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**FRIEDRICH
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IBSA: An International Actor and Partner for the EU?

About FRIDE

FRIDE is an independent think-tank based in Madrid, focused on issues related to democracy and human rights; peace and security; and humanitarian action and development. FRIDE attempts to influence policy-making and inform public opinion, through its research in these areas.

On 17 October 2007 the second IBSA Summit was held in Pretoria, South Africa, between the heads of state of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA). Parallel to the summit meeting, FRIDE, in close cooperation with the FES office in Brussels, launched an initial dialogue between IBSA and representatives of the EU. After an opening session with Brazilian, Indian and South African experts in Madrid, a two-day event was held in Brussels bringing together EU officials and experts with a group of high-level academics from the three participating countries. Discussions concentrated on three key issues raised by the two organisers:

- (1) Is IBSA a trilateral ad-hoc alliance or a substantial future project?
- (2) Can and will Brazil, India and South Africa assume a constructive role as peace-keepers and political stabilisers in their regions?
- (3) Should the EU establish a political dialogue and closer cooperation with the dialogue forum IBSA?

Is IBSA a viable project?

As a coalition between three like-minded emerging southern countries, IBSA represents a new type of South-South cooperation based on presidential diplomacy. As India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, "IBSA is a unique model of transnational cooperation based on a common political identity. Our three countries come from three different continents but share similar world views and aspirations".¹

Originally, the idea of creating the dialogue forum IBSA was launched by South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki and made concrete at a meeting between the three foreign affairs ministers in June 2003 in Brasilia which was aimed at enhancing economic cooperation and political coordination between them.² The organisation's first declaration focused on two global issues: the reform of the UN, including the Security Council, and the need to balance the multilateral trade system in the framework of the WTO Doha round. As some participants pointed out, IBSA is a coalition based on a trilateral initiative between regional middle power democracies with multiethnic and multicultural societies and a long experience with dialogue, bargaining and peaceful conflict resolution.

Given its pragmatic and normative approach, IBSA is not just another Third World initiative, but a new type

of South-South coalition with an inter-regional dimension. Firstly, it represents a value-driven club of countries committed to democracy, peace and development. In further contrast to other southern alliances – for example the Non-Aligned Movement or the G-77 – IBSA integrates emerging powers with a privileged position in Africa, South Asia and Latin America. Moreover, it is not a defensive coalition but a proactive rule-maker within (and not against) the existing international system, which enjoys positive relations with the United States and the EU.

Despite these positive characteristics, there was a general agreement that IBSA is a highly asymmetric and heterogeneous initiative with regards to the territorial and demographic size as well the economic output and military capacities of its member states. Their history of and commitment to democracy also vary: India has 60 years of democratic experience, while Brazil overcame its military regime in 1985 and South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy ended in 1994.

Due to these differences and the geographic distance between them, speakers from the three countries agreed IBSA was not a foreign policy priority for any of them:

- India's top external priority is security and, with regard to relations, it gives priority to the United States, China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, followed by the EU and the rest of Europe in second place, Russia and Japan in third. Asia in general in fourth, with IBSA coming in behind at fifth. For India, economic benefits are modest, given that Brazil and South Africa account for less than three percent of its global exports and imports.
- Brazil's foreign policy has strong global and regional dimensions. Although relations with the EU and the

¹ Closing remarks by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the 2nd IBSA Summit, 17 October 2007.

² de Sousa, Sarah Lea John. "India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA): New inter-regional multilateralism of the South?", FRIDE Comment, Madrid, April 2007, <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/154/india-brasil-sudafrica-ibsa-un-nuevo-tipo-de-multilateralismo-inter-regional-del-sur>

US remain a priority, since the 1990s, the country's foreign policy has increasingly focused on South-South cooperation with regional integration organisations such as MERCOSUR and, more recently, UNASUR.³

- Since 1994, South Africa's foreign relations have been focused on the African continent, followed by the EU and the US. Its post-apartheid foreign policy moved from a moral-ideological perspective to a more pragmatic stance during the Mbeki presidency. Projecting a positive image in Africa and the fear of being seen "as an ally of the North", is still one of the legacies of the apartheid-regime.

IBSA is still an ad-hoc and rather heterogeneous interstate alliance⁴. Since institutionalisation or a permanent forum is not foreseen, it cannot yet be considered an international actor. Although some participants emphasised that IBSA is "still less than the sum of its member states", others underlined that it is an initiative on the rise with a strong commitment to cooperation. It was also underlined that since 2003 the forum has expanded constantly to new issues and increased its political relevance, from ministerial meetings to the presidential summits.

Through parallel academic, parliamentary and business fora, IBSA is also linked to civil society interests. Consequently, the impact and visibility of IBSA is higher than at the beginning of the initiative. In its four-year existence, the three countries have signed several agreements, increased trilateral cooperation through 12 working groups in different

areas and established the USD 3-million "IBSA fund" for joint development projects in Haiti and Guinea Bissau. Trilateral cooperation gives "oxygen to IBSA" and has advanced in several areas, mainly health (AIDS), energy (biofuels), trade, transport and defence. At the summit in Pretoria in October 2007, the Governments also agreed on an integrated IBSA Social Development Strategy based on best practices as a blueprint for three-way cooperation. With regards to trade flows, the three leaders envisaged trade growing from 10 to of 15 billion USD by 2010.

One speaker reminded the delegates that IBSA's global cooperation is aimed at democratising the international system and increasing the three countries' influence in international politics on the basis of their common "commitment and faith in multilateralism"⁵. A major platform for collective power projection is the G8, where Brazil, India and South Africa (along with China and Mexico) have been invited to take part as additional dialogue partners.

At the global level, India and Brazil are the main actors of the IBSA forum. They focus their interests on two platforms: the WTO and the UN. Their inclusion in the group of the four main negotiators of the Doha round (together with the EU and the United States) represents a very visible achievement. In spite of the current paralysis of negotiations, both countries have increased their political status by representing the interests of the South in the main international trade forum and challenging the positions of the United States and the EU. For IBSA, agriculture (the elimination of domestic farm subsidies) is considered to be the key to an acceptable conclusion of the Doha round.

³ Gratius, Susanne. "Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peacebroker?", FRIDE Working Paper 35, Madrid 2007. <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/223/brasil-en-las-americas-una-potencia-regional-pacificadora>

⁴ Vaz, Alcides Costa. "Intermediate States, Regional Leadership and International Security", Editora Universidade de Brasilia, Brasilia, 2006.

⁵ Tshwane IBSA Summit Declaration, Pretoria, 17 October 2007.

Discussions have also reflected the importance IBSA gives to its second area of interest, the UN and the reform of the Security Council. Again, Brazil and India participated with Germany and Japan in the Group of Four (G4), lobbying for permanent membership of the Security Council. In contrast to Brazil and India's international agendas, South Africa is an advocate of continental interests. Due to its former commitment to push for the African Union to be granted permanent membership in the Security Council, South Africa was not part of the G4.

Having been elected as one of the non-permanent members until 2009, South Africa's efforts in the Security Council concentrate on achieving further progress in relations between the UN and regional bodies such as the AU. Brazil and India share a more ambiguous position with regard to regional bodies and are openly challenging their neighbours (particularly Pakistan and Argentina) with their demands for individual membership of the Security Council. To that end, as one of the main contributors of troops to peace operations, India is particularly strongly engaged with UN peace operations all over the world, while South Africa is the major player in UN and AU missions in Africa. Brazil has also strengthened its commitments with the UN: it is the 15th largest financial contributor and it assumed the military command of the stabilisation mission in Haiti in 2004⁶.

Participants agreed that IBSA, as a joint bargaining initiative, is an innovative response to the ongoing debate over the definition of a new multipolar and/or multilateral order. Following the example of IBSA, one

speaker suggested a "multinodal world order" where several centres of power emerge and compete with each other over different global issues. Given the increasing complexity of international relations, the dominance of just one country (the United States) seems less likely than before. According to some participants, cooperation rather than military resources shape today's international relations.

The global and regional power status of India, Brazil and South Africa

Participants stressed a clear tension between IBSA's global and regional dimensions. They also discussed whether regional engagement was necessarily a precondition for obtaining global power status. The ranking of the three countries in the international hierarchy of states is notably different. While India – a nuclear power with significant demographic and economic characteristics – is transforming into a great or global power, Brazil and South Africa are, by self-definition, middle powers committed to diplomatic mediation that are hoping to obtain global influence on certain issues (racism, peace-building, trade).

Brazil and India were considered – thanks to their size and international presence – as powers outside their regions, too. Both have national business sectors which are globally competitive. Thus, Brazil's initiative to create the G20 as a trade alliance between developing

⁶ Hirst, Mónica. "La intervención sudamericana en Haití", FRIDE Comment, Madrid, April 2007, <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/192/la-intervencion-sudamericana-en-haiti>

states, along with the country's privileged bargaining position in the WTO, is based on its agro-business and its internationally competitive aircraft and automobile industries. Similar conclusions were drawn in the case of India which, due to its software industry, is transforming into a knowledge-based global economy with increasing international presence.

None of the three countries were clearly identified as regional powers, though. All were considered reluctant regional leaders, since, as one participant pointed out, Brazil, India and South Africa live in very difficult environments. While South Africa is the major African power, Brazil and India have created their own subregional spheres of influence in South America and South Asia. While India is the main South Asian power, Brazil's position in South America is challenged by the leadership ambitions of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. In contrast to South Africa and Brazil, India is directly involved in conflicts with its neighbours⁷ and, as several participants pointed out, is simultaneously part of the solution and part of the problem.

The question of how to deal with authoritarian regimes and fragile states is a common challenge for all three countries.

- Brazil under President Lula has begun to break the sovereignty line by diplomatic "interference" in ten external conflicts, mainly in the Andean countries. Its protagonism in the UN mission in Haiti, and, to a lesser extent, in Venezuela, where Brazil tries to avoid open criticism of restrictions on democratic rights, are also significant.

- India's stance is more pronounced: its low-profile in the case of Myanmar, its cautious policy towards Pakistan and last but not least its relationship with China demonstrate that India is rather reluctant to push for democracy and human rights in its neighbourhood.
- Based on its own domestic experience, as a facilitator of dialogue between all actors involved, South Africa is strongly committed to conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict settlement in Africa⁸. Nonetheless, its support for the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe shows the difficult balance between its compromise with universal values on the one hand, and an "African renaissance" on the other.

Participants agreed that, for different reasons, the three countries suffer from a negative regional image: Brazil as a former mini-hegemon and rival to Argentina, India as a military power and a player in several conflicts in its neighbourhood, and South Africa thanks to the partheid regime that lasted until 1994. Several participants underlined the new roles of Brazil and South Africa as benign soft powers. Nonetheless, a certain paradox between a "natural leadership position" and a cautious neighbourhood policy aimed at cooperation and integration can be identified in both countries. India's role is different: it is still undergoing a process of transformation from a military hegemon to a more positive regional leader, based on soft power resources.

Finally, the debate got to grips with the question of whether IBSA represented an inter-regional initiative. Although most of the participants agreed that regional

⁷ See Sahni, Varun. "India and the Asian Security Architecture", in: *Current History*, April 2006, pp. 161-166.

⁸ For further details see Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth: "South Africa's regional engagement for peace and security", FRIDE Comment, Madrid, October 2007. <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/275/el-compromiso-regional-de-sudafrica-con-la-paz-y-la-seguridad>

agendas are not included, some of the discussants argued that given the privileged position of Brazil, India and South Africa in their respective regions, IBSA could be considered an inter-regional initiative. Others argued that, since IBSA is not based on integration, it does not fit with the concept. Thus, at most, it represents a new type of bilateral “inter-regionalism” of the South. Following this argument, most of the participants agreed that IBSA is not an inter-regional actor, but a political dialogue initiative between three major powers.

Is IBSA a partner for the EU?

Debate on IBSA’s external agenda centered on IBSA and EU relations with **China**. India’s regional position is limited by China, which is both a global power and a major trading partner. For Brazil, China is its third most important export market, challenging its traditional economic relationship with the EU. In Africa, meanwhile, China has substantially increased its engagement. Several participants agreed that its comparative advantage over the EU and the US is two-fold: it presents no political conditions and no negative history on the continent. China presents itself on the global stage as an economic power, rather than a political actor. Several participants stressed that neither the EU nor the United States are offering any response to China’s increasing extra-regional engagement, which is dominated by economic interests. There was less debate on the IBSA countries’ relations with the **United States** and its role in the international system, including the UN and the WTO. Although this

can be attributed to the possibility of a shift in US policy following upcoming presidential elections, the main reason is China’s rising position of power in international politics. Thus, discussions reflected the fact that China and not the United States was considered a major factor in IBSA’s and the EU’s foreign relations. Within IBSA, only India has recently established a strategic partnership with the US including an agreement on the use of nuclear power. Whereas Brazil and South Africa maintain orderly but rather distant relations, India has become one of the closest allies of the US in the South. Some participants argued that the bilateral agreement on the pacific use of nuclear power might change the power balance in Asia.

The **EU** was not only identified as a soft or normative power, but also characterised as a paradoxical value-driven actor. Several discussants pointed out two conflicts: one between an inter-regional doctrine based on integration and the EU’s bilateral policy practice, and another between the parallel commitments to both regionalism and multilateralism. One of the speakers stressed that security is the EU’s main foreign policy concern. With regards to Africa, attention is focused on fragile states and migration flows. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are the major security issues in Asia, while the Andean states and Haiti are the focus of attention in Latin America. Nonetheless, several participants argued that the EU does not speak with a single voice on global issues. In fact, trade is the only area where the EU has a common and coherent policy. Since neither of the two partners have already offered closer relations with the other, there is no political dialogue between the EU and IBSA. In fact, the event, organised by FES and FRIDE, was the first forum ever held on IBSA and the EU. Thus, relations were discussed on a bilateral basis. All three countries have

a privileged status in European foreign relations: Brazil, India and South Africa are defined as strategic partnerships by the EU and regular summits are organised.

Bilateral relations are still a dominant feature of **EU-India** relations⁹. India's closest European allies are its particular strategic partners: the UK, Germany and France. Several discussants agreed that relations between India and the EU as a whole are mainly driven by economic interests. Trade, followed by investment, energy, science and technology dominate the agenda and are the main driving force of cooperation. But, as one of the speakers explained, India is, for several reasons, a rather difficult partner for the EU:

- First, it is foremost a bilateral, not a regional partner, and has been singled out as a strategic relationship with regular summits with the EU.
- Second, despite the expectations of the EU India is reluctant to act as a regional democracy promoter. India's (lack of a) position on Myanmar is a recent example of this. In contrast to Brazil and South Africa, as one speaker explained, India is "not committed to democratic values abroad" and perceives its own democracy as the result of "a particular historical condition".
- Third, there are important interest divergences on global issues, starting with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (not signed by India) but also with regards to climate change and the WTO.
- Fourth, there is a certain frustration in India that the EU's Asia policy is much more focused on China, thereby neglecting relations with its democratic ally India.

The first **EU-Brazil** bilateral summit, which was held on 4 July 2007 in Lisbon under the Portuguese presidency, was, as one speaker noticed, "a significant step" in a relationship that has shifted from suffering "benign neglect" to becoming a "strategic partnership". It was underlined that in the past Brazil was considered "too small for partnership" and "too big for cooperation". Apart from political affinities and the common global goal of creating a more efficient multipolar international order, the EU has important economic interests in Brazil. Agriculture remains one of the historic and current obstacles in bilateral and EU-Mercosur relations. Thus, part of the discussion on Brazil-EU relations centred on conflicts of interest in the WTO and the pending reform of the protectionist European Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).

The debate also turned to three-way EU-Brazil-Mercosur cooperation and the regional impact of Brazil's special partnership with Europe. Several discussants stressed that the new bilateral partnership relations do not work for or against Mercosur, but simply add an additional component to relations. On the other hand, it also reflects "negotiation fatigue", eight years after the decision to establish a EU-Mercosur association agreement including free trade, as well as Mercosur's rather poor rate of progress on integration. Some participants pointed out that the strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil is more the result of the Latin American country's increasing global engagement and competitive agrobusiness than its (limited) regional engagement. Nonetheless, several countries with much less regional weight, such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, have already requested similar treatment from the EU. This demonstrates that national agendas and bilateral rivalries still prevail over regional interests.

⁹ Jain, Rajendra K. (ed.), "India and the European Union: Building a Strategic Partnership", New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 2007.

Discussions on **EU-South Africa relations** centred less on bilateral aspects than on their respective policies in Africa. For the EU, as its main entrance or bridge to the continent, South Africa is a major partner and ally in Africa. They share common values and interests in stabilisation on the continent and they are both participating in several UN peace missions in African countries. The common African security agenda is the most important link between the EU and South Africa. On a bilateral level, and in contrast to relations with Brazil and India, they have not yet celebrated a summit. As one speaker pointed out, South Africa is concerned that cooperation with the EU and the United States should not lead to it being “seen as a Western proxy” by its neighbours. In general terms, relations with the EU are good, although there is “dynamic tension” in the relationship between France and Cote d’Ivoire.

IBSA-EU: Possibilities and constraints

IBSA is in line with the EU foreign policy doctrine of “inter-regionalism”. Although the dialogue forum is not an inter-regional actor, its three member states can be perceived as a strong voice of regional interests that share “Western concepts” with the EU. Due to its value-oriented and inter-regional approach, IBSA represents a particularly interesting partner for the EU’s normative global power projection.¹⁰ To a certain extent, this form of incipient “Southern inter-regionalism” fits with the European idea of North-South inter-regionalism based on soft power and integration.

Several participants referred to concrete areas of shared EU-IBSA interest that should be explored in

the future, such as relations with China, security and peace missions, energy, development and regional stability. Since all three IBSA countries are engaged in Africa, the continent offers a platform, not only for increasing cooperation between IBSA countries, but also for coordination with the EU as the continent’s major donor.

One speaker suggested defining common positions between IBSA and the EU in the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Nonetheless, other discussants pointed out that it will be difficult to define common positions with regards to, for example, the human rights situation in Myanmar, a sensitive question for India. The same would be true for Brazil, regarding Cuba, or South Africa, regarding Zimbabwe. It was also argued that it would be complicated to coordinate policies between IBSA and the EU.

Conclusions

The IBSA dialogue forum was considered an innovative, pragmatic and positive multilateral initiative. One participant pointed out that “**IBSA aggregates power, enhances cooperation and builds community**”, while another considered IBSA to be “one brick in a new world order” with a more self-confident and proactive South. Nonetheless, IBSA was still seen as an ad-hoc coalition with an uncertain future. IBSA’s major limitations were identified as the enormous differences between the countries, along with limited trade relations and interest diverges on several issues. Rather than a trilateral alliance based on common interests, IBSA is a “menu a la carte”. Furthermore, there is a clear gap between the global

¹⁰ Leonard, Mark/Youngs, Richard. “El efecto Europa”, in: *Foreign Policy* (edición española), Madrid 2007.

and trilateral dimensions of IBSA. Brazil and India represent a global interest coalition with collective bargaining power in the UN and the WTO, but although relations are particularly strong between Brazil and South Africa, the latter country is less important for India.

Despite these constraints, several participants argued strongly in favour of IBSA: the forum is backed at the highest political levels, it is aggregating power, sectoral cooperation is increasing, and it is beginning to create an inter-regional community. Discussants from the three countries stressed that IBSA's importance for each country is different: Given its global power status and the low economic benefits on offer, IBSA has a rather low profile in India and a much higher economic and political value for Brazil, while its global impact is particularly important for South Africa. According to some participants, apart from the three-way dynamic, IBSA's success or failure depends to a large extent on the outcome of the WTO Doha round and the reform of the UN Security Council, as these have been the main platforms for common global interests.

On these grounds, four scenarios for IBSA were discussed, with the first considered to be the most likely:

- (1) maintenance at current levels and with the participation of all three countries;
- (2) disintegration or deactivation due to limited common interests and resources;
- (3) inter-regional transformation integrating MERCOSUR, SADC and the AU;
- (4) expansion to include other emerging powers such as China, Mexico or Russia.

Finally, several participants stressed that IBSA offers broad opportunities for regionalism, particularly with

regards to integration, democracy, regional leadership and fragile states. At the same time, IBSA creates a new and innovative platform for closer links with the EU. Some participants suggested opening a regular IBSA-EU dialogue forum on different topics of common interest such as security and peace missions, the UN system, China as a rival or partner, Africa as a platform for common action, the WTO Doha round, regional integration and democracy promotion. The organisers thereby underlined the opportunity for further exploration of a common agenda between IBSA and the EU based on their strong commitment to democracy, peace and development.

IBSA Chronology (2003-2007):

17 October 2007	Second IBSA Summit in Pretoria/South Africa.
16 July 2007	Fourth meeting of the Trilateral Joint Commission in New Delhi.
13 September 2006	First IBSA Summit in Brasilia.
30 March 2006	Third meeting of the Trilateral Joint Commission in Rio de Janeiro.
10-11 March 2005	Second meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Cape Town.
4-5 March 2004	First meeting of the Trilateral Joint Commission of IBSA in New Delhi
6 June 2003	IBSA "Declaration of Brasilia" following the first Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting in Brasil
6 June 2003	Informal trilateral meeting at the G-8 Summit in Evian/France
January 2003	The South African President Thabo Mbeki launches the idea of IBSA

IBSA: An International Actor and Partner for the EU?

Seminar in Brussels

16-17 October 2007

Organised by:

Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, EU Office, Brussels

Programme

Tuesday, 16 October 2007

- 9.30** **Welcome**
 Pierre Schori (FRIDE, Madrid)
 Ernst Stetter (FES EU Office, Brussels)
- 10.00** **IBSA's Global and Trilateral Cooperation: Outcome and Prospects**
 Chair: Pierre Schori (FRIDE, Madrid)
 Panelists: Mónica Hirst (University Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires)
 Fabio Villares (Instituto de Estudos Economicos e Internacionais - IEEI, São Paulo)
 Comments: Sarah-Lea John de Sousa (FRIDE, Madrid)
- 12.00** **Round Table: The Regional and Global Power Status of Brazil, India and South Africa**
 Chair: Jean-Paul Marthoz (Enjeux Internationaux, Brussels)
 Panelists: *South Africa's Potential for Regional Leadership:*

Francis A. Kornegay (Center for Policy Studies, South Africa)

India: A Global Power without Regional Ambitions?:

Varun Sahni (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

Brazil: between regional understatement and global overstretch: Maria Regina Soares Lima (Observatorio Político Sul-Americano, Rio de Janeiro)

Comments: Marc Saxer (FES, Berlin)

- 17.00** **Public Round Table:**
IBSA: A New International Actor and Partner for the EU?
Prospects for Cooperation and Dialogue
 Chair: Ernst Stetter (EU Office Brussels FES)
 Introduction: Brantly Womack (East Asia Centre, University of Virginia)
 Comment: Marek Grela (Director, Council of the European Union)
 Discussion with experts from the IBSA group and the EU

Wednesday, 17 October

- 9.30** **EU Relations with Brazil**
 Chair: Susanne Gratius (FRIDE, Madrid)
 Panelists: Ana Beatriz Martins (Deputy Head of Mercosur Unit, Brazil Desk, EC, Brussels)
 Alfredo Valladao (Mercosur Chair, Paris)
 Comments: Alcides Costa Vaz (IREL, Brasilia)
- 11.30** **EU Relations with India**
 Chair: Kerstin Roeske (FES, EU Office, Brussels)
 Panelists: Rajendra K. Jain (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

Richard Wilkinson (India, Bhutan and
Nepal Desk Officer, EC, Brussels)

Comments: Christian Wagner (Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, Berlin)

Jose Manuel Pinto Teixeira (Unit Head,
Relations with the Countries and Region of
Southern Africa, EC, Brussels)

16.00 Conclusions

14.30 EU Relations with South Africa

Chair: Elling Tjønneland (Christian Michelsen
Institute, Bergen)

Panelists: Romy Chevallier (South African Institute
of International Affairs – SAIIA,
Johannesburg)

Susanne Gratius (FRIDE, Madrid)

Ernst Stetter (EU Office Brussels, FES)

By Susanne Gratius and Sarah-Lea John de Sousa

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