gas projects are generally limited by the predominance of a neo-extractivist development strategy. However, when
applying a procedural and issue-specific conceptualisation of political opportunity (see Koo-
mpmans 1999; Meyer 2004), we find that some of the variation within levels of contention can
be understood by taking into account widening and constraining opportunities. Based on
our interviews we found that political opportunities for mobilizing opposition against new gas
projects were favourable, shortly after the passing of the Supreme Decree 29033 that regu-
lates prior consultations and when the political system in Bolivia, moreover, was very open
during the constituent process (2006-2009). Thereafter, in the second legislature of Morales’
government (which achieved a two-third majority within the 2009 elections) political oppor-
tunities became more limited and the Bolivian state became much less open to “uncomfort-
able” citizen claims. The only exception was the time period during and shortly after the
TIPNIS conflict. The TIPNIS conflict achieved its peak level in October 2011, and it opened up
discursive and political opportunities for indigenous minorities opposing large-scale projects,
which narrowed down again in February 2012 (see newspaper article collection).

However, while opening opportunities might make community contestation more likely to
occur, we need to take into account other community context conditions for explaining
why such contestation actually emerged or not. For example, independent from wide or
narrow political opportunities, no peasant or intercultural community that was involved
in an environmental licensing process contested the proposed measures. Rather, several
of these communities expressed their support for the gas activities and for Bolivia’s
government (MHE consultation reports). This positive and uncritical position regarding
extraction projects in their territories can be explained, on the one hand, by the political
alliance that exists between the consulted peasant unions and the government under
President Morales, and, on the other hand, by the peasant’s focus on local economic
development, which – according to their view – can be boosted by gas projects. In
contrast, indigenous lowland minorities (that tend to identify less with the current
government) have adopted more critical attitudes toward extraction in their territories,
particularly because one of their main goals has been the consolidation and control of
collectively-owned territories and of their self-determined development.

In contrast to McAdam and Boudet’s assumption that those communities with more
experience regarding large infrastructure projects would be less likely to mobilise, our
data suggests that the contrary holds true for Bolivia. Thus, table 1 shows that those
communities that are located within traditional hydrocarbon areas (like the Guaraní
capitanías Itika Guasu and Yaku Iguá in Tarija or Takovo Mora in Santa Cruz) tended
to be more prone to mobilise against new projects. 12 Moreover, we found that the

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12 See also interview with representatives from Bolivian NGO Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (CEJIS):
„In Bolivia we see that communities’ resistance has not so much been expressed in response to future menaces,
but rather because communities already have experienced previous negative impacts caused by gas projects that had
deteriorated their territories. As a consequence their resistance to future projects is bigger“. Xavier Barriga, the director
of the MHE consultation team interpreted the same phenomena differently when stating that: „the more experience they
[the local communities] have, the more complicated they become“ (Interviews, 16 and 14 January 2013, La Paz).
conditions similar industry and previous opposition often co-occurred: the communities with the largest gas projects in their territories have also been the ones with the most previous oppositional experiences. It seems that on the one hand communities with a lot of gas activities in their territories also accumulated many negative experiences – e.g. negative socio-environmental impacts or unfulfilled expectations regarding benefits and employment opportunities – that made them more critical towards future projects in their vicinity. On the other hand, more experienced communities regarding gas activities have improved their negotiation skills and learned how to deal with the state and extractive corporations.

A further crucial condition for explaining dynamics of contestation is the local critical capacity. We have derived this concept from the condition of “civic capacity”, which combines the level of education of community members and the influence of international NGOs (see McAdam et al. 2010; McAdam and Boudet 2012). In contrast to McAdam et al. we do not only consider the influence of NGOs but also the impact of strong (respectively weak) leaders or advisers of the specific indigenous organisation. Moreover, we further distinguish between “confrontational” leadership and “strong” leadership and argue that only the presence of both components actually induces mobilisation. The great importance of indigenous leaders and advisers – reflected in our own and others’ empirical data – in the analysed cases can be traced back to the large power asymmetry between the state and extractive companies on the one hand, and marginalised indigenous communities with low levels of education, on the other. In such a context actors with sufficient technical and communicative competencies for critically revising project details and entering into a dialogue with the state are necessary for channelling community demands (see also Haarstad and Campero 2011: 52; Devlin and Yap 2008; Humphreys Bebbington 2012). Nevertheless, we assume that it is not exclusively the leadership ranks, which incite contentious collective action, but rather that the presence of critical leaders or advisers is to large parts a consequence of a critical local population. Thus, there is a mutual reinforcement of contentious local leadership and critical communities.13

Our concept of threat perception follows the definition of Boudet and Ortolano (2010) of threat as “the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively” (ibid., 2010: 3). High levels of threat perception figure prominently for explaining mobilisation against large-scale projects (McAdam et al. 2010; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Aldrich 2008). This assumption was also backed up by many of our interviewees during field research. We learned that according to the technical project characteristics and the perceptions of the affected groups, gas pipelines, gas

13 See McAdam and Boudet: „ […] opposition efforts that are largely driven by groups outside of the affected community are not effective in swaying regulators to reject a given proposal […] Instead, local grassroots opposition, particularly when combined with outside forces, appears to be the most plausible route for opposition to lead to eventual rejection.” (Ibid 2012: 117).
wells and the expansion of existing exploitation facilities were associated with lower levels of threat than seismic explorations and the building of new gas plants. The first types of projects firstly only capture a rather limited amount of territory (and thus agricultural area and living space), and secondly imply lower degrees of uncertainty. In contrast, the latter ones require a much larger amount of territory that uses to be deforested. Seismic explorations can, moreover, be perceived as “door openers” for future projects and provoke particularly high degrees of uncertainty and preoccupations within the local population. As expressed by many of our interview partners, their preoccupations regarding seismic explorations have had to do with the sub-surface explosions, whose impacts on water sources and the soil are largely unknown. Besides the perception that large projects will have large impacts, however, there is also another possible connection between the size (and the investment volume) of a project and the level of contention: As compensation payments in Bolivia are usually calculated in proportion to the overall investment, but there is still relatively wide flexibility regarding the negotiation of the concrete sums, communities and advisers expend more energy and time on large and expensive projects. They expect that when they succeed in identifying many negative, irreparable, long-term impacts of the planned projects during the consultations, they will have a better position within the subsequent negotiations over compensations with the corporations.

Table 1 indicates that from the 10 cases of seismic exploration six showed high levels of contention (60%) and all three cases of environmental licensing for the building of new gas plants were highly contentious. In contrast, only four of the 16 licensing processes about the building of new gas ducts were highly contentious (25%) and only two of the 13 licensing processes about the expansion of existing exploitation infrastructure or the construction of new gas wells were highly contentious (15.4%).

Discussing Specific Cases With High and Low Levels of Contention

All in all, we found that especially the level of threat perception has been important for explaining contestations by locally affected communities, particularly when these communities belonged to indigenous lowland minorities. However, beside the existence of high threat perception, these communities also need critical capacity (i.e. strong and confrontational indigenous leaders or advisers) for organizing contentious collective action.

The actual relevance of this combination of conditions for explaining contention can be illustrated by case 36, an environmental licensing process about the building of a new
large gas plant by the corporation Total E&P in the indigenous Guaraní communities of Alto Parapetí. This project consisted of the start-up of production of three gas wells, the building of a gas plant and a plant for the treatment of water, the construction of an airfield and of several new access roads as well as the construction of several camps for company staff (consultation report by indigenous adviser 2013). The new project was estimated to spread over a total of 197 hectares of land and to cost approximately USD 600 million. At the same time the indigenous advisers of the capitanía Alto Parapetí have great knowledge and experience regarding gas projects and many interview partners told us that they would not shy away from confrontation with the state or with extraction companies (interviews). One person who acted as adviser in this case narrated:

“As the consultation process was about a very huge plant, a so called mega project, we tried to make it meticulously. We asked for additional information and we carried out complementary studies about the expected reduction of local water sources. Therefore the ministry got annoyed with us. There were some delicate issues like the one about the water reduction that provoked the preoccupations and anger of all the local communities and they assumed a strong and critical posture. As a consequence the ministry had to amplify the consultation process and to cover the additional costs” (Interview with one of Alto Parapetí’s adviser, 8 November 2013).

This case shows not only the powerful combination of “critical capacity” and “threat perception”, but also the interplay between critical communities and their advisers. This finding is also consistent with other, contrary examples like the seismic exploration in the Guaraní communities from Avatiri Ingre (case 39), where strong and critical advisers were absent and the consultation process was carried out fast and without any visible contention.

However, several environmental licensing processes without high levels of expected threat were also highly contentious. There have been further reasons behind these cases of community contestation. For example, the contestations that emerged in case six about the construction of a new gas duct in Guaraní communities of Takovo Mora can be explained by the political opportunities that were relatively high at that time. An adviser from these communities told us in an interview that Takovo Mora’s communities were quite discontent with the first state-led prior consultation that had been concluded shortly before (case four) and that they decided to assume a stronger posture in the next process for setting a precedent and improving consultation process in the long term. Therefore they disputed the work schedule and consultation methodology proposed by the state and struggled to carry out a comprehensive participatory process with many community meetings and participatory methods. Several other environmental
licensing processes were blockaded due to external reasons like the influence of the TIPNIS conflict, which led to very tense relationships between the Bolivian state and the indigenous lowland minorities (interviews and MHE consultation reports, particularly cases 23, 27, 29 and 30).

Irrespective of the level of threat perception, environmental licensing processes involving the Guarani communities from Itika Guasu were highly contentious, because of these communities' previous experiences with mobilisations against gas projects (cases 2, 15, 17). At this point it is important to note that Itika Guasu is one of the capitanías with most experiences with gas projects – the largest Bolivian gas field “Margarita” operates here – and simultaneously with a highly conflictive history and negative previous experiences with gas companies (see Perrault 2008; Anthias 2012; Humphreys Bebbington 2013). However, it also has to be mentioned that some recent licensing processes with these communities about new activities operated by the corporation Repsol were characterised by low levels of contention. This was particularly due to a corporation-community agreement that was signed between Repsol and Itika Guasu in December 2010 and that included the establishment of a fund in support of the local indigenous communities.

Conclusion

Our argument and empirical findings contribute to the research about contestations between local communities and the state about controversial facility siting, particularly regarding planned resource extraction projects. While previous literature about this topic has been dominated by a concentration on „Western“ countries, it is likely that our findings from the investigated Bolivian cases might be of special relevance for understanding similar environmental licensing processes in other post-colonial countries that share similar characteristics with the Bolivian ones, in Latin America or elsewhere.

Our study indicates that Bolivia’s political economy of a „new extractivism“ – such as the increased role of the state in the extractive sector and the use of growing resource revenues of this sector for financing ample social policies – has tended to contain contestations of local affected communities. As the „new extractivism“ is an expanding phenomenon in many Latin American countries (see Burchardt and Dietz 2014), the more in-depth analysis of this development path and contentious politics in the ambit of resource governance could provide valuable new insights for this field of research.

We found that due to general limited political opportunities (related to Bolivia’s model of neo-extractivism) combined with relatively high levels of economic hardship within
indigenous and peasant communities, the latter ones have focused on achieving compensation payments and other benefits from the planned projects, what contained their potential outright opposition against the projects. Similar phenomena have also been described recently for Ecuadorian indigenous communities (Faletti and Riofrancos, 2013). In contrast, research from many “Western” countries showed that local communities often have rejected money offers in exchange for hosting controversial facilities (Aldrich 2008: 8-10). This means that the general assumption from scholars like McAdam et al. (2010) that resource extraction in indigenous communities is particularly conflict prone might be relativised, especially when these communities suffer from economic hardship and, thus, tend to respond positively to promised benefits related to the projects at stake.

Beyond more general explanations for the lack of outright rejection against the building of gas activities in indigenous and peasant communities, we also identified some conditions that proved to be relevant for better understanding variations within the specific level of contention. Our findings in general underline the importance of co-occurrence of motive for opposition (threat perception or previous opposition) and means or opportunities (critical capacity and political context-sensitive, procedural opportunities).

Firstly, we found that peasant communities tended to give their consent to proposed projects in their neighbourhood without any visible signs of contest. Sometimes they even expressed their welcoming attitude regarding such projects, associated to progress and development. Secondly, the combination of high threat perception and the existence of critical capacity (i.e. strong and critical leaders and advisers) helped us to explain many of the highly contentious cases. The condition of “critical capacity” represents a conceptual innovation, derived from the original concept of “civic capacity” (Mc Adam et al. 2010) and adapted to the Bolivian cases. It might also be appropriate for analysing other licensing and participatory processes that take place in contexts characterised by great power asymmetries. Thirdly, in contrast to previous site fight-literature from „Western“ countries (McAdam and Boudet 2012; Aldrich 2008), we found that in the selected Bolivian cases the community context conditions similar industry and previous opposition often co-occurred and communities with comprehensive (and often contentious) experiences with gas projects have tended to be more critical toward new projects in their vicinity. We assume that this difference is partly due to the lack of strong state institutions that oversee company activities in relatively poor countries like Bolivia. In contexts characterised by weak state presence, companies have used to pay less attention to their socio-environmental record and to comply less with domestic legislation or soft law agreements, a fact that, in turn contributes to community discontent and contestation potential. Finally, our findings show that context-sensitive political opportunities, in the sense of widening and constraining opportunities matters for explaining variations of
local contention. In particular these changing political opportunities have been related to broader national balances of power or legislation processes.

While it will be necessary to have a close look at further country cases in the “non-Western world” to increase the potential for developing more generalisable findings, we believe that the insights of this paper still represent a fruitful point of departure for future research with regard to a further differentiation of the debate on contentious state-society interactions in the context of resource extraction projects.

References


Introduction: Stuttgart21 as a Focal Point of Present-Day Democracy

“Stuttgart21” is the name of a large-scale infrastructure project. Its key feature is the relocation underground of the main railway station in Stuttgart (the state capital of Baden-Württemberg); in addition (and linked to the relocation of the train station), a high-speed train connection from Stuttgart to Munich is built. The new track is part of the so-called “Magistrale for Europe”, linking Paris to Bratislava by high-speed train connections.

At the same time, Stuttgart21 has also become a synonym for the present-day relationship between citizens and the state, at least in Germany (see, among others, Blumenberg and Faas 2012; Brettschneider and Schuster 2013; Faas 2013; Gabriel et al. 2014). The project has caused major protests, had a major influence on the 2011 election in the state of Baden-Württemberg, was the subject of a major state-wide referendum, and has also been dealt with in other arenas and by other mechanisms of citizen participation. The present paper deals with this latter democratic dimension of the project. The aim of the paper is to understand how citizens view these very different modes of participation including electoral, direct democratic as well as deliberative elements of democracy. To do so, it will make use of a unique database: a ten-wave panel study that started in 2010 and covers the period up until autumn 2012. Using this data source, I want to answer two sets of questions: First, how do citizens perceive and evaluate the different modes of participation and what are the consequences that they link to them? Second, can we explain variances related to that, i.e. understand why some citizens evaluate certain modes of participation differently than others?
In order for readers not familiar with the issue at stake to understand these very different processes, the paper starts out with a short history of Stuttgart21 and its accompanying participatory elements. In the second section, a description of the data will follow, before the empirical analyses will start. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive overview of citizens’ perceptions of electoral, direct democratic as well as deliberative elements of present-day democracy and it will do so using Stuttgart21 as a practical example.

A Brief History of Stuttgart21: Multiple Forms of Citizen Participation

The geography of Stuttgart resembles a bowl, which has obvious consequences for the possible development (and expansion), of the city: Space within that bowl is very limited. Hence, the idea of relocating the city’s central train station underground is highly attractive. Areas of considerable size that are currently used for the train station and especially the tracks leading there would become available for other kinds of usage. The first plans for such a project date back to the 1980s; first steps towards its realisation were taken in 2001. The state parliament of Baden-Württemberg approved the project in 2006; a final agreement concerning the financing of the project was settled in 2009. Ultimately in 2010, construction works started. Obviously, construction works for such a major project are quite a challenge and everything but cheap. The current estimate for the overall cost of the project is almost seven billion Euros. Moreover, the plans also include(d) some highly emotional, symbolic elements, first and foremost tearing down the wings of the old U-shaped train station (officially having landmark status, the remainder of the building will be part of the new train station), but also cutting a number of 100-year-old trees in a park area next to the train station.¹

That said, it is hardly surprising that protests against the project had been ongoing from the very beginning onwards. They became especially severe as these highly symbolic events – tearing down the wings, cutting down the trees – came closer. Massive demonstrations on a weekly basis over many months and even years serve as proof. These protests escalated on September 30, 2010 – the so-called “Black Thursday” – when the police deployed water cannons to drive large numbers of protesters from the park site next to the train station, among them many elderly people, pupils, and students, causing several injuries among protesters and policemen. Baden-Württemberg – often seen as a very “ordered”, conservative state – was shocked.

¹ Further information about the project can be found at these website: http://www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de/en/ english/ (from the supporters’ point of view); http://www.kopfbahnhof-21.de/ (from the opponents’ point of view, in German only; accessed 12 September 2014).
To fully understand the nature as well as the dynamics of the protests, one has to take into account the political dimension of the project and the protests. Baden-Württemberg had been ruled by a Christian Democratic government for more than 60 years; the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) often had an absolute majority of their own. With respect to Stuttgart21, the Christian Democrats – along with their smaller coalition partner in the state government at the time, the Liberals (FDP) – have always been in favour of the project. The Social Democrats (SPD) were also in favour of the project, at least officially, even though a considerable share of members of the SPD was actually opposed to it. The Greens were the only party represented in the state parliament that was strongly (and cohesively) opposed to the project. As a result of this setting, Greens and Christian Democrats were the main antagonists in the conflict.

In 2009, when former Prime Minister Günter Oettinger became the new European commissioner from Germany in Brussels, Stefan Mappus – previously the head of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group – became the new Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg. Mappus presented himself as an eager, decisive politician not afraid of conflicts. Despite the considerable (and ever growing) protests against Stuttgart21, he wanted the project to go ahead, for a long time ignoring (and even trying to roll back) the protests. However, with the aforementioned escalation on “Black Thursday”, this strategy would no longer work, which even Stefan Mappus had to realise.

In a (desperate) move to pacify the conflict, Prime Minister Mappus agreed to convene a “round table” to discuss the future of the construction project as such, but also details related to it. These talks became known as the “Stuttgart21 Schlichtung” (arbitration). Chaired by Heiner Geißler – a former federal minister from the rather progressive camp within the Christian Democratic Party – an equal number of supporters and opponents of the project debated advantages and disadvantages, benefits as well as shortcomings of the overall plan of the project (and even alternatives to it), but also very detailed elements of the plans (like the number of tracks, station capacities, safety issues as well as different routes to connect Stuttgart to its airport). These – deliberative – rounds received considerable attention (not only within the region, but nationwide); they were aired live on a national news network. Overall, a total of ten rounds took place that lasted for about one month in November 2010.\(^2\) In the end, supporters and opponents of the project were able to reach a compromise, which was agreed upon behind closed doors in the very final hours of the arbitration process. The compromise was labelled “Stuttgart21 plus” and included a number of changes of the original construction plans, e.g. adding two additional tracks to the new train station and specific suggestions on how to best connect the airport to the city.

\(^2\) Details (unfortunately in German only) were available here: http://www.schlichtung-s21.de/ (accessed 12 September 2014).
Even though the mere fact that such a compromise was reached is remarkable and serves as proof of Geißler’s negotiating skills, the political deadlock concerning the project remained. The divisions were too strong and – probably even more important – a state election was just around the corner, scheduled to take place in March 2011. Especially the Green Party – being the only party in the state parliament vehemently against the project – saw the conflict as a vehicle to mobilise and persuade supporters to vote for them. Another blow for the ruling Christian Democrats (and yet another push for the Greens) came in the course of the election campaign (two weeks prior to the Election Day on March 27), namely Fukushima. In the end, the outcome of the state election was a government of Greens and Social Democrats. Winfried Kretschmann, previously the leader of the Greens in parliament, became the first Green Prime Minister in a German state. The newly elected government subscribed to a politics of listening, implying that the new government would listen to the people and not lose touch with them – by implication in contrast to its predecessor.

Still, even this historic outcome of the state election did by no means imply that the conflict over the infrastructure project was solved and settled. Instead, the conflict concerning Stuttgart21 was present even in the newly elected coalition of Greens and Social Democrats: The Greens were against the project, the Social Democrats in favour of it. To resolve the dispute, both parties agreed to disagree and hold a state-wide referendum on the issue, sending a signal to the people that the new government was serious about its new politics of listening.

However, for a number of reasons, it was far from easy to actually bring such a referendum forward. First of all, from a substantial point of view, the state of Baden-Württemberg is only one of four project partners (along with the federal state, the city of Stuttgart, and Deutsche Bahn/German Rail), ultimately responsible – in financial terms – for less than a fifth of the overall project volume. More importantly, the state constitution does not provide government parties with an easy way to run a referendum on certain policy issues. Still, a solution was found: The green-red government would introduce a bill to the state parliament proposing that the state of Baden-Württemberg should officially cancel all existing contracts for which it is financially responsible. Using the state budget in this way as a vehicle for a referendum also provided a basis for a state-wide referendum. In a second step, the party groups of the Greens and the Social Democrats in parliament had agreed beforehand that they would not unanimously support the bill. As the opposition parties in parliament – Christian Democrats and Liberals – would also vote against the bill, this had an obvious consequence: a government-proposed bill would ultimately fail in parliament. Under normal circumstances such a situation clearly signals the existence of a severe conflict between the executive and legislative branch of government. The state constitution provides the option of an arbitrating referendum under such circumstances,
initiated top-down. The government can ask the people to take a decision and solve the apparent dispute. Using this mechanism, the referendum on Stuttgart21 actually got under way and was scheduled for 27 November 2011 – just eight months after Election Day.

While the opponents of the project were already organised (due to their protest activities that already lasted for several months), the supporters had to organise themselves to get ready for the upcoming campaign and did so instantaneously. In addition, German Rail also invested in campaigning (naturally supporting the project). Moreover, political parties also played a major role in the campaign, most prominently the Greens and Christian Democrats, as they were the two main (party) contenders. Finally, the state government – consisting of Greens and Social Democrats – also decided to be an official part of the campaign: The state government issued an official voting booklet (resembling booklets that have a long tradition in Switzerland). Each side of the conflict had the opportunity to present their arguments there.

In the end, after a lively campaign, the outcome of the referendum was clear. The citizens of Baden-Württemberg voted in favour of the project. Turnout was considerable, amounting to almost 50%, and about 60% of those who voted did so in favour of the project. Green Prime Minister Kretschmann accepted the verdict of the people right away. On referendum night, he promised to accept the outcome of the referendum and build the project, even though the Greens had been in strong opposition to it for years.

Hence, it was clear thereafter that the train station would be relocated. Nonetheless, participatory innovations did not end here. Even though most of the suggestions that the arbitration process chaired by Heiner Geißler came up with soon became forgotten, the question of how to best connect the airport to the city became the issue of yet another mechanism of citizen participation, the so-called “Filderdialog” (“filder dialogue”).³ In June and July 2012, i.e. about seven months after the referendum, three deliberative rounds of talks took place. In the course of these, about 100 randomly chosen citizens from the Stuttgart area met with experts to discuss the pros and cons of different alternatives to connect the airport to Stuttgart. In the end, they came up with a recommendation for one of them by a majority vote. Unfortunately for the participants, though, the recommendations remained unheard in the end, even though all project partners of Stuttgart21 had previously supported the idea of such a dialogue.

Protests, arbitration, a state election, a referendum and finally a dialogue – very different mechanisms of citizen participation were used in the context of Stuttgart21. Obviously,

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³ Details – again in German only – are available here: http://www.filderdialog-s21.de/ (accessed 12 September 2014). “Filder” refers to the area where the airport is located.
they are very different in many respects. The protests constitute the least institutionalised form of participation. In the following, they will not be covered here. Instead, we shall focus on the more institutionalised forms of citizen participation: In the context of an election (and especially one that took place just two weeks after Fukushima), the issue of Stuttgart21 was just one among many others, albeit an important one. In the case of the referendum, it was – by definition – the exclusive issue at stake. Still, the aim in both cases – election as well as referendum – was to have a final and binding decision in the end. Concerning the arbitration and the dialogue, deliberative elements enter the stage, but even these two mechanisms differ substantially: While the arbitration was not limited to a specific element of the overall project, but was (also) about the project as such, the dialogue was limited in scope. Moreover, the arbitration process was characterised by a process of representation (supporters as well as opponents were represented by prominent personae from the respective camps), the dialogue resembled a deliberative poll consisting of randomly selected people who met with experts. What both of these mechanisms share is the non-binding character of their recommendations, which is quite obvious in both cases: These recommendations were – more or less – ignored in both cases in the end.

Still, this multitude of means of citizen participation provides us with a unique opportunity to study these very different modes. This can be done from an institutional, formal point of view. Here, we shall apply a different perspective. Ever since the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963), we know that the structure and culture of a political system have to match each other in order for the system to be stable. Citizens have to accept and actually support “their” institutions. However, there is a lot of talk about democratic innovations or democratic reforms these days: more citizen participation, more direct democracy, more deliberative elements are often requested. But in fact, we know rather little about how citizens actually view these very different processes and to what extent they support them. Moreover, institutional rules should not be a matter of dispute among citizens. The rules of the (political) game should be – more or less – consensual. Hence, it should also be tested to what extent citizens are divided or united concerning such institutional rules and reforms. Again, we know rather little about this question.

That said, Stuttgart21 provides a unique opportunity to study political participation in very different institutionalised manifestations in the context of a real issue. This is even more true given that we have a unique database that covers the entire period during which these events took place, ranging from fall 2010 to summer 2012. This database will be presented in the next section.
Data: A Panel Survey

The different means of citizen participation took place over a period of about two years. To study and analyse these, we need a data base that is longitudinally organised. Fortunately, a dynamic panel study is available: an identical group of people from Baden-Württemberg has been interviewed a number of times in a long-term panel study. For the purpose of this paper, we will make use of ten of these waves. These data come from three related projects: first the Election Study Baden-Württemberg 2011, then a study specifically designed to cover the run-up and outcome of the referendum and finally a continuation of the latter study in August 2012. Table 1 provides some details about the different waves (see also Faas and Blumenberg 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Election Study</td>
<td>18.11.2010 to 02.02.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Election Study</td>
<td>13.02.2011 to 26.02.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Election Study</td>
<td>27.02.2011 to 12.03.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Election Study</td>
<td>13.03.2011 to 26.03.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Election Study</td>
<td>28.03.2011 to 18.04.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Election Study</td>
<td>17.05.2011 to 25.05.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Referendum Study</td>
<td>30.10.2011 to 12.11.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Referendum Study</td>
<td>13.11.2011 to 26.11.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Continuation</td>
<td>14.08.2012 to 03.09.2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants were recruited from an online access panel (provided by the market research company YouGov in Germany); the recruited and interviewed people were supposed to reflect the structure of the voting population of Baden-Württemberg as closely as possible. About 3,150 people took part in the very first wave of our panel study. About 1,000 participants took part in all ten waves; they constitute the basis for the present paper.

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4 In total, twelve waves have been conducted so far, but the two most recent ones will not be used as no further democratic innovations in the context of Stuttgart21 have been conducted in their respective field periods.
Substantially, the study covers campaign dynamics in the run-up to the state election in March 2011 as well as the referendum on Stuttgart21 in November 2011 (hence the high density of panel waves in the days before these events); but the study also included very fundamental questions on perceptions and evaluations of democratic processes that can be used for the purpose of the present paper.

Before these issues will be presented in greater detail, a word of caution is necessary: The applied design consists of ten panel waves and covers a period of approximately two years. Such a design has many advantages, but it also comes at a price: Panel-conditioning (respondents get used to the questions repeatedly asked) as well as selective panel mortality are inevitable. Moreover, as the study is based on an online access panel, it cannot claim to be fully representative. Still, as we are interested in developments over time as well as comparisons across modes of participation, these disadvantages are outweighed by the advantage that we can observe developments and changes on an individual level.

When it comes to questions asked in the course of our panel survey, we first of all have overall evaluations of Stuttgart21, including cognitive ones as well as affective ones: Over the course of our study, we have asked respondents to what extent the issue causes them to experience – among other emotions – joy as well as anger, both measured on 7-point-scales. In addition to that, we have asked them to what extent they are interested in the issue (measured on a 5-point-scale). The affective as well as the cognitive measures can be used to study the effects of the different mechanisms of citizen participation by looking for changes in these global measures over time: Does interest in the issue increase or decrease in a certain context or in the aftermath of certain events? Does the discourse become more or less emotional?

| Table 2: Questions Asked in the Course of the Panel Study |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mode | Item | Scaling | Wave(s) |
| Arbitration | Awareness / Subjective Interest | | |
| Arbitration | How closely do/did you follow the arbitration? | 4-point-scale | 1 |
| Election | How important is the outcome of the state election for you? | 4-point-scale | 4 |
| Referendum | How important is the outcome of the referendum to you? | 4-point-scale | 8 |
| Dialogue | Have you ever heard of the so-called Filder dialogue? / How well informed do you feel about the Filder dialogue? | Yes/No 5-point-scale | 10 |
| (Hypothetical) Participation | | | |
| Arbitration | --- | | |

150
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>On March 27, 2011, the state election took place here in Baden-Württemberg: Have you cast your vote in this election?</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>Have you cast your vote in the referendum on Stuttgart21?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Would you take part in a process such as the Filder dialogue, if you were invited to do so?</td>
<td>5-point-scale</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Overall Evaluation | |
|-------------------|-----------------|---|
| Arbitration | There has been an arbitration process in the context of Stuttgart21, chaired by Heiner Geißler. How do you evaluate the fact that this process has taken place? | 5-point-scale | 2 |
| Election | To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statement: "It makes a big difference which parties govern Baden-Württemberg." | 5-point-scale | 4 |
| Referendum | How do you evaluate the fact that this referendum has taken place? | 5-point-scale | 9 |
| Dialogue | Regardless of the outcome of the Filder dialogue, how do you evaluate the fact that this dialogue has taken place? | 5-point-scale | 10 |

**Expected Consequences**

- All parties involved should accept the compromise found in the arbitration.1

| Arbitration | Overall, the arbitration will increase the acceptance of the project Stuttgart21. | 5-point-scale | 1 (5) |
| Election | --- | |
| Referendum | The green-red state government has to accept the outcome of the referendum. | 5-point-scale | 9 |
| Dialogue | --- | |

---

1 The arbitration process ended in the course of wave 1, hence the question wording had to be adjusted. Moreover, this question was only asked for a subgroup of all respondents from wave 1.

2 This question was only asked if people felt at least partially informed about the dialogue.

In addition to such indirect tests of how the issue of Stuttgart21 is perceived and whether the different mechanisms have an effect on that, we can analyse perceptions of the different modes of participation directly. For each mechanism (arbitration, state election, referendum, dialogue), a number of questions that were directly asked are available.
These can be grouped along several dimensions: First of all, are people involved in these processes? Involvement is understood in a rather broad sense, including awareness and subjective interest, but also and ultimately participation in the respective events (if applicable). Second, to what extent do people support the idea underlying the respective mechanisms? And finally, what are the consequences of the different modes that people expect?

Table 2 provides an overview of the items related to the different mechanisms that will be used in the following empirical analysis; the numbers in parentheses refer to the wave(s) of our panel study in which the questions were asked.

When we try to explain why the different modes are perceived and evaluated differently by different people, I want to use a very simple explanatory model that makes use of socio-demographic variables (age, sex, education) as well as some fundamental variables related to Stuttgart21, namely respondents’ own position (in favour or opposed to the project), the interest in the issue as well as the degree to which Stuttgart21 elicits joy and anger. The stronger the effects of these variables on the perceptions and evaluations of the different modes are, the more disagreement is present within the population.

Results: Global Perceptions of Stuttgart21

As outlined above, I will start the empirical part of the paper with an analysis of global measures related to Stuttgart21 in terms of cognitions and emotions (see also Blumenberg and Faas 2012). Figure 1 displays the development of the subjective interest in Stuttgart21 that our 951 respondents, who continuously took part in our study, report over the course of two years. Two things catch one’s eye: Interest in the issue is relatively high for the entire period under observation. In fact, it is only slightly lower than general interest in politics or interest in state politics.5 This is rather exceptional for a single policy issue. Second, there clearly is a dynamic element: Interest in the issue is highest in waves 1, 7, 8, and 9; lowest in wave 10. Wave 1 was conducted under the impression of the major protests (and the arbitration), whereas waves 7 through 9 constitute the “referendum waves”. Neither the election waves nor wave 10 (conducted in the context of the dialogue) spark a similar interest in the issue.

Figure 2 displays the patterns that emerge for the emotions joy and anger. First of all, very little joy is linked to the project. Over the entire period under observation, the resulting averages are close to the lower end of the scale. Moreover, there is very little variance over time. When

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5 In wave 6, for example, average (general) interest in politics as well as interest in state politics are at 2.45 (on a scale from 0 to 4), interest in Stuttgart21 is at 2.33.
it comes to anger, we see much more of that, but also more dynamics. The highest level is present in wave 1 (after the escalation of the protests); but after that, the situation becomes more and more calm and reaches a low in wave 6. With the start of the referendum campaign, however, anger soars – only to reach a new low right after the referendum. Even though we see yet another rise in anger in wave 10, the pattern still suggests that the arbitration, but especially the referendum had the power to pacify the dispute.

Perceptions of the Different Modes of Participation

As we have just seen, there is a dynamic element related to the project and its perception, possibly linked to the different forms of citizen participation applied. However, we can test this in much greater detail given our data. We will do so in several steps, first looking at awareness of and subjective interest in the different modes, followed by (hypothetical) participation, an overall evaluation of them as well as ascribed consequences, the latter being restricted to the arbitration and the referendum.

Awareness and Subjective Interest

Starting with awareness and subjective interest, figure 3 displays the results for the four modes of participation that are analysed here. As can be seen from the comparison, people still are most aware of the state election, followed by the state-wide referendum.
When asked to what extent they care about the outcome of these two mechanisms of participation, vast majorities do care (implying that they have an interest in the process per se). For the deliberative modes of participation, the arbitration (aired prominently on national television) still gets considerable attention – people have followed these rounds very closely and attentively. The Filder dialogue is the odd one out here – a lot of people had never heard of the event at all. And even those who have heard about it still feel very poorly informed, as the right bar of figure 3 shows.

Overall, we can conclude that we can still take for granted that people pay attention to elections. Large-scale referendums also reach citizens’ awareness. This cannot be granted for other modes of participation. Of course, an arbitration aired on TV becomes well known, but as the dialogue shows, others forms remain hardly heard of.

**Participation**

Being aware of and interested in an election is, of course, only a necessary precondition for other things, first and foremost a (possible) participation. In the case of Stuttgart21, we know (from the respective post-surveys) who participated in the state election and the referendum; for the dialogue, we have at least a hypothetical question: would people be willing to take part in events like the dialogue? For the arbitration, citizen participation is obviously not applicable, as it was based on the idea of representation.
Figure 3: Awareness / Subjective Interest for the Different Modes of Participation

Figure 4: (Non-)Participation in Different Modes of Participation

Figure 4 corroborates the findings from the previous step: Elections have the highest turnout, followed by the referendum. Again, things look very different for the dialogue – people are much more sceptical and hesitant concerning their own participation.

6 The participation rates based on our survey overestimate the true turnout rates (66% for the election, 48% for the referendum) – a phenomenon well known as overreporting in the literature.
in such an event (even though the question is only asked in a hypothetical way). It – again – becomes clear that participation in elections (and referendums) is part of citizens’ standard operating procedures, which is much less true for other forms of citizen participation.

**Overall Evaluation**

In addition to participation, we can look at an overall evaluation of the different modes of participation. Figure 5 displays the respective results. By far, the referendum is seen as the “best” mode of participation – a vast majority of the citizens of Baden-Württemberg support the referendum as such. The dialogue is also seen very positively (even though this finding is only based on people who are aware of the dialogue at all). Still, such forms of participation are highly welcome, as other (German) studies have also shown recently (see, e.g., Gabriel, 2013), even though they are socially selective (Schäfer and Schoen, 2013). This is also – still – true for elections, but this form is just one among many in terms of its overall evaluation. As for the arbitration, people think that is was a good thing by and large, but they are not too enthusiastic about it, either. If one were to speculate, this might be due to the fact that it took place in a very polarised setting and in the end – at least in terms of substantial changes to the overall project – did not have a lasting impact.

**Figure 5. Evaluation of Different Modes of Participation**

![Bar chart showing evaluation of different modes of participation](source: Own Study, n=951)

7 In fact, we have asked this question in multiple waves and the view of the arbitration deteriorates over time.
**Expected Consequences**

The ultimate question remains: Do these different forms of participation have an impact on the course of events? What kind of consequences do people expect in the aftermath of the events? As we focus on Stuttgart21, we will specifically look at questions related to the acceptance of this – highly controversial – issue.

**Figure 6. Expected Acceptance after Arbitration and Referendum**

As Figure 6 shows, results are mixed in this respect. People do expect that the players involved in the processes accept the compromises and results. This is true for the arbitration – a majority of respondents wants supporters as well as opponents of the project to accept the results of the arbitration process. Even more pronounced are the results for the referendum: More than 80% of our respondents expect the green-red government to accept the verdict of the people (as manifested in the referendum), hardly anyone disagrees with that.

However, when it comes to the question of whether these different forms have the power to induce acceptance in the population as a whole, answers are much more mixed. About a third of our respondents expect that the arbitration will increase public acceptance for the project; but another third expects the opposite. The results are very similar for the referendum. Apparently, these mechanisms are seen as tools to bind elites and send a signal to them. But they are not seen as consensus builders in the population as a whole.
Determinants of Perceptions and Evaluations of the Different Modes of Participation

In the very final step of our analysis, I shall take a look at possible determinants of the perceptions and evaluations of the different modes of participation. However, I shall restrict the analysis to two dimensions: First, what are the factors that determine who does (or would) participate in the different modes and who does (or would) not? And secondly, what determines how these modes are evaluated? As outlined above, I want to use a very simple explanatory model that makes use of socio-demographic variables (age, sex, education) as well as some fundamental variables related to Stuttgart21, namely respondents’ own positions (in favour or opposed to the project), the interest in the issue as well as the degree to which Stuttgart21 elicits joy and anger. Linear regression models will be used to test the explanatory power of these potential determinants.

Table 3 displays the results for participation. As it turns out, the different modes have marked differences when it comes to explaining who participates and who does not. Socio-demographic variables play an important role with respect to the election – men and respondents with higher education have a higher likelihood to participate than others. Neither of these variables has an effect on participation in the referendum (even though the direction of the effect is identical) or the dialogue. We see an effect of age for the referendum, though.

Whether or not one is in favour of the project Stuttgart21 as such does not play a significant role for any of the mechanisms. If we look at the sign of the coefficients, however, supporters of the project were rather less likely to participate in the dialogue than were opponents. The driving force of participation for the referendum as well as the dialogue is interest in the issue; this factor also fosters turnout in the state election, even though to a lesser extent; emotions on the other hand do not play a role.

Overall, our – simple – model works best for the referendum, as the Pseudo R² tells us – and that is mostly due to interest in the issue as a driving force. Turnout in the election can be explained to some extent by the variables included, even though the models work less well. When it comes to the dialogue, our model basically fails to explain any variance (with interest in the issue being the only slight exception). Given that we did see that some people would participate in such a dialogue while others would not, we have to come up with different ideas of how to explain these differences. Our simple standard models do not work.
Table 3: Determinants of Participation (Logistic regression, b-coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Referendum</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=Male)</td>
<td>0.713**</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1=Abitur)</td>
<td>0.643*</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro S21</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest S21</td>
<td>0.703***</td>
<td>1.353***</td>
<td>0.241***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger S21</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy S21</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.317*</td>
<td>-2.292***</td>
<td>-1.039**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Evaluation

Participation is one thing, but might be linked to different aspect than the overall evaluation of the mechanisms that we turn to now. In fact, the patterns that emerge when we try to explain these evaluations turn out to be quite different. Pertaining to the arbitration, highly educated people valued this forum more than others – as did supporters of the project. They were probably hoping for a settlement of the dispute so that the construction work would finally start. Elections are valued by older people as well as people interested, more in favour, and also happier about Stuttgart21. Elections seem to be a rather “pleasant” thing that is not necessarily seen as a suitable tool for opposition and change.

Quite contrary, supporters of the project were opposed to the referendum, which posed a potential threat to “their” project. What has to be kept in mind, though, is the timing of the questions asked: The evaluation stems from the period after the referendum, when supporters had actually won the referendum (and opponents had clearly lost). That the opponents still value the referendum more than others, reminds us of the fact that participation also has a value in itself. As was the case for participation, the model only poorly explains perceptions of the dialogue. A note of caution is necessary, though: None of these models explains evaluations of the different modes well. But as we saw some differences in the level of support for them, we need to come up with better ideas what actually drives such perceptions. The new forms of participation not only raise new challenges for political elites, but also for political science!
Table 4: Determinants of Evaluation (OLS regression, unstandardised b-coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arbitration</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Referendum</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=Male)</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1=Abitur)</td>
<td>0.165*</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro S21</td>
<td>0.323***</td>
<td>0.213*</td>
<td>-0.709***</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest S21</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.267***</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger S21</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy S21</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.061*</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.145***</td>
<td>1.423***</td>
<td>3.388***</td>
<td>3.766***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Conclusion

*Stuttgart21* has been one of the most controversial and disputed issues in recent German history. It has also provided a lab for democratic innovations. In this paper, I have looked at citizens’ views of the very different modes of citizen participation that have been used in the context of *Stuttgart21*. After all, structure and culture have to match each other in order for a system to be stable.

The mechanisms that have been used have been very different – arbitration and election, referendum and dialogue are in fact very different. As the results have shown, they are also viewed very differently by people. This is true in terms of level of awareness and participation, but also overall evaluations. But it not only applies to levels of supports, but also determinants that drive these perceptions. As we are talking about the stability and future of our democracy, we need to know these things – but many times, we are not too good at that. The *Filder dialogue*, to name just one example, is probably the most controversial and least known mechanism discussed here. But our explanatory models basically fail. A lot of cumulative works remains to be done to understand present-day relationships between citizens and the state.
REFERENCES


8 The Mexican Movement
#yosoy132

Yanina Welp

Introduction

In Sidi Bouzid (Tunisia 2010-2011), was unemployment and a dictatorship what brought the people to revolt. In the streets of Santiago (Chile 2011) students mobilized to push for a reform of an exclusionary educational system inherited by the dictatorship. During those times, several cities all over Greece had their streets and squares overrun by people demonstrating against the austerity measures that were being applied by their government but ordered from the European Union. In Spain it started in May 2011, when a social movement known as the 15M or the indignados (the outraged) came on the scene just before the municipal elections, protesting against the political class and the economic situation. In 2012 Mexican students, organized under the #Yosoy132 (I am 132) movement during the national elections to protest against the concentration of media influence in compliance with political power, the patronage and manipulation of information. Brazil followed the path in 2013, with mobilizations in the streets organized through the social networks in 2013 in Brazil.

The previous are just few examples of an extended wave of protests that have spread spontaneously in different countries of the world, and account for the diversity of the demands. Protest is defined as a “resource of the powerless”, given that they depend for success not upon direct utilization of power, but upon activating other groups to enter a political arena (della Porta 2008). The possibilities of success of a social protest is conditioned by the way strategies work in a given structural or institutional and conjunctural factors. These refer to the institutional warranties related to respect for the rule of law as well as the mechanisms to access to power. The institutional warranties are based on the functioning of democracy (or lack, thereof) and, particularly, the respect for basic democratic rules (freedom of expression, fair and free elections, and access to

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1 I want to thank Henio Hoyo, Flavia Freidenberg, Jonathan Wheatley and the participants of the Workshop “Social Protest and Democratic Responsiveness: Realities in Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union” (10 October 2014) for their useful comments and suggestions.
information). Mechanisms to access to power can be direct (when there are provisions for activating citizen’ initiatives or referendums) or indirect (related to the capacity of movements to articulate links with allies and to establish clear objectives and make use of the created opportunities, for instance, divisions among the elites). Accordingly, when democratic rules are not observed and there are no (and protests cannot lead to) mechanisms to access to power, the probabilities of affecting the public issues’ definition and the same survival of social movements is on suspense.

Some of the protests mentioned above were relatively successful as they obtained answers to their demands – in Brazil, the government moved backwards with the rise in the price of transport, while it is still remaining the claim for a political reform; in Chile, the need for an educative reform was introduced into the agenda of the new elected President Michelle Bachelet. In other cases, consolidated movements (or divisions of these) have changed their strategies to become new political parties with strong opportunities of disputing the electoral scene, or to build alliances with previous parties in conditions to do so – Podemos, in Spain, is an example of the first option; Syriza, in Greece, represents the second one. A third group of movements has gone from an initial euphoria and generation of great expectations to an impasse and later disappearance or dissolution in local experiences of democratization. This seems to be the case of the Mexican #yosoy132.

The aim of this article is to analyse the movement Yosoy132 in the framework of the Political Opportunities Structure theory (POS) (Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1996). The POS refers to the consistent – although not necessarily permanent or formal – dimensions of the political context that make collective action more or less likely. In this way, the POS emphasises resources that are exterior to the group and which reduce the costs of collective action, discover potential allies and show how the authorities are vulnerable (Martí i Puig 2011). Our main goal is to understand under what conditions #yosoy132 developed its strategy, and which were the weaknesses and limitations faced by the movement to take part in the definition of public affairs, or in other words, what explains its failure in achieving its political goals.

We assume that under certain conditions generated by structural and juncture conditions, the movements develop their strategies; however, these strategies are not determined

2 However, while as a movement it did not leave outcomes in terms of direct influence on the political arena, its legacy could be related to the repertoires of actions available in further protests (as seen at the moment of revisiting this text, when Mexico is mobilized against an event in which 43 students in Iguala (a village in Guerrero state) were massacred by a local drug trafficking gang working in accordance with the police. The dimension of the murdering and the denunciations of many others have opened the door to an in deep questioning of the politics of Mexican governments against social protest in the last decades. See “Mexican gang suspected of killing 43 students admits to mass murder”, The Guardian, 8 November 2014; see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/07/gang-suspected-43-mexican-students (accessed 8 November 2014).
by the political structure. External opportunities do not necessarily produce long-term social movements. Inter personal links and collective identities create the basis for the ideological unity that is necessary to consolidate a sustained social movement (Tarrow 1996).

The article is structured as follows: in the following section, an analytical framework is presented; then the case #yosoy132 is described; it is followed by an analysis of outcomes and reasons explaining these results; finally some conclusions are drawn.

Analytical framework

Social Movements during the Information Era

Recent literature about national and transnational social movements has emphasized on elements that, even in dissimilar contexts, many urban movements share in common. These elements are:

i) **Explosion of the protest:** this means, the fast and often surprising emergency of the protest into the social and political scenery as a symptom of rejection against the *status quo*. This emergency of the protest has much to do with what della Porta (2008) has called “eventfulness”. For Arditi (2014: 113) insurgencies are about saying “enough” and refusing to go on as before. But crisis is not enough, because according to Tarrow “collective action proliferates when people acquires access to the necessary resources to escape from normal passiveness and find the opportunity to use them” (1996: 109).

ii) **Horizontal or network organization:** without having an identifiable leader every time more protests expand and adopt horizontal ways of organization, with assembly mechanisms and flexible nodes of communication (Juris 2005; Welp and Wheatley 2012). Different from the hierarchical dynamic of traditional left and the classical parties dynamic, feelings and emotions play a prominent role, added to a repertoire of artistic, visual manifestations and the joy of being part of a political movement (Juris 2005; Castells 2007). People’s collective action is something attractive not only due to its potential to be exciting or risky, but rather due to the opportunity it offers for self-expression (Marti i Puig 2011).

iii) **Intensive use of new technologies**, which enables fast connections between diverse groups and enhances a viral expansion of the protest on its initial periods. By enhancing the speed, low cost, flexibility and reach of information flows, by allowing
for communication across large distances in real time, digital networks provide
the technological infrastructure for the emergence and renovation of protests and
social movements (Juris 2005; Garret 2006). Online forms of communication such as
blogs, social media and user generated content have allowed people to engage in
activities –online and offline– aimed at influencing government and policy (Groshek
and Bachman 2014) and have proved to be efficient and effective to catapult the
citizenship mobilization (Breuer and Groshek 2014; Triga and Manavopoulus 2013).
These media also have opened windows for people to express and offer frameworks
in which what they say can be understood (from citizens to citizens), escaping from
the traditional control of discourses present in traditional mass media.

#yosoyp132 shared the mentioned features: the movement emerged unexpectedly, when
a group of students of a private university initiated a protest against both media and
political manipulation. The reasons alleged to mobilize combined the perception of
structural lack (a weak democracy; cohabitation of the media and political and economic
power) and a technological structure that enabled the generation and spread of alternative
information (in 2012 the number of internet users was more than 40 million, a third of the
country’s population)³, and the fast contact between those movement supporters once
a punctual fact boosted the protest. The movement was organized in local assemblies
that gathered in certain moments with the national assembly. The process of cognitive
learning stressed by the literature as well as the creative way of organize the protest
were observed by several scholars (Ruiz Tovar and Salinas Amescua 2013; Ruiz Galicia
2013; Rovira Sancho 2012; Galindo Cáceres and González-Acosta 2013). Finally has to
be mentioned that despite the origins of the protest are not dependent of digital media,
in this particular case is possible to posit that the speed and freedom of the digital media
played a key role spreading the protest (see a detailed description below).

The Political Opportunity Structure

In his analysis of the emergence of social movements in American cities during the sixties,
Eisinger conceived protest as a signal of impatience and frustration, and suggested that
“Protest occur in a mixed system because the pace of change does not keep up with
expectations even though change is occurring. As the political opportunity structure
becomes more open, groups that were powerless before begin to acquire influence”
(Eisinger 1973: 15). Eisinger suggested a correlation between the emergence of the
protest and the opening of the system: the link between protest and political opportunities
would be curvilinear, completely opened systems would present enough channels to

³ Source: AMPICI.
avoid non conventional participation while completely closed systems would prevent any participation. “Where formal or informal power appears to be concentrated, and where government is not responsive, the opportunities for people to get what they want or need through political action are limited” (Eisinger 1973: 12).

The POS framework initially thought for democratic regimes, has been redefined to include contexts of mobilizations against partially closed or closed systems (Favela 2002). Mexico moved from being considered a hybrid regime in the seventies (Morlino 2008) to qualify as a full democracy in 2006, while since 2011 the system shows signals of deterioration. In our context, it could mean that more than an opening of opportunities the mobilization of #yosoy132 express an attempt of stopping a process closing. Also has to be noticed that the case is not an isolated event but part of many other mobilizations.

Here we will focus on the following elements of the institutional structure:

1) The power distribution among branches and levels of government, as it establishes the scope and scale of the available channels for citizens to participate and influence policy making (Favela 2002; Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1996). For instance, if the Executive concentrates power and controls to a greater or lesser extent the Legislative and Judicial branches, the accessibility of the system is more limited;

2) The electoral and party systems that indicates, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the electoral process to select governors (transparency, open and fair competency, access and spreading of information; or lack thereof) and, on the other hand, the capacity of the system to represent a wide spectrum of interests through political parties (Alarcón Olguín 2012; Favela 2002)

3) The existence of institutions of citizen participation that offer channels for the citizens to express their voice and decision to ratify or veto reforms and laws, and/or exercise de right of initiative. Here we particularly consider the existence of direct democracy mechanisms (MDDs) out of the control of authorities. Ideally, bottom-up MDDs promote the consolidation of democracy by limiting the capacity of the state elites to abuse their power (Serdült and Welp 2012).

4 From 2006 to 2010 Mexico was qualified as a full democracy and since 2011, as a “partly free” country by Freedom House: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2010Sub-CategoryScores-Website (accessed 24 September 2014); Currently, Morlino defines the Mexican democracy as minimal (private exchange).

5 Although, most of these mobilization have roots on the local level or are located in rural areas.

6 MDDs are defined as a set of procedures that allow citizens to make political decisions directly through a vote. The vote can be prescribed by a constitution or a law and, thus, be automatic (also known as mandatory); it can be triggered by the authorities in power such as a parliament, a government, or (frequently) the president (facultative referendum, identified as “top down”); or it can depend on a collection of signatures (identified as “bottom up”) aimed either at blocking decisions post factum (abrogative referendum) or at introducing legal provisions independent of previous legislative action (citizen’s initiatives, optional referendum; see Serdült and Welp 2012.)
Referring to the negotiation and conflict resolution conjunction we will consider:

4) The availability of allies, considering that the capacity of influence of a social movement can be multiplied if it has powerful allies able to expand the demands into broader scene or make pressure on decision makers (Tarrow 1996). This power could be derived from different more or less combined features such us capacity of mobilization (e.g. a well structure and extended labour union), an actor with influence to fix the public agenda (e.g. a mass media) or to make decisions (a political party with seats in Parliament),

5) The elite cohesion, given that when elites are strongly united, the social movements face a unified and closed opposition, and its possibilities to influence the system are limited, while when there are groups and divisions, it is more likely for some actors to become more sensitive to their demands. Unstable alignments create uncertainty and encourage those disaffected to try to practice a marginal power (Tarrow 1996: 118).

6) The main strategies for conflict resolution; so the repressive or exclusive strategies lead the movements to adopt antagonist or rebellious positions, while the integrative and enabling strategies favour peaceful procedures or less warring (Favela 2002: 106).

In the next section the emergence, spread and functioning during the year 2012 is considered.

Origin and development of #yosoy132

On May 11th 2012, presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the party that ruled the country for over 70 years (1929 to 2000), was invited to give a lecture (as part of a cycle of conferences to which all presidential candidates were invited) at the private Ibero-American University in one of the wealthiest areas of Mexico City. After his speech, Peña Nieto was questioned on the violent repression that occurred in 2006 during his mandate as governor of Mexico State.7

7 In 2006, during “La otra campaña”, a campaign promoted by the EZLN, the federal and the municipal police as well as the State Security Agency were involved in violent conflicts with people and supporters of the Front of People for the Defence of Land (supporters of EZLN). The event ended with two killed people, hundred of arbitrary detentions and sexual abuse committed by the security forces against women of the villages (reported by the National Committee for Human Rights). Peña Nieto not only did not recognize the abuses committed by the military and police forces but also defended the action. It has to be noticed that in those times Mexico was considered a full democracy by Freedom House.
Due to the intensity of the protest, he had to leave the University, but when interviewed by the media, Peña Nieto and his allies presumed that the protestors were only a few, were not students and were paid and mobilized by opposition leader, Manuel López Obrador (Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD). In an interview at Radio Ibero, the spokesperson from PRI declared later “I am not sure whether they were students or not, but they were very aggressive, organized, and they did not only tease Enrique Peña Nieto but also many people, including the reporters”. That very night, the journalist José Carreño said on the most popular newscasts on Televisa that “if they were... let’s say, people, trained young people out there (...) a set of ten guys are able to create a situation that affects the university’s image”. The following day, most of the written press registered this version of the facts.

It is worth to mention that Mexican broadcast media is dominated by two companies: Televisa and TV Azteca. These two conglomerates control over 90 percent of the free-to-air television market. In addition, 13 business groups control 86 percent of radio stations. Televisa wields great financial and political clout and maintains a dominant position as shaper of Mexican public opinion (Trejo Delarbre 2005). According to Freedom House (2012), the company is capable of harming the careers of politicians who threaten its dominance; conversely, it may transform a favoured candidate into a winning politician, as it would have been the case with Enrique Peña Nieto. This is a key fact to explain the emergence of #yosoy132.

During the weekend after the confrontation with Peña Nieto, two students of the Ibero-American University spread the word calling for those who had been on Friday, to send a short video showing their answer (“we are not a shock group, we are not carried, and no one trained us for nothing”) and the university card. They expected around 30 videos, but they received more than two hundred, of which 131 (the ones that arrived on the deadline) were edited together in a YouTube video. The video showed 131 young students giving their names and student card numbers while the voice of a member of the Green Party (in coalition with PRI at this time) is heard saying “There is a group of, I do not want to say young people. They were older. I believe from 30 to 35 years old. Inciting. They were no more than 20 people. The information we received is that groups close to Manuel López Obrador were promoting and organizing this kind of acts”. The words of the spokesperson from the Green Party and the images on the screen were enough to show the media manipulation.

The following days, the video went viral, became trending topic on Twitter and triggered a movement that would fast take the streets. When Denisse Dresser, a well known Mexican

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8 Quoted by Rovira Sancho, 2013.
9 Ibid.
10 “131 students from the Ibero answer”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7XbocXsFkl (accessed 24 September 2014). This and other videos as well as the graphics used by the movement showed that different from other protests (such as the indignados in Spain) the cultural dimensions of the movements were less prominent.
journalist used the expression “Yo soy 132” (I am the number 132, already twitted by some students) helped to catapult the movement on the public space.

From May 11th to July 1st, the polling day, the movements started to take shape not only to be on the social networks but also on the streets with massive demonstrations, with diverse expressions of protest. The Twitter account @yosoy132 had 41,226 followers by June 3rd, and the Facebook account, over 100,000 (Sandoval and Gil-García 2013).

On May 18th, students from many universities organized a demonstration in front of Televisa offices to claim for the human right to information (Rovira Sancho 2013). After that, a twitt calling for protest against the PRI candidate was again becoming massive. Two weeks later, more than forty thousand people were on the streets. The purpose was oriented to the democratization of mass media and the rejection to the PRI's candidate. On May 23rd, a multitudinous assembly towards the “Stella of Light” (Estela de la Luz) was taken as a platform for the presentation of the movement principles:

“We are a movement unconnected to any political party, constituted by citizens. Being so, we do not express support to any candidate or political part, but we respect the plurality and diversity of the members of this movement. Our wishes and demands are centred on defending the freedom of expression and the right to information of all Mexicans, as both elements are essential for a conscious and participative citizenship. We will promote an informed and thoughtful vote”.

On May 30th, the first inter-university assembly was celebrated. The movement was organized in local assemblies that gathered in certain moments with the national assembly. Many working tables were created in order to analyse and develop contents. Research centred on internal dynamic of the movement suggest that such structure blocked in many cases more flexible processes and fast decision making (Ruiz Galicia 2013). This is, in any case, a common tension between democratization and efficiency that often crosses contemporary movements.

On June 11th, at the peak of the movement and short time before the elections, the British newspaper The Guardian published documents that would prove the undercover propaganda paid by the PRI to Televisa in order to install Peña Nieto in diverse programs of the enterprise. The piece of news called the attention of the public. Based on cables

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11 This text became later a part of the #yosoy132 Manifest: http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Primer_comunicado_de_la_Coordinadora_del_Movimiento_YoSoy132_%28Manifiesto%29 (accessed 24 September 2014).
leaked from the US embassy in Mexico, referred to the two networks (Televisa and TV Azteca) “widely perceived to be political kingmakers”.

On July 9th Televisa and TV Azteca broadcast the second debate between presidential candidates (TV Azteca refused to broadcast the first because took place at the same time that a football match) in a fact that was identified as a victory for #yosoy132. A third debate, organized by the movement was broadcast by the social networks, and Peña Nieto did not take part. This was considered a triumph of the people to the extent that the debate was not scheduled by the Electoral Federal Institute.

On July 10th again thousands of people went on the street of Mexico DC and other twenty cities demonstrating against Peña Nieto. Many denounces of campaigns organized by PRI to intimidate supporters of the movement were made (Rovira Sancho 2013). Other campaigns are organized, such as the teenagers who do not have right to vote but ask for their right to information (“yosoy132”) as well as parents and relatives of the mobilized students (“You are not alone”, with a speech such as “my daughter works for democracy” or “my son is an intelligent man, not a criminal”).

The collective Anonymus also got involved into the protest. Finally, the movement organized to play a role as electoral observers against a possible fraud. New callings for taping and keeping alert during the elections were made.

After the election – which Peña Nieto won with an important margin (38% for PRI, 31.5% for PRD and 25% for PAN with a turnout of 63%), an initial moment of frustration and confusion was followed by an attempt to reactivate and sustain the protest. Students organized themselves and broadcast a vast report on Felipe Calderon’s administration (PAN, president between 2000 and 2006). On December, Peña Nieto held office in a day ended with violent repression and protests (Ruiz Galicia 2013, Alonso 2013). In 2013, although the movement continues, it is weakened and reduced. As an outstanding case, on July 2nd, #yosoy132 accused and ex member of being paid by the Center of Research

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13 Is worth to mention that Televisa denounced The Guardian by defamation and finally both corporations arrived to an agreement; see http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/feb/05/guardian-settles-legal-dispute-televisa (accessed 24 September 2014).
14 Yosoy133: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yT4sKoUPGik (accessed 24 September 2014).
15 “You are not alone” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTY6KOUGik (accessed 24 September 2014).
16 http://cronicasasociales.org/2012/09/04/contrainforme-del-gobierno-de-felipe-calderon-por-yosoy132/
and National Security to infiltrate into the movement almost since the beginning.\textsuperscript{18} Also worth to mention, some members of the movement were invited to produce a TV program in Televisa\textsuperscript{19} (something strongly criticized inside \#yosoy132).

A year after the polling day, a survey by Fernández et al. (2014) in Mexico D.C. reveals that most of the interviewees agree with the demands of the movement, such as democratic media (66\%), conscious and informed vote (75\%), but almost a 37,9\% believes the movement is dishonest and 39,7\% that it is manipulated; 56\% considers that the movement had no achievements but still a 64,8\% assumes it is necessary.

Outcomes and Explanations

The movement had two central objectives: i) to end the manipulation of information, with the maximum aim of modifying the property structure and the regulation of the media contents; and ii) to avoid the PRI presidential candidate’s victory. Regarding to the first aim, it could materialize in the form of an internal change of strategy or as a new legal framework regulating the media, but nothing of these happen (neither a discussion nor an attempt of opening a dialogue about media regulation). About the second aim, even if the movement pretended to be “non partisan” and resisted different pressures to be incorporated by other actors (particularly, the PRD), it was clear that had Peña Nieto been defeated, his defeat would have been attributed to the protest. The campaign generated to supervise the elections lead to complaints that showed the dimensions of the patronage machinery of PRI, but they could not nullify the results.\textsuperscript{20}

Institutional Structure

As mentioned above we consider as elements of the institutional structure i) the \textit{power distribution among branches and levels of government}, ii) \textit{the electoral and party systems}, and iii) \textit{the existence of institutions of citizen participation}. These three factors are crucial to consider the structural openness (or lack of) of the system to citizen’s demands.

\textsuperscript{20} Alonso (2013: 22) quotes 2700 reports, 350 videos and 700 photographs registering fraud acts, which lead to 500 citizen complaints supported by proofs. The Federal Electoral Jury dismissed the complaints.
When analysing the distribution of competences between branches of the Mexican government, it is observed that the three branches counterbalance one another significantly. Indeed, the most important change since the middle nineties has been the weakening of the previously “imperial” presidency and the associated rise of the legislative and judicial powers. The Mexican presidency lacks the decree powers, fast-track authority and other legislative prerogatives found in many other Latin American presidential systems, which makes a relatively weak executive (Weldom 1997; Freedom House 2012). However, norms and practices of authorities at the federal state and local levels lead to systematic infringements of civil liberties, so that the achievement of the rule of law becomes a very distant aspiration21. A party-centric political culture reproduces itself and thrives through patronage, collusion, graft and sporadic intimidation of individuals or groups standing in the way (Palma 2010).

In terms of effectiveness of the electoral and party system, it can be noticed that the controversy around the tight result of the presidential elections in 200622 has lead to the discredit of the electoral system, expressed in the opinion of a third of the voters, who believe there was fraud in those elections (Crespo 2007). This loss of legitimacy erodes the democratic quality. In front of these facts, in 2007-2008, the electoral system was modified as a result of – as Freidenberg (2009) affirms – the convergence of interest of a “declining governmental coalition”, the PRI, which perceived the worst electoral result in its history; a “looser challenging coalition”, the PRD, that in spite of losing the presidential elections got a legislative majority without precedent and, in consequence, increased its capacity to influence the political agenda;23 and an “embarrassing governmental coalition”, the PAN, which despite winning the elections by a tight margin saw its governability quite limited, without legislative majority and a criticized electoral process. Freidenberg points that the negotiation was just like in the previous reforms: specialists and citizens forums, in order to “support” the future law, and hidden negotiation between the three big parties, through their parliamentary coordinators.

As for the openness of the institutional framework to citizen’s participation, the Mexican Constitution did not regulate any of these in the national level in 2012 (some states did), so there are no direct citizen intervention mechanisms in public affairs, and the spaces generated by specific contexts – citizen enquiry around punctual reforms – are built according to the main parties’ discretion when deciding the “citizenship”. Even if under

22 According to the “ Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación” (TEPJE), Felipe Calderón (PAN) succeeded against the leader from PRD, Manuel López Obrador, by a narrow 0,58%. López Obrador did not accept the results, proclaiming himself the “Legitimate President of the Mexicans” in a process that generated a deep crisis that lasted for months.
23 However the PAN missed the power acquired in Parliament of proposing from the left a change in policy making. This happened because despite having majority in Parliament the whole party focused its activity in denying Calderón’s presidency. It also explains the incapacity of arriving to agreements.
very strict conditions, some reforms that could substantially change the future scenario were introduced.\(^{24}\)

Conjunctural factors

As for the conjunctural dimension here we focus on iv) the availability of allies, v) the elite cohesion and vi) the main strategies of conflict resolution. The context in which negotiation and or conflict resolution took place present a difficult arena for a movement seeking to open a system which shows signals of increasing enclosure and a high level of complexity. For instance, despite there has been political alternation through elections, especially in the sub national level, the traditional image of powerful “caciques” (local political chiefs) remains an everyday reality in the majority of the Mexican states and municipalities. The three main parties have developed political machinery with solids voting blocks, and often the PAN and PRD, which have long criticized the PRI’s patronage while they were in the opposition, have replicated this political style once in power\(^{25}\). At the same time, the relative cohesion of the elites was observed during the negotiations to promote the electoral reform in 2007-2008, when the three main parties (PRD, PRI and PAN) were able to prevent the party system from the incorporation of new groups and protect themselves from the interference of external actors (Freidenberg 2009).

The lack of open and fair competence during the previous electoral period was part of the #yosoy132 concerns. Thus, although the political system seems opened to a wide spectrum of interests (parties’ formation), the cohabitation among them is dissimilar and not transparent enough. During the previous electoral campaign, complaints included the excessive funding amounts, media manipulation and use of state resources by the party in power (Baños 2007). The electoral reform in 2008, in spite of being planned to solve some of these problems, did not include the prohibition of governmental propaganda during the campaign, the impartiality of public officials, or the electoral use of social programs (Freidenberg 2009).\(^{26}\) The connections between PRI and Televisa reinforce the negative view of the system. Trejo Delarbre (2005) has affirmed that the authoritarian control of the

\(^{24}\) Reforms in 2013 and 2014 have included the referendum. According to art. 26 from the Constitution: The law will enable the Executive to establish the procedures of participation and referendum in the national system of democratic planning (...); the art. 34 establishes that the referendums “will be called by the National Congress by request of: a) The President of the Republic; b) The equivalent to thirty three percent of the members of any Chamber of the Congress; or c) The citizens, in a proportional number of, at least, the two percent of the voters registered, in terms of the law. Besides, it is fixed that when total participation reaches at least the forty percent of the voters registered, the result will be binding for the federal Legislative and Executive powers and for the authorities with competence. It is also established that the Supreme Court of Justice will solve, before the call by the Congress, about the constitutionality of the matter involved. According with Temkin and Salazar Elena (2014) these instruments are controled and limited.

\(^{25}\) As a example In September 2014 a group of 43 students organizing a demonstration disappeared in Iguala (state of Guerrero), a municipality with a major from PRD which seems to have strong connections with gungs groups

\(^{26}\) New reforms were conducted in 2012 and 2013 (the last approved in January 2014).
media before the transition\textsuperscript{27} has become a submission of the state to the media. The electoral reform in 2007-2008 had evidenced the dimensions of the business involved when the owners of television and radio licenses pressured against the introduction of a law banning the possibility for private persons to hire time on the media (Freidenberg 2009).

All things considered, it is not surprising that the protest had found obstacles to define viable strategies towards the demanded transformation. The formulation of abstract and maximalist demands (against Televisa and Peña Nieto) avoided the possibility to take advantage from the support of different parties in Congress that could have contributed to introduce punctual demands. Some authors have emphasized on the value of these movements to put the senses to aspects that seemed invisible. In the defence to the absence of a specific program typical from new movements, Arditi quotes Krugman saying “we shouldn’t make too much of the lack of specifics” because their main thrust is to change the political climate; the specifics will be filled in later” (Arditi 2014: 117) The problem is that in a system not open to negotiate, if the movement does not strengthen through a convincing program and making use of the system gaps, there are serious possibilities of wasting an opportunity.

Conclusions

A video posted on You Tube by 131 students complaining about the media manipulation in Mexico, detonated a long-standing and contained protest leaded by young people with almost no experience in political participation. Why this collective action did happen?

The emergence of #yosoy132 could be related more than to a process of openness of the system (the situations seems to be the opposite) to the combination of a particular juncture –national elections – with the potentialities offered by digital media. As showed in previous works, online social networks enabled the organization not only to engage an unprecedented number of citizens into its activities but also to extend mobilization beyond the boundaries of its traditional networks while at the same time lowering the costs previously allocated to communication in the context of campaign mobilization (Breuer and Welp 2014).

The movement was able to catch the national and international attention, and threatened to modify the course of events. But despite the great expectations generated, the PRI

\textsuperscript{27} An illustrative example could be the expressions by Emilio Azcárraga, director of Televisa until 1997, who claimed to be a “soldier of the PRI” in 1990; http://www.razonypalabra.org.mx/espejo/2007/abril23.html (accessed 24 September 2014).
won the elections, and beyond the diffusion of the candidates’ debates, the movement did not obtain visible results in the definition of other public issues. Definitely, the PRI candidate’s victory and the non-existence of any law directed to regulate the media suggest that Yosoy132 did not leave a mark in the definition of public affairs. What do these discouraging results obey to? We believe this result shows that:

a) the Mexican political system has signs of higher enclosure (an institutional structure relatively locked away from citizen participation and not very worried about accountability and responsiveness). It combines certain opening with a large patronage net that braces power in the territory and the mentioned articulation of interests between media corporations and political elites.

b) #yosoy132 wasted the limited favourable structural conditions. The movement could not, or did not know how to, take advantage of the cracks (open spaces) of the system, while it suffered the remnants and authoritarian configurations. They were able to raise their voice in protest, but did not generate a feasible strategy to produce transformations. This is because, on the one hand, the frontal confrontation against PRI and Televisa did not let an intermediate via that could be negotiated. Whereas, on the other hand, sustaining the radical rejection to dominant actors they did not generate an alternative proposal presenting them as a political option, or contributing clearer slogans to the voters. And, last,

c) the movement had difficulties in the elaboration of a convincing discourse for most of the citizens. As already mentioned, in spite of the challenge represented by the protest, internet has no generalized scope among the population (a third part of the country were users in 2012, and from them, a considerable proportion were minors, unable to vote), which limited the capacity of the movement to dispute the production of “the truth” in a radical way. The profile of the main protagonists of the movement – in the first moment students from a private university and later on university students in general as a main protagonists– in a country with high levels of inequality did not contribute to gain strong and massive support. The same campaign reinforce the idea of a particular group making the protest (such as the youtube video “you are not alone” which made the campaign appear as an issue of the students). The “apolitical” claim of the movement, openly openly against Peña Nieto, could have contributed to its failure in achieving their goals as the movement strongly criticized the state of facts but did not offer a solution neither open a new path to act (see as an example of this the discourse of anonymous when they spread a calling for vote: “this day I ask you to put aside your political preferences and focus on what vote truly means, voting for a candidate, for his proposals, for his government…”, putting aside your political preferences to vote?).
Finally, the elements prompting the emergence of #yosoy132, the elections and the digital media uses, also account for the limitations faced: while the short time before the elections did not allow the movement to develop stronger roots in society (the polling day represented the main goal and “final” step), the digital divide did not allow the movement to be identified and recognised by greater segments of the population.

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